

**Logic and Belief
in
Indian Philosophy**


**Edited by
Piotr Balcerowicz**

Second Revised Edition

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
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Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy

Second Revised Edition

edited by
Piotr Balcerowicz

Warsaw, 2016

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The present text is identical with the searchable PDF file contained on a CD attached to the first printed edition of the book, published in 2010 and distributed by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.

The updated PDF text of the book published online in 2016 (the present file) and contained on the above-mentioned CD varies in some details from the printed text as published by Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2010 (First Edition).

In the printing process by the Publisher (Motilal Banarsidass Publishers) some important corrections of the Editor and Authors were overlooked by the Publisher (Motilal Banarsidass Publishers).

The present online 2016 edition presents the correct text as approved by the Editor and Authors in the form as was intended to be first published in 2010.



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Preface

The present volume explores a theme which has so far rarely received the attention it legitimately deserves, although its fundamental importance to proper understanding of the true nature of Indian philosophical enquiry and intellectual heritage seems unquestionable. Whether in Indian social and historical context or throughout the history of Western thought, the relations between logic, belief and philosophy have always been very complex and multifaceted.

The general theme of the enquiry presented here is adequately reflected in the title of the volume: *Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy*, which aptly highlights the *yukti-āgama* dimension. In particular, it focuses on various aspects of Indian thought, and Indian logic in particular, with special emphasis on the relationship, and tension, between rational examination and belief in Indian philosophical tradition.

The selection of papers by world-acclaimed specialists in Indian philosophy deals with a broad spectrum of problems such as the real nature and status of reason and faith in India, their rational, or otherwise, grounding or the extent to which their correlation is bipolar or interdependent. A number of vital philosophical questions stimulated the discussion in the volume: Can we speak of the symbiosis or, rather, tension between philosophy, logic in particular, and religion in Indian context? How do sound proof and irrefutable evidence relate to the bequeathed body of dogmas? To what degree did Indian thinkers consider logical means of enquiry independent of belief? How can logic itself be rationally validated without a recourse to assumptions sanctioned by tradition and belief? What is the place of scepticism or mystic experience vis-à-vis rational method and logical tools? How did Indian logicians try to accommodate the idea of irrationality and religious belief in the scheme of *pramāṇa*? These questions do not only concern the relationship between the phenomena of religiosity and religion, on the one hand, and rationality and rational justification, on the other. They are also applicable to the spheres of ritual, religious-social practices, or even gambling, as well as to various ways of how behaviour and religious acts were rationalised.

The contributions were grouped in thematic sections, the titles of which are self-explanatory. Some articles probe deeply into very detailed and intricate doctrinal aspects of selected Brāhmaṇical philosophical schools and of Jaina and Buddhist traditions, whereas others attempt synthetic conclusions as well as methodological and

theoretical reflection concerning the very nature of Indian philosophy and its religious background. The reader will also find an English translation of ‘The chapter on the negative-only inference’ (*Kevala-vyatireki-prakaraṇa*) of Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattva-cintā-maṇi*, a ground-breaking work that revolutionised mediaeval Indian logic.

Some of these contributions were directly presented by the authors during the International Seminar ‘Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy—The Impact of Indian Thought in Asia and Europe’ (for the programme see below, p. 9), held between 30 April and 5 May 2006 in Białowieża, one of the most beautiful and picturesque spots in Poland, in the heart of the great Białowieża Forest, supposedly the largest primeval forest in Europe. The Seminar ‘Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy’ was organised by Piotr Balcerowicz, Marek Mejor and Monika Nowakowska.

On this occasion, on behalf of the organisers of the Seminar, I would like to extend most sincere thanks to UNESCO, to the Polish National Commission for UNESCO and the Rector of the University of Warsaw for their much appreciated financial support, without which the Seminar could not have taken place.

I also wish to express my deepest gratitude to my colleagues Marek Mejor and Monika Nowakowska of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, the University of Warsaw, for their organisational efforts that made the Seminar possible.

The present volume appears as Volume Three of the Series *Warsaw Indological Studies* by the arrangement with Motilal Banarsidass Private Limited, Delhi. When I met my friend Narendra Prakash Jain, the Director of Motilal Banarsidass, in December 2006 and mentioned the plans to publish the proceedings of the Seminar ‘Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy’, he enthusiastically greeted the idea. I personally feel deeply obliged to him for his readiness to accept the publication for print and his efforts to make the contributions included in this volume available to a wider readership.

Piotr Balcerowicz
Warsaw, July 2008

SESSION PROGRAMME OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
'LOGIC AND BELIEF IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY'

Warsaw–Białowieża, Poland

30 April – 5 May, 2006

University of Warsaw

1 May, 2007 (Białowieża): Session 1, 2 [chairmen—Karl Potter, Hiroshi Marui]:

Johannes Bronkhorst: 'What Did Indian Philosophers Believe?'

Ashok Aklujkar: 'Grammarians' Leaving Logic at the Door'

Carmen Dragonetti and Fernando Tola: 'The Ontological Proof and Bhartṛhari'

John Vattanky, S. J.: 'Theism: The Culmination of Nyāya Logic'

2 May, 2007 (Białowieża): Sessions 3, 4 [chairman—Jonardon Ganeri]:

Raghunath Ghosh: 'Can there be Unbiased Epistemology in Indian Philosophy?'

Claus Oetke: '*Pramāṇa*, Belief and Decision'

Shujun Motegi: 'Early Concepts of Logic in Sāṃkhya'

Philipp Maas: 'Valid Knowledge and Belief in Classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga'

3 May, 2007 (Białowieża): Sessions 5, 6 [chairmen—Ashok Aklujkar, Johannes Bronkhorst]:

Karl Potter: 'Should Dharmakīrti have given in so easily to Yogācāra?'

Dan Arnold: 'On Semantics and Saṃketa: Thoughts on a Neglected Problem with *Apoha*'

Vincent Eltschinger: 'Studies in Dharmakīrti's Religious Philosophy: The *Cintā-mayī Prajñā*'

Horst Lasic: 'A Hot Dispute About Lukewarm Air: Dignāga on *Āpta-vāda*'

Stephen Phillips: 'Sensitivity to Defeaters (*bādhaka*) as Intrinsic to Knowledge of Inference-Warranting Concomitance (*vyāpti*)'

Toshihiko Kimura: 'Imperfect Reduction to Absurdity in the Proofs of Indian Metaphysics'

4 May, 2007 (Białowieża): Sessions 9, 10 [chairman—Stephen Phillips]:

Taisei Shida: 'On the Distribution of Validity and Invalidity at the Origination of Cognition: What is the "General Cause of Cognition" and the "Causal factor for Validity"?'

Peter Flügel: 'Power and Insight in Jain Discourse'

Hiroshi Marui: 'Considering the 'Six Tarkas' in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*'

Piotr Balcerowicz: 'What Exists for the Vaiśeṣika?'

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**Myth, Belief
and
Appeal to Rationality**



What Did Indian Philosophers Believe?

JOHANNES BRONKHORST

1. Did the Indians believe their myths?

1.1. Introduction

Popular writers about Christianity sometimes maintain that only modern fundamentalist Christians take the Biblical creation story literally; no one in pre-modern days, they say, ever thought of doing so. Karen ARMSTRONG represents this view in various publications, in one of which she states (2005b): ‘Until the advent of the modern period, nobody would have regarded the six-day creation story [of the Bible] as a literal, historical account.’¹ She is not the only one to maintain such a position. Some scholars of religion hold quite generally that myths were not taken literally in earlier days.² Ninian SMART (1996: 138), to mention but one example, has the following to say about myths in general and about the way they are understood at present and in the past:

‘[It] seems ... that we are moving out of the age of what may be called “fanciful” myth into that of “factual” myth. I do not mean by this that the more fanciful myths have not been believed in some sense to be factual: describing reality. But now there is a more earthbound understanding of what is factual. So Adam and Eve have to be real persons: or if they are not they have to be symbolic representations of a real human condition that can be described metaphysically or existentially.’

¹ She elaborates these ideas in ARMSTRONG (2005a).

² An example of a philosopher who holds similar views is Mary MIDGLEY (2006: 51): ‘For a long time this kind of language [i.e. mythical language—JB] was reasonably well understood. Since the mid-nineteenth century, however, there has been a disastrous attempt to get rid of it, keeping only literal statements of fact.’

And again (SMART (1996: 161)):

‘As we move towards another century and into it, the divergence, considered phenomenologically, between the old myth and the new history tends to fade away. Legends of Moses and Krishna and the Buddha and Confucius tend to solidify. Since historicity is regarded as a plus, there is a trend towards thinking of the legendary as historically real. In any case, it becomes a problem to distinguish between the two.’

These passages suggest that, at least according to Smart, there was a time when myths were not understood to be true in an earthbound factual manner, not historically real. Unfortunately he does not elaborate or clarify this suggestion, and nor does he give any specification as to the date or period during which the important transition toward the new understanding of myths took place. Why should such a change take place? And what is it that supposedly pushes ‘us’ to change our understanding of myths? Neither Smart nor Armstrong propose answers to these questions.

Some support for the position of Smart and Armstrong may be derived from a well-known article by Raffaele PETTAZZONI (1954 /1984), whose original Italian version came out in 1948. It points out that many societies described by ethnographers distinguish between ‘true stories’ and ‘false stories’, with creation myths typically belonging to the ‘true stories’. However, as PETTAZZONI (1954 /1984: 102) points out, ‘myth is true history because it is sacred history, not only by reason of its contents but also because of the concrete sacral forces which it sets going.’ The truth of myths ‘has no origin in logic, nor is it of a historical kind; it is above all of a religious and more especially a magical order’ (p. 103). These myths remain ‘true’ as long as the world they are part of remains by and large the same. However, PETTAZZONI (1954 /1984: 108) observes, ‘a day will come when the myths of beginnings too will lose their “truth” and become “false stories” in their turn ... This will occur when their world, built up on the ruins of the first one, collapses in its turn to give place to a later and different structure.’

Pettazzoni’s remarks are interesting, but strictly speaking they only concern ‘truth’ in inverted commas. If I understand them correctly, ‘truth’ in inverted commas may be paraphrased with the help of some such word as ‘applicability’. Pettazzoni’s remarks leave open the question whether or not members of the societies involved literally believe even their ‘true’ stories (‘true’ in inverted commas). They suggest that these people may normally not bother about their ordinary truth, they may never think about it. The question whether they believe their stories may therefore be misplaced, inapplicable in the situation.

This reflection is related to a known difficulty in anthropology, whose description I borrow from the philosopher Daniel C. DENNETT's book *Breaking the Spell* (2006: 161):

'Many anthropologists have observed that when they ask their native informants about "theological" details—their gods' whereabouts, specific history, and methods of acting in the world—their informants find the whole inquiry puzzling. Why should they be expected to know or care anything about *that*? Given this widely reported reaction, we should not dismiss the corrosive hypothesis that many of the truly exotic and arguably incoherent doctrines that have been unearthed by anthropologists over the years are artefacts of inquiry, not pre-existing creeds. It is possible that persistent questioning by anthropologists has composed a sort of innocently collaborative fiction, newly minted and crystallised dogmas generated when questioner and informant talk past each other until a mutually agreed-upon story results. The informants deeply believe in their gods—"Everybody knows they exist!"—but they may never before have thought about these details (maybe nobody in the culture has!), which would explain why their convictions are vague and indeterminate. Obligated to elaborate, they elaborate, taking their cues from the questions posed.'

The suspicion that some myths may be artefacts of inquiry rather than pre-existing creeds gains in interest in the light of the recent and much discussed claim that the Pirahã, a people of Amazonian hunter-gatherers, have no creation myths at all.³

It may not be justified to extrapolate directly from anthropological literature to societies with sophisticated intellectual traditions, but it may make us aware of possible difficulties. These latter societies may preserve ancient myths by means of writing or refined mnemonic devices well beyond their sell-by date. How do educated readers or listeners consider them?

Scholars of classical Greece have repeatedly addressed the question whether the ancient Greeks believed their myths. The question is complicated and cannot, it turns out, be answered with a simple yes or no.⁴ It is yet justified to ask the question, if for no other reason than that classical Greece witnessed the coming into being of a tradition of critical reflection. It would certainly be interesting to know whether there were issues that were considered beyond questioning, and the realm of myths might conceivably be one of those.

³ See EVERETT (2005), DOUGLAS (2006).

⁴ See VEYNE (1983), LLOYD (1990: 44 f.).

This way of formulating the problem shows that the exact meaning of the word ‘myth’ is of little importance for its solution. It does not matter here whether myth is a meaningful or useful concept in and outside ancient Greece, nor whether the Greeks themselves had a concept corresponding to it. All that counts here is that critical reflection in ancient Greece was sooner or later confronted with traditional forms of knowledge, usually presented in narrative form. Was this confrontation experienced as one by the individuals involved? And what was its outcome? These questions are interesting, even if—as appears to be the case—their answers are multiple and complex.

Some thinkers point out that Judeo-Christian religion distinguished itself, already in Antiquity, from Greek and other religions in that reflexive thought about myth became an integral part of it. The requirement of truth in religion, it is claimed, pervades all of ancient Christian thought.⁵ This, if true, would distinguish the Judeo-Christian tradition from other religions.

I have already pointed out that it is not clear whether or to what extent myths—I use the word again in its broadest sense—are believed to be true in societies which have no strong tradition of critical reflection. One can easily imagine a society many of whose members, even though thoroughly familiar with its myths, have never asked themselves the question whether they are true or not. One thing seems however clear. In a society in which there *is* a tradition of critical reflection, at least some members will sometimes ask this question. Some of them will answer in the positive, and hence be conscious believers; others will decide that some of these myths, or all of them, are not, or probably not, literally true.

1.2. An Indian creation myth⁶

Classical India, like classical Greece, had many myths, and a tradition of critical reflection that expressed itself primarily in its philosophies. A number of thinkers, many of them belonging to different philosophical schools, were engaged in an ongoing debate, in which each tried to improve his own system in the light of the criticism he received or might receive from others. The consequences of this debate were far-reaching, and various school doctrines appear to have been adopted, even invented, for no other reason than to improve the inner coherence and consistency of the different philosophies.

⁵ STROUMSA (2005: 34–36), with a reference to ASSMANN (1997: 1–8).

⁶ This section and the following one use material found also in BRONKHORST (2001); see further BRONKHORST (2007: 212 ff.).

What attitude did these philosophers have with regard to their myths?⁷ This question is important, for it may enable us to understand these thinkers better. For when classical Indian philosophers defend their positions against each other, they normally defend the philosophical aspects of their beliefs, leaving other aspects—such as the ‘mythical’ ones—out of the discussion. Yet there is at least one myth which is so often referred in the surviving literature that some conclusions can be drawn about it.

This myth is particularly important in the Brahmanical context. It is a creation myth which tells us not only about the creation of the world, but also about that of the different classes (*varṇa*) in human society.⁸ It is important for Brahmanism, for the division of society into these four classes is the cornerstone of their vision of society. No doubt for this reason it is told or referred to in many texts, not always in exactly the same form. The story finds its classic, and as far as we know earliest, exposition in the *Puruṣa-sūkta* of the *Ṛg-veda* (RV 10.90). This hymn recounts how the world and its inhabitants came about as a result of a sacrifice in which the primordial giant, Puruṣa, is dismembered. The hymn does however more: it also explains how the proper hierarchy of human beings came about.⁹ The for us most important parts read, in the (slightly adjusted) translation of Wendy DONIGER O’FLAHERTY (1983: 30–31):

‘[1] The Man has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet. He pervaded the earth on all sides and extended beyond it as far as ten fingers. [2] It is the Man who is all this, whatever has been and whatever is to be. He is the ruler of immortality, when he grows beyond everything through food. ... [6] When the gods spread the sacrifice with the Man as the offering, spring was the clarified butter, summer the fuel, autumn the oblation. ... [11] When they divided the Man, into how many parts did they apportion him? What do they call his mouth, his two arms and thighs and feet? [12] His mouth became the Brahmin; his arms were made into the Warrior, his thighs the Common man, and from his feet the Servant was born.’

⁷ The question what story is to be counted as myth, and which not, will not be addressed here. The Indian epics constitute a marginal case. Note here that the sixteenth-century commentator Maheśvaratīrtha states, with regard to Vālmīki’s *Rāmāyaṇa* (ad 2.41.10 vulg.), that everything that happened in it was absolutely real; see POLLOCK (1993: 279).

⁸ Note that this is not the only creation myth that accounts for the origin of the classes; for other examples, see MUIR (1972).

⁹ OBERLIES (1998: 381–382): ‘In dem diese Opferung beschreibenden Sūkta ... wird nicht nur die Entstehung der Welt und der sie bevölkernden Wesen—im weitesten Sinne—erklärt, sondern auch die Ordnung der Gesellschaft.’

It is not obvious how exactly the composer and early listeners of this hymn believed this process to have taken place. It may not be all that difficult to imagine such a sacrifice, even though its size exceeds that of the world. However, some of the details pose serious challenges to our power of imagination. How, for example, does one use spring as clarified butter, summer as fuel, autumn as fuel in a sacrifice? And there are serious problems related to the division in which the primordial giant's mouth became the Brahmin, his arms the Warrior (*rājanya*), his thighs the Common man (*vaiśya*), and his feet the Servant (*śūdrā*). These four classes of human beings—this seems to be the first mention of the four *varṇas* in Indian literature—are referred to in the singular. Do we have to conclude that just one Brahmin, one Rājanya, one Vaiśya and one Śūdra were created at that time? In that case one could wonder where they found partners so as to procreate. Should we perhaps understand the text differently, in the sense that all Brahmins were created out of the mouth of primordial Man, all Rājanyas from his arms, all Vaiśyas from his thighs, and all Śūdras from his feet?

It might be objected that myths should not be read like this. No cosmogonic myth, it could be maintained, was ever understood in such a literal fashion. It cannot be questioned or analysed in the way a modern scientific theory is subjected to questioning and analysis. Myths have to be interpreted and should not be taken at face value. When a Bororo individual says 'I am a parakeet' this must be understood to mean—according to some anthropologists—'As a man, I am to other men what a parakeet is to other birds.'¹⁰ With regard to the *Puruṣa-sūkta*, M. Sunder Raj points out that it 'is an allegory, a poetic vision, and is not to be taken in a literal sense.'¹¹

The hymn to Puruṣa is, in the words of Louis RENOU (1965: 8), 'the major source of cosmogonic thought in ancient India'; elsewhere he says (1956: 12):

'Il n'y a guère de poème cosmologique de l'Atharvaveda où l'on ne retrouve quelque allusion voilée au mythe du Géant sacrifié et au schéma évolutif qui en résulte ... C'est encore le thème du Géant qui sous les traits de Prajâpati 'le seigneur des Créatures' ressurgit dans les Brāhmaṇa et en commande la plupart des avenues.'

Jan GONDA (1968: 101) calls it 'the foundation stone of Viṣṇuite philosophy'. Especially the part concerning the creation of the four main divisions of society, the four *varṇas*, has been taken over in numerous texts belonging both to the Vedic and to the classical period. We find it, for example, in the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* (7.1.1.4–6), the *Mahā-bhārata* (3.187.13; 8.23.32; 12.73.4–5; 12.285.5–6), the *Rāmāyaṇa*

¹⁰ WEINER (1994: 573), who ascribes this recast to Lévi-Strauss.

¹¹ DANDEKAR (1993: 27).

(3.13.29–30), but also in the first chapter of the *Manu-smṛti*. The Lord, we there read, created, ‘so that the worlds and people would prosper and increase, from his mouth the Brahmin, from his arms the Kṣatriya, from his thighs the Vaiśya, and from his feet the Śūdra.’¹² Elsewhere the same text refers to this myth as common background knowledge, used as an alternative way of speaking about the four *varṇas*.¹³ The *Puruṣa-sūkta* remains important in later literature and practice.¹⁴

These and many other references to the myth of the *Puruṣa-sūkta* do not allow us to decide with certainty whether the authors concerned took this myth literally. They do however show that this myth remained ‘true’ in Pettazzoni’s sense in remaining relevant to a social situation that continued to prevail, or that should prevail according to those primarily concerned, the Brahmins. But did they think that the myth was true in the sense of corresponding to reality? The answer, it seems, was yes for at least some Brahmanical thinkers. There is indeed evidence that Indian thinkers, or at least some of them, did take the myth of the creation of the four *varṇas* out of the initial giant quite seriously, i.e. literally—as being literally true. Part of the story is retold in the *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha*, also known as *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, which is the classical surviving treatise of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, written by Praśasta, alias Praśastapāda. The passage concerned reads:¹⁵

¹² MDhŚ 1.31:

*lokānām tu vivṛddhy-artham mukha-bāhūru-pādataḥ /
brāhmaṇam kṣatriyam vaiśyam śūdrām ca niravartayat //*

The translation follows, with modifications, DONIGER–SMITH (1991). The *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa* has the same verse, see LÁSLÓ (1971: 117).

¹³ MDhŚ 10.45:

*mukha-bāhūru-pajjānām yā loke jātayo bahiḥ /
mleccha-vācaś cārya-vācaḥ sarve te dasyavaḥ smṛtāḥ //*

Tr. DONIGER–SMITH (1991: 241):

‘All of those castes who are excluded from the world of those who were born from the mouth, arms, thighs, and feet (of the primordial Man) are traditionally regarded as aliens, whether they speak barbarian languages or Aryan languages.’

See also MDhŚ 1.87, 92–94; 8.270; 10.45.

¹⁴ See SHENDE (1965), GONDA (1977: 98–105 (390–397)).

¹⁵ PBh, p. 11: *evam samutpanneṣu caturṣu mahā-bhūteṣu mahēśvarasyābhidhāna-mātrāt taijasebhyo ’nubhyaḥ pārhiva-paramāṇu-sahitebhyo* (variants: *pārthivādi-paramāṇu-sahitebhyo*, *pārthivāṇu-sahitebhyo*) *mahad aṇḍam ārabhyate* (some editions read: *utpadyate*). *tasmimś caturvadana-kamalaṁ sarva-loka-pitāmahaṁ* (variant: *caturvadana-kamala-sakala-loka-pitāmahaṁ*) *brahmāṇam sakala-bhuvana-sahitam utpādya prajāsarḡe viniyukte* (variant: *niyukte*). *sa ca mahēśvareṇa viniyukto* (variant: *niyukto*) *brahmā ’tisaya-jñāna-vairāgyāiśvarya-sampannaḥ prāṇinām* (variant: *sarva-prāṇinām*) *karma-vipākam viditvā karmānurūpa-jñāna-bhogāyusaḥ sutān prajāpatīn mānasān manu-deva-rṣi-pitṛ-gaṇān* (variant: *manūn deva-^o*) ***mukha-bāhūru-***

‘When in this way the four composite elements have come into existence, a great egg is formed, caused solely by God’s meditation/volition, out of atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth (i.e. gold). In it [God] creates Brahmā, with four faces like so many lotuses, the grandfather of all worlds, and all worlds; he then enjoins him with the duty of creating living things. That Brahmā, thus enjoined by God, and endowed with abundant knowledge, complete absence of passion and absolute power, knows the effects of the deeds of living beings; he creates the Prajāpatis, his mind-created sons, with knowledge, experience and span of life in accordance with their [past] deeds; [he also creates] the Manus, Devas, Ṛṣis and groups of Pitṛs, the **four varṇas out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet [respectively]**, and the other living beings, high and low; he then connects them with *dharma*, knowledge, absence of passion and power in accordance with their residue of past deeds.’

In order to correctly evaluate this passage, it is important to realise that the *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha* is no book of stories and myths, and nor is it meant to be read as literature. Quite on the contrary, it is a very serious treatise about the constitution of reality, of which it presents a coherent and systematic explanation. It is hard to believe that any passage of this serious work, including the one just cited, was not meant to convey reality, not metaphorically, but in a most literal manner. It is true that the contents of this passage may not have been part of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy during the time preceding Praśasta. There are reasons to believe that the very notion of a creator God may have been introduced into the system by this author, and that he borrowed this notion from the religious current to which he may have belonged, that of the Pāśupatas. This does not, however, mean that this notion is to be taken less seriously than the remainder of the *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha*.¹⁶

The explicit mention of the creation of the four varṇas out of the mouth, arms, thighs and feet respectively of the creator in a work as serious and reality-oriented as Praśasta’s *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha* strongly suggests that at least one participant in the tradition of critical reflection accepted this myth as literally true. It seems likely that there were other Brahmanical intellectuals of that period who did the same.

pādātāś caturo varṇān anyāni cōccāvacāni bhūtāni (variants: *bhūtāni ca; anyāni cōccāvacāni ca sṛṣṭvā*) *sṛṣṭvā, āśayānurūpair dharma-jñāna-vairāgyāśvaryaīḥ saṁyojayatīti.*

¹⁶ On the philosophical reasons underlying the introduction of the notion of a creator God into Vaiśeṣika, see BRONKHORST (2000: § 7, esp. p. 37 f.); further BRONKHORST (1996).

As is well known, the Buddhists did not accept the Brahmanical division of human society into four classes, nor did they accept the myth that lent credence to it. A number of Buddhist authors criticise the very same myth which Praśasta (and probably many others with him) explicitly accepted, the myth that the four *varṇas* were originally created out of the mouth, arms, thighs and feet of the original being. They do so by showing that it is incoherent, or that it has implications which even the Brahmins would not be willing to accept.¹⁷

We find such criticism already in the *Aggañña-sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya*. The Brahmin Vāseṭṭha here reports the position of his fellow-Brahmins, according to whom ‘only the Brahmins are the real sons of Brahmā, born from his mouth, born from Brahmā, produced by Brahmā, heirs of Brahmā.’¹⁸ The Buddha responds that they maintain this position, ‘forgetting what is old’ (*porāṇaṃ assarantā*). This expression has been variously interpreted by the commentators: some speak of an old tradition,¹⁹ others of ancient history.²⁰ The context however favours a third interpretation: these Brahmins forget the past, that is to say, the relatively recent past of their own birth. This is shown by what follows.²¹ According to the Buddha it is undeniable that the wives of Brahmins (*brāhmaṇānaṃ brāhmaṇiyo*) have their periods, become pregnant, give birth and feed; in spite of being thus born from a human womb, the Brahmins maintain that they are born from Brahmā.²² In doing so, these Brahmins insult (*abbhācikkhanti*) Brahmā.²³ This criticism is obviously based on the most literal interpretation of the Brahmanical myth. The claim of the Brahmins of being born from Brahmā is in conflict with their birth from a human mother. In other word, the Brahmins are credited with the belief of having been born, at the beginning of their present life, from the mouth of Brahmā.

A somewhat more recent text, the *Vajra-sūci*, proceeds in a similar manner. One finds here the following argument:

¹⁷ For the following paragraphs, see ELTSCHINGER (2000), RENO (1960: 43).

¹⁸ DN III, p. 81: *brāhmaṇā va brahmuno puttā orasā mukhato jātā brahma-jā brahma-nimmitā brahma-dāyādā*. Cp. MEISIG (1988: 80 f.) for the Chinese parallels.

¹⁹ WALSHE (1987: 408): ‘ancient tradition’; RHYS DAVIDS (1921: 78): ‘ancient lore’.

²⁰ Sv III, p. 862: *porāṇan ti porāṇakaṃ aggaññaṃ lok’uppattiṃ cariya-vaṃsam*; FRANKE (1913: 275) ‘es ist nicht uralte Erinnerung an eine wirkliche Tatsache.’

²¹ The following remarks also occur in the *Assalāyana-sutta* (MN II, p. 148).

²² DN III, pp. 81–82: *dissanti kho pana vāseṭṭha brāhmaṇānaṃ brāhmaṇiyo utuniyo pi gabbhīniyo pi vijāyamānā pi pāyamānā pi, te ca brāhmaṇa yonijā va samānā evaṃ āhaṃsu: brāhmaṇā va ... brahmuno puttā orasā mukhato jātā brahma-jā brahma-nimmitā brahma-dāyādā*. Cp. MEISIG (1988: 86 f.).

²³ This last remark does not occur in the *Assalāyana-sutta*.

‘There is another defect [in your proposition]. If the Brahmin is born from the mouth, where is the Brahmin woman born from? Certainly from the mouth. Alas! Then she is your sister! So, you do not regard the convention of licit and illicit sexual intercourse! But that is extremely repugnant to the people of this world.’²⁴

The *Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna* states essentially the same:

‘If this world has been created by Brahmā himself, the Brahmin woman is the sister of the Brahmin, the Kṣatriya woman the sister of the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya woman [the sister] of the Vaiśya, or the Śūdra woman [the sister] of the Śūdra; in case she has been created by Brahmā, [a woman of the same class], being a sister [of her husband], will not be a suitable wife.’²⁵

This is not the place to investigate how the Vaiśeṣikas answered, or might have answered, the criticism of the Buddhists. It must here be sufficient to note that the three classical commentaries on Praśasta’s *Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha*—the *Vyomavatī*, the *Nyāya-kandalī*, and the *Kiraṇāvalī*—dedicate in this connection long discussions to the question as to the existence of a creator God, but do not say a word about how this particular myth is to be interpreted so as to avoid contradictions. The discussion stays on a highly abstract, ‘philosophical’, level, where inferences and logical analyses have their place. The details of the myth, on the other hand, do not receive attention.

Note that a number of Jaina texts, too, criticise the myth of the primordial giant, along with other Brahmanical myths. These texts are part of what may have been a micro-genre of Jaina literature that uses satire to make fun of these stories. Jean-Pierre Osier has recently studied four of these texts that have survived: two versions of the ‘Ballad of the rogues’ (*Dhūrtākhyāna*, *Dhuttakkhāṇa*)—one in the Cūrṇi of

²⁴ VSūc₁, p. 225 l. 6–8, VSūc₂, p. 9 [JJ]: *anyac ca dūṣaṇam bhavati. yadi mukhato jāto brāhmaṇo brāhmaṇyāḥ kuta utpattiḥ. mukhād evēti cet hanta tarhi bhavatām bhagini-prasaṅgaḥ syāt. tathā gamyāgamyam na sambhāvyaṭe. tac ca loke ’tyanta-viruddham.* Tr. MUKHOPADHYAYA (1960: 20).

²⁵ Divy(V) no. 33, verses 76–77, p. 332:

*yadi tāvad ayaṃ loko brahmaṇā janitaḥ svayam /
brāhmaṇī brāhmaṇa-svasā kṣatriyā kṣatriya-svasā //
atha vaiśyasya vaiśyā vai śūdrā śūdrasya vā punaḥ /
na bhāryā bhagini yuktā brahmaṇā janitā yadi //*

the *Niśītha-sūtra*, the other one by Haribhadra—and two ‘Examinations of Dharma’ (*Dharma-parīkṣā*), by Hariṣeṇa and Amitagati respectively.²⁶

What can we conclude from the above? One gets the impression that those in the Brahmanical tradition were inclined to accept the creation story considered (and other myths) literally, in spite of the difficulties this entailed. One might be tempted to conclude, with Ninian Smart and Karen Armstrong, that perhaps in those pre-modern days no one would dream of understanding a myth literally. This position is however undermined by the fact that the Buddhists (and the Jainas) had no difficulty whatsoever to interpret the myth so literally that they could make fun of it. They had no difficulty imagining all Brahmins being born, literally, from the mouth of the primordial giant, and they drew absurd consequences from this. But if the Buddhists could interpret this myth literally, so could the Brahmins, or at least those Brahmins who had trained themselves as philosophers and debaters. Some of these Brahmins may have silently discarded a literal interpretation of the myth, but some, among them apparently Praśasta, did not, and included the myth, literally understood, in their analytical vision of the world.

1.3. Mīmāṃsā

The Mīmāṃsakas are probably the most orthodox upholders of the Vedic tradition. They present their school of thought as a school of hermeneutics, i.e. textual interpretation. These Mīmāṃsakas were therefore directly involved in the question we are studying: do we have to take everything in the *Veda* literally?

These Vedic hermeneuts are aware of the difficulties that may arise, and they discuss it in their classical text, the commentary by Śabara on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*. Śabara points out that certain Vedic statements are hard to accept if interpreted literally. Śabara gives the following examples: ‘The trees sat down for a sacrificial session’; ‘The snakes sat down for a sacrificial session’; ‘The old bull sings mad [songs].’²⁷ These statements are in conflict with our experience. Śabara does not ask us to accept them. On the contrary, he proposes a form of Vedic interpretation that allows us not to accept any descriptive statement at its face value.

The justification for this radical position lies in the Mīmāṃsā conception of what the *Veda* really is. It is a corpus of texts, to be sure. But it is a corpus of texts that has no beginning in time, and therefore no author. The reasoning is simple. An

²⁶ OSIER (2005: 45, 80 f.) for the myth of the primordial giant; see also OSIER (2000) and OSIER–BALBIR (2004: 76).

²⁷ ŚBh 1.1.32: *vanas-patayaḥ sattram āsata; sarpāḥ sattram āsata; jarad-gavo gāyati mattakāni*. None of these three citations seems traceable in the *Veda* as we know it.

author, any author, composes his text at a specific moment of time. A text that was always there can have no author, because it has no beginning. Such a text cannot refer to any historical event either, for such a reference can only be made after the event. Śabara pronounces himself on this issue in connection with the Vedic statement which says that the god Prajāpati extracted his omentum.²⁸ Śabara discusses this statement and observes: ‘If a historical event were to be referred to, the *Veda* would be open to the charge of having a beginning.’²⁹ Similarly, the Vedic statement ‘We grasped your right hand, o Indra’³⁰, if taken literally, would be open to the same charge.³¹ Elsewhere (1.1.31) Śabara is obliged to give different interpretations to expressions such as *prāvāhaṇi* and *auddālaki*, which normally signify ‘son of Pravāhaṇa’ and ‘son of Uddālaka’,³² of course, the *Veda* cannot refer to historical personalities or their sons.

This procedure is radical, as I pointed out already. It does not permit a literal interpretation of large portions of the Vedic texts. The creation myth which we discussed above falls by the wayside, as do all other stories, whether mythical or historical. In the end Śabara and his co-Mīmāṃsakas decide that only injunctions are to be taken literally. Mīmāṃsakas like Śabara did not believe any of the Vedic myths. The criticisms uttered by the Buddhists against a Vedic creation myth was no threat to them.

One may wonder whether there were really many Brahmins in ancient India who spent their lives performing complex and demanding rituals that were not accompanied by myths, in whatever way understood. We will return to this question later on. Theoretically the classical Mīmāṃsā position is coherent: Yes, Vedic rituals have to be performed, but no, the myths and other stories that are told in those same *Vedas* should not be taken literally. One wonders how many people were satisfied with ritual obligations that would, so to say, be hanging in the air.

It is yet noteworthy that the custom to give metaphorical interpretations to myths continued undeterred in India, particularly so in connection with the stories told in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahā-bhārata*. Christopher MINKOWSKI (2005) draws attention to the seventeenth century commentator Nīlakaṇṭha, who interprets the whole *Mahā-bhārata* in a non-dualist manner. The story of Manu and the Flood, for example, is about the ontological possibility of *jīvan-mukti*, i.e. the possibility of con-

²⁸ TaitS 2.1.1.4: *sa ātmano vapām udakkhidat*.

²⁹ ŚBh 1.2.10: *vṛttāntānvākhyāne 'pi vidhīyamāne ādimattā-doṣo vedasya prasajyeta*.

³⁰ RV 10.47.1 etc.: *jaḡrbhmā te dakṣiṇam indra hastam*.

³¹ ŚBh 9.1.9: *athāivam ucyate, tasyāūtat vacanam yo ḡrhitavāms tasya hastam iti. ucyate. nāūtat adhyavaseyam. ādimattā-doṣo vedasya prasajyate*.

³² POLLOCK (1989: 608) refers to this passage in an article that draws attention to the non-historical nature of much of Sanskrit literature, possibly in imitation of the *Veda*.

tinuing embodied life after spiritual enlightenment. Manu, seen this way, is the mistaken egoism (*ahankāra*); the fish that saves him is the *jīva*; the boat that Manu builds is his last human embodiment etc. And Nīlakaṇṭha was not alone in providing such allegorical interpretations.

1.4. Purāṇic versus Siddhāntic astronomy

At the beginning of this lecture I talked about the Biblical creation myth that, if taken literally, is in conflict with the findings of science. The Vedic creation myth which we subsequently considered was not accused of being in conflict with science, and yet it was criticised for being in conflict with common sense, or with propriety. We do not normally associate difficulties that arise within Indian religions with a presumed conflict with science, but this is too simplistic a position, as the following example will show.

The Vedic corpus was not the only corpus which was invested with canonical status within the Brahmanical tradition. A subsequent stage of this tradition found expression in the *Purāṇas*, a large number of texts of great length, and contrary to the *Veda* the texts in this corpus were read by numerous Hindus.³³ These *Purāṇas* present a view of the universe that has been summarised as follows by Christopher MINKOWSKI (2001: 81):

‘The *Purāṇas* are consistent in presenting a model of the cosmos in which the earth is a flat horizontal disk in a vertical, egg-shaped universe, in which there are seven heavens above and seven underworlds below. Mount Meru stands at the centre of this disk, and above Meru are suspended a series of wheels, with the Sun, Moon, nakṣatras, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and the Saptarṣi stars, in that order, riding on them. Above the Saptarṣi is the pole star. The rising and setting of the Sun, Moon, nakṣatras and planets is explained by the enormous height of Mt. Meru, behind which in their circular rotations above us the celestial bodies are blocked from our sight.

Viewed from above, the disk of the Earth is made up of seven concentric continents with seven intervening oceans. The central continent

³³ These texts contain contradictions, and some of them are aware of it. McComas Taylor (Indology discussion forum, 2 March 2007) draws attention to some relevant passages in the *Śivapurāṇa*: before this *Purāṇa* arises in the world, ‘all the śāstras will contradict one another’ (1.2.7), and ‘all [other] *Purāṇas* will clamour on the surface of the earth’ (1.2.10); there will be disputes among *tīrthas*, *mantras*, places of pilgrimage, *piṭhas* (seat, throne, sacred place), donations, *devas* and doctrines (*siddhānta*) (1.2.11–17).

with Meru at its centre is called the Jambūdvīpa, which is surrounded by the salt ocean. The southernmost portion of Jambūdvīpa is the location for the land of Bhārata. As far as distances are concerned, Mt. Meru is 84,000 yojanas high, Jambūdvīpa is 100,000 yojanas in diameter, the Bhāratavarṣa is 9,000 yojanas in extent, while the disk of the earth as a whole, including all seven continents and seven oceans, and what lies outside them, is 50 crores or 500 million yojanas in diameter.

... this account of the cosmos is found in a number of Purāṇas and can be traced to a common source, which Pingree has argued was probably completed in the latter half of the 2nd century C.E. (Kirfel, 1954: 7–49; Pingree, 1990: 275).’

Besides this mythological model of the universe, there existed in India also a tradition of astronomy which had undergone strong Hellenistic influence. It found expression in a number of texts called *Siddhāntas*. MINKOWSKI (2001: 81) summarises the Siddhāntic view of the universe in the following words:

‘In the Siddhāntic model of the cosmos the earth is a fixed, non-rotating sphere at the centre of a series of interesting spheres on which the sun, moon, and the various planets and stars revolve around the earth. In this model the planets are ranged above the earth in this order: Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and all the Stars. In this model the diameter of the earth is calculated to be about 1600 yojanas, with a circumference of about 5000 yojanas. This is the model articulated already in the *Paitāmahasiddhānta* of the fifth century, and it is the model taken up in all other astronomical Siddhāntas in India, regardless of their other differences (Pingree, 1990: 276–78).’

It will be clear that these two models of the universe are very different from each other, and that one might say that here a religious point of view was in conflict with a scientific one. The inconsistencies between the Purāṇic and Siddhāntic cosmologies do indeed strike the eye: in the former the earth is flat, while in the latter it is a globe; in the first it has a huge size, in the second it has a manageably small size; etc.³⁴

What happened when the two met? MINKOWSKI (2001: 82) gives the following brief résumé:

³⁴ MINKOWSKI (2001: 82).

‘As far as we know, [the] mutual inconsistency [between the Purāṇic and Siddhāntic cosmologies] passed largely undiscussed until the mid-ninth century, when the astronomer Lalla turned to a critique of the Purāṇic model in his Siddhānta, the *Śiṣyadhivṛddhidatantra*. Lalla did attempt to accommodate some elements of the Purāṇic model to the globular earth of the Siddhāntas: Mt. Meru is made the axis inside the earth on which the earth revolves; all the other oceans and continents of the Purāṇic model are assumed to be south of the equator; and the power that drives the interesting spheres is still the Pravaha wind, which is the force that makes the planets and stars revolve around Meru in the Purāṇic model.

Nevertheless Lalla explicitly rejected the improbable Purāṇic assertions that eclipses are caused by Rāhu; that night is caused by Meru blocking the Sun; that the Moon wanes because the gods are drinking the Soma in the moon; that the Moon is higher in the heavens than the Sun is; and that the earth is flat and rests on a support. These criticisms are repeated in later Siddhāntas, especially in Bhāskara II’s very influential work, the *Siddhāntasīromaṇi*, of the 12th century ...’

So far there is a rather clear parallel with the Christian scientist who reinterprets certain Biblical passages and rejects others so as to leave space for his scientific convictions. What happened next in India invites a comparison with the creationism of today. From the sixteenth century onward astronomers and some others started writing treatises to show that there is no contradiction between the Purāṇic and the Siddhāntic models, and that the *Purāṇas* are right. I cite once again MINKOWSKI (2001: 83–84).³⁵

‘Since the Purāṇas must be true, therefore, it is in their proper interpretation, and in the proper construal of the Siddhāntas, that contradictions can be removed. Typically it is asserted that the Siddhāntas describe only some limited part of the real, Purāṇic world, or else that they describe some alternative, and less actual world, or that the Siddhāntic model is simply a convenient fiction, not literally believed even by the astronomers, but useful for making calendars and calculating the relative latitudes and longitudes of places in our local range of knowledge.’

Here, then, there can be no doubt that the authors concerned believed their myths, literally and not symbolically. It is remarkable that the two different models seem to

³⁵ See further MINKOWSKI (2000), (2002a), (2002b), (2004).

have coexisted peacefully for a number of centuries. Following this, some professional astronomers made critical remarks with regard to Purāṇic cosmology. Only during the last few centuries did the upholders of tradition strike back with force. Do we have to conclude from this that people had started to attach more value to their traditions, that they had perhaps started to read their traditional texts ever more literally?

The disputes between the upholders of the Purāṇic and the Siddhāntic views of the universe were fierce, and became even more so when Lancelot Wilkinson, the British Political Agent to the court of Bhopal from 1829 to 1841, acted on the belief that the best way to introduce the modern Copernican system of astronomy to learned Indians was through the medium of Sanskrit, and in particular through the instrumentality of the Siddhāntic model of the cosmos. This led to a vivid exchange of pamphlets and treatises, surveyed by MINKOWSKI in a recent publication (2001). The details do not interest us at present. It is however clear that the literal interpretation of ancient religious teachings were at the heart of this debate.

2. Did the Indians believe their philosophies?

It might be argued that the myths we have considered so far—the myth of creation out of a primordial giant, the myth of singing bulls, the mythical concept of the universe—are not part of the core beliefs of Brahmanism, about which unshakeable faith should be expected. To make a comparison with Christianity once again, those who reject, or reinterpret, the creation myth of Genesis may yet remain good and convinced Christians. Their belief, these Christians may think, centres on more vital issues than some stone age myths. The same might be thought of Indian philosophers, who made great efforts to base their philosophical claims on sometimes elaborate arguments, but did not use their reasoning skills (at least not in the surviving philosophical literature) to prove the correctness of the myths of their religions.³⁶ What is more, these philosophers, while criticising each others' views, never attacked each others' myths. Yet these myths would have been easy targets, if they had been seriously believed in. This may be taken as an indication that, say, Buddhist philosophers did not think that their Brahmanical opponents took the Brahmanical myths seriously, and vice-versa.

³⁶ LO TURCO (2005) argues that stories, too, can be arguments, and cites a number of modern philosophers to support this claim. Unfortunately the Indian thinkers we are interested in had not read these philosophers. As a result they persisted in their (positivist?) ways and tried to prove their positions with arguments rather than stories. This is even true where this position is a subjective illusionism which denies the existence of the world; see BRONKHORST (1999).

Which are the vital issues of Brahmanism? Or rather: which knowledge did the Brahmins consider vital? It is possible to answer this question, for certain types of knowledge are for many Brahmins an essential precondition for reaching the highest religious goal: liberation from the cycle of rebirths. Philosophers have made efforts to formulate this liberating knowledge as clearly as possible. There are different schools of Brahmanical philosophy, to be sure. This is due to the fact that there were differences of opinion as to what exactly constitutes this liberating knowledge. The Sāṃkhya philosophers, for example, claimed that knowledge of Sāṃkhya was a precondition for reaching the highest goal. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers had a rather different vision of the world, knowledge of which was essential *for them*. And so there were other schools of thought, with equally high claims.

Knowledge of the right philosophy, seen in this way, is extremely important in the Brahmanical tradition (similar applies to Buddhism). Reaching such knowledge was not just a matter of life and death, but far more important: a matter of being liberated from, or hopelessly enmeshed in, the endless cycle of rebirths. Here the certainty of the beliefs concerned could not be taken lightly. There would be no possibility to treat this kind of knowledge in the same way as mythological ‘knowledge’. This, at least, is what one would expect.

However, this expectation is confronted with some difficulties.³⁷ There is a long list of commentators who wrote on philosophies which were clearly not their own. The most famous example is Vācaspatiśra I (tenth century), who wrote important works in the fields of Advaita Vedānta, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Yoga. Scholars may be tempted to think that Vācaspati changed his convictions several times over, i.e. experienced several conversions, but there is no indication in his works to suggest this (as far as I am aware). One rather has the impression that Vācaspati, by writing all those works, established himself as an authority in all those fields; what he privately believed was not part of this exercise.

Vācaspati does not stand alone.³⁸ Several Jainas wrote commentaries on Buddhist logical texts: Mallavādin and Durvekamiśra on Dharmottara’s *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā*, Haribhadra on Śaṅkarasvāmin’s *Nyāya-praveśa*. Another Jaina, Abhayatilaka, wrote a commentary on Nyāya, the *Nyāyālaṅkāra*. Various authors of Mīmāṃsā works quietly dissent from a number of key premises of the tradition, most notably its

³⁷ Eli Franco and Lawrence MacCrea alerted me to the phenomenon described in what follows. Franco also shared with me his impression that mostly Jainas and Vedantins wrote on other systems. See further below.

³⁸ It is quite unusual in the history of Indian thought to find members of one school writing commentaries on a text of another school with an eye to refuting its arguments, yet this happened in the case of Śrīharṣa’s *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, which was in this way attacked by Naiyāyikas and Navya-Naiyāyikas. See POTTER (1977: 15–16).

strict atheism. MacCrea mentions in particular Murāri Miśra, author of the *Aṅgatva-nirukti*, a Mīmāṃsā work, and Lakṣmaṇa, author of the *Tantra-vilāsa*, both in the eighteenth century CE. But already Kumārila-bhaṭṭa (seventh century CE) begins his *Śloka-vārttika* with a dedicatory stanza to Śiva,³⁹ a feature which his commentator Pārthasārathi Miśra makes an attempt to explain away.⁴⁰ Inscriptional evidence from the end of the first millennium CE, too, shows that there were Brahmins who claimed expertise in various incompatible schools of philosophy. The Malhar stone inscription of Jājalladeva, for example, speaks of a Brahmin who ‘had no rival in the doctrine of Kāśyapa and in the Sāṃkhya. He completely mastered the two Mīmāṃsās. He had for his eyes the teaching of Akṣapāda.’⁴¹

A quick glance at the bibliography of Karl Potter’s *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (EIPh) creates the impression that the more we advance in time, the more scholars felt free to write commentaries on altogether different schools of philosophy; it contains numerous names of authors who appear to have commented on works belonging to different schools. A famous example is Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, also known as Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa (around 1700), who made his reputation as a grammarian, but also wrote commentaries in the fields of Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Advaita Vedānta. I myself have had the privilege of learning from a traditional teacher, Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī, who was a recognised expert in the field of Navya-nyāya, but personally committed to Advaita Vedānta. This double (or triple, or quadruple) allegiance of a large number of traditional scholars has never been made the object of a study, as far as I am aware. It seems however clear that for many of them philosophy did not exhaust their religious commitment. It is hard to obtain precise information, but there is reason to think that many Nyāya philosophers had links with Śaivism, the worship of the god Śiva. A number of thinkers of the ‘old’ Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools are known to have been Śaivas, or even more specifically Pāśupatas; this is true of Praśastapāda (probably), Uddyotakara, Bhāsarvajña, Vādi

³⁹ MŚV, Pratijñādhikaraṇa, 1:

*viśuddha-jñāna-dehāya tri-vedī-divya-caṅkṣe /
śreyaḥ-prāpti-nimittāya namaḥ somārdha-dhāriṇe //*

There are further indications suggesting that Kumārila may have been concerned to integrate ‘Hinduistic’ elements, such as his acceptance of the idea of liberation (see MESQUITA (1994); there is no reason to think that earlier Mīmāṃsakas had accepted this idea, cp. BRONKHORST (2000: 100)). See further below.

⁴⁰ Cp. BIARDEAU (1964: 145): ‘Est-ce ... que la Mīmāṃsā épuise la croyance religieuse des brahmanes qui l’enseignent ou qu’elle l’ait jamais épuisée? Pour l’époque contemporaine, il est certain que non: les rares Mīmāṃsaka d’aujourd’hui se disent généralement *smārta* et se rattachent donc aux disciples de Śankara.’

⁴¹ GUPTA (1983: 30), with a reference to *Epigraphia Indica* I, p. 44.

Vāgīśvara.⁴² Other philosophers may have had other religious convictions which however have left no traces in their works.

Most of the examples here talked about are relatively recent. But the knowledge that there were many recent authors who wrote about more than one system of thought raises questions about early authors who did the same. The most famous example is no doubt Vasubandhu, who is supposed to have converted to the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, having been a Sautrāntika before. Robert KRITZER (2005) has recently collected numerous passages that show that Vasubandhu's presumably early *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya* was already strongly influenced by the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, one of the most prominent early texts associated with the Yogācāra school. This suggests that the legend about Vasubandhu, too, may be in need of renewed reflection.

What, then, did Indian philosophers believe? It appears that, also in the Indian situation, it may not be possible to generalise. Some, it would seem, were willing to believe at least a number of their traditional myths quite literally, others would rather avoid being associated with these improbable tales. Some took the philosophies they wrote about quite literally, others took their distance with regard to at least some of them.

It is tempting, and I think illuminating, to recall in this connection what Wilhelm Halbfass had to say about the Sanskrit doxographies, texts which offer a survey of 'all' or 'six' systems or doctrines. The most well-known of these texts is the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* of Mādharma-Vidyāraṇya (fourteenth century CE), the oldest known is the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* of Haribhadra (eighth century), but there are many others. HALBFASS (1988: 351 ff.) draws attention to the fact that the Indian doxographic literature is largely the work of two religio-philosophical groups—the Jains and the Advaita Vedāntins. This may not be coincidence. The Jains had developed a way of presenting non-Jaina points of view in such a way that they appear as partial truths within a context of comprehensive perspectivism. Advaita Vedānta viewed other doctrines as stages on the way to its absolute truth, which was tantamount to their subordination to Advaita Vedānta. To quote HALBFASS (p. 356):

‘The two traditions (i.e. Jainism and Advaita Vedānta) claim to include and fulfil other doctrines—as a perspectivistic or a hierarchically subsuming inclusivism. They claim that in their ultimate and perhaps hidden meaning these doctrines converge in what is clearly and explicitly

⁴² On Praśastapāda, see BRONKHORST (1996); on Uddyotakara, see the final colophon of the *Nyāya-vārttika*; INGALLS (1962: 284); on Bhāsarvajña, see SARMA (1934); on Vādi Vāgīśvara, see RAGHAVAN (1942). See also GERSCHHEIMER (2007: 240): ‘l'on regroupe le Nyāya et le Vaiśeṣika sous une même étiquette—parfois *tarka*, ou *śaiva*.’

taught in Advaita Vedānta (or in Jainism according to the Jains). This is expressly stated in the introductory verse of the *Sarvasiddhānta-saṁgraha* of Ps.-Śaṅkara: that which, in a variety of forms, all philosophical doctrines express, is the *one* Brahman which is taught by the Upaniṣadic Vedānta.’

But also Bhavya, a Buddhist author of the Madhyamaka school, has an inclusivist attitude with regard to the other schools of thought he describes. As he put it:⁴³

‘The Blessed One has taught the very existence (*astitva*) of the Self (*ātman*) in order to divert (i.e. to remonstrate) those who grasp non-existence and advocate non-existence, [and] those whose minds are impaired by the view (*dr̥ṣṭi*) which negates (*apavāda*) causality (*hetu-phala*). He attracts those and in order to stop attachment to the grasping of a Self (*ātmagraha*) among the adherents of a Self (*ātmaśāstra*), he teaches: “The Self does not exist” (*ātmā nāsti*). Conventionally (*saṁvṛtitaḥ*), he teaches the abandonment of the Self, and to those who are endowed with receptivity (*kṣānti*) for the vast and profound doctrine (*dharma*), he teaches that in ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ*) there is neither Self (*ātman*) nor non-Self (*anātman*). Thus the very teachings in the many preachings (*pravacana*) of the Blessed One are taught in accordance with relative (*saṁvṛti*) and absolute (*paramārtha*) [truth (*satya*)], so there is no contradiction (*virodha*).’

It can easily be seen that several religio-philosophical groups allowed, even encouraged, their followers to study other systems of thought in detail. It would be worth a separate study to see whether and to what extent the history of Indian philosophy manifests a development from confrontation to subordination. Whatever the outcome of such a study, it seems clear that the answer to our riddle may have to be looked for in the peculiar nature of Jainism, Advaita Vedānta, Madhyamaka Buddhism, and perhaps other schools, which took a wider view of reality, in which there was also place for alternative philosophical positions.

⁴³ *Tarka-jvālā* on *Madhamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* 8.88, as translated by QVARNSTRÖM (1989: 106–107); cited in KIBLINGER (2005: 51).

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Pramāṇa, Logic and Belief

CLAUS OETKE

— 1 —

Unlike many papers read on conferences about Indian philosophy the present essay will not primarily deal with something which is found in texts but something which is not found, or more exactly with something which is conspicuous by its absence. The idea of belief or some comparable notion can hardly be encountered as a topic in textual passages in which epistemological issues are discussed, and this holds good in particular for passages dealing with the so-called *pramāṇas* as well as those which focus on matters that are commonly considered as topics of logic in its Indian variety. This is a remarkable fact even if hardly anybody has found that circumstance surprising. But the topics of *pramāṇas* and of ‘Indian Logic’ in particular are in fact essentially related to the issue of belief, and objective connections between those phenomena exist in various regards.

An adequate assessment of the relations between *pramāṇa*, logic and belief requires, however, a terminological clarification or more precisely an elimination of possible misconceptions as far as belief is concerned. Presumably there are intuitions that suggest a contrast between the notions of logic and belief. Those who feel that logic is intimately connected with truth and knowledge whereas belief has its place in religion or generally in areas in which safe knowledge can hardly be attained are probably influenced by such intuitions. But what is the basis of these impressions? I remember that in school I once gave an explanation of ‘belief’ which reads as follows:

Belief is if one regards something as true without knowing that it is true.

Nowadays I regard this definition as incorrect and I believe to know why that error arose. A concise description of the mistake is that the idea that lack of a certain ingredient is an essential feature of a concept had been amalgamated with the idea that lack of a certain feature is an essential ingredient of a concept. In other words, from the fact that something is not implied by a term it had been inferred that the term

implies the exclusion of the pertinent semantic ingredient. Such a derivation is surely illegitimate. Using linguistic terminology one can say that 'believe' is in contrast to 'know' a 'non-factive' verb. By attributing to a person a belief one does not presuppose that that which is believed is true. But although it is indeed correct to say that somebody might believe something without knowing it this does not entail that nobody can both believe and know one and the same thing (at the same time). As far as one can see the only reasons which are suited to induce the impression that believing something excludes knowledge are connected with presumably universal principles of linguistic behaviour but not with the conceptual content of 'belief' and 'knowledge'. It might be noted in passing that precisely this circumstance could partly explain why belief has not been made topical in Indian theories of *pramāṇa* because of the mistaken idea of a contrast between belief and knowledge. At any rate, I adopt here a view which is widely accepted nowadays, namely that knowledge entails belief but not vice versa, or to put the point in a more stylish manner: 'NN knows that p' entails 'NN believes that p' but not the other way around. The tenet of entailment between knowledge and belief could arouse feelings of uneasiness in view of phenomena of 'implicit knowledge'. Perhaps we should say that every competent speaker of English knows that the following sentence

(i) If everybody go to this meetings then he are not happy.

is grammatically incorrect. But is it equally correct to say that every native speaker of English believes that the above cited sentence is incorrect? Nevertheless, in the present context complications of this sort can be set aside because it suffices to assume that according to a standard way of using terms of knowledge an implication between knowing and believing holds true.

Against the background of the preceding conceptual elucidations one can easily convince himself of the fact that posing questions concerning relations between logic and belief *can* be important and relevant. Two examples suffice for an illustration of this point:

(Q1) If (a proposition) P logically implies (a proposition) Q, does it hold true for everybody that if he knows P he believes Q?

(Q2) If (a proposition) P logically implies (a proposition) Q, does it hold true for everybody that if he knows P and believes Q he knows Q?

A negative answer to Q1 casts a light on the common concept of belief, whereas an affirmative answer would be suited to arouse questions concerning some pertinent concept of belief or logical implication or both. The high relevance of Q2 can be gathered from the consideration that if, given identical concepts of knowing and believing, different answers could be legitimately given to the question, the differ-

ence would necessitate the supposition of deviant concepts of logical implication. One can thus *a priori* establish that if an affirmative answer would be suitable with respect to (a number of) logical theories of the Western tradition whereas a negative answer would be appropriate to (a number of) doctrines that are commonly acknowledged as logical theories of the Indian tradition, then the concepts of the notion of logical implication and presumably the import of the term ‘logical’ must be essentially different in both cases, provided that the deviant verdicts concerning Q2 result on the basis of identical concepts of belief and knowledge. That suffices for a justification of the claim that the mutual connection of the notions of logic, knowledge and belief is an issue of fundamental importance for the assessment and understanding of the area which is often designated by the term ‘Indian Logic’ and that this holds good independently of empirical details.

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Before assessing the question of the treatment of belief in textual sources a further terminological specification concerning the noun ‘belief’ and the verb ‘to believe’ is required. The verb occurs both in contexts such as

(ii) Karl believes in acupuncture.

as well as in

(iii) Karl believes that Kathmandu is the capital of Bhutan.

Only the usage of ‘believe’ in the last example and the corresponding notion of belief will be the topic of the present discussion. It can be set apart from other possible uses of the word by the criterion that ‘to believe’ is replaceable by ‘to regard as true’ and the corresponding concept could be distinguished by a term such as ‘T-belief’, where ‘T’ signals the specific connection between believing something and regarding something as true. Nevertheless, in the subsequent paragraphs the word ‘belief’ or ‘believe’ will be used throughout, so that one must be aware of the fact that a conceptual specification is involved here. It might be worthwhile to note in passing another factor that could have contributed to an unwarranted neglect of the notion of ‘belief’ in epistemological treatises of the Indian tradition: Philosophically relevant notions or concepts are often not made available by words of a language in a ready made form but must be distilled from current usages of linguistic expressions.

The following examples serve as illustrations and should convey a clearer idea of the exact manner in which the phenomenon of belief in the sense of regarding as true without involving any commitment about actual truth has been disregarded. In

the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* in which the relevant items acknowledged in the Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy have been systematically classified mental entities, in particular mental events or states have been relegated to the domain of the category ‘Quality’ (*guṇa*). In this treatise six mental qualities are made topical, five of which, namely ‘pleasure’ (*sukha*), ‘pain’ (*duḥkha*), ‘desire’ (*icchā*), ‘dislike’ (*dveṣa*) and ‘effort’ (*prayatna*), cannot be equated with belief in any sense of the word and relate to clearly distinct phenomena of the mental realm. In contrast to these the item which the text mentions in the first place, namely *buddhi*, exhibits an undeniable connection with the cognitive sphere. The two most fundamental statements concerning *buddhi* which the text makes are the following: 1) The terms *buddhi*, *upalabdhi*, *jñāna* and *pratyaya* are equivalent (*pariyāya*). 2) There are two main varieties of *buddhi*, namely ‘knowledge’ (*vidyā*) and ‘non-knowledge’ (*avidyā*). It is easy to see that the term *buddhi*, which might be rendered here by ‘cognition’, exhibits a significant trait which it shares with the concept of belief as explicated above. Both belief and *buddhi* have in common that they lack entailments with respect to actual truth or more precisely: the extent to which those terms refer to mental states involving a relation to something that can be true the existence of that relation does not presuppose the factual truth of the pertinent relatum. But *buddhi* in the sense of the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* represents a more general concept and can never be equated with belief. There are two items belonging to the non-knowledge variety of *buddhi* which obviously do not involve that something is regarded as true by anybody, namely ‘doubt’ (*saṁśaya*) and ‘non-ascertainment’ (*anadhyavasāya*). The latter term is significant insofar as it is explained by examples in which persons who are in a perceptual position which could permit them to classify certain objects do in fact not classify them in some pertinent regard. Accordingly, they suggest a close affinity between the correlating non-negated term *adhyavasāya* and the concept of ‘judgement’ which has played and sometimes still plays a prominent role in Western philosophy. The latter term is significantly related to the concept of belief inasmuch as judging that something is the case represents a typical manner of acquiring a belief. Nevertheless, although the term *adhyavasāya* explicitly occurs in the section that deals with non-ascertainment the text provides no clue as to whether it denotes a mental act that presupposes the truth of some object of ascertainment or not. Everything which the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* says in connection with *adhyavasāya* or *anadhyavasāya* is, so far as one can see, perfectly compatible with the assumption that the root from which it is derived is a factive verb and thus belongs to the same category as ‘know’, ‘regret’ etc. The same holds true regarding the term *nirṇaya* that appears in the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* in connection with an assessment of the outcome of the operation of the two *pramāṇas* ‘perception’ and ‘inference’. To be sure, there is no definite evidence that could rule out that those words or par-

ticular occurrences of certain other terms such as *avadhāraṇa* are meant to denote acts of judgement that do not presuppose truth. But the very fact that those terms are left undetermined seems to betray that non-factive notions like believing or judging had not evoked the interest of the author. The same diagnosis can be given regarding the *Tarka-saṃgraha*, a work which represents the later tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to this text ‘cognition’, represented by the terms *buddhi* as well as *jñāna*, comprises two varieties, namely (1) ‘remembrance’ (*smṛti*) and (2) ‘experience’ (*anubhava*). Since the text declares concerning the latter term that it comprises two varieties, namely a) ‘corresponding to an object’ (*yathârtha*) and b) ‘not corresponding to an object’ (*ayathârtha*) one could be tempted to believe that the pertinent notion exhibits an affinity to that of belief inasmuch as it specifically relates to acquisitions of new beliefs concerning some object irrespective of whether the concerned beliefs are true or false. However, the elucidations that are given in connection with the *ayathârtha*-type suffice to show that this equation must be erroneous. For according to the text there are three varieties of this type, namely (i) doubt (*saṃśaya*), (ii) error (*viparyaya*) and (iii) counterfactual reasoning (*tarka*). The occurrence of the first sub-variety makes it impossible to equate *anubhava* with either judgement or belief. The last variety on the other hand excludes an identification of *yathârtha* with ‘true’. For according to the *Tarka-saṃgraha*, *tarka* is instantiated by counterfactual deliberations such as ‘If fire would not occur then smoke would not occur either’. According to a natural understanding, counterfactual propositions like the cited one can be true, and it appears evident that the term *yathârtha* possesses a restricted import corresponding to its compositional semantic value ‘as an object’ or ‘as its object’ so that it can only refer to judgements which ascribe to really existing entities attributes which they in fact possess. Although the terms *buddhi*, *jñāna* and *anubhava* according to the elucidations which the text provides subsume a range of phenomena that could be plausibly considered as involving acquisitions of beliefs, none of them can be equated with notions like ‘judgement’, ‘belief’ or ‘acquisition of belief’. On the one hand they are too general, because of the inclusion of states of doubt, and on the other hand they are too restrictive, because they do not provide room for other types of hypothetical judgements apart from a special variety of counterfactual deliberations or other non-hypothetical judgements apart from those that pertain to atomic subject-predicate propositions. Sources of the Nyāya-school, such as the *Nyāya-sūtras* and the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, reveal a similar lack of interest concerning notions equivalent to ‘judgement’ or ‘belief’. The terms *buddhi* and *jñāna* occur equally in many places in the *Nyāya-sūtras* (NS), and those items even occupy a prominent place because in NS 1.1.9 *buddhi* is explicitly mentioned as a member of the category ‘objects of cognition’ (*prameya*) and NS 1.1.15 declares that *buddhi*, *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* are

equivalent (*buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthāntaram*). However, in view of NS 1.1.10 which says that desire, dislike, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition are the characteristic of the soul (*icchā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duḥkha-jñānāny ātmano liṅgam*) one should suspect that in a similar manner as in the Vaiśeṣika *jñāna* is a general notion that is meant to comprise all mental phenomena which are neither volitional nor emotional or sensational. Since *jñāna* in its technical sense should relate to mental entities that possess the duration of a single moment, this term is at any rate unsuited to represent a dispositional state like belief. On the other hand various occurrences of *upalabdhi* show that the term refers to mental acts that have concrete objects, such as material substances or qualities as objects, see e.g. NS 3.1.10, 3.1.26 etc. And the same holds probably good for a number of uses of the terms that are declared to be its equivalents, see e.g. NS 3.2.33. The term *nirṇaya*, which occurs in the enumeration of the Nyāya-categories in NS 1.1.1, seems to represent a notion that is closer to the ideas of judgement and belief insofar as it apparently denotes an attitude which concerns objects that are capable of being true. Nevertheless the definition provided by NS 1.1.41 which says that *nirṇaya* is the ascertainment of a matter after deliberating over it by means of a position and a counter-position (*vimṛśya pakṣa-pratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇam nirṇayaḥ*) betrays that the term can refer to judgements at best with respect to specific situations occurring in debates. In the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* this problem is recognised and at the end of his explanation of NS 1.1.41 the author of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* states that the same sort of ascertainment equally occurs without deliberations concerning a thesis and a counter-thesis as a result of perception (*na cāyam nirṇaye niyamaḥ vimṛśyāva pakṣa-pratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇam nirṇaya iti. kintu indriyārthasannikarṣōtpanna-pratyakṣe 'rthāvadhāraṇam nirṇaya iti*). A reference to belief itself could be assumed in the definition of 'example' (*dṛṣṭānta*) which is given in NS 1.1.25 and which reads: *laukika-parīkṣakānām yasminn arthe buddhi-sāmyam sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ*. For a natural translation of this sentence could be: 'An object regarding which there is an agreement of beliefs/opinions/views of ordinary men and experts is an example.' Nevertheless, neither here nor in the preceding passage of NS 1.1.14 is it absolutely certain that the pertinent terms *nirṇaya*, *arthāvadhāraṇa* and *buddhi* are meant to represent non-factual concepts like 'judgement' and 'belief'. For the hypothesis that translations such as '*Nirṇaya* is the true ascertainment of a matter after deliberating over it by means of a position and a counter-position' or 'An object regarding which there is an agreement of true beliefs of ordinary men and experts is an example' represent the intended import of the concerned statements is not at all eccentric and commentaries like the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* do not disconfirm such an understanding. The fact that the words *nirṇaya*, *avadhāraṇa* and *buddhi* do not embody a factual import by virtue of their linguistic meaning can

surely not refute that supposition. As far as I can see there is only one unambiguous reference to a non-factive notion of belief or conviction which occurs in NS 2.1.3 *vipratipattau ca sampratipatteḥ*. For there is no reason to question the interpretation suggested by the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, at least to the extent that this phrase expresses the thought that situations in which differences of opinions exist are situations in which different persons have in common that they are convinced of contrary propositions. Since among contrary propositions at least one of them cannot be true the term *sampratipatti* cannot represent a factive notion and the assumption that it should relate to states of belief or conviction appears very plausible. At the same time, however, one must acknowledge the fact that the statement of NS 2.1.3 occurs in the context of a deliberation about the origins of doubt and this is a topic which is at best remotely connected with that of logic in any defensible meaning of this term.

Seen in this light one could be tempted to ask: ‘What have belief and logic in common in Indian philosophy and what could justify a symposium with the title ‘Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy’?’

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It appears advisable to transcend the narrow framework of a purely immanent perspective. For even if it should turn out that the Indian tradition itself has nothing or little significant to say about relations between logic and belief in some sense of those two terms it does not follow that nothing significant *can* be said. Let us therefore have a closer look at the issue as to whether the subject-matter associated with the denomination ‘Indian Logic’ is *objectively* connected with the phenomenon of belief if one hypothesises the notion of ‘belief’ that has been explicated in the first chapter.

The topic of ‘Indian Logic’ appears under an internal perspective as a component of the comprehensive area of epistemology and in particular of the theory of *pramāṇas*. Given the assumption that this outlook is not completely erroneous it emerges that logic in its Indian variety and belief are in fact significantly related and that this holds even true in various respects. The expression *pramāṇa* is rendered by ‘means of knowledge’, ‘means of (right) cognition’, and in the German tradition often by ‘Erkenntnismittel’ or even ‘Mittel gültiger Erkenntnis’. All these expressions suggest that *pramāṇa* is instrumental in the acquisition of knowledge and one could even surmise that ‘means of acquisition of knowledge’ would be a very apt rendering of this expression. But if it is true that a *pramāṇa* is instrumental for the acquisition of knowledge it must equally hold good that a *pramāṇa* is a means for the acquisition of belief given the above claimed entailment between knowledge and belief. Nevertheless, this fact alone cannot suffice for a vindication of the contention

that one should explicitly attribute to *pramāṇas* a function with respect to belief. Inasmuch as an accelerator is an instrument for an increase of speed it is also an instrument for the change of speed, but the characterisation of an accelerator as a means to increase speed appears more significant than to characterise it as a means for changing speed. By the same token one could argue that a characterisation of *pramāṇas* as a means for the acquisition of beliefs is less significant than its characterisation as a means for the acquisition of knowledge. It could therefore appear that emphasising links between logic and belief in Indian philosophy is more misleading than revealing. This objection could be set aside if one were able to show that, even given that the equation between *pramāṇa* and ‘means of knowledge’ is at least roughly correct, the notion of *pramāṇa* is connected with the notion of belief in other ways than merely by the circumstance that anything that applies to knowledge equally applies to belief because every state of knowledge is a state of belief.

The claim that *pramāṇa* is related to belief in a more significant manner than the one depicted above rests on the theses that (1) *pramāṇas* themselves, i.e. items designated by the term *pramāṇa*, are related to states of belief not only by some sort of instrumental relation, (2) theories of *pramāṇa* are linked with belief on account of methodological connections and (3) an *objectively* proper explication or definition of the term *pramāṇa* would contain reference to belief as an ingredient. The first two points possess a special significance because they manifest different respects in which empirical knowledge is relevant for philosophical undertakings. Inasmuch as the contention of a significant relation between logic in its Indian variety and belief is concerned, it can be vindicated on account of three sorts of connection that are correlates of (1)–(3), namely (a) belief is a relevant object of cognitive processes which are an object of concern in ‘Indian logic’, (b) acquisition of belief constitutes a phenomenon that is methodologically important for the establishment of theories of the concerned type and (c) the ideas of belief and acquisition of belief are needed for a description of the nature of pertinent logical doctrines.

Ad (1)

In the context of doctrines of *pramāṇa* belief comes into play as a relevant object in two regards. Belief is a possible object of a most significant variety of *pramāṇa* and it is an important type of object of that variety. The fact that inference (*anumāna*) plays a central role in doctrines of *pramāṇa* is beyond any reasonable doubt. It is equally plain that ‘inference’ in this context must be taken to represent a broad notion allowing for a subsumption of inferential activities taking place in everyday practice. If one poses the question as to what types of entities are the most common objects of inferences in common life, the following answer appears indis-

putable: states of beliefs are typical objects. Even against the background of an immanent perspective it is appropriate to assign to beliefs a distinguished status among the possible objects of inference. The tenet that states of beliefs of other people cannot be directly observed by ordinary men is, as far as one can see, universally acknowledged in the Indian philosophical and non-philosophical tradition. On the other hand, recognition of unobservable objects is at various places in the textual sources depicted as a distinguishing mark of inference.

The fact that knowledge of states of belief can be equally considered as a result of verbal communication in combination with the circumstance that some textual sources suggest such a view does not refute the contention that belief represents a most important kind of objects of central varieties of *pramāṇa*. Even against the background of statements that assign to the *pramāṇa* 'word' or 'linguistic communication' (*śabda*) a particular relevance for the recognition of unobservable entities, the assignment of a prominent status to beliefs as objects remains valid. On the one hand, with the exception of the minority group which acknowledges only perception as a *pramāṇa*, it is generally assumed that the importance of certain varieties of means of knowledge lies in their capacity to make imperceivable objects recognisable, irrespective of variations of detail as far as the question is concerned as to whether the concerned objects can be even imperceivable in principle. Accordingly, it is at most of secondary importance what the varieties of *pramāṇa* performing such a function are called and how they are described. It is anyway doubtful whether the debates concerning the sub-classification of *pramāṇas* and their exact number concern a substantial issue. For without the lack of explicit criteria for the identity of types of *pramāṇa* it is not sure that deliberations of this sort possess significance and even if explicit criteria were stipulated it would not follow that a number of alternatives cannot be equally legitimate. At any rate, given that the standard type of inference that is explicated in the framework of 'Indian Logic' as well as in the context of *pramāṇa*-theories concerns the acknowledgement of facts which can be derived from certain data on the additional supposition that some pertinent case does not deviate from a norm (in some or the other sense of the term), an extension to the area of linguistic communication is apposite. The same considerations which have been put forward as arguments supporting the claim that acts of linguistic communication create under certain conditions a basis for the recognition of facts which are communicated can be equally used to support the claim that acts of linguistic communication are suited to convey the existence of particular beliefs on the part of communicating subjects. The basis is in all cases an assumption of compliance with regularities. In fact, the descriptions offered by the texts usually suggest that the existence of situations described by linguistic expressions can only be validly derived on the hypothesis of a corresponding belief. As a matter of fact, one can

hardly dispute that if an act of communication, say an assertion of NN to the effect that P, constitutes a valid basis for the acquisition of the knowledge that P on the part of some other person, a recognition of a corresponding belief of the speaker on the part of the recipient is at least sometimes, if not even regularly, an indispensable requirement.¹ Moreover, it is plain that acts of verbal communication are not the only basis for knowledge of other person's belief; the common basis of such knowledge is behaviour in general in combination with assumptions concerning wishes, desires or preferences of other beings.

The circumstance that beliefs are not only possible but even important objects of pieces of inferential reasoning is due on the one hand to the pervasiveness of their occurrence in human beings and on the other hand to the importance of knowledge about beliefs for the acquisition of knowledge of other matters such as states-of-affairs which other people consider as true, of actual or possible behaviour of people, of human character, of the import of acts of communication etc. For such reasons belief deserves to play a central role in the humanities. Knowledge of the mechanisms of belief acquisition is particularly important for making predictions in the realm of social life.

Belief as an object of knowledge possesses even epistemological relevance under the aspect of the issue as to how knowledge about belief can be attained in special cases. Concerning the question as to what is generally required for having knowledge of other persons' beliefs a natural answer would be that an essential requirement is the existence and knowledge of some piece of evidence, in particular some linguistic or non-linguistic (way of) behaviour. This is a picture which is equally suggested, although as far as one can see not explicitly stated, in Indian epistemological treatises. But is that true? The issue which is at stake is crucial because it affects the methodology of historical studies on philosophy. According to an alternative view, which I consider as correct, the above depicted 'behavioural evidence' account of knowledge of belief is inadequate because in certain instances possession of adequate evidence is insufficient. What is acquired in addition is the possibility of providing a plausible account of why and how a considered possible belief could have been adopted. An important reason for advocating a stricter standard of knowledge concerning belief is rooted in the phenomenon of linguistic indeterminacy. It happens that even in view of contextual features different and non-equivalent hypotheses concerning interpretation are admissible and that the ascription of non-equivalent beliefs on the basis linguistic acts are equally compatible with all fea-

¹ Here one can leave out of account the doctrine that the eternal words of the *Veda* constitute valid means for the recognition of certain (non mental) facts, because on the one hand this opinion is merely shared by certain groups and on the other hand even the proponents of this doctrine allow for the possibility of acquiring knowledge by ordinary acts of communication.

tures of linguistic behaviour. If the pertinent interpretations and the corresponding belief-ascriptions differ regarding the possibility of providing a plausible account of their origination or the rationality of their adoption, a decision between the alternatives would have to rely on those considerations. Or one could say, more cautiously, that if definite knowledge of beliefs is possible in such cases then considerations pertaining to behavioural evidence must be supplemented by considerations pertaining to rational intelligibility. Is thus explicability or rationality a means of knowledge on the same par with perception, inference etc.? In the context of linguistic communication one could provide additional support for such a view by referring to cases in which speakers employ linguistically indeterminate forms of expression in connection with expectations to the effect that interpreters will apply considerations of intelligibility including considerations pertaining to the explicability and rationality of beliefs for an interpretation of their utterances. It is not necessary to pursue this issue deeper here. But the point should be noted that this phenomenon manifests that considerations pertaining to empirical matters, such as the way in which linguistic communication is related to belief and knowledge about belief, are potentially relevant for the detection of problems arising in philosophical investigations.

If belief possesses so much epistemological significance merely as a possible object of knowledge one could wonder why many if not the overwhelming majority of textual sources fails to assign to belief a special significance in the above discussed respects. Why did authors writing on *pramāṇa* miss the opportunity to highlight the importance of their topic by stressing the fact that their investigations pertain to the methodological equipment of acquiring knowledge about other person's beliefs? On the one hand, this omission can appear intelligible in view of the fact that in the context of the philosophical literature *pramāṇas* were naturally brought in connection with the ascertainment of theoretical propositions, in particular tenets that belong to the field of metaphysics and sometimes also to religion. Under such a perspective it is natural to think that one should ascertain in the first place how the world really is rather than what individual people believe about it. On the other hand, however, functions are attributed to *pramāṇas* which are objectively related to successful practice—and this connection has been even explicitly acknowledged in the Indian philosophical tradition. Since at least in the social sphere success of practice is intimately connected with knowledge of what people believe, the degree of lack of attention regarding belief exhibited by treatises on *pramāṇa* is by no means a matter of course. The relevance of knowledge about beliefs of people exists independently of whether the concerned beliefs are true or not. The same holds true for knowledge pertaining to the mechanisms which are at work in the acquisition of beliefs. It is a well known fact that success on the stock market crucially depends on

the ability of recognising not only what other people believe but also of predicting what people will believe irrespective of the truth of their beliefs. What matters is a sufficiently firm grasp of the mechanisms which are actually at work in the acquisition of beliefs. Possibly the overwhelming emphasis on knowledge in theories of *pramāṇa* has favoured a neglect of all the aspects of belief which are not immediately related to the *contrast* between (mere) belief and knowledge.

It has to be admitted that from the circumstance that some topic is objectively important it does not follow that it deserves to occupy a prominent place in epistemological theories. Moreover, given the existence of momentous divergences between the modern world and the world which the creators of theories of *pramāṇa* experienced, there is no *a priori* basis for being surprised if our attributions of importance to phenomena and those of past writers radically differ. Therefore the fact is significant that the preceding considerations do not yet provide an exhaustive account of the issue. One reason is that the very nature of the undertaking of elaborating a theory of means of acquisition of knowledge bestows importance to adoptions of beliefs. Given the correctness of the previously suggested explication of *pramāṇa*, the attribution of vital relevance to the phenomenon of belief-acquisition can be immanently derived from the idea of a doctrine of *pramāṇas*.

Ad (2)

It is the methodological aspect that establishes a most significant relationship of relevance between a philosophical theory of *pramāṇa*, taken as something involving a specification of possible means of acquisition of knowledge or of possible justifications for knowledge claims, on the one hand and investigations of actual ways of acquiring beliefs on the other. A main reason lies in the comprehensive, and, so to speak, topic-neutral character of such a theory. A philosopher wanting to investigate the nature of knowledge will surely not be satisfied by listing everything which in his opinion is an instance of this notion. But even if he did, he would not be well advised to begin with collecting items which instantiate that term because a crucial problem lies in the fact that his personal opinions about what counts as knowledge and what does not might not be shared by everybody. Moreover, an adversary could rightly object that if an enumeration of all items satisfying a term should specify its import or nature then the question becomes vital whether our philosopher counts as knowledge his personal opinions about knowledge and whether he allocates his belief about the correctness of the outcome of his own investigations to the realm of knowledge. Thus a vicious circle threatens. On the other hand, it cannot be a satisfactory procedure to pick out certain items which are commonly acknowledged as instances of the notion of knowledge. For the general and comprehensive nature of

the envisaged investigation forbids one to start with a partial selection and on the other hand one could expect from a philosophical investigation concerning knowledge that it does not merely tell us what people generally believe to be an instance of knowledge but also embodies a critical examination whether or not the concerned beliefs are justified and conveys some idea about what does not fall under the notion and why this should be so. Isn't it therefore recommendable to tackle the pertinent problem by investigating properties of a notion that deviates from knowledge exactly by lacking the commitment of truth which is inherent in that notion? Belief exhibits this feature. Moreover, a reliable assessment of what people actually believe does not appear unrealistic. There is no need to enumerate all instances of this notion. The general and topic neutral nature of the project entails merely that all relevant types of belief occurring in all areas of possible knowledge are accounted for. To be sure, it cannot be *a priori* guaranteed that actual accounts using this method fail to be exhaustive in this regard. It is even conceivable that lack of exhaustiveness is unavoidable due to the circumstance that relevant types of belief have not occurred in the society which is accessible to the investigator, and a glimpse on the Indian intellectual tradition seems to show that this is not merely a theoretical possibility. Nevertheless, all those impediments also affect a procedure starting from the notion of knowledge. Therefore the advantage of avoidance of circularity characterising the approach by belief is decisive.

To be sure, in a philosophical context not every *a posteriori* investigation and classification of actually occurring beliefs and their possible objects is meaningful. But *some* classifications are in fact philosophically relevant. At the beginning of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* it is stated that an agent of cognition after having apprehended an object by means of knowledge desires either to acquire or to get rid of that object (*pramāṇena khalv ayaṁ jñātārtham upalabhya tam artham abhīpsati*—variant reading: *tam īpsati vā jihāsati vā*). Apparently the writer of the text thinks here that an 'apprehension' of an object represents something which is brought about by a *pramāṇa* as a means, and the object can hardly be something else than a concrete particular because otherwise it would be hard to see how that could become an object of desire or aversion. In the light of the general conception of *pramāṇa* as a means of (the acquisition) of knowledge this is puzzling given that this characterisation appears to rule out from the outset knowledge pertaining to abstract entities. If somebody recognises that the number 321 can be divided by three, does he thereby develop a desire to acquire or get rid of that object? Maybe, the remark concerning the alleged consequences of 'apprehensions' by a *pramāṇa* are not really essential, but another component of the pertinent conception, namely that *pramāṇas* are means of apprehending objects seems to be a vital ingredient of such theories. As we had seen before, the *Tarka-saṁgraha* distinguishes between experiences that

are in accordance with the object (*yathârtha*) and experiences which are not (*ayathârtha*). The four *pramāṇas* acknowledged in this work are viewed as instruments for the former type of cognition, which is according to the text designated by the term *pramā*. Such experiences are defined as cognitions classifying objects as they really are, for example a cognition (*jñāna*) with respect to a piece of silver that it is silver. Regarding the other type the author of the work remarks that it is an experience that classifies something as something which it is not and that the cognition with respect to a conch-shell ‘this is silver’ represents an example. (*tad-vati tat-prakāraḥ ’nubhavo yathârthaḥ. yathā rajata idaṁ rajatam iti jñānam. sa eva pramēty ucyate. tad-abhāva-vati tat-prakāraḥ ’nubhavo ’yathârthaḥ. yathā śaktāv idaṁ rajatam iti jñānam*—the second and the last sentence is missing in some manuscripts). This shows two things: (1) The expression *jñāna* appears (in this passage and elsewhere) as a non-factive term, applying to *yathârtha* experiences such as ‘this is silver’ with respect to silver as well as to *ayathârtha* experiences such as the above cited one. (2) Both types of ‘experiences’ appear to correspond to a three place relation between a subject, an object and some mode of conceiving an object that could be represented by a sentence-scheme such as ‘A apprehends B in the manner C’. Accordingly, the nature of this experience must be closely akin to the states that are described by sentence-forms such as ‘A regards B as (a) C’ and ‘A believes B to be (a) C’. Irrespective of whether we even identify the pertinent cognitions as beliefs or acquisitions of beliefs or not, the following question is relevant: ‘Must belief always be analysed as a relation that holds good between a subject, an object and a way of viewing an object?’ There is no doubt about the correct answer: ‘This is not true’. Cases exist in which belief *cannot* be analysed in this way. People can believe that Hanuman fought against Rāvaṇa, and for the existence of this belief it is absolutely immaterial that Hanuman and Rāvaṇa probably never existed, so that such a belief cannot consist in a relation of viewing-as concerning certain objects on the part of a subject. It is equally difficult to see how a conception of belief as a relation between a believer and a particular object can do justice to beliefs pertaining to non specified objects, i.e. states of beliefs which are ascribed to some believing subject by sentences such as ‘A believes that a/some cat is on the mat’ (according to their most natural reading) and how those theories can account for the difference between such a belief and a belief which would be expressed by ‘A believes that his cat is on the mat.’ We had seen above that the *Tarka-saṁgraha* itself mentions counterfactual propositions like ‘If fire did not exist, smoke would not exist either.’ Those who persist in thinking that such sentences should be understood as expressing relations between (real) fire and (real) smoke should also consider counterfactuals such as: ‘If a second sun existed it could be much warmer.’ There should be no need to elaborate in more detail that there are a lot of actual or

possible beliefs that cannot be analysed in the manner suggested by the *Tarka-saṁgraha*, the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* and other sources. If one wants to specify a more general form and simultaneously wishes to preserve the conception of belief as a relation it would be more suitable to analyse it as a relation between a subject and an abstract entity that can be denoted by 'that'-clauses, but is surely not well suited as an object of acquisition or avoidance or of corresponding desires.

The upshot is that an analysis of belief reveals in a more immediate manner than an analysis of knowledge why theories of *pramāṇa* are threatened by crucial deficiencies. An advocate of the *pramāṇa*-tradition might argue that one should refrain from classifying as knowledge propositional attitudes pertaining to fictions. After all, the writer of the *Tarka-saṁgraha* explicitly assigns 'experiences' referring to counterfactual propositions to the realm of *tarka* which is subsumed under the category of experiences that do not correspond to an object, i.e. which are *ayathārtha*. But against the background of belief such a move turns out to be futile. The fact that beliefs can pertain to fictions is undeniable. It can equally be hardly denied that such beliefs can be true.—After all, if Hanuman did not exist, the belief that Hanuman did not exist should be true.—Accordingly, the question as to which factors either guarantee or increase the probability that if beliefs occur they are also true, irrespective of whether or not they are *de re* beliefs, i.e. beliefs about actually existing objects, is not spurious. If 'knowledge' were defined in such a manner that in principle all true beliefs could be classified as knowledge, then it follows that the question as to which factors might guarantee or enhance the probability of the occurrence of knowledge cannot be solved by taking only *de re* beliefs into consideration. If, on the other hand, one defined knowledge in some narrower sense then the aim of specifying all relevant factors for its existence might be attainable even if one restricted one's attention to particular varieties of belief, but in this case the *relevance of achieving* the pertinent aim becomes questionable. By considering the phenomenon of belief without supposing an artificially restricted meaning of the term the entire range of phenomena can be discerned which any theory of means of knowledge or means of acquisition of knowledge must account for if it should be both correct and relevant.

Not only accounts of the nature of belief, but also a survey of manners of acquisition of beliefs is methodologically relevant for a theoretical account of means of knowledge. A first question that should be posed is: (a) 'Are *all* beliefs acquired?'. This question is not spurious because the view that there are innate beliefs is not absurd. Another question that must be equally considered is: (b) 'Are *all* beliefs that are acquired, acquired by experience?'. Obviously the notion of acquisition of a belief is vague to some extent. Nevertheless, there is a legitimate reading of the term

according to which one could say that a person can acquire the belief that, say Peano's second axiom, which reads

$$(x)(Nx \rightarrow (\exists y)((Ny \ \& \ Syx) \ \& \ (z)(Szx \rightarrow z = y)))$$

and which means in ordinary language

'Every natural number has exactly one successor'

is true. Is such a belief, if it is acquired, acquired by experience? Maybe, a staunch defender of *pramāṇa*-theories of the sort of the doctrine propagated in the *Tarka-saṃgraha* would be inclined to bring the *pramāṇa* 'verbal communication' (*śabda*) into play and point out that ordinary people adopt the belief that Peano's second axiom is true by reading books written by competent mathematicians. But it is not difficult to discern that such a reply misses some most vital points. First one cannot reduce the problem to the acquisition of the *de dicto* belief, that Peano's second axiom is true. Most people who understand the axiom will not merely come to the conclusion that there was some person called 'Peano' who stated some mathematical truth, but they will rather, possibly 'triggered' by reading some book, come to believe that that which the axiom says is true. Should one nevertheless say that persons who believe that it is true that every natural number has exactly one successor after having read a book have adopted their belief by experience? Obviously a distinction must be drawn here. On the one hand one could admit that experiences like reading a book might stimulate persons to grasp the pertinent thought that every natural number possesses just one successor. But this does not entail that a person who has grasped the thought must rely on experience in order to believe it or to recognise that he is justified to believe it because it is true. As a matter of fact, in this regard considerations of trustworthiness of the conveyer of a verbal message, which have usually been considered as an essential ingredient of verbal communication in *pramāṇa*-theories, are quite irrelevant. Acknowledgement of mathematical axioms or proofs only because of the trustworthiness of a person is a deficient manner of adopting a mathematical belief. If anything essentially matters it is insight into the content of a message and not assumptions regarding a conveyer of a message. In view of these facts it could appear natural to retort that theories of *pramāṇa* are meant to account for just one of two aspects of acquisition of knowledge and argue that doctrines like the one proposed in the *Tarka-saṃgraha* are fully adequate because they specify a decisive factor, namely verbal communication, that causes persons to grasp a true thought. But in the final analysis this move is futile. For verbal communication can only serve to impart something which some person—or maybe some god—has recognised as true without being informed by acts of verbal communication. One should note that this view is in complete agreement with state-

ments that can be found in the textual sources about verbal communication as a *pramāṇa*. Accordingly, both grasping the thought which the above cited or some other axiom expresses and recognising its truth—provided it is true—should be possible without relying on any verbal communication as a means of knowledge. The most plausible supposition is that knowledge is at stake which can be acquired without any experience. Anyhow, the question as to whether beliefs pertaining to mathematical axioms or theorems are acquired by experience requires a differentiated answer embodying a reference to the distinction between grasping or entertaining a thought and judging it to be true. Even if acts of grasping thoughts are caused by experiences it does not follow that beliefs in their truth depend on experience. Thus an analysis of certain varieties of belief are suited to reveal crucial distinctions which in their turn throw a different light on the notion of a means of knowledge. This result has not only a bearing on the issue that emerged in the preceding paragraph as to whether ‘rationality’ or terms involving reference to rationality, such as ‘rational intelligibility’ etc., could designate something possessing the status of a means of knowledge. It possesses equally potential relevance for an explication of the notion of a means of knowledge—and the question of the equivalence between ‘means of knowledge’ and *pramāṇa*.

It had been suggested earlier that accounts of ways of acquiring beliefs might be bound to remain deficient due to ‘social’ circumstances because of the fact that a community in which a philosopher was active ignored certain sorts of cognitive practice. Now one can see, why this problem is not merely theoretically conceivable. In contrast to the Western tradition knowledge of mathematical axioms and mathematical proofs was not a central topic in Indian philosophy. The most plausible reason is that mathematical reasoning did not play the same role in ancient Indian communities as in ancient Greek society. This sort of limitation is, however, not peculiar to accounts of acquisitions of beliefs but affect accounts of knowledge and theories of *pramāṇa*, too.

Nonetheless, even under an Indian perspective certain aspects of acquisition of beliefs which are not retrievable from theories of *pramāṇa* could have been detected. The pertinence of the above formulated question, viz. ‘Are *all* beliefs acquired?’, can be recognised without taking special areas of knowledge into consideration. For it is in the first place observation of the world of everyday practice and common sense which undermines confidence in an affirmative answer. Is it reasonable to assert that people at some time acquire the belief that they are living or that other things apart from themselves exist? Perhaps one should even here observe a distinction which has been suggested in the preceding paragraph. For it seems implausible to maintain that very small children grasp the thought that they live or exist. In some sense at least, which involves the idea of grasping a thought, one might say that

people acquire the belief that they exist. In another sense it seems apposite to ascribe even to small children a belief in their existence as well as the existence of an external world, because they behave in ways which (seems to) betray some grasp of a difference between their own existence and that of other persons and objects and because their behaviour could not be regarded as reasonable if the pertinent beliefs were not true. At any rate, given that a person grasps thoughts pertaining to her own existence or the existence of an external world, it appears doubtful that additional experiences are needed in order to make valid assessments of their truth. This suggests the idea that there might be beliefs such that entertaining the thought (proposition) which is their content is sufficient for their truth and beliefs such that a recognition of the truth of their content cannot rely on additional experiences apart from grasping the pertinent content. Beliefs about one's own existence or the existence of an external world are by no means the only candidates for such a status; believing that something is the case and recognising that one is believing this or the proposition expressed by substituting 'thinking' for 'believing' in the preceding sentence could be other examples. At any rate, if one admits that there can be true beliefs classifiable as knowledge which do not require any experiences apart from grasping certain thoughts for a recognition of their truth, one might consider either the act of grasping thoughts as a means of knowledge or accept that states of knowledge occur which do not depend on any means of knowledge. Neither alternative has been accepted in any *pramāṇa*-theory, as far as one can see. It appears even that the latter alternative of knowledge not relying on means of knowledge has been (almost?) unanimously rejected in the Indian philosophical tradition. Seen in the light of the preceding considerations this appears astonishing. One might accordingly think that a different idea has been associated with the term *pramāṇa* and that the possibility of assigning to acts of grasping thoughts the status of a *pramāṇa* should be rejected because *pramāṇa*-theories ask for the primary causes of states of knowledge and therefore cannot recognise that acts of grasping a thought which are caused by different factors are means of knowledge in the pertinent sense. However, this move threatens to be self-defeating. All theories accepting inference as a *pramāṇa*—and this is the overwhelming majority—acknowledge that inferences can and usually are 'triggered off' by acts of perception. As long as not the entire canon of *pramāṇas* is reduced to perception, it needs to be admitted that mental processes that take perceptual data as inputs can in principle occupy the position of a *pramāṇa*. In view of the above mentioned examples of presumably true beliefs or other common examples such as truly believing that one does not experience a severe tooth-ache at present, it is by no means immediately plausible that inference or indicators permitting valid inferences should be a means of knowledge but not processes of grasping a thought, of becoming aware of something, of interpreting data

etc. or their respective objects. Seen from a purely immanent perspective it could be objected that the notion of *pramāṇa* is intimately connected with the notion of the acquisition of new information, so that e.g. acts of obtaining awareness might not appear as suitable candidates for the status of means of knowledge in the relevant sense. However, the notion of new information is affected by crucial vagueness. It is notorious that Dharmakīrti accepted as valid inferences derivations such as ‘A is a tree’ from ‘A is an oak.’ Given that this philosopher accepted also the tenet that a means of knowledge must impart new knowledge that did not exist before, it follows that the proposition that something is a tree must represent new information with respect to the proposition that the entity concerned is an oak. This is by no means a matter of course but might be accepted given a suitable understanding of ‘new information’. The problem is, however, that precisely on this understanding of the notion it becomes difficult to see why subsuming perceptual data under concepts or other varieties of interpretation of data are denied the status of a separate means of knowledge. One could point out that problems of consistency of Dharmakīrti’s theory must not affect in the same way other doctrines of *pramāṇa* because they permit the hypothesis of a stronger reading of ‘new information’, according to which information is new relative to some (set of) data only if its recognition requires additional experience apart from experience of the pertinent data. Accordingly, something can be a *pramāṇa* only if it plays an instrumental role for the acquisition of beliefs which are new in the strong sense. This, however, leads us back to a problem which had been encountered before: Internal consistency might be saved, but this has the price of diminishing the relevance of the entire theory as a general account of knowledge and acquisition of knowledge.

The methodological relevance of accounts concerning belief rests on purely systematic grounds and possesses two facets. First a registration of actually existing types of belief and an analysis of actual ways of belief acquisition constitute a relevant heuristic device for detecting properties of possible knowledge and its acquisition. On the other hand any account that involves a specification of possible sources of knowledge can be effectively controlled by testing whether some pertinent inventory of sources of knowledge exhibits the property that for every variety of belief there is at least one source exemplifying a type occurring in the inventory. Even if a negative result does not immediately necessitate a rejection of the concerned knowledge account it either yields reasons for putting its adequacy into doubt or furnishes motives for specifying some regard in which the account *would* be adequate. Accordingly, the topic of belief and belief acquisition is in principle also relevant for the understanding of theories of *pramāṇa*. Questions of detail as those mentioned in the preceding sections only illustrate the systematic connections.

Ad (3)

The preceding considerations are compatible with the assumption that theories of *pramāṇa* specify factors which are decisive for the possession or acquisition of certain true beliefs. They do not refute the conditional saying that every belief is such that if it has been acquired by means of a *pramāṇa* then it is true and possibly an instance of knowledge. The arguments of the preceding paragraph concern only the contention that the reverse, namely that everything which is an instance of knowledge has been acquired by means of *pramāṇas*, is most probably false and that therefore the methodological relevance of belief casts a critical light on ‘really existing doctrines of *pramāṇa*’. But can one admit that the Indian doctrines of *pramāṇa* identify factors for which it holds true that every belief that depends on those factors is also true and can be classified as an instance of knowledge? My claim is that this is not only not true but that certain textual sources even betray an implicit recognition of this fact.

In the second half of the comments on NS 1.1.3 the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* deals with the question as to whether the different *pramāṇas* pertain to different or to identical objects. The position of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* is that although certain objects can only be vindicated by one specific *pramāṇa* various cases exist in which different *pramāṇas* can have common objects. An example is, among others, the acquisition of knowledge of the occurrence of fire at some place. Somebody might be informed (by a trustworthy person) that fire exists somewhere, somebody might infer the occurrence of the same fire because he perceives smoke and somebody might have a perceptual experience of the fire itself. These different ways of ascertaining the existence of objects might even occur regarding one and the same person. In this connection the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* remarks, however, that some sort of priority needs to be attributed to perception. This is illustrated by the example that somebody first ascertains an object about which he has a desire to acquire knowledge on the basis of verbal cognition but desires to ascertain it also by inference and after this task has been performed still wants to ascertain it by perception. Only after the object has been perceived, the ‘desire to know’ vanishes, according to the opinion of the author (*sā cēyam pramitiḥ pratyakṣa-parā. jijñāsitam artham āptōpadeśāt pratipadyamāno liṅga-darśanenāpi bubhutsate, liṅga-darśanānumitam ca pratyakṣato didṛkṣate, pratyakṣata upalabdhe rthe jijñāsā nivarttate*). The significant fact is that the writer expresses the view that both after verbal communication and after inference a desire to know can persist. To be sure, one *could* interpret this remark as a result of the consideration that a subject might be unsure whether something which appears to him to be based on a *pramāṇa* is really based on a *pramāṇa*. This means that the initial ascertainment by linguistic communication leaves room for the doubt whether

that which the subject cannot distinguish from valid linguistic communication and which would under the hypothesis that it is an instance of valid linguistic communication furnish an appropriate reason for believing that some communicated state of affairs is the case exhibits in fact the property which it appears to exhibit, i.e. whether it really is an instance of valid linguistic communication. Nevertheless, whereas such an interpretation might be acceptable regarding the stage of verbal cognition because misjudgements concerning the reliability of what other people say is not uncommon, a similar diagnosis appears little plausible as far as the stage of inference is concerned. In view of the fact that the standard inference of fire from smoke is pertinent in the present context one must ask: If even in standard cases of inference doubt can persist whether the inference is really valid, how could one rely on inference at all? To be sure, one could imagine that the writer of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* had in mind that in the context of an inference a person can be subject to a perceptual error by considering something as smoke which is not smoke. But if perceptual error is a relevant issue here, then it is hard to understand why the author of the text categorically declares that after perception desire to know comes to an end. The idea that the curiosity is satisfied by perception in particular because in a perceptual situation one recognises a number of characteristic features of an object which cannot be ascertained by means of communication or inference should not be decisive here because the remarks appear in the broader context of a discussion of the phenomenon that different means of cognition can pertain to the same object. Therefore the most plausible hypothesis is that the writer of the text intuited that both verbal communication and inference are relatively fallible and felt that perception possesses a higher degree of reliability. This could be true even if this view militated against the general theoretical outlook of the author. For whenever theoretical tenets are concerned which appear intuitively doubtful it can happen that in some context somebody expresses thoughts that do not fully harmonise with his theory. Perhaps it is no accident that later commentators such as Uddyotakara and others employ the more neutral term *ākāṅkṣā* 'desire' instead of 'desire to know' (*jijñāsā*).

The recognition of the phenomenon that inferences can be blocked either by other inferences or by other means of cognition is attested by sources of various periods. Even relatively late treatises, such as the *Tarka-saṃgraha*, admit this possibility notwithstanding the fact that such a position probably implies a rejection of certain earlier tenets, in particular those of Dharmakīrti and his successors, and a reintroduction of views which were prevalent at still earlier periods. The *Tarka-saṃgraha* explicitly stipulates that among the fallacious reasons a variety, called *sat-pratipakṣa*, and another variety, called *bādhita*, exist. The first one is exemplified in cases in which an inference or inferential argument is counterbalanced by a different

inference or inferential argument employing a different ‘reason’ (*yasya sādhyābhāva-sādhakam hetv-antaram vidyate sa sat-pratipakṣaḥ*). The second one occurs if the outcome of an inference or inferential argument militates against some proposition that is vindicated by some other means of cognition (*yasya sādhyābhāvaḥ pramāṇāntareṇa niścitaḥ sa bādhitah*). Although it is plain that these as well as other fallacious reasons or pieces of reasoning do not qualify for the status of a *pramāṇa*, those phenomena possess relevance for the assessment of inference as a means of knowledge. For the manner in which they are treated strongly suggests that *if* the same pieces of reasoning would not be counterbalanced in the mentioned ways, then they would qualify for the status of a *pramāṇa*.

We may well abstain from investigations concerning the ‘real intentions’ of writers of works on *pramāṇa*. For if one assesses the issue from an objective point of view the verdict should be that inferences, even if they are valid, do not guarantee truth. According to many theories of inference (*anumāna*) compliance with the criteria for the validity of a reason leaves room for the possibility that the criteria are fulfilled and the outcome is false precisely because some pertinent case exhibits a unique exception to an otherwise general regularity. The examples which are commonly discussed in ‘Indian Logic’ only allow the diagnosis that that which is at stake is a derivation of some proposition from certain data under the premise that the pertinent data do not exhibit a deviance from a norm. Given that this is true, one must draw the conclusion that Indian theories of inference attempt to account for pieces of defeasible reasoning. It follows from this fact that the account of inferential reasoning that is represented by the tradition of Dharmakīrti is misleading. Although inferences employing so-called *svabhāva-hetus* could be considered as pieces of reasoning in which from given data propositions are derived which can be recognised as true without bringing other experiences into play, the variety of the *kārya-hetus* corresponds to pieces of reasoning in which the data do not license the derivation of the conclusion without bringing propositions relying on other data of experience into play. Whereas the first variety corresponds to acquisitions of beliefs which need not rely on any knowledge except knowledge of pertinent data, the second variety corresponds to acquisitions of beliefs which can never be licensed by knowledge of data without relying on additional experiential knowledge concerning regularities. The issue of the correct answer to the above formulated query (Q2), namely

If (a proposition) P logically implies (a proposition) Q, does it hold true for everybody that if he knows P and believes Q he knows Q?

is quite intricate as far as ‘Indian Logic’ is concerned. If the phrase ‘(a proposition) P logically implies (a proposition) Q’ is interpreted in the sense of ‘(a proposition)

Q can be established by a faultless *anumāna* on the basis of (a proposition) P as a datum' an affirmative answer to the question might well correspond to views held by a number of writers even outside the tradition of Dharmakīrti's school. On the other hand, however, it is questionable whether such a stance is objectively adequate and it is even possible that a negative answer harmonises better with internal theoretical elements of doctrines advocated in the Indian epistemological tradition.

Knowledge imparted by verbal communication as defined in textual sources is equally defeasible because even if all the stipulated requirements of reliability of a verbal communication are met the fact that the linguistic data of a message need to be interpreted by a recipient of a message introduces an ingredient of fallibility that cannot be eliminated.

The proposition that defeasible reasoning is a primary concern of Indian Logic would alone suffice for a falsification of the above formulated conditional that whenever a belief has been acquired by means of a *pramāṇa* then it is true and a possible instance of knowledge. Means of acquisition of new beliefs which, applied in a correct manner, guarantee true outcomes, might in fact exist. Arithmetical operations could be a suitable example. One could also mention phenomena such as the capacity to make safe predictions about possible outcomes of particular situations in certain games or the ability of competent speakers of a language to identify possible meanings of sentences not encountered before. But precisely examples like these are conspicuous by their absence in discussions on *pramāṇa*. (The discussions on the *pramāṇa sambhava* in the *Prasastapāda-bhāṣya* or the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* do not invalidate this statement.) On a more general level the problem is that doctrines of *pramāṇa* are meant to provide an account of empirical knowledge. In this context it is doubtful whether a specification of means playing an instrumental role for the acquisition of states of beliefs or criteria that could be invoked for a justification of claims of knowledge, such that their existence or satisfaction guarantees truth, is possible and meaningful at all. For on the one hand considerations of relevance demand that the range of possible belief and knowledge should not be restricted to trivial and completely uncontroversial propositions, and on the other hand the desideratum that the account should be significant calls for a specification of means of knowledge that is not overtly or covertly circular. If it were stated e.g. that knowledge could be acquired by entertaining arbitrary thoughts and simultaneously ascertaining in oneself a feeling of well being of some type and if the danger of the fallibility of such a criterion were averted by *stipulating* that a feeling of well being exhibits the relevant type only under the condition that the entertained thought is in fact true, then the provided specification would evidently trivialise the account. Similar consequences threaten if the concepts of perception, inference etc. were manipulated in such a way that they imply the truth of some concerned content.

If theories of *pramāṇa* have neither achieved an exhaustive account of the acquisition of true beliefs nor a non question begging specification of criteria such that beliefs complying with those criteria are guaranteed to be true, one might wonder whether those doctrines possess any value at all. Should we say that the Indian epistemological tradition including Indian Logic was an aberration in the history of philosophy? In order to recognise that this verdict is not justified we should reverse the perspective by looking at certain outcomes and pose the question in which respect those results could be useful. Let us only take the Nyāya doctrine of the four *pramāṇas*, ‘perception’, ‘inference’, ‘comparison’ and ‘verbal communication’, as an example and let us set aside the third *pramāṇa* ‘comparison’ which usually plays a marginal role. Bearing in mind that *pramāṇas* are classified as instruments (*karaṇa*) in textual sources, this means that we should ask whether perception, inference and verbal communication can be regarded as relevant factors for the acquisition of true beliefs in *some* respect. Or let us address the issue like this: ‘Which question concerning belief or knowledge would exhibit the property that a specification of perception, inference and verbal communication as instruments would provide a significant reply to it?’ There is at least one promising answer to this question which demands though to give up the quest for a connection between *pramāṇas* and individual beliefs or individual pieces of knowledge. The proposal is: Perception, inference and verbal communication possess an exceptional relevance as instruments for the regulation of systems of beliefs. The term ‘regulation of systems of beliefs’ refers here to processes of acquisition of new beliefs, abandonment or suspension of previous beliefs as well as the replacement of old beliefs by new beliefs in the framework of a structure of a multitude of (partly interconnected) beliefs, representing a totality of beliefs held by an individual person or even a social community. If an individual or a group of individuals regularly employs perception, inference and verbal communication as a means of acquiring new beliefs and of controlling inherited or previously adopted beliefs he boosts the chances to better his ‘score of knowledge’, both in the sense that the amount of true beliefs is augmented and in the sense that the proportion between true and false beliefs is improved. This does not entail that the employment of those means of knowledge guarantees truth in each individual case. Their function is merely to contribute to increase of knowledge in the longer run. It is not any more assumed that those means fulfil only an instrumental role for acquisitions of beliefs because, in contrast to the view suggested in theories of *pramāṇa*, it is acknowledged here that their employment might equally possess an abandonment of previous beliefs without an adoption of a different opinion as a result.

Against this background it is even possible to appreciate the adoption of verbal communication as a separate *pramāṇa* in Nyāya. For verbal communication is the

only *pramāṇa* which hints at the dimension of social control of the adoption and preservation of beliefs of individuals. Notwithstanding the fact that historical examples show that the actual manner in which opinions of individuals are influenced by social communities is sometimes disastrous, the possibility of social control is immensely significant. An important way of detecting perceptual error is the knowledge, most often imparted by verbal communication, that other persons who are in a similar perceptual situation have divergent perceptual experiences. This also reveals the importance of the adoption of a plurality of means of cognition. In this light one can recognise the questionable nature of the arguments of philosophers advocating a rejection of certain *pramāṇas* or a reduction of their number on the basis of the allegation that the concerned *pramāṇas* do not always generate true beliefs. By reducing the number of *pramāṇas* one diminishes the chances of mutual control. It is the conception of means of acquisition of knowledge which invariably generate true beliefs alone by themselves which deserves to be rejected rather than the admittance of instrumental factors that cannot perform such a task in isolation.

To be sure, as an account of instrumental factors enhancing increase of knowledge in general theories of *pramāṇas* in the form encountered in the texts are presumably deficient. It can hardly be doubted that the prevalent conception of inference explicated in the framework of Indian Logic is too narrow and that this diminishes the significance of those theories for a general account of increasing knowledge by inferential means. The textual sources betray the intention to single out as relevant inferences relying on the hypothesis of regularities to which no exceptions are known. Thereby the possible relevance of hypotheses concerning regularities to which exceptions *are* known is ignored. As far as the general question is concerned, as to precisely when and why extrapolations of regularities can be employed for the acquisition of new beliefs or of knowledge, it seems that some clues can be got from Dharmakīrti's works, but these represent at best a beginning. The role of an *a priori* component in the acquisition of belief and knowledge is completely ignored in *pramāṇa*-theories. In addition to this, they provide no clue which instrumental function should be attributed to actions, such as sending someone to see what is happening, placing something on scales or making an experiment. Theories which simply declare that *pramāṇas* are mental entities do not provide a satisfying reply. The decisive problem is *why* non-mental activities must be precluded and in this connection answers relying on doctrinal tenets such as that in reality there are no entities except mental ones are hardly convincing. As far as the question of the factors relevant for 'improving the score of knowledge' is concerned, remembrance can surely not be ruled out as irrelevant. Judgements such as the one expressed by the sentence

(iv) He is now much bigger than last year

are only justified on a basis which involves acts of remembrance. Notwithstanding those and other problems, regarding the question as to how human beings are able to increase knowledge pertaining to the world of experience by bettering the score of true beliefs in the longer run, both theories of *pramāṇa* and Indian Logic provide relevant answers, and this holds true despite the fact that those teachings were developed under a different perspective. Therefore the results of Indian doctrines of *pramāṇa* possess significance under the aspect of the question of how human beings can extend their realm of knowledge. One might even characterise *pramāṇas*, such as perception, inference of the sort of an Indian *anumāna* or verbal communication, as means or instruments of knowledge as long as one bears in mind that the pertinent concept of the vague notion of a means of knowledge is that of a tool by which human beings are able to increase their knowledge both on the individual and on the collective level. The above mentioned items are suited as tools for increase of knowledge in two different ways: (a) They can function as quite reliable sources for the acquisition of new beliefs, such that individual beliefs that are adopted on their basis possess a fairly good chance of being true. (b) They can be employed as means of controlling possible beliefs in the manner that they are used as criteria for assessing the truth of (the contents of) potential beliefs either in the way of questioning the basis on which beliefs have been actually adopted or in the way of examining whether or not the propositional contents of possible beliefs are in accord with other possible experiences. This is a much more modest role than the one which is suggested concerning *pramāṇas* in many textual sources of the Indian tradition. One might wonder what should explain such a divergence. To this question at least a partial answer can be offered: Competing schools of thought in Ancient India were eager to establish their own doctrinal tenets and defend them against rival contentions and detected in the idea that their tenets can be vindicated by *pramāṇas* a useful device for validating their claims. Against this background every account of *pramāṇas* that emphasises aspects of fallibility must appear unattractive.

Inquiries on belief in Indian philosophy will presumably yield quite meagre results as long as they only investigate what explicit statements occurring in textual sources, and in particular treatises on *pramāṇa* and inference, tell us about belief. Nonetheless, a pursuit of the question of belief in Indian philosophy can render an immense help for a better understanding of the subject-matter which was a concern of logic and epistemology in Ancient India.

Can There be Unbiased Epistemology in Indian Philosophy?

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

In this paper an effort is made to show that epistemology (*pramāṇa-sāstra*) as available in Indian philosophical systems is not unbiased, but is vitiated through various metaphysical or ontological presuppositions, though it is claimed by Indian philosophers that through a means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) a knowable entity (*prameya*) is substantiated. Gradually we will see that this principle of *mānādhinā meya-siddhiḥ* is a myth, because *pramāṇa* itself is not untouched by the scheme of *prameya* admitted by them.

— 1 —

The Naiyāyikas have accepted means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) as a first category, depending on which the other factors involved with it become meaningful. According to Vātsyāyana, if *pramāṇa* remains in its true form, such concepts as knower (*pramātṛ*), knowable entity (*prameya*) and valid cognition (*pramiti*) become meaningful. In fact, the meaningfulness of all these depends on that of *pramāṇa*.¹ That is why *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-sāstra* receive so much importance in this system. How do we know that a *pramāṇa* is a genuine one? In reply, it is said that the genuine nature of it is substantiated on the strength of its successful inclination.² In fact it is itself a form of inference in which *arthavattva* ('capability of being meaningful') is the *sādhyā* ('probandum'), *pramāṇa* ('means of knowing') is *pakṣa* ('subject of inference') and *pravṛtti-sāmarthyā* ('efficacy to successful inclination') is the *hetu* ('probans'). The genuinity of a *pramāṇa* is proved in terms of another *pramāṇa*, i.e. inference, which ultimately leads to infinite regress (*anavasthā*). In spite of this the Naiyāyikas are very much concerned with proving the genuinity of *pramāṇa* with the help of its efficacy to successful inclination (*pravṛtti-sāmarthyā*) after keeping

¹ NBh 1.1.1: *arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātṛ prameyaṃ pramitiḥ ity arthavanti bhavanti.*

² NBh 1.1.1: *pramāṇataḥ artha-pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇaṃ.*

the theory of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya* ('extrinsic validity of proof') in view. Whether something is a *pramāṇa* or a pseudo-*pramāṇa* (*pramāṇābhāsa*) is dependent on its successful inclination, which leads to the supposition that the theory of *pramāṇa* on which a *meva* ('provable object') is substantiated is not free from the influence of *meva*-related presuppositions.

— 2 —

Each and every system of Indian Philosophy has got some metaphysical presuppositions that are reflected in their theories of knowledge. That is the only reason which gives rise to the principle of *mānādhīnā meva-siddhiḥ* ('the substantiation of the knowable entities depends on the source of knowing'). This principle is true in the sense that knowable entities or categories are different in different philosophical systems. Hence, the definitions are formulated in such a way so that their presupposed entities can be proved. One could raise the problem of *circularity* in these cases. When a philosopher of a particular school is framing a definition of *pramāṇa*, it is to some extent 'subjective', but not objective in the sense that he bears some presuppositions. Whatever may be the reasons the philosophical systems particularly in India are not free from this defect of biasness. The point will be clearer if I put forth some definitions of perception (*pratyakṣa*) accepted by different systems.

The definition of perception given by the older Naiyāyikas is as follows: 'The perceptual knowledge is a cognition arising out of the contact of the sense-organ with an object, which cannot be described through language, which is non-deviating (*avyabhicārin*) and non-erroneous (*vyavasāyātmaka*).'³ This definition was accepted by the older Naiyāyikas because it was formulated in such a way so that their accepted theories of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), indicated by the inclusion of such terms as 'something inexpressible by words' (*avyapadeśya*), 'contact' (*sannikarṣa*) between sense-organs and the object, 'non-erroneous character' (*vyavasāyātmaka*), 'non-deviating character' (*avyabhicārin*) etc. be preserved. To them an object (*artha*) was a kind of category accepted by them and capable of being perceived (*yogya*). There did not arise any question of perceiving an absurd entity, as the categorical scheme admitted by them did not permit us to do so. The Nyāya did not admit an entity which could not be included under the accepted seven categories. In this case the term *artha* was included so that an absurd object not belonging to the set of admitted categories did not find entry in the scheme of perception.

³ NS 1.1.4: *indriyārtha-sannikarṣōtpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam.*

Let us have a look towards the Advaita theory of perception. According to the Advaitins, the whole world is nothing but the manifestation of Brahman or Ātman or Consciousness (*caitanya*). Under this situation Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, a follower of the Advaita school, thinks that mere connection (*samnikarṣa*) between sense organ and an object may not be the cause of perceptual cognition. If the whole world is Consciousness (*caitanya*), object (*artha*) is something covered by this Consciousness. Other object, like our sense organs etc., are the consciousness limited by objects, sense organs etc. Though Consciousness (*caitanya*) is one, it may have limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) such as consciousness of an object (*viṣayāvachhinna-caitanya*), consciousness of the mental mode (*antaḥ-karaṇa-vṛtty-avacchinna-caitanya*) and consciousness of the knower (*antaḥ-karaṇāvachhinna-caitanya*). These limiting adjuncts of one Consciousness are called *viṣaya-caitanya*, *pramāṇa-caitanya* and *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* respectively. Being one, it has limiting adjuncts just as time, though one, has limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) in the form of hours, days, week, fortnight, month, year etc.⁴ After keeping these metaphysical presuppositions in mind Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra accepted two criteria of perceptuality: perceptuality of knowledge (*jñāna-gata*) and perceptuality of object (*viṣaya-gata*). To him when there is a union between consciousness of a means of knowing (*pramāṇa-caitanya*) and consciousness of an object (*viṣaya-caitanya*), then it is the case of the perceptuality of knowledge (*jñāna-gata-pratyakṣatva*). It is to be borne in mind that they Advaitins have made a distinction between perception of the knowledge of a jar and perception of a jar. In the case of the perception of the knowledge of a jar there is the union between *viṣaya-caitanya* ('consciousness of an object') and *pramāṇa-caitanya* ('consciousness of a means of knowing') but *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* ('consciousness of the knower') will remain isolated in the sense that it maintains its separate existence by playing the role of an agent (*kartṛ*). How is such union of these two *caitanayas* possible? Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra left no stones unturned to make us convinced with the following reasoning. When our mind, after issuing from the body reaches to the object with the help of sense organs and assumes the shape of the object, then it is called mental mode (*vṛtti*), which is also a form of the consciousness.⁵ To them the

⁴ VPar (*Pratyakṣa-pariccheda*), p. 13: *siddhānte pratyakṣatva-prayojakaṁ kiṁ iti cet, kiṁ jñāna-gatasya pratyakṣatvasya prayojakaṁ pṛcchasi, kiṁ vā viṣaya-gatasya? ādye pramāṇa-caitanyasya viṣayāvachhinna-caitanyābheda iti brumaḥ. tathā trividhaṁ caitanyaṁ viṣaya-caitanyaṁ pramāṇa-caitanyaṁ pramāṭṛ-caitanyaṁ cēti. tatra ghaṭādy-avacchinnaṁ caitanyaṁ viṣaya-caitanyaṁ antaḥ-karaṇa-vṛtty-avacchinnaṁ caitanyaṁ pramāṇa-caitanyaṁ antaḥ-karaṇāvachhinnaṁ caitanyaṁ pramāṭṛ-caitanyam.*

⁵ The luminous mind, issuing through the eye etc. essential for perception of an external object only (happiness etc. being perceived inwardly), goes to the space occupied by objects like a jar etc. and is modified into the form of a jar. This modification is called mental mode (*vṛtti*).

Advaitins the mind (*antaḥ-karaṇa*), like liquid substance, has no shape of its own, but assumes the shape of the object just as water assumes the form of the container. If this were the case, the consciousness of an object (*viśaya-caitanya*) becomes identified with its corresponding mental mode (*antaḥ-karaṇa-vṛtti*). The union of these two limited forms of consciousness gives rise to the perception of the knowledge of the object.⁶ The *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* ('consciousness of the knower') which, being a knower, remains isolated and *perceives* the knowledge of an object (*jñāna-gata-pratyakṣa*). In this case there is the distinction between a knower (*jñāṭṛ*) and a known object (*jñeya*). That is why it is the perceptuality of knowledge of an object (*jñāna-gata-pratyakṣatva*).

But there is another case of perception, which is called perceptuality of an object (*viśaya-gata-pratyakṣatva*). For having a cognition of an object the existence of a knower is a precondition, insofar as the cognition of an object without the knower is impossible. If it is said that there is the perceptuality of object, it should be treated as different from the perceptuality of knowledge of an object (*jñāna-gata-pratyakṣa*). It is *not* knowledge which is perceived, but the *object only*. Such a situation cannot give rise to knower-known relationship (*jñāṭṛ-jñeya-bhāva*). Hence Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra says that in such cases there is only the knower in the form of consciousness (*pramāṭṛ-caitanya*); but other two, i.e. consciousness of the mental mode (*antaḥ-karaṇa-vṛtti*) and consciousness of an object, are united in the knower (*pramāṭṛ*). This situation is described by him as *pramāṭṛ-sattātirikta-sattākatvābhāva* ('an absence of the existence of other forms of consciousness excepting the existence of the knower').⁷ Herein lies some sort of metaphysical presupposition. In this case Dharmarāja is dealing with metaphysics in disguise of epistemology. When a person thinks himself identified with the whole world, it is the stage of liberation due to the absence of reality of more than one (*advaita*). In this case an object is *not mere an object* but a *subjectified object*. Though there is no difference in saying 'subjectified object' and 'objectified subject' as evidenced in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (BhG 6.29: *sarva-bhūta-stham ātmānam sarva-bhūtāni cātmani*, i.e. extension of self to others and bringing others under self), Dharmarāja preferred to use 'subjectified object', since *pramāṭṛ* ('knower') only remains at this stage. There is the absence of the existence of other objects excepting the existence of knower (*pramāṭṛ*). Is it not a state of liberation? Such a state is generally realised temporally at the time of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*). In KĀ, p. 92, Abhinavagupta has ex-

⁶ VPar, p. 14: *tatra yathā tadāgodakam chidrān nirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvad eva catuṣ-koṇādy-ākāram bhavati, tathā taijasam antaḥ-karaṇam api cakṣurādi-dvārā nirgatya ghaṭādi-viśaya-deśam gatvā ghaṭādi-viśyākāreṇa pariṇamate sa eva pariṇāmo vṛttir ucyate.*

⁷ VPar, p. 25: *ghaṭāder viśayasya pratyakṣam tu pramāṭṛ-abhinnavatvam ... pramāṭṛ-abhedo nāma na tāvad aikyam kintu pramāṭṛ-sattātirikta-sattākatvābhāvaḥ.*

plained this state of ‘subjectified object’ as ‘the melting of the state of the knower’ (*pramāṭṛ-bhāva-vigalana*). Just as an object when liquidified covers many areas, in the like manner the knower can expand himself in such a way so that all objects are included in him. At this stage he is not confined within himself but expands himself to all the objects and hence objects have no other existence other than that of the knower. That is why an individual can enjoy aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) as he considers the pathos etc. belonging to characters of the novel or drama as his own due to his emotional involvement. This sharing of others’ feelings is called by Abhinavagupta (KĀ, p. 84) *tan-mayī-bhavana* (‘becoming one with other’). It may be asked to the Advaitins whether it is the case of epistemology or metaphysics. Whatever may be their reply, we have shown that a set of metaphysical presuppositions has led Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra to formulate such a definition of perception.

If we turn to the Buddhists in general and Dharmakīrti in particular, they are also not free from some basic presuppositions such as theories of momentariness, dependent origination, causal efficacy (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*) etc. as a characteristic feature of being (*sat*) etc. Keeping these in view Dharmakīrti has formulated the definition of perception: ‘perceptual cognition is the non-erroneous cognition of an entity free from mental ascriptions.’⁸ Is it not true that such a definition is given keeping some presuppositions in mind?⁹

Hence there is hardly anything in different systems of Indian philosophy which may be described as ‘pure epistemology’ or ‘unbiased epistemology’. Perhaps this is the characteristic feature of all branches of philosophy. Behind the formulation of this definition Dharmakīrti has two presuppositions in mind: (1) the mark of an existent entity is its causal efficacy (*artha-kriyā-kāritva-lakṣaṇam sat*) and (2) whatever is existent is momentary (*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*). An object endowed with mental ascriptions is not momentary due to its conceptualisation and hence it loses its unique singular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). That is why the perceptual entity is described as free from mental ascriptions so that its unique momentary character is preserved.

While discussing the Buddhists definition of perception one could easily remember the affinities between *sva-lakṣaṇa*-character of an object and indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*). Regarding the acceptance of a *sva-lakṣaṇa* (‘unique singular’) entity there are problems. As for example, an unique singular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) entity is existent (*sat*) by virtue of its causal efficacy (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*).

⁸ NB 3: *tatra kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*.

⁹ The presuppositions like an entity’s momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and unique singular character (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) lead the Buddhists to formulate the definition of perception in such a manner so that this momentary and unique singular character of an entity is protected. In this context the question of circularity may be raised but it is of the virtuous type because no theorisation is possible without these presuppositions.

How can the causal efficacy of it be judged with a moment (*kṣaṇa*), the minutest particle of time? At the same time I would like to state that the Navya-nyāya theory of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) in its turn is not free from some problems either. I would suggest one or two problems that the acceptance of the theory of indeterminate perception as admitted by the Nyāya poses. These problems occur due to the inconsistency of the presuppositions of the Naiyāyikas. First, Viśvanātha in his *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* (verse 51) and *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* has accepted that presentative cognition (*anubhava*) may be valid (*yathārtha*) and invalid (*ayathārtha*). The valid presentative cognition (*yathārthānubhava*) is of four types: perceptual cognition, inferential cognition, cognition through similarity and verbal testimonial cognition. The instruments of these are the four *pramāṇas*, i.e. perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*). The perception is of two types: determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). Viśvanātha has accepted indeterminate perception as a form of perception but subsequently he remarks: ‘the cognition which is indeterminate is beyond our sense-organ.’¹⁰ If it is beyond the reach of our sense organ, how can it be called a form of *laukika-pratyakṣa* (ordinary perception)?¹¹ For, there is the lack of conditions of being perceptual due to not having the contact of the sense organ with the object (*indriyārtha-sainnikarṣa*). Secondly, there arises the problem of determining its validity (*prāmāṇya*). If it is a form of perception, it must be true. But afterwards it is said that the truth-value cannot be assigned to it. It is neither true nor false. If it is so, it can never be a case of perceptual knowledge. Thirdly, if it is accepted that it is true how can *prāmāṇya* be ascertained? The Naiyāyikas believe in the extrinsic validity of truth (*parataḥ-prāmāṇya*), which cannot be applied to the indeterminate perception. Viśvanātha’s position cannot be taken for granted due to the absence of feasibility of applying the extrinsic validity of truth which will go against the Naiyāyikas basic presuppositions. In this way we judge the justifiability of a theory through the spectacle of the ontological presuppositions, which proves that there is hardly any room for independent reasoning developed afterwards.

That the Naiyāyikas are bound with the ontological presuppositions is evidenced from the acceptance of the *prameyas* (‘knowable entities’). The Nyāya admits twelve *prameyas*: the self (*ātman*), body (*śarīra*), sense-organ (*indriya*), object (*artha*), cognition (*buddhi*), mind (*manas*), inclination (*pravṛtti*), defect (*doṣa*), rebirth (*pretya-bhāva*), result (*phala*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and liberation (*apavarga*), the real

¹⁰ BhPar 58: *jñānam yan nirvikalpākhyam tad atīndrayam iṣyate.*

¹¹ It may be argued that there are certain perceptions like *yogī-pratyakṣa* (transcendental perception) and *ārṣa-pratyakṣa* (seer perception), which are non-sensuous (*atīndriya*) in character caused by the contact of *ātman* and *manas*. But it should be kept in mind that these are not ordinary forms of perceptions but extra-ordinary (*alaukika*).

cognition of which leads us to realm of *apavarga*. From the false cognition an individual is entangled with this worldly affair leading to suffering and hence the real cognition of twelve *pramayas* leads us to the world of liberation. Among these *prameyas* self is fundamental. Wrong cognition of the self arises where the self is understood as the non-self. Ordinary human beings consider the non-selves such as the body, sense organ and mind as selves and take new birth and death again and again. So long as there is no separation of the self from the body etc. an individual cannot be absolutely free from suffering. As soon as the wrong notion of the self in non-self vanishes, an individual attains liberation in the form of absolute cessation of suffering due to the loss of the cause of suffering. Hence, the realisation of the self is the real cause of liberation and hence the self is mentioned at the outset among the *prameyas*.

The right cognition of the categories leads us to the attainment of mundane and transcendental well-being (*dr̥ṣṭa* and *adr̥ṣṭa niḥśreyasa*). The right cognition of the categories such as *pramāṇa*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *chala*, *hetv-ābhāsa* etc. leads us to the mundane well-being, because they are beneficial for defeating others and defending our own stand point. If an individual is well conversant with the categories and their application, he can easily understand the points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*), 'quibble' (*chala*) and 'pseudo-reason' (*hetv-ābhāsa*) in others argument, which can lead him to the world of victory in the field of philosophical debate. In the same way, the right cognition of the self, one of the *prameyas*, can conjoin us with the transcendental well-being (*adr̥ṣṭa-niḥśreyasa*), i.e. the attainment of liberation.¹² The true cognition of the self can remove ignorance or wrong notion (*mithyā-jñāna*), which again removes suffering, aversion and attachment (*rāga-dveṣa*) caused by the wrong notion. If there is non-attachment, there cannot be inclination (*pravṛtti*) towards an object. Due to the absence of inclination the merit and demerit cannot be generated. Owing to the lack of *dharma* and *adharmā* there is no possibility of rebirth, which is meant for the enjoyment of the result of *karma* by an individual being. The absence of birth leads to the absence of suffering, which is the state of liberation according to Nyāya.¹³

This type of philosophical procedure of attaining liberation through self-realisation is primarily due to the Naiyāyikas first belief in the authority of the *Veda* and *Vedas*. Though the Nyāya is taken to be a realistic philosophy, yet it is not free from the influence of *Veda* or *Vedas* at the grass root level of their philosophy. Like the Vedāntins they also believe that the realisation of the self ultimately leads to the

¹² NS 1.1.1, vol 1, p. 65.

¹³ NS 1.1.2: *duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyā-jñānānām uttarōttarāpāye tad-antarāpāyād apavargaḥ*.

realm of liberation. Though the Naiyayīkas have mentioned *pramāṇa* as the first category to prove the existence of *prameya*, yet it cannot be ignored that the application of *pramāṇa* is to know the self truly (*tattva-jñāna*), otherwise there is a chance of misapprehension of self. When *pramāṇa* is applied, the total end-in-view of applying it, i.e. to conjoin an individual to liberation through self-realisation, is in the background. Hence *pramāṇa* is not 'objective', because of an agent cannot apply it 'freely', but 'subjective' or teleological, in the sense that it cannot be unbiased. That the Naiyayīkas are bound with the Upaniṣadic self etc. is evidenced from the example of *jahad-ajahad-lakṣaṇa* ('quasi-inclusive implication') taken by Annambhaṭṭa as *tat tvam asi* ('Thou art that'). Is it a case epistemology in the true sense of the term? Certainly not, because it is mixed with the metaphysics, which has been taken as an indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) by the Advaitin. In this case the testimonial cognition is based on some notion of self which is metaphysical.

Let us explain the same in the following way.

The indeterminate perception or *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is accepted in the case of the recognitive cognitions, such as 'This is that Devadatta' (*so 'yam devadattaḥ*) or 'That art thou' (*tat tvam asi*), on account of the fact that it does not reveal the relation between the two, i.e. this and that Devadatta or That and thou. It has been interpreted by the Advaitins that the sentence conveys the sense that Devadatta exists in Devadatta himself or an individual self exists in himself in the form of Brahman. But they do not admit any relation between the two by the term *vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhin* ('absentee of knowledge apprehending relatedness of the qualificand and qualifier'). If the meaning of the aforesaid sentences is pondered upon, it will be revealed that these are not actually relation-free. In other words, like other components the relation is also revealed in such cases due to the following reasons. First, how do we know that Devadatta exists in himself without the assumption of the relation of identity between them? Any type of recognitive cognition presupposes the relation of identity (at least in the sense of similarity) between two existing earlier or at present time. To the Advaitins identity (*tādātmya*) is the vital relation in the phenomenal cognition. In fact, they admit *tādātmya* in the places where there is a part-and-whole relation (*avayavāvayavi-bhāva-sambandha*) etc. Hence *tādātmya* has very often been accepted as a relation. To the Advaitins *tādātmya* ('identity') is taken in the sense of similarity as found in colour and the possessor of it. In the cases cited above there must be a relation of identity (*tādātmya*) in the sense of similarity between this and that Devadatta. That is why the recognitive knowledge (*pratyabhijñā*) is possible. Secondly, though there is no absolute identity between this Devadatta and that Devadatta or an individual being and Brahman, there must be an essential identity (*svarūpa-tādātmya*) between them. Otherwise, the sentences could not pro-

vide the intended meaning. Lastly, the cognition coming through the sentences are called relational in character, as it is sentential in nature. A sentence becomes meaningful if there is a word, its meaning and their relation. It may be asked whether in the words and their meaning there is signifier–signified relationship (*vācyā-vācaka-bhāva*) or not. If the answer is in positive, relation is accepted between them. If not, the sentences cannot provide the desired meaning due to the lack of signifying character (*vācakatva*) of the words. In fact, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has accepted the meaningfulness of the sentences, which entails the existence of the relation in them. Hence the definition of *nirvikalpaka* perception as formulated by the Advaitins is hardly adequate. At least this type of definition apparently fails to justify *nirvikalpaka* cognition. The problem has been well taken by the Advaitins by giving a fresh interpretation of the above-mentioned sentence. To them the meaning of the sentences such as *so 'yam devadattaḥ* or *tat tvam asi* etc. is indivisible (*akhandārtha*). When the sentences produce right cognition without being related to the relation among the words, it is called indivisible meaning. Only the stem (*prātipadika*), which are free from the suffixes causing relation, can give rise to indivisible meaning. In the case of the *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* there is no relation between the meanings of the terms, but it gives an indivisible meaning after ignoring the individual ones.¹⁴ Such statement is dependent on some metaphysical pre-suppositions, such as the phenomenon of *śabda-brahman* or *sphoṭa* in *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* (VPar).

Two types of perception, apart from the previously mentioned one, are *jīva-sākṣin* and *īśvara-sākṣin*. It has been mentioned in the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* that the distinction between an individual being (*jīva*) and witness in self (*jīva-sākṣin*) lies on the status of internal sense-organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*). If consciousness is limited by mind or inner organ it is called *jīva* (*antaḥ-karaṇāvachchinnaṁ caitanyaṁ jīvaḥ*). If the same *antaḥ-karaṇa* remains as a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) in a *jīva*, it is called *jīva-sākṣin*. In the same way, the consciousness qualified by *māyā* is called *īśvara* or God (*māyāvachchinnaṁ caitanyaṁ paramēśvaraḥ*). When the same *māyā* remains as a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of consciousness, it is called witness in God (*īśvara-sākṣin*). The property, which is related to the predicate (*kāryānavayin*) and becomes a distinguisher (*vyāvarttaka*), being present (*vartamāna*) in a possessor of property, is called *viśeṣaṇa* while something, which cannot be related to the predicate (*kāryānanvayin*) and becomes a distinguisher (*vyāvarttaka*), being present (*vartamāna*) in the possessor of property, is called *upādhi*. Though the distinction between *viśeṣaṇa* and *upādhi* has been shown clearly, it is very difficult to understand the

¹⁴ VPar (*Pratyakṣa-pariccheda*), p. 35: *idam eva tat tvam asi ity-ādi-vākyānām akhandārtham yat samsargānavagāhi-yathārthajñāna-janakatvaṁ iti.*

exact position whether the inner organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) remains in an individual being as an adjunct or limiting adjunct. In the same way the position or status of *māyā* in consciousness (*caitanya*) cannot be known with the help of the reason. Without the help of intuition it is very difficult to have an idea about the status of mind in an individual being or the status of *māyā* in a consciousness. It needs *vision* to know the same. If these are known transcendently, why are they called the forms of perception? The phenomena of *jīva-sākṣin* and *īśvara-sākṣin* are more metaphysical in character than epistemological. Hence the Advaitins cannot do 'pure epistemology' without the help of metaphysics.

In connection with the immediate awareness (*aparokṣa-jñāna*) Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has pointed out that such perceptual awareness may sometimes arise from the testimony also, which is called perceptual awareness generated through verbal testimony (*śābda-janya-pratyakṣa*).

It has been argued by the Advaitins that, when an individual comes to know of his happiness through the utterance of the sentence 'You are happy' (*tvam sukhi*) by somebody else, would it be considered as perceptual? The answer is in the positive, to the Advaitins. They have put forward an example of perceptual awareness through some testimonial cognition. A leader of a team is counting the members of his team to confirm that nobody is left behind. Among the ten members every time he is counting nine members but not ten, not including himself due to his absent-mindedness. Being pointed out by some body else he comes to know that he has not counted himself. Ultimately the person pointed him out as the tenth person and said: 'You are the tenth' (*daśamas tvam asi*). This is a case of perception, no doubt, which is generated through the utterance of the sentence by some body else.¹⁵ Actually this type of awareness suggests a great area of the Advaita philosophy. To the Advaitins an individual being is always free, but he does not know it. When it is pointed out that he is free from suffering through the injunction of the *śāstra* or *āgama* or through hearing (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*), he suddenly sees himself free. This freedom is not new to him, but it is acquirement of what is acquired (*prāptasya prāptiḥ*). An individual's liberation or freedom is not at all a new achievement, but awareness of something, which is already known. This knowing of the known is possible through the testimonial statement as found in different *śrutis*. The function of the testimony in the form of *śruti* is to make someone aware of his own position and status. It provides the true picture of the human being, his freedom etc. about which he did not know. Hence, perception in the field

¹⁵ VPar (*Pratyakṣa-pariccheda*), p. 19: *na cāvam api vartamāna-daśāyām tvam sukhi ity ādi-vākya-janya-jñānasya pratyakṣāpattiḥ syād iti vācyam iṣṭatvāt, daśamas tvam asi ity-ādau sannikṣṣṭa-viśaye śabdād apy aparokṣa-jñānābhyupagamāt.*

of freedom or liberation is generated through the āgamic statement *tat tvam asi*, which is very much significant in Indian Philosophical systems. In order to highlight this metaphysical aspect they have introduced a specific type of *pratyakṣa* called *śabda-janya-pratyakṣa* ('perceptual cognition generated through verbal testimony').

Indian theories of error called 'error theory' (*khyāti-vāda*) as admitted by different systems are based on purely metaphysical structure. The Vijñāna-vādin and Śūnya-vādin schools of Buddhism propagate consciousness-centric error theory (*ātma-khyāti-vāda*) and non-existent error theory (*asat-khyāti-vāda*) respectively after keeping the theory of consciousness in the form of *vijñāna* (consciousness) and *śūnyatā* (voidness) in view. Such is the case with the indescribable theory of error (*anirvacanīya-khyāti-vāda*). In this case the represented object or the mistakenly known object is admitted as different from existent or non-existent (*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*), because it (i.e. the snake in the case of rope) is neither existent due to its sublation by the latter cognition nor non-existent due to having its apparent awareness (*prātibhāsika-sattā*). The Mīmāṃsaka who do not believe in the existence of erroneous cognition formulates the theory of no error theory (*akhyāti*) presupposing it in view.

The Naiyāyikas admit that more than one *pramāṇa* can be applied to know a single object, which is called the theory of *pramāṇa-samplava*. The nature of an object is not a factor for applying *pramāṇa*. As for example, 'fire' can be known through perception, inference or verbal testimony. But so far as the Buddhist view is concerned, a particular nature of an object determines the particular means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) through which alone it is revealed. An object having a unique characteristic (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) is revealed by perception alone. A *sva-lakṣaṇa*-entity ('unique singular') cannot be revealed by inference and in the same way the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*-entity ('entity characterised by generality') can be known by inference alone, but not capable of being known by perception. This metaphysical presupposition leads them to admit the system of a specific fixed means of knowing (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*). The Buddhists may say that if more than one *pramāṇa* is applied in a certain case, the object may be seen as having contradictory nature. To them if perception, inference and verbal testimony have a common object, the object should have been of similar type. But actually we find 'fire' for example, perceived in proximity is different from that existing in a remote distance. If an object is seen from a distance, it is seen as associated with some general features. When it comes near, the same object seems to have some other special features. Hence, perception, inference and verbal testimony differ from each other regarding the object grasped by them.

But the Naiyāyikas stick to their decision that many modes of knowing (*pramāṇa*) can be applied to the same object. They assert that a locus having diverse properties is one and the same. Jayanta (NMa, p. 33) has referred to the paradigm case of applying various *pramāṇas* in a particular situation. From the words of a trustworthy

person an individual can know of the existence of fire in a distant place. He goes towards the locus of fire. When he goes certain distance, he sees smoke arising from a place by which he infers the existence of fire. When he goes nearest to the fire, he perceives the same with his own.

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From the above-mentioned arguments it can be concluded that *pramāṇa-śāstra* is not free from metaphysical or ontological commitment. In fact, when a particular epistemic theory is propagated by a particular system, the philosophers belonging to the school keep the ontological presupposition in view. Being influenced by this they formulate an epistemic theory, which can ultimately prove these presuppositions. Before a particular epistemic theory is formulated, its formulation is influenced by the presuppositions. The ontological commitment guides a philosopher remaining in him in the form of proposition (*pratijñā*). The same ontology or *prameya* is proved through the *pramāṇa*, which is in the substantiated form as we find in the case of conclusion (*nigamana*). When it is said that ‘*prameya* is established through *pramāṇa*’ (*mānādhinā meya-siddhiḥ*), Indian philosophers talk of the latter type of function occupying the position of *nigamana*. The above-mentioned point may be highlighted again following the Advaitic line. In the beginning of the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* Śaṅkara has given the definition of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) as ‘the appearance of the previously seen object in a different place, which has affinities with memory is called superimposition.’¹⁶ This definition is in the description level, which has no relation with the actual realisation of the same. This is not the result of experience. When the self is realised, an individual can realise the truth of the statement describing *ādhyāsa* (‘superimposition’). This description is the starting point to reach the realm of realisation. The true nature of the illusoriness of the world (*adhyāsa*) can be realised just after self-realisation has been attained. The first introduction with the concept of *adhyāsa* is taken as proposition (*pratijñā*) and the realisation of the same at the end is the conclusion (*nigamana*). Though the proposition and conclusion seem to be the same, there is a gulf of difference between the two. The former is a mere description given by somebody else from his experience while the latter is the result of an individual’s own realisation. Such is the case with other theoretical enterprises. But it should be kept in view that these probable entities (*meya*) are working in the brain of the philosophers before the theoretical formation of knowledge starts. Hence, theory of knowledge can never be unbiased in the true sense of the term.

¹⁶ ABh, p. 4: *āha—ko ’yam adhyāso nāma iti. ucyate—smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ.*

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Power and Insight in Jain Discourse*

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In contrast to earlier Jainological emphasis on the unchanging and dogmatic nature of doctrinal Jainism, recent historical-philological and anthropological scholarship focuses predominately on historically changing, syncretic and hybrid features of Jain beliefs and practices, and on the role of agency in the construction of socioreligious identity.¹ Contrary to culturalist self-images and academic representations, it is widely recognised that the ‘differences which separate Jainism from Hinduism and Buddhism ... are largely differences of emphasis for all are built from common material’ (WILLIAMS (1983: xxii));² and that ‘even though Jainism is a distinct religion and not a sect of Hinduism, still it is a fact that in the past [and present] many Jains used to regard themselves as Hindus and were also regarded by others as Hindus’ (SANGAVE (1980: 3)). This raises questions about the characteris-

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¹ It is impossible to define a religious tradition, such as Jainism through a list of unchanging attributes. LÉVI-STRAUSS (1970: 3 ff.) prefers to talk about crystallisation of secondary differences within syncretic fields. Another viable strategy is to analyse contextually changing self-attributions. FOUCAULT (1981: 69) investigates discourse diachronically as a ‘regular and distinct series of events’ rather than positing a ‘tradition’ which might be ‘behind discourse’. See also LUHMANN (1982). CARRITHERS (1990) and GOMBRICH (1996: 7), similarly, opt for the study of religious tradition as ‘a chain of events’.

² Because of this common heritage, contemporary Jain ‘orthodoxy’ classifies only originally non-Indian traditions, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as truly heretical. See JAINI (1979: 314, n. 63). In the following I will focus on the relationship between ‘Hindu’ religions and Jainism only.

tic features and the politics of Jain discourse, the principle medium of Jain cultural synthesis.³ DUMONT (1980: 210) once stated that the Jains, like any non-Hindu group in India, ‘cannot be regarded as independent of the environment in which it is set, as really constituting a society by itself, however strongly its own values push it in this direction.’ Yet, whether, or to what extent, the Jains ‘derive their *raison d’être* from their distinctive ways of manoeuvring within a [hierarchical] structure that they share with the whole society’ (MARRIOTT (1976: 131)) needs further research.⁴ LAIDLAW (1985), (1995: 95), in one of the few studies of Jain discourse to date,⁵ argues that ‘Jain cultural distinctiveness does not rest on rituals or practices in which people are marked as different and counted in or out’ but on ‘a range of practices and relationships through which Jains *participate* in Hindu public culture in India, and do so as Jains.’ Jain culture is defined as a shared ethical life-style, or ‘class psychology’, grounded in ‘a set of processes and practices which cluster around the ownership, management, funding, and use of property’ (LAIDLAW (1985: 147, cf. 349 f.)). Socioreligious group formations beyond the institutions of family, caste and religious trusts are seen as ephemeral and dependent on instrumental processes of strategic mass mobilisation by individual lay leaders. CARRITHERS (1992: 118) studied how in conventional settings Jain public speakers ‘create, manipulate, and transform’ connections between listeners (*śrāvaka*), in particular through the narration of religious stories in communal rhetoric.⁶ LAIDLAW’s (1985: 55 f.) theory

³ The single defining criterion that is universally accepted within the Jain tradition is the reference to the Jinas, especially Mahāvīra. To a lesser extent, the notions of practising *ahiṃsā* and vegetarianism, which is nowadays shared with many ‘Hindus’ and Buddhists, are used as reference points. On problems of Jain identity see FLÜGEL (2005), (2006a), (2006b).

⁴ In spite of their differences, DUMONT and MARRIOTT both rely on the code-model of classical structuralism. However, MARRIOTT (1976) and his followers posit a multiplicity of incongruent cultural codes and/or rule-oriented strategies in order to investigate ‘surface’ phenomena as products of their interaction. The unity of ‘Hindu society’ or ‘culture’ is no longer presupposed, ‘rather it is an empirical observation to be analyzed’ (BURGHART (1978b), (1978a: 38)) in terms of competing groups which ‘regulate their interaction on the basis of their own code of hierarchy’ (BURGHART (1978a: 36)). The essentialism of ‘society’ is thus replaced by the essentialism of competing ‘strategic groups’ or ‘(sub-) cultures’ (within a territorial state). The unity of a system as a whole is then generated through (a) mutual incorporation of elements of other codes, and (b) temporary agreements on the code of interaction (BURGHART (1978a: 37)). BURGHART (1983), (1985), in his outline of the study of intra-cultural ‘arenas of interpretation’, first noted points of transition between the multiple code-model and HABERMAS’ (1980–81) theory of communicative action (which however avoids *a priori* reification of ‘groups’ altogether by merely presupposing universal interactional competencies).

⁵ LAIDLAW (1985) offers an analysis of the relationship between Jain ‘*mokṣa*-discourse’ and ‘*puṇya*-discourse’, on which see CORT (1989) and BABB (1996), who do not explicitly use discourse-analytical approaches.

of the Jain ‘language game’ and CARRITHERS’ (1991: 262) work on the ‘rhetoric of *samāḥ*’ both successfully move away from essentialist notions of communal identity. But they achieve this only at the price of recurring to instrumentalist definitions of community formation, disregarding the key dimensions of felt togetherness and shared belief and custom.⁷

In this essay, I propose to avoid both *a priori* definitions of socio-cultural identity and instrumentalist theories of community formation by analysing the stated principles of Jain religious discourse itself. I will compare and contrast these principles with the categories of Jürgen HABERMAS’ (1980–81), who in his *Theory of Communicative Action* offers a seemingly non-reductionist interpretation of linguistically mediated processes of socio-cultural synthesis. In contrast to the explicit normative ideals of the Jains, rooted in an ontology of *karman*, Habermas’ theoretical investigation presents itself as a non-ontological reconstruction of regulative ideals implicitly presupposed by all actual human discourse.⁸ Some preliminary remarks on the architecture of his theory are necessary.

Habermas’ model seeks to transcend the false alternative of ‘community’ and ‘society’—which still dominates the sociology of Indian religions—by focusing on the relationship between ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’ instead, as differentiated in contemporary modern society. ‘Lifeworld’, a term imported from phenomenology, is defined as the horizon or context of linguistically mediated communicative action.⁹

⁶ See CARRITHERS (1992: 106) on the importance of the setting for processes of negotiation of Jain identity through the medium of cultural narratives; and FLÜGEL (1993) on the significance of self-referentiality in conversion stories narrated in settings, such as sermons, similar to those described in the narrative itself, thus generating self-verification. BOURDIEU (1991a), in FAUCONNIER (1981: 202 n. 8), demonstrated that self-verification must be distinguished from the success of an intended perlocutionary effect. See also FAUCONNIER’S (1981: 185) analysis of the ‘principle of incorporation’, the description of a rite within the rite.

⁷ See TÖNNIES’ (1887) classical work on community and society.

⁸ HABERMAS’ analysis of discourse is influenced by the work of Karl-Otto APEL (1973) and the analysis of the ‘colonisation’ of discourse by generalised media of communication by the neo-Parsonian social systems theory of LUHMANN (1979), etc. ‘Discourse’ is here used in the general sense of a set of verbal or written statements. HABERMAS (1980: 71) / (1984–1987 I: 42), (2005: 20) understands ‘discourse’ in a more restricted (and old-fashioned) sense as ‘reasoning’, i.e. the rational exchange of arguments for or against contested claims. In his terms, ‘discourse’ is the reflective form of ‘communicative action’ which is distinguished from mere ‘communication’. LUHMANN (2002: 42 n. 37) points out that ‘capacity for reasoned elaboration’ is a traditional definition of ‘authority’. See *infra* 106 f.

⁹ Following Peirce and Royce, Apel and Habermas presuppose the ideal of an ‘infinite community of interpretation’ as the ‘collective subject’. The resulting contrast between the ‘real community of communication’ and an implicitly presupposed ‘ideal community of communication’ has been criticised, for instance by WELLMER (1986: 68 f., 81–102) and ALBERT (2003: 30, 50

It is, in his view, constituted by language and has three components or actor-world relations, in which communications are simultaneously embedded: cultural symbols, social norms, and personal aims. Lifeworlds are conceived as thematic resources for the intersubjective construction of social situations through symbolic or communicative action.¹⁰ In case of disagreement, situations are ideally defined rationally and consensually, through co-operative processes of interpretation based on the rejection or acceptance of claims of objective truth (cognition oriented), normative rightness (action oriented), and subjective sincerity (person oriented). The limited explanatory scope of the lifeworld perspective conceded, HABERMAS (1981: 180) / (1984–1987 II: 118) defines society as a whole ‘simultaneously as a system and a lifeworld’: ‘societies are *systematically stabilised* complexes of action of *socially integrated* groups’ (1980–1981: 228) / (1984–1987 II: 152). This definition acknowledges that society is not constituted through symbolic or communicative action alone, but also—and increasingly so—through systemic processes, i.e. the unintended consequences of action and interaction mediated by ‘steering media’ such as money or power rather than by language. Habermas thus situates the social role of discourse within a theory of differentiation of system and lifeworld. The degree of differentiation determines the extent to which social integration can/must be achieved through symbolic or communicative action alone.¹¹ Habermas argues that lifeworld and system perspectives are mutually incompatible. His proposed synthesis (chided as ‘eclectic’ by his critics) prescribes a systematic alternation of the two perspectives, thus addressing the problem in a similar way as Jain perspectivism. Within this framework, Habermas’ contribution to discourse analysis results from a single conceptual move: the substitution of the pivotal concept of subjective ‘intentionality’

Royce ff.), who advocate for a fallibilistic notion of consensus and deny a general interest in infinite discussion (ALBERT (2003: 70)). For a similar conceptual structure see, however, the Buddhist (and Jain) distinction between ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ *saṅgha*, analysed for instance by BECHERT (1961: 23 f., 35). HABERMAS (1991: 133) conceded that the normative content of universal pragmatic presuppositions can not be equated with obligatory norms of interaction. Anticipating presuppositions are normative in ‘a wider sense’, enabling practice, without regulating it. In his recent revision of his epistemic universal pragmatic concept of truth, HABERMAS (2004: 50–55, 256 f.) renounced the concept of a ‘final consensus’, because it is beyond the necessity and problems of discourse, and distinguishes now between truth and legitimation.

¹⁰ Communicative action is defined as the reflexive form of symbolic interaction.

¹¹ HABERMAS (1981: 219) / (1984–1987 II: 145): ‘Universal discourse points to an idealized lifeworld reproduced through processes of mutual understanding that have been largely detached from normative contexts and transferred over to rationally motivated yes/no positions. This sort of growing autonomy can come to pass only to the extent that the constraints of material reproduction no longer hide behind the mask of a rationally impenetrable, basic, normative consensus, that is to say, behind the authority of the sacred.’

(championed by Weberian, Husserlian or Wittgensteinian variants of interpretive sociology)¹² with the notion of intersubjective ‘communication’ (*Verständigung*), which in his view is the inherent *telos* of human language.¹³ The intersubjective alternative to conventional subject-philosophical approaches¹⁴ enables Habermas to criticise empirical discourses of power, based on ‘instrumental action’, as ‘deviations’ from an ‘original’ mode of unconstrained ‘communicative action’, implicitly presupposed by all interlocutors.

Habermas’ characterisation of the constitutive role of implicit idealisations for linguistically mediated interaction by the term ‘ideal speech situation’ has been widely criticised (in similar ways as Chomsky’s ‘ideal speech community’), since, by definition, ideal situations are rarely, if ever, empirically encountered, and not even consciously contemplated by the majority of interlocutors.¹⁵ Though it is a truism that ideals can only influence behaviour if they differ from it, a society which relies entirely on explicit consensus is both a modern utopia and a nightmare, since everything can become problematic under the imperative of rational control in an ideal world of unconstrained intersubjectivity. To avoid the ‘cost’ of social reflexivity, social life has to rely on traditions, habits, routines and systemic processes (mediated by institutions or markets) which are taken for granted, until questioned. This is recognised by the model. Habermas insists, however, that the fundamental unspoken expectations underlying all social interaction can be analytically reconstructed. Conflict, for instance over values, can only be peacefully resolved if the normative presuppositions of communicative action, such as common interest in the avoidance of violence, are implicitly observed.¹⁶ Hence, rather than dismissing Habermas’ ‘utopianism’ outright,¹⁷ it may be more fruitful to ask whether the prin-

¹² See HABERMAS (1984: 35–82, 307–50) on three types of intentionality: fundamental intentionality of consciousness, strategic intentionality, and intentionality of non-deliberate actions. Phenomenological ‘intentionality of consciousness’ (not to be confused with Weber’s ‘strategic intentionality’ or Scarle’s concept of subjective ‘meaning intentionality’) can be usefully compared with Jain concepts of consciousness and intentionality. An intentionalist stance alone can, however, not account for social processes of acceptance or definitions of acceptability of actions or arguments. APEL (1993: 41) stressed, rightly in my view, the ‘reciprocal dependence of a priori of consciousness and linguistic a priori’.

¹³ HABERMAS (1984: 461). *Verständigung* is itself an ambiguous word, combining ‘understanding’ (something, someone) and ‘coming to an agreement’ or ‘reaching understanding’.

¹⁴ See HABERMAS (1985) for an analysis of the *aporias* of 20th century philosophy.

¹⁵ E.g. ALEXY (1996: 155 ff., 412 ff.).

¹⁶ HABERMAS (1991: 169) derives the normative presuppositions of communicative action from the notion of ‘common interest’. In (neo-)Parsonian sociology, the condition that the interacting units know that both could also act differently is known as ‘double contingency’.

¹⁷ ALBERT (1994: 259) chides the analytical projection of such an ideal into ‘pre-theoretical knowledge’ as ‘normative essentialism’.

principles of discourse identified by Habermas function indeed as universal presuppositions of communicative action or are merely one set of possible idealisations amongst many. The question is pertinent, since ‘communicative action’, according to Habermas, is predicated on the implicit recognition of the values of individual autonomy and equality, and the existence of domination-free social spaces and interactional competencies, which are rarely given in any concrete situation. Does Habermas’ model, then, merely impose modern European ideals or is his theory indeed of universal relevance?¹⁸

This question can be explored by comparing Habermas’ dialogical model of the ‘ideal speech situation’ with other models of highly idealised speech situations of a similar level of abstraction, such as the Jain theory of speaking, which, at first sight, seems to be predicated on hierarchical, or subject oriented, rather than egalitarian, or intersubjective, normative presuppositions.¹⁹ From Habermas’ perspective, the principles informing hierarchical systems, even if culturally dominant, cannot be universalised, since they themselves are predicated on the principles of communicative action which are (from the perspective of analytical reconstruction) consciously or unconsciously presupposed in all linguistically mediated interaction. Conversely, from a Jain perspective, the ontology of soul, non-soul, *karman* and the principle of non-violence are implicitly presupposed in all universally acceptable actions. In

¹⁸ KEENAN’S (1976) ethnographic critique of the postulated universality of Grice’s conversational maxims has been extended to Habermas by PRATT (1986: 70). Disregarding criticism of Keenan’s arguments, for instance by PRINCE (1982), she argues that Habermas’ ‘ideal speech act’ merely reflects dominant Western standards of normality used to criticise ‘deviations’ as ‘systemic distortions’. Following Nietzsche, FOUCAULT (1981: 56) had earlier criticised the ‘will to truth’ as a ‘machinery of exclusion’ of ‘false discourses’. See also LINKENBACH’S (1986: 108 n. 43) anthropological critique of Habermas’ ‘objective hermeneutics’. HABERMAS (1983: 88 ff.) / (1990: 78 ff.) responded to objections to his ‘ethnocentrism’ in his work on discourse ethics, distinguishing ‘moral’ questions of ‘common interest’ or ‘justice’, orienting his own work, from ‘ethical’ questions of ‘the good life’ or ‘self-realisation’ which are culturally specific (HABERMAS (1983: 118).

¹⁹ Normative presuppositions in Indian theories of language have been discussed by GANERI (1999: 17), who pointed to differences between the subject-centred epistemological conception of language in Nyāya and information transmission theories which, in contrast to the Nyāya theory of ‘direct, non-inferential assent’, assume that ‘assenting to another’s utterance is never direct, but always depends on the hearer’s awareness of the speaker’s intentions.’ The proposal that the ‘normativity of meaning’ by divine decree in Gadādhara’s (Navya-nyāya) semantics can ‘partially’ be defended in terms of the notion of tacitly shared ‘conventional semantic theories’ as ‘the standard of correctness’ within a specific linguistic community, rather than recurring to Matilal’s ‘ideal hearer’ concept (GANERI (1999: 44)), presupposes an intersubjective solution of ‘the co-ordination problem’. For the use of ‘optimal standpoints’ for reconstructing the presuppositions of Jain many-valued logic see also GANERI (2002: 271).

both cases, moments of ‘insight’ can be generated through the acceptance²⁰ and situational projection of the respective model.²¹ It is debatable whether any comparison between contrasting philosophical or religious models implies a dialectical third perspective which will ‘always be more general than the most general postulates of a religion and the most general rules of investigation itself’ (PIATIGORSKY (1985: 210)) or is simply an addition without being ‘higher or lower’ (MURTI (1955: 127)). Frequently cited examples of overarching perspectives that are not predicated on specific comparisons are the dialectic of the categories of reflection (Hegel), the politics of cultural hegemony (Gramsci), or indeed the Jaina conception of a disjunctive synthesis of differences or alternatives (*anekānta-vāda*), which according to MURTI (1955: 128) is ‘more a syncretism than a synthesis’. A non-relativistic scenario is plausible if one model is able to reconstruct another on its own terms in a non-reductive way, or if it improves the other model, without losing information, while the reverse is not possible. In such a case, the analytical superiority of one model over the other must be conceded in principle.

A peculiar feature of Habermas’ universal pragmatic theory is that it can only be operationalised by ‘reversing step by step the strong idealisations’ of the concept of

²⁰ See for instance the extensive literature in analytical theology, following WITTGENSTEIN (1953), on the role of models for religious insight. For example RAMSEY’s (1967: 37) analysis of the ‘disclosure situation’, based on religious commitment: ‘So we see religious commitment as a total commitment to the whole universe; something in relation to which argument has only a very odd function; its purpose being to tell such a tale as evokes the “insight”, the “discernment” from which the commitment follows as a response. Further, religious commitment is something bound up with key words whose logic no doubt resembles that of words which characterise personal loyalty as well as that of the axioms of mathematics, and somehow combines the features of both, being what may be called “specially resistant” posits, “final” endpoints of explanation, key-words suited to the whole job of living—“apex” words.’ See further SMART (1965), HICK (1969), and others.

²¹ The concept of ‘insight’ is used somewhat ambiguously in this article, referring both to cognitive insight in the sense of Habermas (*Einsicht*) and to Jain religious insight (*samyaktva* or *samyag-darśana*). This can be justified by pointing to similar ambiguities (a) in Habermas’ use of *Einsicht* referring both to understanding and acceptance (close to Skt. *saṃjñā*, agreement, understanding, harmony), and (b) in the Jain usage of *samyaktva* which can refer to cognitive insight and acceptance of the ‘rightness’ of Jain doctrine, but mainly describes the ‘direct experience’ of the soul/self; see JAINI (1979: 80). The understanding of doctrine and self may or may not be linked, for instance in conversion experiences (FLÜGEL (1993)), which can be interpreted as a ‘realization and internalization of important dogmatic subjects’ (BRUHN (1997–1998, V.1)), though this conception does not account for the ‘self-reported’ enlightenment experiences of the Jinās. See SCHMITHAUSEN (1981: 199 n. 3) on similar ambiguities of the term ‘insight’ in early Buddhist scriptures. Generally on the problem of communicating ‘experience’ in Buddhist contexts see SCHMITHAUSEN (1981: 200 ff.), and for ideological uses FAURE (1991) and SHARF (1995). On Buddhist insight meditation, see GRIFFITHS (1981) and HOUTMAN (1999), amongst others. For observations on Buddhist and Jain meditation see BRONKHORST (1993b).

communicative action to approximate the complexity of natural situations. Because most methodological provisions and theoretical assumptions have to be dropped in this process, universal pragmatics becomes, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from empirical pragmatics, except for the additional conceptual sensitivity 'needed to recognise the rational basis of linguistic communication in the confusing complexity of the everyday observed' (HABERMAS (1980: 444)/(1984–1987 I: 331)).²² What is gained is the ability to discover different levels of the linguistically represented reality, and communicative pathologies, such as veiled power relationships or systemic distortions of rational communication through the use of generalised media of communication.²³ For formal pragmatic investigations of South Asian discourse the fundamental empirical question is not whether, for instance, *mantras* or ritual language can be considered as 'speech acts', or in which sense.²⁴ The question is rather, as Richard BURGHART (1996: 301) put it, 'how does non-distorted speech communication take place in hierarchical structures'? BURGHART (1983), (1985) was the first South Asianist to tentatively explore the possibilities of the theory of communicative action for an understanding of religious and political discourse in South Asia. Since his premature death, few advances have been made in rendering Habermas' highly abstract theory fruitful for South Asian studies.

In this essay, I make a fresh attempt in exploring the analytical potential of Habermas' communication theoretical approach for South Asian Studies by contrasting Habermas' discourse ethics, the reflective form of communicative action, with Jain discourse ethics, a reflective form of non-violent action. I will focus particularly on their respective theorisation of the subtle role of power in processes of indirect communication. Habermas opened up a new critical perspective by studying the constitutive role of idealisation in discourse and its exploitation. Alternative approaches, such as FOUCAULT's (1981) and BOURDIEU's (1991a), by contrast, emphasise the ubiquity and institutionalised nature of power. This view exerts a strong influence on current empirical investigations of Jain processes of social self-

²² On the difference between formal and empirical pragmatics see HABERMAS (1980: 440–52) / (1984–1987 I: 328–37).

²³ Talcott Parsons was the first to argue that symbolically generalised media of communication, steering media, such as power, money, status and value commitment, are the functional equivalents of sacred symbols in co-ordinating actions in societies not dominated by tradition: 'Instead of negotiating to consensus ... men rely on symbols <promising> the experience of meaning as a statistical probability over many acts. They are freed from the efforts to negotiate basics all the time' (BAUM (1976) on Parsons, cited by HABERMAS (1981: 393) / (1984–1987 II: 262).

²⁴ The potential of speech-act theory for South Asian studies has been explored by POTTER (1970), (1984), WHEELOCK (1982), DESHPANDE (1990), FINDLEY (1989), TABER (1989), GÖHLER (1995a), (1995b), amongst others.

identification.²⁵ In comparing Habermas' and Jain theories of discourse, I pursue three main arguments as far as the principles of Jain discourse is concerned:

- (a) Despite being differently constructed, the Jain theory of speech plays a similar role within Indian philosophy as Habermas' theory of communicative action does within Western philosophy. Both aim at the integration of a variety of perspectives, proclaim the primacy of morality over truth and logic, and predicate critical analysis of typical speech acts, especially latent strategic speech acts (perlocutions), on idealised normative presuppositions.²⁶
- (b) The orientation towards, and mastery of, the principles of Jainism generates interactional competencies regarding the non-violent resolution of conflicts, and cognitive distancing effects, which enable competent agents to intentionally create ambiguous symbols (utterances and gestures), and to manipulate identities through the re-interpretation of culturally normative or conventional presuppositions. The same can be said of the cognitive functions of modern theories of communication.
- (c) The perceived plurivocality or multifunctionality of symbols—one of the main features of syncretism and socio-cultural synthesis in general—is in the Jain case not only a feature of rule-application, or a consequence of external imposition or extrinsic borrowing etc.,²⁷ but also a consequence of religious knowledge, which can generate effects of insight *qua* (re-) interpretation of any given content. From the conventional point of view of communicative action, the principles of Jain hermeneutics produce systematically distorted communication, albeit one that is ideally oriented to salvific rather than material ends.

My basic contention is that philosophy (and logic), whether preoccupied with questions of universal validity, scepticism or pluralism, is always embedded in socio-cultural milieus which it both reflects and influences in varying degrees. Philosophy is always not 'merely philosophy', but a form of social discourse with social functions, manifest or latent. Philosophy does not merely consist in sets of propositions and logical or argumentative procedures but has also, directly or indirectly, pragmatic and expressive dimensions, and presupposes matching lifeforms

²⁵ See LAIDLAW (1985), (1995), and CORT (1989), (2001: 11, 171), who invokes Eliade's rather than Foucault's theory of power. See FLÜGEL (1997), (2006b: 108 f.).

²⁶ Citing examples, GÖHLER (1995b: 66) noted, similarly, the 'überraschende Gegenstands-gleichheit der Untersuchungen der Mīmāṃsā und der "Sprechakttheoretiker"' Austin and Searle: 'In etwas anderer Fassung finden sich diese Kategorien auch in der Mīmāṃsā' (GÖHLER (1995b: 69)).

²⁷ On extrinsic borrowing see DUMONT (1980: 194). For a Jain example see MISRA (1972: 16) on the merely 'nominal adoption' of the local South Indian culture by (Rājasthānī) Śvetāmbara Jain merchants in Bangalore.

and institutions for its social recognition.²⁸ The comparison between two expressly non-absolutist universalist theories, the theory of communicative action and the Jain theory of language usage, in my view, demonstrates that philosophies are intrinsically connected with a selective range of matching life-forms, while recognising that most socio-cultural milieus are culturally hybrid and contain elements which are universally acceptable. To what extent procedures and contents of 'rational inquiry'²⁹ are influenced by and influence social context is a question for empirical research.

The aim of this essay is to outline a new approach for the analysis of religious discourse in South Asia, and to prepare the ground for future critical sociolinguistic studies of Jain discourse. For this purpose key theoretical issues of philosophical pluralism and cross-cultural comparison are explored in a heuristic way. The essay is in eight parts. First, I am going to review the general problematic of Jain syncretism (I) and the existing academic literature on Jain rhetoric and discourse (II), followed by an overview of Habermas' theory of communicative action (III) and aspects of the work of Grice and Brown and Levinson, which will prove useful for operationalising Habermas' theory (IV). To prepare the ground for empirical investigation, I will then propose a typology of characteristic social settings of Jain religious discourse, and discuss their normative implications (V). Thereafter, I analyse the key features of the Jain theory of speech (VI), and of Jain discourse ethics in form of the Jain tetrad of the modes of speech (VII). Finally, I draw some general conclusions by comparing and contrasting the normative presuppositions of the theory of communicative action and the Jain theory of speech, which both in their own way offer critical analytical perspectives on the role of power and violence in human communication (VIII).³⁰

— I —

One of the key arguments of this essay is that Jainism, as a meta-philosophy whose social efficacy is predicated on the systematic reinterpretation of conventional perspectives, constitutes a form of discourse which produces syncretic patterns. At present, syncretism is predominantly understood as a transitional phase

²⁸ See LUHMANN (1990). HABERMAS (1991: 25): 'Moralische Einsichten müßten für die Praxis in der Tat folgenlos bleiben, wenn sie sich nicht auf die Schubkraft von Motiven und auf die anerkannte soziale Geltung von Institutionen stützen könnten. ... jede universalistische Moral ist auf entgegenkommende Lebensformen angewiesen.'

²⁹ BRONKHORST (1999: 23 f.).

³⁰ Readers who are not interested in the discussion of the relevant theoretical context and literature are advised to move straight to section V.

within an overall dialectical process of religio-historical development—syncretisation or acculturation—which often involves parallel processes of linguistic syncretism and/or group formation.³¹ PYE (1994: 220), for instance, defines the ‘syncretic situation’ as ‘the temporary ambiguous existence of elements from diverse religions and other contexts within a coherent religious pattern.’ He locates syncretism between a ‘mere mixture’ and a ‘coherent mixture’ or ‘synthesis’:

‘If coherent mixture, or synthesis, represents the conclusion to a process which is thereby completed, syncretism by contrast is to be understood as dynamically open and indeed patent of resolutions other than synthesis. These might be, in particular, the outright dominance of one strand of meaning by another (assimilation), or the avoidance of synthesis through the drawing apart of the distinct elements and the consequent collapse of the syncretism (dissolution).’³²

Earlier, BECHERT (1978: 20–3) had proposed a similar typology of syncretic phenomena, i.e. of ‘the different forms in which religious traditions have influenced each other’, associating them with particular ideological or cultural systems: (1) The marginal acceptance of single elements (e.g. Jains), (2) proper syncretism ‘where elements from different religious traditions gain equal weight’ (e.g. Nepal, Bali, Sri Lanka), (3) full integration (Neo-Hinduism), (4) perfect synthesis (e.g. Sikhs). According to Bechert, Jainism (in general) is an example of type one, because its ‘essential characteristics’ are not touched by the assimilation of new elements. Bechert’s assessment of Jainism was probably influenced by BRUHN’s (1954: 136) remarks on the lacking ‘mixture of traditions’ and the prevalence of a combinatorial coexistence of elements from diverse traditions in Jain literature. BRUHN (1987a: 109) later pointed to the frequent co-occurrence of various syncretic phenomena within a single tradition. He distinguished, for instance, between ‘syncretism’ and ‘import’ in Jain literature. In contrast to Bechert and Pye, in his view ‘syncretism’ denotes the end product of the process of syncretisation, i.e. a ‘real’ synthesis of elements (from the participants point of view), whereas ‘import’ describes a situation of ‘unreal’ synthesis, where new elements are incorporated but not yet properly integrated (danger of disintegration). Bruhn also suggested distinguishing more clearly between different sources and periods, in order to achieve greater realism. In this context belong analytical distinctions between (a) the ‘hinduised’ (WILLIAMS

³¹ COLPE (1987: 220 f., 226).

³² PYE (1994: 220). Structural-functionalist models of acculturation artificially limit the role of ambiguity and change to a ‘liminal’ phase between presumably static extremes (e.g. TURNER (1986: 93)). So called post-modern approaches try to invert this scheme by defining identity itself as a limit case.

(1983: xx)) or ‘pseudo-jainised’ (JAINI (1974: 335), (1979: 291–4) ritual and literature of (post-) medieval temple-worshipping Jain traditions, (b) the ‘islamicised’ (JAINI (1974: 314 n. 63)) iconoclastic reform movements which emerged in the Mughal period, and (c) contemporary ‘westernised’ developments.³³ Whatever the merit of such typologies, which contrary to WEBER (1988) are often based on the supposition of ‘essential characteristics’, it is apparent that one of the main ambitions of present research is the construction of comprehensive classifications of various forms of syncretisation and their strategic uses.³⁴

An important debate between GOMBRICH (1971: 49) and BECHERT (1978: 20–4) on the question of the relation between literary syncretism (eclecticism) and the syncretism of popular religious practice in contemporary (Theravāda) Buddhism is also relevant for the understanding of similar phenomena amongst the Jains. Gombrich describes non-monastic forms of Buddhism as ‘accretive’ or corrupted forms. Bechert, on the other hand, criticises his devaluation of popular beliefs and of the political role of religion as ‘elitist’. Instead, he interprets Buddhist ‘cultures’ as ‘systems’ or organic totalities, encompassing both *saṅgha* and society. TAMBIAH (1977), too, focuses less on Buddhist doctrine and the *saṅgha* and more on cultural history, emphasising especially the constitutive role of local cosmologies (‘pantheons’) which are implicated in the cults of Buddhist kingship. This approach, which favours a typified ‘common man’s’ view from within and privileges ‘hierarchisation’ (‘hegemony’ or ‘totalisation’) as the most important strategy of acculturation, was pioneered by DUMONT (1980: 427 n. 6, 433 n. 19), who argued that historically the ‘worldly religion’ of ‘Hinduism’ emerged as a product of cumulative interactive processes between the ‘two ideal types’ of Brāhmanism and Jainism/Buddhism which superimposed an ‘individual religion ... on to the religion of the group [caste]’ (DUMONT (1980: 275)).³⁵ From the perspective of an individ-

³³ See the somewhat different ideal-typical distinction between ‘canonical’, ‘classical’, ‘protestant’ and ‘modern’ types of Jainism in FLÜGEL (2000: 37–40), to which ‘mystical’ Jainism (Digambara Mysticism) needs to be added.

³⁴ The following strategies have been suggested for instance: addition, parallelism, identification, hierarchical subordination (inclusion), re-interpretation. See HACKER (1985: 12), DUMONT (1980: 260), COLPE (1987: 223), PYE (1994: 222), BECHERT (1978: 23), BRUHN (1993: 38). With few exceptions, research on syncretism has been restricted to the comparative study of the semantics of cultural ideologies. This article, by contrast, utilises the analytical tools of rhetorics and pragmatics.

³⁵ The theoretical appropriation of ‘the participant’s point of view’ generated much confusion in South Asian Anthropology because of the ambiguous status of the key Neo-Kantian concept of ‘value-realisation’, which, on the one hand, reifies culture, and, on the other hand, claims to achieve greater empirical adequacy by representing the ‘native’s point of view’ (HABERMAS (1981: 340–3, 351) / (1984–1987 II: 226–8, 234)). DUMONT (1980) oscillates ambiguously between two interpretations: Hinduism (1) as a mixture between two literary ideal types, and (2) as a

ual, GUMPERZ (1972: 230 f.) pointed out, superposed structures demand a wider socioreligious repertoire, including role compartmentalisation and perspective variation. Dumont's view that, from a lay participant's point of view, soteriological cults appear as religions of individual choice which are superimposed upon worldly religion, lends support to both accretionary and syncretistic interpretations. It also highlights the marginal historical role of Jainism in India, which, for want of political support, was nowhere able to achieve a culturally dominant position comparable to Buddhism in the countries of Theravāda Buddhism, and consequently not forced to develop its own (hegemonic) social system. Jainism always remained primarily a monastic religion which relied on the institutions of Hinduism and the state to legislate for society. Jain philosophical syncretism conceives merely of a negative totality based on the disjunctive synthesis of differences within an infinite horizon of plural perspectives. Yet, negative philosophical forms of syncretism are to be distinguished from positive linguistic or socioreligious forms of syncretism, which are less prominent in Jain discourse, but dominant in practice.³⁶

The Jain case shows that it is an empirical question whether a given form of popular religion appears to be predominantly accretive or syncretic. It also underlines the crucial importance of configurations of power for competitive processes of doctrinal syncretism and socio-cultural synthesis. The religious status of 'popular Jainism'—'deviation', 'cultural bedrock' or 'modern political essentialisation'—is the subject of ongoing disputes between rivalling Jain leaders. Epistemologies and religious rituals for Jain laity were constructed intentionally by Jain monks. Yet, the

form of popular religious practice, resulting from the hierarchical incorporation of tribal cults, textual Brāhmaṇism, and 'the great heresies' (cf. DUMONT (1980: 428 f. n. 10)), through (a) Brāhmaṇic mediation, and/or (b) popular extrinsic borrowing of social signs from superiors without functional transformation (DUMONT (1980: 194)). The elitist *Brāhmaṇa*-centredness of this approach has attracted much criticism. Dumont himself indicated that his approach is not much different from the one of the philologist (DUMONT (1980: 433 n. 19)). The problem is that the 'common man' is usually treated as a literary type—'the Buddhist king' (Tambiah) or 'the Brāhmaṇic householder' (Dumont)—which mediates between doctrine and practice in a normatively prescribed way. By contrast, GLUCKMAN (1955: 128), for instance, appeals to the universal rationality or 'reasonableness' of common sense: 'The concept of the "reasonable" measures the range of allowed departure from the highest standards of duty and absolute conformity to norm, and the minimum adherence which is insisted on.' 'Reasonability' can be normalised, but, strictly speaking, it refers to empirical conditions.

³⁶ On the Jain philosophical 'syncretism' of *anekānta-vāda* and *syād-vāda* see for instance MURTI (1955: 127 f.) and GANERI (2001: 147), (2002: 279): 'In moving from pluralism to syncretism, the Jainas commit themselves to the claim that we are led to a *complete* account of reality by integrating of all the different points of view' (ib. GANERI (2002: 279)). It has to be noted, though, that this approach does not tolerate 'invalid' (*apramāṇa*) points of view. Hence, not every statement is conditionally true.

extent to which social life is regulated by Jain social philosophy varies locally and from sect to sect, and from caste to caste. Iconoclastic Jain sects rely on the Hindu social system alone, whereas temple-worshipping sects accept the ‘hinduised/jainised’ practices of popular Jainism as an integral part of Jain religion,³⁷ while communal reformers demand the ‘eradication of every non-Jain element from the Jaina community’ (SANGAVE (1980: 410)) in order to form entirely new social entities. Present political attempts to ethnicise the ‘Jain community’ by propagating intra-religious, trans-sect and trans-caste marriages are unlikely to succeed, however, because of ongoing internal sectarian rivalries, exclusive caste and class affiliations of the laity, and the continuing existence of mixed religious castes. Effectively, Jain communalism contributes to the strengthening of the cultural self-consciousness of an important faction of the new Indian business class, but does not alter the hierarchical structure of the society itself.

Jain laity usually practises ‘Jain’ and ‘Hindu’ rituals side by side, combining soteriological religion with worldly religion without mixing the two, as described by Dumont.³⁸ Even the lay followers (*śrāvaka*) of contemporary Jain reformist groups (e.g. ‘Jain communalists’) cannot avoid combining ‘Jain’ and ‘Hindu’ religious practices, because of lacking Jain life-cycle rituals.³⁹ Sometimes popular practices are ‘jainised’ by ascetics, and in this way legitimately incorporated into Jain religion. ‘Jain marriages’ for instance, and similar life-cycle rituals, are created simply by adding a Jain *mantra* to customary local procedures; and ‘Jain *pūjās*’ are rendered possible if interpreted as forms of *dāna*, i.e. without expectation of return etc. (WILLIAMS (1983: xx–xxv, 216)). Re-interpretation and modification through addition etc., are essential techniques for incorporating elements from other traditions and for constructing cosmologies and embryonic Jain social systems along the lines of pre-existing Hindu and Buddhist models. Yet, only few elements of ‘Hindu’ popular religion have been fully integrated, predominantly into the ritual corpus of

³⁷ See JAINI (1991: 187).

³⁸ MAHIAS (1985: 96 f., 287), GOONASEKERE (1986: 185 f.), CORT (1989: 433), and others, talk about the Jain layman’s ‘oscillation’ between ‘alternative’ Jain (or Jain and Hindu) ‘realms of value’. The social function of Jain practices for legitimising status-mobility within Indian society remains to be studied.

³⁹ ‘Jain practices’ are considered to be forms of temporary renunciation which are derived from the code of conduct for individual Jain mendicants, like the six obligatory rites (*āvaśyaka*), asceticism (*tapas*), meditation (*dhyāna*), plus, for the laity, the obligatory giving of alms to the ascetics (*dāna*); whereas all social rituals mediated by the *Brāhmaṇas*, such as life-cycle rituals (*saṃskāras*) or the worship (*pūjā*) of gods other than the Jinas, are regarded as ‘Hindu practices’. Of course, ‘Jain practices’ are considered to be hierarchically superior by Jains, although ‘Hindus’ regard them as ‘heretical’ deviations from standard practice, because they are neither predicated on the authority of the *Vedas* nor on the mediation of the *Brāhmaṇas*.

temple-worshipping sects. Aniconic Jain sects do not practice socioreligious rituals to the same degree as image-worshipping sects, and thus have a less clearly defined socioreligious identity. Structure and semantics of the ritual terminology correspond to socioreligious structure. The paradigmatic case of an apparently ‘non-Jain’ popular ritual which was appropriated and re-interpreted by medieval Jain ascetics to build up a Jain system of lay rituals is *pūjā*.⁴⁰ Its ambiguous status between soteriological and world-affirming orientations is reflected in the intentional multivocality of the religious terminology employed in this and similar lay rituals, as WILLIAMS (1983), LAIDLAW (1985) and CORT (1989), (1991) demonstrated.⁴¹ The socio-religious dimension constituted by a system of jainised lay rituals seems to be predicated on generalised indirectness.

— II —

Modern writers on Jainism have often noted the abundance of similes and double meanings (*śleṣa*) in Jain narrative and ritual literature,⁴² and their strategic use to infuse conventional language and popular stories with different meanings, derived from Jain ethics.⁴³ WILLIAMS (1983: xviii–ix) was the first scholar to highlight the ways in which medieval Jain writers, such as the Digambara *ācārya* Jinasena (9th CE), instrumentalised śaivaite terms (amongst others) as ‘vehicles’ for the indirect communication of their own religious views:

‘Jain writers have shown a remarkable aptitude for the subtle handling of words ... The polyvalence of certain expressions even within the limits of the same text is often disconcerting: *guṇa* in particular is greatly overworked and so are *kriyā* and *karman*. Indeed one is led to wonder whether the double meanings given to many words and their

⁴⁰ It is an open question whether Hindus or indeed Jains or Buddhists first introduced *pūjā* rituals in Indic religion. Jain *pūjā* manuals are comparatively late.

⁴¹ The fact that the status of *pūjā* as a ‘Jain ceremony’ is disputed within the Jain tradition diminishes the relevance of HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW’s (1994: 41 f.) ‘cognitive-psychological’ analysis of Jain *pūjā*, as they point out themselves (LAIDLAW (1994: 137)). See FLÜGEL (2006b) for a review of this issue.

⁴² E.g. WINTERNITZ (1920 II: 303–5), BLOOMFIELD (1923: 262 f.), SCHUBRING (2000: 268, § 150), BALBIR (1983), BRUHN (1993: 36) etc.

⁴³ E.g. HERTEL (1922: 8), JAIN (1981: 11), MONE (1987: 324 f.) etc. The social implications of the possibility that the multivocalities in Jain texts are intentional have, however, only reluctantly been considered by textual scholars to date, not least because of the unclear status of the element of necessary violence it implies (cf. BALBIR (1984: 37), GRANOFF (1992)).

formal identity with Hindu terms may not be voluntary. Examples of such coincidences (with the Jaina meanings noted in parentheses) are: *śiva* (*mokṣa*), *liṅga* (the monks symbols such as the *rajo-harana*), *guṇa-traya* (the *ratna-traya*), *paśupati* (the Jina) *mahā-deva* (the Jina) whilst on the other hand the word Digambara itself can be an epithet of Śiva.’

WILLIAMS (1983: xix) sees the reasons for the intentionally multivocal use of terms in the political assertiveness of ‘Hinduism’ in medieval South Indian society which forced the Jains to conceal their ‘heterodox’ beliefs behind a conformist public facade as a way of social self-protection:

‘It may be that such resemblances were intended to render Jaina doctrines attractive to śaivas or that śaiva persecution made it desirable to give to certain Jaina texts an innocuous aspect. Certainly the Jaina’s concept of *asatya*⁴⁴ would make it easy for them to adopt an attitude similar to that of those Shiite sectarians who in the early days of Islam maintained an outward conformity by concealing their real beliefs under forms of words.’

Numerous studies on diglossia, multilingualism/multifaithism and code-switching demonstrated in the meantime that the strategy of ‘outward conformity and inward dissent’, based on the method of differentiating hierarchical levels/ media of discourse, is not limited to a certain historical period in South Asia or to the Jains in particular, but a universal feature, especially of dependent subaltern groups, minorities, or elites. DUMONT (1980: 194) analysed the method of ‘extrinsic borrowing’ ‘from superiors of certain features as social signs and not as functional features’ in terms of a theory of acculturation, which distinguishes three contemporary types of cultural interaction:⁴⁵ ‘rejection, mixture, in which traditional and modern features exist happily side by side, and combination, which unites them intimately in new forms of a hybrid nature and ambiguous orientation’ (DUMONT (1980: 229)).⁴⁶ Oth-

⁴⁴ See *infra* (p. 194) on *satyāsatya*: something may be true as well as false (*satya-mṛṣā*) or neither true nor false (*a-satya-mṛṣā*).

⁴⁵ Cf. FERGUSON’S (1972: 244 f.) definition of diglossia: ‘DIGLOSSIA is a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standard), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superimposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation’ [author’s italics].

⁴⁶ See FLÜGEL (1995–6: 170 f.) on the relationship between conventional indirectness and ‘mixed’ and ‘combined’ strategies of integration.

ers emphasised the political implications of counter-hegemonic adaptive strategies. SEAL (1968), RUDOLPH–RUDOLPH (1984), HAYNES (1991), and JAFFRELOT (1993), for instance, investigated the paradoxical effects of double-strategies employed by political mediators in (colonial) South Asia, which used ‘modern language’ in the public sphere, i.e. institutions of the state and print media, and ‘traditional language’ within their own community. Sociolinguistic theories of discourse and multilingualism will prove useful for the future study of the interaction of different levels within Jain religious language and of Jain discourse being superimposed on different contexts.⁴⁷ In Jain literature, DERRETT (1980: 144) identified ‘double standards’. CARRITHERS (1991: 266 f.) showed how the multivocal ‘political rhetoric’ of the leaders of Jain lay communities (*samāja*) gains persuasive force only if indirectly tapping into a ‘diffuse realm of religious sentiments’. LAIDLAW (1985: 60) and CORT (1989: 449–70) suggested, conversely, that the official renunciatory ‘religious ideology’ of the Jains implicitly relies on a ‘diffuse Jain ideology of wellbeing’, and how ‘symbolically rich’ multivalent concepts, such as *lābha* or *maṅgala* which can mean either ‘profit’ or ‘power’ both in the world and in the religious sphere, ‘bridge the two ideologies’ (CORT (1989: 465)). The merit of Carrithers’, Laidlaw’s and Cort’s approaches lies in the attempt to interpret the implicit links between the Jain religious discourse and the socio-economic sphere in terms of a theory of symbolisation.⁴⁸ But they suffer from an exclusive focus on the

⁴⁷ GUMPERZ (1972: 225) distinguishes two types of relationships between variants: ‘*dialectal* and *superposed*’. On ‘seemingly intentional processes of distortion’ by argots and on the use of implicit language to claim in-group membership and to maintain group boundaries see GUMPERZ (1961), (1972: 221–3, 227 f.). Most authors in a recent volume on religious discourse edited by OMINIYA and FISHMAN (2006) derive their inspiration from the classic papers of FERGUSON (1959/1972: 232 f.) and FISHMAN (1967) on diglossia and bilingualism in exploring situational uses of either two varieties of a (religious) language, or of two distinct (related or unrelated) languages side by side throughout a speech community, each with a clearly defined role. Jain heteroglossia is discussed, with varying success, by PANDHARIPANDE (2006), with the additional help of BOURDIEU’s (1991: 107) institutional theory of the power of language. See also DESHPANDE (1979) on Jain claims of Ardhmaṅgadhī being a prestigious ‘Āryan’ language.

⁴⁸ Cf. STRECKER (1988). For similar descriptions of the ‘dual purposes’ of the Jain cult, see WEBER (1920/1978: 217), HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW (1994: 171 f.), LAIDLAW (1995: 354), JOHNSON (1995b: 310), and BABB (1996: 98–101). However, as WILLIAMS (1983) indicated, there is nothing particularly ‘Jain’ about the ‘undefinable symbolic realm of wellbeing’ (CORT (1989: 455)). Well-being as a religious value is generally associated not with Jainism but with ‘Hinduism’ or interpreted as a general social value (CORT (1989: 458)), SANGAVE (1980: 409), MAHIAS (1985: 109, 287), GOONASEKERE (1986: 185 f.). In the Jain context it might as well be interpreted as a mere contextual condition of success of ascetic life. FLÜGEL (2006b: 104), therefore, proposed to distinguish between well-being A (socioreligious) and well-being B (material). See also contemporary

laity and from the artificial treatment of Jain communities as quasi-ethnic groups isolated from the wider context of Indian society, which makes a critical analysis of the contextual relationships between Jainism and society, Jainism and power etc.—masked by the use of multivalent symbols—virtually impossible.⁴⁹ ‘Clearly’, writes CORT (2001: 11), ‘most scholars of ideology view power as ubiquitous.’ LAIDLAW (1995), following Foucault, shares this view. However, while Williams’ remarks need to be qualified, I think he and his successors posed the crucial question for an understanding of the characteristic ‘syncretic’, ‘hybrid’ or ‘parasitic’ form of much Jain narrative literature and lay ritual, by pointing to the intentional multivocality of basic concepts of popular Jainism, invented by ascetics, and their political-rhetorical function within contexts of competitive religious proselytisation. Williams did not pursue this line of research further, but confined himself to the sociologically less interesting search for the precise entailments of single terms. In order to handle the potentially boundless increase of investigations of such terms, BRUHN (1983: 61) proposed to limit ‘rhetorical studies’ to specific Jain genres, and most of Williams’ successors followed this path.

I chose a different strategy in this article, turning away from the description and analysis of literary genres and doctrinal semantics (a task for the philologist) to the investigation of the pragmatics of Jain discourse. The limited aim of this study is to explore the methodological preconditions for an investigation of contextual implications of intentional multivocal utterances in Jain religious language. To accomplish this, a prior comparative analysis of the constitutive principles of Jain discourse and its typical normative contexts is required. Particularly significant is the question of the ways in which the specific ethical principles of Jain discourse interlink both with contextual norms and with universal moral presuppositions of communication *per se*, upon which intentional language usage indirectly relies, if Habermas is to be believed. I will seek to demonstrate that critical reflection on language usage on a level of abstraction similar to universal pragmatics is doctrinally prescribed for Jain ascetics, who need to consider the ethical implications of their own religious rhetoric in different contexts.⁵⁰ Because the social implications

Terāpanth reformist attempts to disambiguate the concepts of Jain popular religion, i.e. to separate clearly between religion and society.

⁴⁹ See the first principle of FISHMAN’S (2006: 14) decalogue of theoretical perspectives for the sociology of language and religion: ‘The language (or ‘variety’) of religion always functions within a larger multilingual/multivarietal repertoire.’ The notion of ‘religious repertoire’ is derived from GUMPERZ’S (1972: 230) definition of the ‘verbal repertoire’ of a speech community (or individual) as ‘the totality of dialectal and superposed variants regularly employed.’

⁵⁰ The notion of univocality has to be used with great care, because of its association with positivistic ideal language theories. In practice, perceived univocality is always relative to a his-

of the Jain rules of speech themselves are hardly illuminated in Jain hermeneutical literature,⁵¹ I will start my investigation with a theoretical analysis of characteristic Jain hermeneutical procedures and discursive strategies in typical situations of linguistically mediated interaction.

The social function of Jain theories of speech, I argue, can be understood from the perspective of a theory of interactional competence. The term interactional competence encompasses cognitive, linguistic and rhetorical ability, and hence the capacity to use language both for the pursuit of power and insight. Interestingly enough, the use of mental and linguistic violence is a necessary requirement for accomplishing both aims. Power and influence are intrinsically connected with violence. It is one of the most intriguing questions how power works through discourse. Power has been defined by Max WEBER (1972: 28), from an intentionalist perspective, as the ‘opportunity existing within a social relationship which permits one to carry out one’s own will even against resistance and regardless of the basis on which this opportunity rests.’⁵² Rhetoric has similarly been characterised as a competence-based social technique by means of which a minority, or an elite, may gain or exercise social influence, personal prestige or persuasive power, over a majority. Its capacity to influence is often predicated on the measured violation of a conventional structure by means of the manipulation of linguistic and non-linguistic media of communication; i.e. it presupposes a ‘deviance’ from what is culturally felt as being ‘normal’ without threatening the co-operation of the listeners. Influence is further

torical background of implicit contextual knowledge and cannot be explicated merely by referring to logical or grammatical rules. Strictly speaking, common-sense knowledge cannot be described exhaustively at all, because ultimately the whole world is implicated in every expression.

⁵¹ See in particular the canonical *Aṇuogaddārūim* (AṇD).

⁵² HABERMAS (1981: 400–12) / (1984–1987 II: 267–77) adopts both Weber’s definition of power as ‘instrumental action’ and Parsons’ theory of money and power as ‘codes’ or ‘generalised media of communication’, distinguished from the codes of influence and value commitments. Parson’s theory of power was further developed by LUHMANN (1975)/(1979) and HABERMAS (1981) / (1984–1987 II). Power as code is explained as follows: ‘The power code schematises alter’s possible responses in a binary fashion: he can either submit to or oppose ego’s demands. A preference for compliance is built into the code through the prospect ego holds out for sanctioning later in case the latter fails to carry out orders. Under those conditions, the person in power can condition the responses of those subordinate to him, without having to depend primarily on the willingness to co-operate. From both sides is expected an objectivating attitude toward the action situation and an orientation to the possible consequences of action’ (HABERMAS (1981: 401) / (1987: 268)). Habermas thus implicitly operates with two notions of power: power as a code in the sense of Parsons and Luhmann, and as instrumental action in the sense of Max Weber. In this article the instrumental definition of power is predominately referred to. For a discussion of Jain conceptions of power, see FLUGEL (forthcoming).

strengthened through commitment and dogmatism on the side of the proponent.⁵³ By such means, a speaker may exert a disproportionate influence on individuals and society at large and stimulate changes in a pre-meditated direction. Social influence is rooted in conflict and striving for a new consensus: ‘Conflict is ... at the root of influence, either because it arises from the presence of a difference or because the existence of a disagreement brings it into the open’ (MOSCOVICI (1985: 353)).

Rhetoric has another, ethical-pedagogical, side: it may not only serve as an instrument of power and manipulation, but (from the perspective of the addressee) also as a critical analytical method of truth-finding and insight. Both aspects are often intrinsically related and can only be dissected analytically.⁵⁴ The ways in which Jain ascetics play with the two aspects of rhetoric, how they use multivocal language strategically as a means of normative influence and religious conversion, are interesting questions for sociological research.⁵⁵ If, as Williams argued, the multivocal categories of/popular Jainism are intentionally constructed by proselytising ascetics, and if this is done to generate effects of religious insight (*samyag-darśana*) in the audience, for instance through the rhetorical provocation of *vairāgya*-shocks (aversion leading to renunciation),⁵⁶ how then does Jain philosophy account for the element of violence which is necessarily implied in acts of persuasion? In other words, if social influence can only be achieved through strategic acts of violence, how do ascetics conceive of the moral paradox involved in the violent production of non-violent attitudes?

— III —

For the analysis of the role of violence in rhetoric, or speech acts in general, a standard of non-violent speech is required. Such a standard is offered in the Jain scriptures. It will be discussed in Chapters V–VII. Comparable paradigms in contemporary Western philosophy are the conversational maxims of GRICE (1975) and the universal pragmatic validity claims of HABERMAS (1980), both echoing Kant rather than Carnap. A comparison with the Jain model promises to elicit key differences and highlight the specific nature of the principles of Jain discourse. In the following discussion of the two models, I adopt HABERMAS’ (1980–1981: 440 ff.) /

⁵³ LUHMANN (1982) and ALEXY (1996: 326 ff.).

⁵⁴ See HABERMAS (1981: 270 ff., 414–18/1984 II: 181 ff., 280) on trust (based on possession of valid knowledge and autonomy), and punishment and reward (based on property and means of inducement and deterrence) as distinct—rational and empirical—sources of generalised acceptability.

⁵⁵ SONTHEIMER’S (1991: 201) observation that codified ‘Hinduism had [has] only persuasive power and was no law in the western sense’ equally applies to doctrinal Jainism.

⁵⁶ BRUHN (1983: 32).

(1984–1987 I: 328 ff.) suggestion to treat empirical pragmatic models as if they were conscious operationalisations of universal pragmatics.⁵⁷ The latter claims to be a more general than the former since it does not only theorise principles of linguistic exchange but also the morally binding force of rational argument and the socially constitutive function of rationally constituted consensus. Contrasting claims to universality of the models of Habermas and the Jains, the former would claim (on debatable grounds), can be tested through comparative analysis.

In his *Theory of Communicative Action*, HABERMAS (1980: 384–88) / (1984–1987 I: 284–89) distinguishes between ‘communicative’ and ‘strategic’ types of linguistically mediated interaction to be able to discriminate between consensus-oriented and manipulative forms of language usage. The key variable in his model is the dominant social orientation informing language usage.⁵⁸ Communicative action is orientated towards consensus through rational argumentation, understanding and insight, whereas strategic action (success-oriented action) is orientated towards power and the pursuit of self interest through the manipulative use of speech.⁵⁹ Despite the ambiguity of his key terms *Verständigung* (‘communicative understanding’) and *Einsicht* (‘insight’),⁶⁰ Habermas differentiates clearly between linguistic and normative aspects of communicative action, that is, the understanding of the meaning of a speech act and the acceptance of implicit validity claims. In contrast to speech act theoreticians such as Austin, Grice, and others, Habermas does not privilege the intention of the speaker as determinative of the social meaning of a

⁵⁷ This approach goes back to Pierce, Royce and Mead, and was revived by Apel.

⁵⁸ HABERMAS (1980: 442 n. 84) / (1984–1987 I: 444 f. n. 84). This formulation is still intentionalist. The artificial segregation of perlocutions from the other components has been criticised, as well as Habermas’ original equation of perlocutions with latent strategic action, his exclusive attribution of teleological goal-oriented behaviour to strategic action, and the logocentric ideal type of rationality. In response to criticism, HABERMAS (1986: 401 n. 60) later accepted the ‘basic teleological structure of all actions’ and proposed a combination of ‘actor-orientation’ (success vs. understanding) and ‘types of coordination of action plans’ (influence vs. agreement) as a replacement. This formula was necessary to save his definition of ‘proper illocutions’ being dependent not only on subjective conditions of satisfaction of the meaning of a speech act, but also on intersubjective conditions (reasons for the acceptance of validity claims). In reality, strategic action always appears to be intermingled with communicative action (HABERMAS (1986: 443)), and perlocutionary effects are not only consequences of strategic action but also of communicative action. Cf. HABERMAS (1980: 397) / (1984–1987 I: 295 f.) versus SEARLE (1993: 98 f.).

⁵⁹ Most critics of Habermas rejected his strict distinction between *poesis* and *praxis*.

⁶⁰ HABERMAS (1996: 339): “‘Insight’ signifies that a decision can be justified on the basis of ‘epistemic’ reasons’, that is, when practical reflection ‘extends beyond the subjective world to which the actor has privileged access [“pragmatic” reasons] to the [implicitly known] contents of an intersubjectively shared social world.’”

speech act, which he sees as negotiable, but focuses on the (contextually varying) conditions of acceptability, that is, the implicit or explicit reasons on which the validity claims of a speech act are based, which can be accepted or rejected in processes of intersubjective communication. The question is: What does it mean to understand a speech act? Not: What does it mean to understand an intention? Habermas expands AUSTIN's (1962) distinction between 'locutionary', 'illocutionary' and 'perlocutionary' speech acts, which he re-labels, partly following SEARLE's (1979: 12–20) terminology, as 'constatives', 'regulatives' and 'expressives' in analogy to his three universal validity claims 'truth', 'rightness' and 'truthfulness', by focusing not so much on speech acts themselves but on the social function of speech for the co-ordination of action. The advantage of Habermas' distinction between 'speech acts' and 'linguistically mediated interaction', prefigured in the work of sociolinguists such as GUMPERZ (1964), (1972) and HYMES (1972b),⁶¹ is that it allows to analyse the contextual moral and legal implications of language usage, i.e. the socially binding force of the validity claims implied in illocutionary speech acts, which cannot be reduced to the 'power of words' themselves nor to the underlying intention of the speaker.

'Communicative action' is not the same as 'communication'. It refers to a situation where the intersubjective co-ordination of action-plans is reached by way of rational agreement, that is, where an explicit consensus is constitutive for social integration (HABERMAS (1998: 396–98)). 'Strategic action' (success- / influence-oriented action), on the other hand, refers to a situation of exploitation, because it is not able to generate new normative consensus through rationally motivated acceptance of reasons itself, but only through the force of pre-existing norms and institutional or other configurations, which are external to the communicative process.⁶²

⁶¹ GUMPERZ (1972: 381): 'Verbal interaction is a social process in which utterances are selected in accordance with socially recognized norms and expectations. It follows that linguistic phenomena are analyzable both within the context of language itself and within the broader context of social behavior.'

⁶² HABERMAS (1984: 313–5) distinguishes between cognitive and expressive intentions; arguing that the illocutionary goal of speech acts, that is, consensus, can be reached either through the intersubjective recognition of power claims (perlocutionary effects) or of validity claims (illocutionary effects) (HABERMAS (1980: 385 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 286 ff.), (1981: 107 ff.) / (1984–1987 II: 69 ff.)). Cf. his comparison between imperatives (directives), e.g. commands, and regulatives (commissives), e.g. promises (HABERMAS (1980: 427 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 319 ff.)); both commissives, and directives (and declaratives) imply normative conditions by referring to situations that OUGHT to be, whereas assertives merely represent situations as they ARE.

Acts of social self-commitment to do something in the future or to give reasons for a validity claim, by way of promises, oaths and contracts, and acts aiming at committing others through directives (commands, injunctions), by instrumentalising existing obligations, are both focal elements of Jain discourse. The difference between the models of Habermas and the Jains is that the former rely on universal moral justifications, whereas the latter require only socially valid norms

Hence, by defining communicative action as the original mode of language usage, directly oriented towards normative agreement, Habermas is able to criticise strategic action as a success orientated mode of language usage, which is parasitic on the former, because it is only indirectly orientated towards communicative understanding. The whole purpose of Habermas' theory lies in the analysis of the conditions of the possibility of a consensual constitution of social order, without grounding the emancipatory potential of discourse either in metaphysical postulates or in institutional configurations of power as suggested by FOUCAULT (1981), BOURDIEU (1991a), (1991b), or BLOCH (1975). The critical emancipatory interest which informs the theory of communicative action is directed against (illegitimate) power and in favour of consensual (and non-violent) forms of conflict resolution and institution building. HABERMAS (1998: 449) argues that the emancipatory potential of language is not a metaphysical ideal, but manifest in the 'unconcealed idealising surpluses of an *innerworldly* transcendence' in form of the universal validity claims implicitly presupposed in all processes of communication, as the vanishing points (*Fluchtpunkte*) of infinite processes of open intersubjective interpretation.⁶³

How can we explain the power of non-institutionally bound illocutionary acts to produce feelings of normative obligation? What motivates a listener freely to submit him/herself to normative constraints if not self-interest or external force? At first sight, HABERMAS' (1980) argument that illocutionary binding effects are the product of processes of rational understanding, i.e. of insight into the validity of reasons (e.g. common values and convictions), seems to rely on the pre-existence of an implicit normative consensus and of the rhetorical ability of the speaker (HABERMAS (1980: 386)). However, like other proponents of formal pragmatics (Apel, Allwood, Grice),⁶⁴ Habermas attempts to circumvent both normative reductionism and subjectivism, by not focusing on the local 'ethical' context of specific empirical cases, but on the general 'moral' presuppositions of communication, that is, the universal normative conditions of intersubjective recognition which must be fulfilled for a speech act to be accepted. He states that 'we understand a speech act, if we know, what makes him acceptable' (HABERMAS (1980: 400)). Crucially, he assumes that every linguistically mediated interaction presupposes a set of idealisations on the side of the interlocutors

as conditions for their acceptability. Expressives are a different case altogether. They are not predicated on truth claims nor on claims of rightness, and therefore not redeemable by argument. Legitimacy is entirely based on sincerity and redeemable by practice only (HABERMAS (1981: 97–100) / (1984–1987 II: 62–4). For differing views on the structure and interrelationship of the various components see APEL (1993: 45–9), HABERMAS (1993), and SEARLE (1989), (1993).

⁶³ Remarks on religious communication can be found in HABERMAS (1988: 23, 34, 60, 185), and HABERMAS (2005). See also ARENS (1991: 174–6).

⁶⁴ On the history of formal pragmatics see APEL (1993: 43) and HABERMAS (1993: 21–5).

themselves. He explicates these implicit basic conditions of communicative action in terms of a model of three universal pragmatic⁶⁵ validity claims underlying all grammatically comprehensible utterances: (1) (propositional) truth, (2) (normative) rightness, and (3) (expressive) sincerity.⁶⁶ Habermas argues that the binding power of rea-

⁶⁵ Cf. HABERMAS (1984: 354 f., 440). With some exceptions (HABERMAS (1980: 418 f.) / (1984–1987 I: 312 f.)) his validity claims correspond closely to Grice's cooperative principle and conversational maxims (see *infra*) (and more generally to Searle's conditions of success and non-defective performance). However, one of the great misconceptions of speech act theory is the assumption that almost all social actions are communicative actions, and that communication is more or less identical with conversation. The cooperative principle of speech exchange should not be mixed up with consent to social co-operation (HABERMAS (1980: 397) / (1984–1987 I: 295)). Another mistake is to assume that only intentional communicative actions have communicative effects. SEARLE (1993: 89) was the first to criticise Grice's 'meaning-nominalism' with counter-examples showing that even non-intentional statements can have an effect, which demonstrates that conventional propositional content of words, i.e. representation, is more fundamental than speaker intention, and that Grice, by concentrating exclusively on the transfer and decoding of information, ultimately 'confuses meaning with communication.' In other words, understanding an utterance cannot be regarded as a perlocutionary effect. Critics of Grice denounce the infinite regress involved in the inference of speaker's intentions, and the vagueness and arbitrariness (incompleteness and incoherence) of the maxims. HABERMAS (1984: 333–48, 362), (1980: 371, 418) / (1984–1987 I: 274 f.) and APEL (1993: 32) criticise Grice's (etc.) mentalist 'intentional semantics' as treating understanding exclusively in terms of strategic action, *à la* Weber and economic game theory, by reducing meaning to the perlocutionary effect of the intentions of an isolated individual, not taking into account community context and conventional intersubjectivity and understanding through consensual agreement by condemning the hearer to passivity.

From HABERMAS' (1993: 18 f.) perspective, Searle offers an intermediary approach between intentional semantics and universal pragmatics: 'From my point of view, a speech act, which the speaker uses in order to come to an agreement with the addressee about something, expresses simultaneously (a) a certain speaker intention, (b) a certain state of affairs, and (c) an interpersonal relationship. According to the original intentionalist view [Grice, P.F.], the whole communication process can be explained from the perspective of the speaker and his intentions in such a way that (c) and (b) are derived from (a). ... Searle modifies his explanatory strategy to the effect that successful communication now depends on the successful representation of states of affairs, namely that both (c) and (a) are derived from (b).'

⁶⁶ Habermas' validity claims are grounded in Popper's 'three world' theory of subject, object, and society. See ALBERT's (1994: 240) critique of this 'ontology' from a 'one world' perspective. Cf. Searle's five 'conditions of successful speech' (essential condition, preparatory condition, propositional content, sincerity), three of which correspond to Habermas' validity claims (truth = essential condition, rightness = preparatory condition, sincerity = sincerity), whereas one (propositional content) is unique to Searle. On the basis of the idealised 'standard form' of rational communicative action, HABERMAS (1980) generates a complex system of analytical categories, by correlating the validity claims and the two dominant social orientations, consensus and power, with four 'basic' types of speech acts (imperatives, constatives, regulatives, expressives). The aim is to discriminate between consensual and latent strategic forms of language usage. The resulting

sons, that is, of rationally motivated validity claims whose acceptance implies weak normative obligations,⁶⁷ is not rooted in content but in procedural form, i.e. in the guarantee of the speaker, if necessary, to justify his/her claims in terms of these three types of validity claims and to give reasons which can be criticised and rejected (only) with better reasons (HABERMAS (1980: 406)).⁶⁸ Precondition is the principal autonomy of the interlocutors, their ability to say 'no'. Only under this provision does acceptance imply voluntary agreement. For Habermas, who follows Kant and Durkheim here, the socially constitutive power of discourse is predicated on the independence of interdependent interlocutors, who co-operate on the basis of negotiated agreement. This, critics object, is the logic of the modern market based on functional division of labour.⁶⁹

HABERMAS (1981: 62 f.) / (1984–1987 II: 38 f.), (1991: 25, 44) acknowledges, the readiness to accept the binding power of agreed normative claims, instead of traditional authority, is itself a product of processes of social conditioning and presupposes specific forms of life and socialisation. The development of moral consciousness is predicated on the internalisation of the perspective of the generalised other or threatening or factually exercised sanctions. Moreover, the social manifestation of the ideal-typical 'standard form' of rational argumentation presupposes situations or institutions where unconstrained rational argumentation between equals plays a constitutive role for society, such as the public sphere, the parliament, the courts of justice, or the university.⁷⁰ According to Habermas, modern social milieus such as these are the product of evolutionary processes of social differentiation generating an increase in both inter-

'pure types of linguistically mediated interaction' are summarised in Figure 16 of *Theory of Communicative Action* (HABERMAS (1980: 439) / (1984–1987 I: 329).

⁶⁷ They concern the present discourse of norm legitimation, not norm application. In updated versions of his theory HABERMAS (1991: 131–42) distinguishes two steps of argumentation: (1) related to moral judgement (legitimation) and (2) to moral action (application); i.e. *Begründungsdiskurs* and *Anwendungsdiskurs*.

⁶⁸ 'The binding effect of illocutionary forces comes about, ironically, through the fact that participants can say 'no' to speech-act offers. ... A hearer can be "bound" by speech-act offers because he is not permitted arbitrarily to refuse them but only to say "no" to them, that is, to reject them for reasons' (HABERMAS (1981: 114) / (1984–1987 II: 73 f.). GADAMER (1993) objected that co-operation in communication does not automatically imply submission to the power of the better argument, at least not without considering the relevance of reasons. FOUCAULT (1981), BLOCH (1975: 21) and BOURDIEU (1991a: 107) similarly reject the idealisations of speech act theory in terms of institutional theories of discursive or symbolic power: 'The power of words is nothing other than the delegated power of the spokesperson' (BOURDIEU (1991a: 107)). For HABERMAS (1980: 418) / (1984–1987 I: 311 f.), (1985) these arguments apply only to empirical pragmatics.

⁶⁹ For instance R. Bubner, and A. Wellmer. See HABERMAS (1991: 32, 86 f., 166 f., 15).

⁷⁰ On the difference between informal and institutionalised 'ideal speech situations' see HABERMAS (1991: 132).

dependence and individual autonomy and responsibility through a progressive universalisation of law and acquisition of moral competence. He argues that in cases where communicative action is consciously used for the production of normative consensus and social co-operation, discourse takes over the social function of ritual, and becomes a second order ritual (HABERMAS (1981: 86)).⁷¹ With reference to the apparently increasing importance of explicit negotiation in processes of social self-identification, Habermas defines this process of rationalisation as the ‘linguistification (*Versprachlichung*) of the sacred’, and argues that it goes hand in hand with the progressive ‘technicisation’ or ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ by systemic processes.

How to analyse Jain discourse from the point of view of the theory of communicative action? Generally, religious discourse is depicted by HABERMAS (1980–1981) as a form of communication based on structures of traditional authority in which status rather than argumentation functions as a medium of generalised acceptability.⁷² The role of power and insight in Jain discourse could be analysed in these terms. But one has to be aware of the fact that the ‘rational reconstruction’ of the universal normative presuppositions of linguistic exchange projects its own idealisations into human reality. The theory of communicative action itself contains a religious element in its notion of the ‘unconscious innerworldly transcendence’ that is implicitly presupposed in communicative action. A deeper analysis of the differences between the theory of communicative action and the Jain doctrine of speech therefore requires a comparison between the normative ideals underlying Habermas’ theories of communicative action and discourse ethics⁷³ with those of Jain discourse ethics (to my knowledge there are no Jain attempts to rationally reconstruct implicit rules), supplemented by comparative analyses of rules and discourses of norm application in typical speech situations (See *infra* section V–VI).

The daily sermon (*pravacana*) of Jain ascetics is a good example for a transitional ritual, where discourse serves both as an instrument for the reproduction of the traditional authority of the *saṅgha*, and for the eventual production of new normative consensus via the evocation of religious insight amongst yet unconverted listeners. A

⁷¹ Cf. WEBER (1978) on ‘ethicisation’, and FOUCAULT (1981: 62 f.) and LUHMANN (1982: 144 f.) on the progressive substitution of ritual through discourse. An evolutionary theory of religious development as increasing manifestation of communicative competence has been proposed by DÖBERT (1973: 152). For a critique see PEUKERT (1992: 231 f.).

⁷² HABERMAS (2005) pointed out that within the public sphere religious arguments function in same way as other arguments, as reasons to be accepted or rejected.

⁷³ HABERMAS (1983: 103, cf. 76) / (1990: 93, cf. 66) defines the basic principle of discourse ethics (D), the reflective form of communicative action, as follows: ‘Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.’

Jain discourse of conversion presupposes mutual independence of interlocutors and creates new consensus via the unconstrained acceptance of validity claims. The main difference compared with the ideal situation of communicative action is the institutionalised one-sidedness of a monological discourse and its coded semantic form which does not allow for a negotiated modification of the religious dogma itself, at least not in the short run. Because insight and power go hand in hand in tradition-based religion, conversion discourses always take the form of strategic action, producing insight (psychological and verbal acceptance of the dogma) as a perlocutionary effect predicated on the intentional deconstruction of the pre-existing conventional normative consensus.⁷⁴ In this case, latent strategic action serves as the vehicle for both communicative action or even mythopoetic world disclosure, and for the unquestioned reproduction of the hierarchy of power. In practice, the two fundamental ways of interpretation are irreducible to each other. But they can be analytically differentiated. In the following, I analyse the plurivocality of Jain discourse primarily in terms of its social implications—as a form of latent strategic action—though multiple ambiguities can be distinguished in every speech act in a conventional speech situation.

It is an open question to what extent the theory of communicative action falls under this verdict as well.⁷⁵ HABERMAS (1986: 383), who after all regards communicative action as the original or constitutive mode of language usage, insists on the empirical inevitability of indirect violence and power in the initial stages of the historical evolution of abstract norms. He distinguishes two developmental phases of communicative co-operation and social integration: Communicative action, he argues, is originally embedded in contexts of latent strategic action, because, initially, situation definitions do not sufficiently overlap. The participants therefore have to use indirect communication ‘following the model of intentional semantic approaches (Grice)’, in order to avoid a breakdown of co-operation. In the opening phases of all processes of co-operation indirect communication plays an important role for the creation of overlapping definitions of the situation, as an alternative of meta-communication: the speaker makes the hearer understand something qua perlocutionary effects, i.e. latent strategic speech acts, whose contextual implications are not directly expressed, and need to be inferred by the hearer.⁷⁶ However,

⁷⁴ This creates paradoxical consequences once communicative action as a value becomes itself topical.

⁷⁵ SEARLE (1993: 99).

⁷⁶ On perlocutionary effects and latent strategic speech acts see HABERMAS (1980: 393–7) / (1984–1987 I: 292–5).

these strategic sequences are embedded within the general context of communicatively oriented speech.⁷⁷

For HABERMAS (1980: 402–8) / (1984–1987 I: 298–304), (1981: 57–63) / (1984–1987 II: 34–9), as for SEARLE (1993: 91, 99), normative authority is originally embedded within imperative authority, and takes the form of context-specific intentions and speech acts of particular individuals. This fits the case of the Jain sermon. However, Habermas' evolutionary theory of the genesis of norms is highly speculative and certainly the weakest part of his conceptual system. Moreover, he has not elaborated his theory of latent strategic language usage. But he indicates the systematic role of latent strategic action within a typology of social actions,⁷⁸ and shows how shared convictions may serve as sources of legitimate power. Power enters unnoticeable into the pores of everyday-life communication via two forms of pseudo-communication concealing strategic intent under the facade of consensual action: (a) conscious deception or manipulation, and (b) systematically distorted communication (HABERMAS (1984: 548)).⁷⁹ In cases of manipulation, at least one actor intentionally deceives others by hiding the fact that s/he does not comply with the three universal pragmatic validity claims. In cases of systematically distorted communication at least one of the participants deceives him/herself about the fact that s/he acts strategically, while maintaining the external appearance of communicative action (HABERMAS (1984: 461)). In both cases a deviation from universal pragmatic presuppositions takes place, through the splitting up or doubling of communication. In the first case, a competent speaker generates intentionally multivocal expressions for social purposes. In the second case, the internal organisation of speech is distorted by way of a privatised use of language. In psychoanalysis this is regarded as a process of de-symbolisation. According to Habermas it is symptomatic for a loss of interactional competence (which may or may not be culturally normalised) (HABERMAS (1984: 251–4)). He argues that distorted forms of communication often occur in situations of social dependency, where they serve as unconscious defence mechanisms concealing conflict smouldering beneath surface consensus (HABERMAS (1984: 232, 264–9)).⁸⁰ A manipulative, intentionally symbolic usage of language, on the other hand, creating conflict artificially for the sake of influence, is to be expected in situations of social dominance, and requires cognitive and communicative competencies. We will see that ambiguous language can be used for religious purposes as well.

⁷⁷ HABERMAS (1980: 444) / (1984–1987 I: 331).

⁷⁸ HABERMAS (1980: 446) / (1984–1987 I: 333).

⁷⁹ For Durkheimian criticisms of psychological theories of 'rationalisation' see TURNER (1986: 36, 56).

⁸⁰ Cf. JAIN (1929: 72), GOONASEKERE (1986).

It could be asked whether the structural multivocality generated by Jain discourse, superposed on varying contexts, can from different viewpoints be interpreted either as a form of latent strategic action or of systematically distorted communication. The perceived ambiguity of certain terms or utterances in Jain discourse is a function of processes of religious interpretation. Depending on circumstances, they may involve forms of symbolisation as well as the expression of latent structural conflicts, resulting for instance from the typical position of many Jains as subaltern elites within the hierarchical structure of Indian society. On the one hand, Jain ascetics use the strategy of intentional re-interpretation of dominant forms of discourse and popular rites, thus creating a private language for competent members of their religious community. On the other hand, the propagation of Jainism through proselytising renouncers eventually triggers effects of moral insight amongst some listeners, by providing a language for example for the explanation and expression of diffuse feelings or implicit conflicts, which may explain part of its appeal. It is important to note that the Jain tradition itself provides a yardstick for the critique of self-deceptions and symptoms of alienated modes of life with its ideal of non-violence. The authenticity associated with such a life-project could be understood as a higher-level validity claim, in analogy to the claim to truthfulness in expressive speech acts.⁸¹ However, better analytical categories are required to investigate the empirical diversity of forms of concealed strategic action. As Habermas indicates, some of them are provided by the intentional semantic approaches of Grice and Searle.

— IV —

One of the most interesting contributions to the theory of linguistic communication and rhetoric is GRICE'S (1975) analysis of the communicative function of 'conversational implicature'. In his article *Logic and Conversation*, Grice provides a pragmatic description of how multiple meanings are purposefully generated. He investigates what he calls 'implicature', that is, instances in which 'a speaker deliberately says something which is not, in fact, what he means' (GRICE (1975: 43 f.)). Grice's analysis is based on the fundamental pragmatic postulate that there is a assumption by all conversationalists of the rational and efficient nature of talk—a supposition, which can be formally stated in terms of a set of counterfactual principles and maxims concerning the efficient and univocal transmission of information, given that both parties co-operate and are interested to continue the conversation. Against this assumption polite, multivocal ways of speaking appear as deviations, requiring ra-

⁸¹ HABERMAS (1996: 341).

tional explanation on the part of the recipient, who finds in considerations of politeness reasons for the speaker's apparent irrationality or inefficiency. Given the speaker's rationality of expression, and the hearer's willingness to co-operate, unclear, ambiguous language forces the hearer to work out the implied suppositions of a multivocal statement. The latter must ask her/himself why a speaker, who can express her/himself unambiguously, has chosen not to say directly what s/he means, but rather speaks in a veiled language. In such cases, Grice argues, the hearer (interpreter) will assume that the speaker has deliberately 'flouted' the mutually presupposed conversational principles to 'force an implicature' onto the hearer, who then has to infer what the speaker intended without saying so openly. Particularly interesting are cases in which someone deliberately violates a maxim, not to mislead, but to influence others by getting another message across. Strategically constructed 'deviations' such as these, which are 'parasitic' to direct communication, are particularly successful in achieving social influence, because they induce the necessary element of conflict in a manifestly non-violent form, not breaching social norms openly but only indirectly via implicit 'exploitation' or 'flouting' of presupposed conversational principles. It is precisely this 'non-violent' form of social influence which I regard as central to Jain rhetoric.

The construction of implicatures is one of the foremost rhetorical and poetical devices. Yet, only under certain contextual conditions will a conversational act of flouting lead to social consequences. Without the hearer's willingness and ability to co-operate, and to invest the effort to work out or to grasp intuitively the implications of an ambiguous statement, rhetorical communication with the help of implicature would not be effective. The uses of implicatures presupposes the invocation of contextual knowledge or common experiential ground on the part of the hearer, who is forced to generate a meaningful interpretation in response to the speaker's deliberate violation of the principles of conversation, which implicitly forces on the hearer a choice between deference to the veiled imperative or discontinuation of the communication. The efficacy of this kind of indirect communication is ultimately based on ego's exploitation of alter's willingness to adhere to the general cooperative principle of language exchange under given normative conditions. Accordingly, the principal means of physically 'non-violent' resistance is non-cooperation.⁸²

Grice's theory of language usage is, in itself, of limited use in anthropological research. Theories of information processing cannot sufficiently account for the empirical role of conventional meaning and contextual knowledge, as HYMES (1972a), (1972b) convincingly argued.⁸³ BROWN'-LEVINSON's (1978) theory of politeness,

⁸² SHARP (1960), (1973).

⁸³ In his summary critique of Grice's intentionalist semantics, DAVIS (1998: 174) notes that 'common interests sustaining indirect speech act conventions are much deeper than mere politeness.' However, 'A common interest need not be universally shared to sustain a common practice.'

which builds upon Grice's principles, therefore links the theory of conversational implicature with Goffman's theory of social self-identity or 'face' (self-esteem or public self-image). It argues that talk exchange can be related to contextual, that is, institutional, variables by considering the relative social position of speaker and hearer, which decisively influences choices of politeness strategy. 'Face' is relationally defined, 'that is, normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others' faces, it is in general in every participant's best interest to maintain each other's face' (BROWN-LEVINSON (1978: 66)). Two kinds of 'face wants' are distinguished: 'negative face wants' (to be unimpeded by others)—often achieved by strategies of non-interaction (which Marriott regards as typical for Jains, and *vaiśyas* in general)—and 'positive face wants' (to be desirable to others) (BROWN-LEVINSON (1978: 66)). 'Face threatening acts' (FTA's) are illocutionary acts which might cause a loss of face by way of orders, requests, threats, offers, suggestions etc. They run contrary to particular face wants, and motivate certain strategies of politeness, employed to minimise the threat, and to maintain face in a particular situation (BROWN-LEVINSON (1978: 70–3)).

BROWN and LEVINSON distinguish four main strategies of politeness: (a) 'bald on record' (being as clear as possible), (b) 'positive politeness' (the expression of solidarity), (c) 'negative politeness' (the expression of restraint), and (d) 'off record' (the avoidance of unequivocal impositions) (BROWN-LEVINSON (1978: 73–5)).⁸⁴ Any of the four strategies may satisfy the opponent's face wants to avoid conflict and to minimise threat. Yet, politeness is also used in order to stimulate conflict in a calculated way. Positive politeness and negative politeness—the dominant Jain strategy—I

'Speaker meaning' and the 'actual linguistic conventions of language communities' should be studied: 'Rather than trying to deduce arbitrary practices from some general psychosocial principles, we must look at the social functions that particular conventions serve.'—'In sum, Gricean theory fails because speaker implicature is a matter of intention, sentence implicature is a matter of convention, and neither is calculable from or generated by psychosocial principles. Conversational rules instead codify social goals motivating intentions and sustaining conventions' (DAVIS (1998: 190)).

⁸⁴ Examples for positive politeness are familiar and joking behaviour. Negative politeness is mainly concerned with self-determination. It is at the heart of respect behaviour and corresponds to Durkheim's 'negative rites', that is, rituals of avoidance, which are typical for Jains. Characteristic examples of negative politeness are: conventional indirectness, question/hedge, be pessimistic (don't coerce, don't assume other's willingness to co-operate), minimise imposition, give deference, apologise (beg forgiveness), impersonalise, state FTA as a general rule, nominalise, go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebteding the hearer (BROWN-LEVINSON (1978: 134–216)). There are certain similarities between these strategies and Searle's and Habermas' illocutionary components, although Brown and Levinson's categories reflect the inconsistency of Sahlins' well known scheme of reciprocities, which was obviously influential.

would argue, are primarily strategies of conflict avoidance. The most interesting strategy, also often used in Jain discourse, is to go off-record, that is, to construct intentionally multivocal statements: 'A communicative act is done off record if it is done in such a way that it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the act. In other words, the actor leaves himself an "out" by providing himself with a number of defensible interpretations; he cannot be held to have committed himself to just one particular interpretation of this act. Thus if a speaker wants to do a FTA, but wants to avoid the responsibility for doing it, he can do it off record and leave it open to the addressee to decide how to interpret it' (BROWN-LEVINSON (1978: 216)). The purpose of off-record strategies is to make the addressee responsible for decoding the intentions. An FTA, like any word, rule or symbolic act,⁸⁵ gains its meaning through context and becomes threatening only through its realisation via 'wrong or correct' interpretation.⁸⁶ The near universal usefulness of off-record strategies for purposes of persuasion and social influence is aptly expressed by STRECKER (1988: 114): 'To go off-record is one of the most pervasive strategies in social interaction whenever actors want to avoid harsh confrontation and the possibility of conflict, and when they want to persuade others, to influence them so that they do what they cannot be openly coerced to do. All this is done by means of indirect message construction.' Important for my argument is that politeness and symbolisation is used to avoid open conflict. A great deal of politeness and symbolisation is therefore to be expected from the Jains.

BROWN-LEVINSON (1978: 254–6) conclude their discussion of politeness phenomena with a typology of characteristic patterns of strategy distribution in speaker/hearer relationships regarding the contextual variables of power (P) and social distance (D) (which could be associated with 'active' directive and 'passive' commissive orientations respectively). In this way, they try to tie Grice's concept of conversational implicature into a context-sensitive social theory of linguistically mediated interaction.⁸⁷ They predict that in a situation where one of the interlocutors has high social power over another, and where social distance is low, the speaker with high social power will predominately use on-record strategies, and the speaker with low social power will use negative politeness and off-record strategies. STRECKER (1988: 165 f.), however, notes that individuals in an inferior position are generally not allowed to force an implicature upon the socially powerful (only *vice versa*). He suggests that the dominant pattern of strategy distribution in asymmetri-

⁸⁵ Cf. CASSIRER (1923–1929).

⁸⁶ Cf. BROWN-LEVINSON's (1978: 219) depiction of off-record strategies as violations of the Gricean maxims.

⁸⁷ Cf. BROWN-LEVINSON's (1978: 255) chart of dyadic strategy types.

cal social contexts is the combination of off-record strategies on the part of superiors and on-record strategies and negative politeness on the part of inferiors.

The still unresolved discrepancy between Brown and Levinson's and Strecker's interpretation provokes the question whether it makes sense at all to link types of socially-purposeful language usage to certain 'social positions', given the wide range of contextually acceptable strategy choices. Off-record strategies, in fact, can be used for many purposes: for purely aesthetic reasons, for the negotiation of unclear social relationships, for the veiling of heavy FTA's or forms of control, or for the stabilisation of asymmetrical social relationships. More importantly, a statement in itself does not force a reader/listener to adopt a particular type of interpretation (and no particular action follows from it in any structured way). Everything, in fact, depends on the wider social context, particularly on the informal or institutionalised norms and social conventions of a given field of discourse, which sanction the way in which language is used and which interpretations are regarded as feasible. As Habermas shows, it is only in situations where social pressures and normative sanctions are attached to language usage, that normative claims can be enforced through extra-linguistic sanctions. It is impossible to force anybody to comply with pragmatic conditions for the fulfilment of an implication, in the Gricean sense, without implicitly presupposing an institutional context and referring to a set of known social sanctions attached to the specific norms of a particular discursive field.⁸⁸

This point has evaded most linguistic theories of politeness, because—as Habermas points out—they do not clearly distinguish between co-operation in conversation and the role of speech acts for social co-operation. Therefore they cannot explain, for instance, how, in certain situations, superiors may rely on contextual pressures to force inferiors to decode their veiled speech and to fulfil the indirectly communicated demands. It is not the power of the words themselves nor the speaker's intentions which inform the 'calling in' of conversational implicature, but the role of the presupposed norms and sanctions which assure the perpetuation of social systems which, for instance, force inferiors to infer unequivocally the indexical meaning of intentionally ambiguous statements of their superiors, and to practically fulfil their unspoken commands without questioning the normative basis of their social co-operation.⁸⁹ Because

⁸⁸ Strategies can be conventionalised and ossified into norms of dominance, and compliance can be legitimately enforced. See HABERMAS (1984: 253).

⁸⁹ In the technical linguistic and philosophical literature the term 'implication' is used in different ways and still awaits clarification as BROWN-LEVINSON (1978: 216 f.) note. For recent work see HORN (1973), (1985), (2001), DAVIS (1998), LEVINSON (2000), HORN-WARD (2004), ATLAS (2005). In the following I will call the process of fulfilling accepted validity conditions the 'social implication' of a speech act, in contrast to the 'logical' or semantical implication of a communicative act, and to its psychological 'conditions of satisfaction'. The social implications of a speech act are the possi-

they accept the unnecessary constraints of Grice's theory of information processing, even Brown and Levinson and Strecker cannot avoid reductionist interpretations of language usage in terms of pre-existing 'social positions' and differential 'power'. Habermas' distinction between communicative and success orientated language usage, however, seems to open a path for a non-reductionist understanding, for instance, of the social function of positive politeness, which, in the words of Brown and Levinson, can only 'express' but not 'generate' solidarity. Reductionism can only be avoided if not merely the reflexive but also the constitutive function of discourse for the construction of social identities is considered. From this perspective, strategies of negative politeness and off-record appear to have greater power than positive politeness or on-record strategies, particularly in social situations where coercion cannot succeed and where co-operation is primarily engendered through indirect communication.

— V —

Any empirical analysis of conversational implicatures requires a careful description of the discursive field and conventional ways of speaking in different 'speech situations' which form part of the 'communicative competence' (HYMES (1972b))⁹⁰ and 'repertoire' of the members of a particular 'speech community' (GUMPERZ (1964), (1972)).⁹¹ From an observer's point of view, there are four formal contexts,

ble actions which may follow from it, if its validity claims are explicated through context-sensitive processes of interpretation of indexical meaning, and accepted. Cf. WEBER (1988: 95, 125) on the social function of 'noetic' interpretations of the social motives of ambiguous commands (in contrast to the objective understanding of the meaning of a statement) either (a) in terms of/for practical purposes, or (b) in terms of value-relations and for purposes of scientific understanding.

⁹⁰ See GUMPERZ's (1995: 209) definition: 'Communicative competence can be defined in interactional terms as "the knowledge of linguistic and related communicative conventions that speakers must have to create and sustain conversational cooperation", and thus involves both grammar and contextualization.'

⁹¹ GUMPERZ (1964: 137) defined 'speech community' first as 'any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction over a significant span of time and set off from other such aggregates by differences in the frequency of interaction.' Later he added the criterion of compartmentalisation (GUMPERZ (1972: 231)) and emphasised the role of social norms for the definition of a speech community: 'any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction by means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off from similar aggregates by significant differences in language usage. ... Regardless of the linguistic differences among them, the speech varieties employed within a speech community form a system because they are related to a shared set of social norms' (GUMPERZ (1972: 219 f.)). See also GUMPERZ-HYMES (1986) and HABERMAS (1980: 382 f.) / (1984-1987 I: 283). HYMES (1972b: 55) tries to 'bypass' the difficulties of defining 'community' by stating: 'The essential thing is that the object of description be an integral social unit.' The problem of essentialism does not pose itself at all in the more

or ‘speech situations’⁹² and associated ‘speech events’ and ‘genres’, which are relevant in the case of Jain discourse: (a) the religious debate (*vivāda*⁹³ or *prayoga*),⁹⁴ for instance at a royal court or modern court of law, (b) the public sermon (*pravacana*),⁹⁵ (c) the interaction between ascetics and non-ascetics in informal settings (*bhāṣā*), and (d) the interaction between ascetics (*vinaya*).⁹⁶ Each of these settings involves a different set of social and stylistic conventions, norms and expectations.⁹⁷ The agonistic debate at a royal court or a court of law for instance is a highly pragmatic affair whose outcome might decide the fate of a particular monastic group. Here, the contextual rules are defined by the king or the state, and classical

abstract theory of communicative action and Jain theories of speech (HYMES (1972b: 56), (1983: 167));—despite ALBERT’s (1994: 259 n. 41) objections. See footnotes 10, 18, 67, 142.

⁹² ‘Such situations may enter as contexts into the statement of rules of speaking as aspects of setting (or of genre). In contrast to speech events, they are not in themselves governed by such rules throughout’ (HYMES (1972b: 56)).

⁹³ Ṭhāṇ 6.67 lists six empirical types of debate, and Ṭhāṇ 10.95 ten special faults of debate. On Indian traditions of rational inquiry and theories of debate see, for instance, BRONKHORST (1999), PRETS (2004).

⁹⁴ CARRITHERS (1992: 112 f.) singles this setting out as particular significant; while emphasising the universal principle of free negotiation of situations (CARRITHERS (1992: 105 f.)).

⁹⁵ Cf. WEBER (1978: 213 f.) on the role of politeness in the proselytisation of Jainism, and WILLIAMS (1983: 45 f.) on the ‘spreaders of religious faith’ (*prābhāvaka*).

⁹⁶ Obviously, this is not an exhaustive taxonomy of all typical situations of language usage in Jain culture. I do not discuss examples of formulaic language, such as *mantra* or *japa*, or political oratory, which have already been exhaustively treated in the literature, but concentrate on those types of ritualised interaction where religious discourse is the predominant form of language usage. There are many different classifications of speech situations in the Jain scriptures, which deserve further investigation. For example, the four types of speech appropriate for an ascetic performing *bhikṣu-pratimās* listed in Ṭhāṇ 237 (4.22): (1) requesting speech, used in the context of the begging round (*jāyaṇī bhāṣā* <*yācānī bhāṣā*>), (2) questioning speech, used in the context of the studying the meaning of the scriptures, or path-finding (*pucchaṇī bhāṣā* <*pracchaṇī bhāṣā*>), (3) speech used for seeking permission, for example to stay at a certain place (*aṇuṇṇavaṇī bhāṣā* <*anuññāpanī bhāṣā*>), (4) speech used in the context of question-answer dialogues (*puṭṭha-vāgarāṇī bhāṣā* <*praśna-vyākaraṇī bhāṣā*>). Ṭhāṇ 4.274 specifies also four situations in which it is permitted for monks and nuns to talk to each other.

⁹⁷ HYMES (1972b: 55–66) proposed the following useful analytical categories: language field, speech situation, speech event, speech act, speech styles, ways of speaking, components of speech (message form, message content, setting [physical], scene [psychological/ cultural], purpose [outcome], purpose [goal], key, channel, forms of speech [varieties], norms of interaction [social structure], norms of interpretation, genres). They roughly correspond to Malinowski’s earlier distinction of dogmatic context, ritual context, and sociological context, as well as structure and mode of recitation (HYMES (1972b: 64)). The interrelation of genres, events and acts and other components in Jain settings is worth studying further (HYMES (1972b: 65)).

philosophical and political rhetorical skills are in demand. The public sermon, on the other hand, is comparatively informal, despite its conventional setting and asymmetrical structure. It conveys religious content, inspiration and insight in an entertaining manner, and is often followed by casual discussions at the end. The fundamental norms of comportment are defined by the monastic community itself. The interactions between ascetics and non-ascetics ideally take place within a hierarchical context of worship of ascetic purity, and are sometimes highly ritualised.⁹⁸ However, there are also informal interactions, which require greater discriminatory skills on the part of the ascetics for not transgressing the norms of non-violent interaction. The code of polite interaction within the monastic order itself is derived from the principles of ascetic seniority (*dikṣā-paryāya*) and group leadership, and operates in a similar manner.

I have ordered these four ritualised types of discourse sequentially in terms of their increasing coincidence with Jain ideals, starting with political rituals, then conversion rituals, interaction rituals, and finally monastic rituals. Other forms of classification are possible; for instance in terms of degrees of formality, social setting (assembly or individual contact),⁹⁹ or regarding the relative importance of discourse in ritual.¹⁰⁰ How-

⁹⁸ CARRITHERS (1992: 106) notes that in Jain (Indian) settings, the free negotiation of meaning is constrained by socio-cultural norms: 'There is a bias towards the authoritative pronouncement, that is, towards a relationship of unquestioning domination of the instructor. ... If we substract the authoritarian flavour, the telling of Siddhasagar's story [his example, P.F.] still retains an essential element, the creating of a common meaning by working jointly, interactively, to establish which interpretation is to be accepted.'

⁹⁹ TAMBIAH (1968: 177 ff.) and BLOCH (1975: 19) also distinguish between the 'primary function of language', as a vehicle for communication, and certain types of 'ritual language' (e.g. *mantra* or formalised oratory), which violate the communication function by being formal, unintelligible, and/or private (see also WHEELOCK (1982: 57); and HUMPHREY-LAIDLAW's (1994: 89) psychological variant). However, both ignore the constitutive function of language, and do not distinguish between speech acts and linguistically mediated interaction. Hence, they are forced to resort to reductionist interpretations of the social function of ritual language either in terms of institutions of power (BLOCH (1975: 24)) or paradigmatic cultural ideas (TAMBIAH (1985: 154)). Bloch's singular, BERNSTEIN (1964) inspired, emphasis on formality as (a) the decisive and (b) restrictive attribute of political and ritual discourse in contexts of traditional authority, can neither account for the Jain emphasis on content rather than form, nor on their insistence on ethics and the generative power of restraint. Tambiah criticises Bloch for not taking into consideration a number of factors: the intelligibility of ritual language derived from cosmological ideas, the role of ritual functionaries, and social context. Despite emphasising intellectual content of sacred language (in Buddhism), and similarities between sacred and profane language, Tambiah himself only discusses cases of popular 'magical' usage of language (e.g. *mantra*), and accepts emic 'power of words' theories as empirical fact, without discussing the role of discourse in ritual and emic theories of language (e.g. Vedic: RENOUE (1955), Navya-Nyāya: GANERI (1999); the power of words to signify is also recognised by Jain philosophers).

ever, for our primarily sociological purpose, the crucial variable is ‘interactional competence’, that is, the knowledge and ability to use rules and moral judgement for interaction in specific situations. Interactional competence presupposes ‘cognitive competence’ (PIAGET (1937)), ‘linguistic competence’ (CHOMSKY (1965)),¹⁰¹ ‘communicative competence’ (HYMES (1972a)), including ‘oratory skill’ (BLOCH (1975)). HABERMAS (1984: 187 ff., 231 f.) defines interactional competence more specifically as the universal pragmatic ability to regulate social conflict consensually through rational agreement, even in situations of severe discord, in accordance with the three universal pragmatic validity claims. He distinguishes further between the intuitive or conscious knowledge of specific grammatical and socio-cultural rules and contexts, and the mastery of the universal pragmatic conditions of the possibility of mutual understanding (*Verständigung*).¹⁰² Because Habermas’ notion of ‘communicative competence’, a composite of cognitive, linguistic and interactional competencies (in a more narrow sense),¹⁰³ is more abstract and formal than Hymes’ sociolinguistic notion of ‘communicative competence’, it circumvents the problem of analytical reification of ‘speakers’ or of ‘speech communities’. Building upon HABERMAS’ (1991: 111–3) distinction between two levels of competencies, also reflected in his differentiation between universal ‘moral’ and cultural specific ‘ethical’ principles, and HYMES’ (1972b: 57 f.) notion that knowledge of grammatical rules and of determinate ways of speaking together form the communicative competence of a particular speech community or individual, I propose to differentiate further between general ‘interactional competence’ and specific ‘Jain interactional competence’, that is, the formal procedural knowledge necessary for constituting discourse in agreement with Jain principles.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ TAMBIAH (1968: 176) poses the interesting question of the relationship of words to actions in ritual, noting the predominance of words and intelligible language in healing and initiation rites addressing human beings, in contrast to rites of mass participation and rites addressing supernatural beings or forces of nature. He also discusses the problem of alternation between various types of language in ritual, and reformist attempts to destroy the ritual formalism of sacred language in favour of increased accessibility and understanding. Both observations apply to contemporary Jainism.

¹⁰¹ See also DURBIN (1970).

¹⁰² HABERMAS (1975: 3).

¹⁰³ To distinguish the two kindred notions of communicative competence, I privilege the term interactive competence here. The usefulness of HYMES’s (1972a), (1972b) approach for the empirical investigation of ways of speaking has frequently been highlighted by HABERMAS (1975: 5), (1980: 440) / (1984–1987 I: 328). Habermas first used ‘interactional competence’ and later preferred ‘communicative competence’. I use the term interactional competence in the broader sense of social coordination of actions through linguistic and non-linguistic means.

¹⁰⁴ This application of the theory of social competence was first outlined in FLÜGEL (1994), (1995–6: 165). For theories of religious competence (often combined with theories of religious socialisation) see SAMARIAN (1969), LUHMANN (1982), WAARDENBURG (1979), and GLADIGOW

Jain interactional competence is informed by general ‘Jain religious competence’, which can be defined as the sum total of Jain religious knowledge learned by an individual. In addition to general ‘Jain interactional competence’, religious rules and contextual knowledge necessary for navigating specific contexts can be studied, and the ‘Jain religious repertoire’ of a specific population or individual analysed (as part of a particular ‘socio-cultural repertoire’).

General ‘interactional competence’ refers to the ability of a flexible reflective regulation of total conduct in terms of universal moral presuppositions, contrasting with institutionalised settings, which, through their formal properties, relieve the individual to some extent from the task of defining the situation and from difficult moral choices. ‘Jain interactional competence’ varies with the degree of knowledge and the internalisation of general and cultural specific (sectarian etc.) It is necessary to distinguish Jain principles and their contextual rules of use; that is, the cognitive and non-cognitive (motivational, emotional etc.) know how to act in accordance with abstract and specific doctrinal principles in different socio-cultural circumstances. Jain principles and rules of application, of varying degrees of specificity.¹⁰⁵ General Jain principles are characterised by constitutive rules, generative of the field of Jain discourse as a whole. They are exemplified by ideal Jain speech events. Jain interactional competence is context-sensitive. The corresponding rules are deliberately constructed to enable a performer to react flexibly to emergent properties of a specific speech situation, and to shape it in accordance with Jain principles. Since principles and rules only negatively determine the field of pragmatic possibilities, speaking the Jain way, or avoiding interaction altogether, are creative acts, performances, which

(1997). The latter noted that the ability to orient oneself in complex religious contexts, to distinguish between different situations, to develop a ‘religious identity’, and to act appropriately cannot be taken for granted: ‘Die Kompetenz, in einer polytheistischen Religion zu leben, sie angemessen zu benutzen, wird von modernen Interpreten einfach unterstellt’ (GLADIGOW (1997: 105)). Following Luhmann and Waardenburg, he advocates for the semiotic analysis of religious pantheons as ‘languages’ which can be learned and selectively used (GLADIGOW (1997: 106)).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. SINGER’s (1961: 96–138) distinction between principles and rules: ‘I argued that moral principles are to be distinguished from moral rules by the fact that the former hold in all circumstances and do not admit of exceptions; that principles are always relevant whereas rules are not; that principles are invariant and do not vary with changes in circumstances or conditions; and by the fact that it is impossible for moral principles to conflict with each other. ... I distinguished between fundamental rules, local rules, and neutral norms. Local rules ... depend on local conditions in a way that fundamental rules do not, and hence are peculiar to, and differ with, different groups and communities—that is to say, different circumstances. Neutral norms are local rules that are conventional in a way that other rules are not [‘it would make no moral difference if their opposites were adopted’ (SINGER (1961: 113))], but both neutral norms and local rules depend on social needs or purposes that are advanced by general observance and would be frustrated or defeated by their general violation’ (SINGER (1961: 327 f.)). On levels see also HARE (1981: 35 ff.).

ideally transform any speech event into a Jain discourse. Actual speech performances, or Jain ‘speech styles’ in the terms of HYMES (1972b: 57), I would argue, can not be sufficiently understood in terms of statistical features of overt behaviour, or as deviations from a general norm or ideal, but only as constitutive acts dependent on ‘qualitative judgements of appropriateness’ of selected features in a given situation.¹⁰⁶

Theoretically, the required interactional competence of the ideal ‘pure ascetic’ (*śuddha-sādhu*) increases with the degree of informality of the interactional situation, because ascetic self-control, in accordance with Jain principles, is the price for freedom from external (social and ritual) control. In practice, Jain ascetics try to prevent rule-transgressions due to insufficient procedural knowledge with various methods: for example, by teaching context-sensitive rules not in abstract, but through exemplary cases, or by keeping inexperienced ascetics away from morally overcomplex situations through strict supervision. Similar competencies are outlined for the Jain laity. An ideal lay person is characterised, for instance by Hemacandra (YŚ 1.47–56), as one who is listening (*śravaṇa*), memorising (*dhāraṇā*), showing respect (*vinaya*), being an expert in sacred lore (*pravacana-kuśala*), and also avoiding religiously unprofitable speech (*sat-kathā*) etc. (WILLIAMS (1983: 265–72)). Thus, it is always the Jain interactional competence, the religious and cultural repertoire of an individual or group, which generates the capacity of defining or judging situations in terms of Jain principles, of imposing or inferring implicatures, and determining the relevant type of rhetoric or hermeneutic procedure.¹⁰⁷

Once the settings and the required competencies are considered, the social implications of Jain discourse can be analysed in terms of the conditions and presuppositions of the acceptability of particular validity claims in Jain intersubjective hermeneutics. These can be discovered by negating speech acts as a whole.¹⁰⁸ The question is always: What are the social implications of a religious claim in this particular context? ‘What makes a religious statement acceptable?’¹⁰⁹ Ultimately, such a question can only be answered by the participants themselves, because only they can determine on which grounds to accept or to reject a particular claim. In other words, the explication of implications can never be achieved objectively, for instance by explaining the ‘cogency of ideas’ through a description of ‘the structure of

¹⁰⁶ On appropriateness and general features of discourses of rule application see also WELLMER (1986), and HABERMAS’ (1991: 137–42) discussion of K. GÜNTHER (1988).

¹⁰⁷ Non-literal speech-acts can only work if their implications are understood (and accepted). BRUHN (1987b: 67), for instance, writes: ‘The fact that everybody knew the basic pattern [of Jain soteriological sequences, P.F.] made it rather simple to find suitable words for a lecture or a sermon.’ Cf. GLUCKMAN (1955: 24) on degrees of ‘flexibility or of moral implication’ of legal concepts.

¹⁰⁸ HABERMAS (1993: 26).

¹⁰⁹ Cf. GOMBRICH’S (1988: 10) question: ‘What makes a religious innovation acceptable?’

a problem situation' alone, as GOMBRICH (1988: 11) suggests, but is always an outcome of specific intersubjective processes of socio-cultural self-interpretation.¹¹⁰

Classical performative approaches to ritual or ritual language, for instance, which made use of Grice's or Searle's analysis failed to investigate this (like Grice and Searle themselves). In fact, they neglected the role of discourse in ritual altogether, in favour of either cultural determinism (Tambiah) or mental (Humphrey and Laidlaw) or material reductionism (Bloch). Following Searle's and Habermas' interpretation of the dual (illocutionary and propositional) structure of the speech act, TAMBIAH (1985: 153) argues that, because ritual action appears to mediate between (cultural) ideas and (political) practice, it can be interpreted as a performative matrix of 'indexical symbols (and indexical icons) as duplex structures carrying semantic and pragmatic meanings':

'The duality thus points in two directions at once—in the semantic direction of cultural presuppositions and conventional understandings and in the pragmatic direction of the social and interpersonal context of ritual action, the line-up of the participants and the process by which they establish or infer meanings. We note that the sense in which I imagine actors to infer indexical meaning is similar to Grice's formulation of "conversational implicature", in that by saying or enacting something a certain meaning is implicated, which can be readily understood (conventional implicature) or is capable of being "worked out" (non-conventional implicature), given certain contextual features and certain common understandings' (TAMBIAH (1985: 154)).

Although he treats ritual acts as speech acts (thus identifying action and his own action description), speech itself is curiously absent in Tambiah's conception (and where he talks about it, he returns to the traditional 'power of words', *śabda-śakti*, theory). Moreover, the propositional component of the ritual act, its symbolism, is not treated in terms of specific validity claims whose debatable normative implications may or may not be acceptable, but identified with timeless and incontestable cultural paradigms. Tambiah's performative analysis is therefore still oriented towards the theological model of textual hermeneutics, that is, the dogmatic explication (*phronesis*) of contextual implications of mythic paradigms or sacred texts. His approach assumes that the knowledge embodied in texts is superior to the interpreter's, and has to be accepted.¹¹¹ Because his performative analysis does not clearly distinguish between ritual acts and ritually mediated forms of social interaction, it must assume socially binding effects emerge automatically from the experi-

¹¹⁰ Cf. GARFINKEL-SACKS (1970).

¹¹¹ Cf. HABERMAS (1980: 193–6) / (1984–1987 I: 134–6).

ence of ritual acts themselves, and that the authority of traditional ritual form should always be accepted, without question. The underlying notion of ritual enactment, a variation of the Neo-Kantian model of value realisation, cannot account for processes of intersubjective negotiation of conditions of acceptability and for the contextually varying social implications of ritually communicated validity claims. The presumed timelessness of mythical paradigms re-produces the characteristic pseudo-concreteness of Durkheimian functionalist studies of ritual performance, positing social integration both as a presupposition and result of ritual, without investigating the constitutive role of discourse in and about ritual itself.

Tambiah's theory does not throw light on Jain religious discourse, which appeals to reason and insight, instead of formulaic repetition, and whose contextually specific normative claims are constantly challenged and revised by the Jain *ācāryas*, under the threat of failure to appeal. In sum, because of the lacking theory of social constitution and cultural change, and the absence of sociolinguistic interest, Tambiah's approach cannot assist analysing the problem of contextual ambiguity of indexical meaning, which I deal with later in this essay. As an alternative, I suggest investigating Jain ritual discourse through the analysis of the Jain discourse ethics and traditional interpretative procedures for negotiating social meaning; to avoid falling into the same trap as Bloch, who identifies an increase of formality generally with a loss of meaning, which Tambiah rightly criticises.

Even if the idealist limitations of universal pragmatic or culturalist discourse analysis could be overcome, there is still the problem of how to analytically reconstruct implicatures in specific cases in a methodical way. This question is particularly prominent in theological, juridical and moral-philosophical debates concerning the status of rule application, that is, of interpretative processes that are involved in the specification of principles and rules through the explication of the contextual implications of given principles and rules.¹¹² As language in general does,¹¹³ explicit normative principles and rules always entail an anonymous indexical element. That is, they implicitly refer to a range of possible situations as their field of applicability, which we must know and accept, if we wish to act accordingly. To explicate general conditions of applicability, one has to refer to paradigmatic situations. Paradoxically, the range of applicability diminishes with the increasing specification of the conditions, and increases with the diminishing specification.¹¹⁴ In other words, the problem is the principal vagueness and ambiguity of the indexical meaning of symbolic forms, which, as GLUCKMAN (1955: 293) and TURNER (1986: 44) argued,

¹¹² GADAMER (1993: 107), WELLMER (1986).

¹¹³ APEL (1993: 41).

¹¹⁴ WELLMER (1986: 28, 35 f.).

is in fact a positive functional feature of abstraction, because it secures the adaptability of general principles to changing contexts.¹¹⁵ An exhaustive characterisation of merely negatively determined situations, therefore, cannot and, indeed, should not be achieved once and for all by participants, even if a principle itself is accepted.¹¹⁶

The contextual meanings and social implications of symbolic forms (and the forms themselves) are always underdetermined and hence negotiable.¹¹⁷ They can only be established temporarily through use and agonistic intersubjective interpretative processes, whose outcome is always open, even if methods of argumentation and discursive procedures are conventional,¹¹⁸ and predicated on idealised universal pragmatic presuppositions. I therefore suggest supplementing standard descriptions of ritual, or action in general, by an analysis of the discursive procedures which define situations and establish relevance and contextually acceptable social meaning. The discursive field surrounding rituals and other social settings should be the main focus for an investigation of social dimensions of ritual efficacy. Conventional analyses of ritual focus almost exclusively on the given ceremonial setting and on the performative experience itself, and tend to give undue weight to the procedural knowledge of ritual functionaries, textualised cultural ideas, and articulated subjective experience. The resulting meaning reductionism can be avoided by investigating discursive negotiations of validity claims *in situ*,¹¹⁹ including possibly the relationship between general, for instance moral, language games and institutionalised forms of reflexivity, such as theology and the social sciences. The analysis¹²⁰ of implicit judgements invoked in everyday practices of moral justification, moral utterances and moral disputes, can also demonstrate how cultural resources are used as potential reasons for claims of validity. From this perspective, social solidarity does not only emerge exclusively as a consequence of partaking in ‘effervescent’ rituals, to use Durkheim’s expression, but primarily—and increasingly so—as the result of the participation in socially constitutive discourses of norm legitimation and shared definitions of situations.

¹¹⁵ Pace BLOCH (1975: 17). On the function of general principles see also HARE (1981: 41).

¹¹⁶ On the impossibility of an objective description of indexical meaning of Jain religious terminology see CORT (1989: 93), (1992: 178), HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW (1994: 101), and FLÜGEL (2006b).

¹¹⁷ General principles or rules are generally combined with more specific rule of application. See WITTGENSTEIN (1953). ‘Keine Norm enthält die Regeln ihrer eigenen Anwendung’ (HABERMAS (1991: 24)).

¹¹⁸ They may include culturally specific discourse etiquettes and formalised interpretative procedures, such as the (monological) forms of Jain scholastic exegesis (*niryukti*) described by BALBIR (1993: 56).

¹¹⁹ See the pioneering work of TURNER (1986: 45). Lately, HABERMAS (2004: 53) conceded that all discourses are embedded in lifeworld practices, because they have the function to restore partially distorted background consensus (as analysed by TURNER).

¹²⁰ HABERMAS (1996: 335) used the term ‘critical understanding’ through ‘reconstructive translation’.

The paradigmatic example of practical hermeneutical explications of implied indexical meaning, are intentionally multivocal forms of communication within ‘master-slave’ relationships; often discussed either in terms of formalisation of discourse, and of understanding implicit directives (e.g. commands), or in terms of the instrumentalisation of interpretation as such by the rhetoric of spiritual power in contexts of traditional authority. Building on the work of Brown and Levinson and Strecker on the influence of social structure on discourse, DRECHSEL (1994: 50), for instance, draws an analogy between the relationship of off-recordness and on-recordness in politeness theory, and the relationship of the ambiguous symbolism of ‘sacred’ kingship and the unequivocal social and material implications of royal pomp, which, he suggests, have to be worked out by the lower strata of society qua unspoken command. Although mere compliance or non-compliance with implicit directives in no way shows that they are legitimate or illegitimate,¹²¹ the explanatory problem of this institutional theory is the same as in Habermas’ analysis of latent strategic action in terms of universal normative presuppositions. The king’s dual socially constitutive role, as a living symbol of society and as an individual with its own specific interests, involves his subjects in a paradoxical double-bind situation.¹²² Because the king is the condition of socio-cosmic existence, royal power appears not primarily ‘exploitative’, but ‘attractive’, to the extent that the subjects try to read the king’s mind and, ideally, to fulfil his unsaid wishes. Because the king is the condition of social order everyone is forced to identify with him. In fulfilling his wishes, the subject reproduces the conditions of its own social existence as a social being. A good example is the relationship between the king and his officials in the context of the ‘polite society’ of the court, and their characteristic mutual strategic orientation: the characteristic ambiguity of the king’s role forces the officials to work out the ‘implications’ of royal gestures, and to fulfil his unspeakable material needs in form of service, presents etc.¹²³ Even a cursory glance at the vast literature on South Asian kingship shows the empirical significance of such phenomena, first theorised by HEGEL

¹²¹ APEL (1993: 49).

¹²² BURGHART (1996: 306): ‘In a “Government of one”, conventionally called monarchy, everyone else leads double lives. They lead a life as dictated by the will of their lord and master, and they lead a life of their own.’

¹²³ See also ALI (2004). LUHMANN (1979: 36) argued that the efficacy of power in general is predicated on the mutual desire to avoid anticipated possibilities of open conflict and brute force. Obedience is usually not the result of explicit commands but based on the avoidance of expected sanctions in case of the non-performance of desired behaviour: ‘Der Machthaber braucht gar nicht erst zu beföhlen, auch seine unbeföhlenen Beföhle werden schon befolgt. Sogar die Initiative zum Beföhle kann auf den Unterworfenen verlagert werden; er fragt nach, wenn ihm unklar ist, was befohlen werden würde. Explizite Kommunikation wird auf eine unvermeidbare Residualfunktion beschränkt. In gewissem Umfänge geht mit dieser Form der Machtsteigerung Macht auf den Machtunterworfenen über...’ A classical European text on this phenomenon is LA BOÉTIE (1983: 136).

(1981: 145–77) in his analysis of the dialectic of recognition, and investigated by ELIAS (1983) in his sociological study of the French court and KANTOROWICZ (1957) on the ideology of European kingship.¹²⁴ BURGHART (1996: 308) found similar mechanisms within the political discourse under the Hindu monarchy in Nepal of the 1980s, combining arguments from Habermas and Bloch: ‘The king cannot speak informally to the body politic: rather he must speak formally to everyone, for he represents everyone. Little that he utters, therefore, can be taken at face value, and one treats Governmental speech with some suspicion. It is, as a matter of course, something distorted.’

The relationship between a king and his subjects is structurally homologous to the relationship between senior and junior Jain ascetics, and to the relationship between ascetics and laity (*śrāvakas*, ‘listeners’, or *upāsakas*, ‘servants’). In Jain scriptures, the junior partners in both relationships are characterised by the combined virtues of politeness (*vinaya*) and serving the guru (*vaiyāvṛtṭya*) (Uttar 30.30–7). From the point of view of Jain laity, even the relationship between Jains and Non-Jains should be analogous to the relationship between ascetics and Jain-laity (ascetics : laity :: laity : non-Jains). Similar (on/off record) strategic orientations are therefore to be expected. From an anthropological perspective, the crux of politeness theory is that functional contributions for the maintenance of public self-image are not coerced but received through processes of deliberate ‘fulfilment’ of face-wants of speakers of superior status by ‘hearers’ of inferior status; particularly the ‘faces’ of legitimate public figures, which condense the sense of identity in wider social circles. Social power operates here indirectly through the medium of free will and consent, if only under the implicit threat of social sanctions in the case of non-satisfaction of face-wants. In the words of TURNER (1986: 30), ritual in general is a mechanism that ‘converts the obligatory into the desirable.’¹²⁵

— VI —

It is essential for my argument to investigate Jain conceptions of pragmatic language usage, and to compare them with the theories outlined in the previous sections. The central question concerns the applicability of the theory of communicative action and

¹²⁴ On indirectness see for instance VELUTHAT (1978), BURGHART (1983: 297), BALBIR (1993: 267–9). In his work on *bhakti*, LORENZEN (1995: 3) recalls Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’, i.e. ‘that the ideology (or ideologies) of privileged classes may exert, by a combination of persuasion and coercion, a “hegemony” over the ideology (or ideologies) of nonprivileged classes in the same society.’

¹²⁵ GÖHLER’s (1995b: 72 f.) discussion of Kumārila’s explanation of the ‘impersonal’ injunctive force of Vedic words whose propositional content can only be realised under certain conditions could be reinterpreted in similar terms.

its forms of operationalisation to the Jain context; particularly the role of the ‘universal’ validity claims and of the Gricean maxims. I have argued that the Jain theory of speech plays a similar role within Indian social philosophy as Habermas’ theory of communicative action does within Western philosophy, because both proclaim the primacy of morality and ethics in language usage. Underlying Habermas’ theory of communicative intent (*verständigungsorientierter Sprachgebrauch*) is not only the notion that, by definition, in the immediate context of communication all participants must have a common interest in the maintenance of linguistic exchange, and hence implicitly presuppose the ideal of non-violence, at least of the avoidance of physical violence, but also that they are implicitly oriented toward reaching agreement.¹²⁶ In this regard, Habermas’ notion of infinite consensus represents a functional equivalent of the Jain notion of infinite knowledge leading to salvation (see *infra*, p. 129 f.). Moreover, universal pragmatic validity claims can be usefully compared and contrasted with the Jain vows of *ahimsā* and *satya*. On lower levels of abstraction, the Jain doctrine of the ways of speaking (*bhāṣā-jāta*), as exposed already in the older texts of the Śvetāmbara scriptures, can be usefully compared and contrasted with the conversational maxims of Grice; and conversational implicatures in Jain discourse, theorised in Jain literature, can be analysed as forms of latent strategic action in terms of Brown and Levinson’s typology of FTAs. I do not argue that there is an exact correspondence between these modern and ancient Jain schemes of interpretation. Nor do I believe that there is only one way of reconstructing the social implications of Jain theories of language from the point of view of modern social philosophy and logic. But the comparison generates new perspectives on both Jain and Western philosophy, in particular on the ways in which fundamental ontological distinctions or questions can function as codes for the constitution of different discourses.

The principal difficulty of this enterprise is the apparent incompatibility of dialogical and monological perspectives; of the—quasi-legal—intersubjective and egalitarian normative underpinnings of the theory of communicative action and the self-centred and hierarchical normative foundations of the Jain theory of speech, that is, their different ontological commitments.¹²⁷ Habermas’ differentiation between universal ‘moral’ and culturally specific ‘ethical’ presuppositions undermines from the outset the claim to universality of any religious ethical system. Since the legitimacy of Jain religious speech is rooted in the traditional authority of the

¹²⁶ Cf. HABERMAS (1991: 17, 173). HABERMAS (2004: 49) distinguishes four idealised presuppositions of argumentation: (a) public inclusion of all concerned individuals, (b) equal distribution of rights to communicate, (c) non-violence in the discourse situation, (d) truthfulness of all participants.

¹²⁷ See GERT (1973: Ch. 5–6) on the ways in which ego-centred legitimations of moral rules can be universalised; and critical comments of WELLMER (1986: 41 f.) and HABERMAS (1991: 173 f.) from the point of view of dialogical ethics.

speaker (*āpta*), that is, his/her Jain religious competence, rather than the procedural form of communicative action (*śabdānuśāsana*),¹²⁸ from the perspective of the theory of communicative action, its claims to universality can only gain acceptability in an open field of discourse to the extent that it articulates phenomena for which no other language is available.¹²⁹ Jain authors have also formulated a principles of discourse intended to transcend cultural boundaries. These principles can, however, only claim universality to the extent that they fulfil the condition of universal acceptability. Yet, this criterion is not foregrounded in Jain texts. A rational defence of the universality of Jain ethics will need to reconstruct the presuppositions of the egological Jain ethical perspective from the point of view of general interest. Conversely, discourse ethics rooted in formal pragmatics has only weak regulative force and needs to be supplemented by obligatory norms of action. The reduction of religion to morality and ethics and the epistemic approach, which Habermas inherited from Kant, are however shared, to some extent, by Jain doctrine. The following comparative study of Jain discourse ethics begins with the question of the status of religious language in Jain philosophy, especially intentionally multivocal language, which, at first sight, appears to violate the fundamental norms of universal pragmatics.

The main difficulty in understanding Jain concepts of religious language derives from the paradoxical, direct and indirect, nature of Jain religious knowledge (*āgama*). The problem is that, doctrinally, every utterance can be interpreted both from the transcendental or ultimate point of view (*niścaya-naya* or *pāramārthika-naya*) (henceforth PN), and from the practical point of view (*vyavahāra-naya*) (henceforth VN).¹³⁰ For a participant, ultimate and relative points of view are not necessarily absolutely distinct, but complementary, hierarchically related modes of orientation, which mutually implicate one another (like *noesis* and *noema* in

¹²⁸ Cf. UPADHYAYA (1987: 448).

¹²⁹ HABERMAS (2005). Christian theologians such as ARENS (1989: 11, 17 ff.) criticised this point already. ARENS (1991: 191) follows PEUKERT's (1984) views: 'In einer politisch-theologischen Kritik an Habermas ist Religion selbst als kommunikative Praxis zu begreifen, die "als Praxis, also im kommunikativen Handeln, Gott für die anderen behauptet und im Handeln zu bewähren sucht".' ARENS (1995: 150) proposes to see the 'church as a community of communication' in a double sense: 'Jesus Christ is communicated in the church and through the church's mediation.'

¹³⁰ Although influenced by the Nyāya school and by Nāgārjuna, within Jainism this terminological distinction goes back to Kundakunda, a South Indian Digambara ascetic of the c. 1st–8th century CE, who gives the following definition: 'From the *vyavahāra* point of view, conduct, belief and knowledge are attributed (as different characteristics) of the Knower, the Self. But from the real point of view there is no (differentiation of) knowledge, conduct and belief, in Pure Self' (SSā 1.7). Cf. MATILAL (1981: 43), CAILLAT (1984: 71 n. 54). The paradoxes generated by the PN/VN distinction gave rise to an extensive commentary literature which cannot be reviewed here.

Husserl's notion of intentionality). We are thus confronted with a conception of stages of religious insight and corresponding ways of using and interpreting language, measured in terms of degrees of insight (*jñāna*) and restraint (*saṁyama*), i.e. practice of non-violence (*ahimsā*).¹³¹

The Jain tradition uses the term *āgama* ambiguously.¹³² It refers primarily to the ultimate truth, which Mahāvīra, the last Tīrtha(ṅ)kara, had experienced directly and preached to the world, and in a second sense to 'canonical' Jain scriptures, which still form the doctrinal basis for sermons and writings of present day ascetics (MĀLVANĪYĀ (1968: 10–13)).¹³³ In classical Jainism, knowledge of ultimate religious truth and reality can only be gained through meditation (*bhāvanā*). However, in the present 'unhappy' time cycle (*duṣamā avasarpinī*) direct insight cannot be achieved anymore. Instruction through the words or testimony (*śabda* or *āgama*) of Mahāvīra, handed down by the religious authorities (*ācārya*), is the only way of gaining religious knowledge at all. The doctrinal primacy of cognition over language explains why Jains (and Buddhists) 'have tried to preserve the meaning of the words concerned and not (like the Brahmins—P.F.) words themselves' (MĀLVANĪYĀ (1968: 1)). Jainism teaches that, ultimately, all words—and indeed: doctrines—are neutral; it is the attitude of the knower alone that turns them into means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).¹³⁴ Conversely, for the knower, each word of the Jain scriptures appears to condense the teachings of Mahāvīra in a summary fashion. This is part of its evocative power:

'The Jainas maintain that the meanings of one single sentence, grasped by different hearers, are innumerable in accordance with their innumerable capacities ... a sentence in the *āgama* has the power to suggest in various ways innumerable meanings' (MĀLVANĪYĀ (1968: 12)).¹³⁵

It is crucial for any understanding of Jain attitudes to language that, from the ultimate point of view (PN), sensuous cognition (*mati*) and words (*śruta* or *āgama*)¹³⁶

¹³¹ Cf. CAILLAT (1991: 10).

¹³² Cf. AṅD 51, 467–70.

¹³³ The *āgamas* (scriptures) are not merely texts (HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW (1994: 199 f.)) but transmitted 'words of the omniscient' (Mahāvīra), that is, of trustworthy authority (*āpta*). They are considered as the vital force of Jain religion (MĀLVANĪYĀ (1968: 1)). *Āgama* can be roughly translated as knowledge or testimony (MĀLVANĪYĀ (1968: 9)).

¹³⁴ SHAH (1966: 211), TULSĪ (1985: 190 f.).

¹³⁵ Cf. WITTGENSTEIN (1953) on word meaning and contexts of use.

¹³⁶ DUNDAS (1996: 77) translates *śruta-jñāna* both as 'knowledge of religious scripture' and as 'knowledge located within scripture', which needs to be revealed through interpretation. On the

are both forms of indirect, mediated knowledge (*parokṣa*) (TS 1.11).¹³⁷ This is why Digambara Jains insist that the sermons of a Jina take the form of a miraculous sound (*divya-dhvani*), which radiates the meaning (*artha*) of his teachings instantaneously, not mediated through words. As there is no language for the unspeakable (*avaktavya*) ultimate truth, any language can be used to express it.¹³⁸ As a consequence, ‘from the absolute standpoint, the validity of a word or sentence is not intrinsic but extrinsic. That is, it depends on the merit of the speaker as well as of the listener’ (MĀLVANIYĀ (1996: 2)). The conventional perception that ‘there is no possibility whatsoever of any faults or defects in the content of the Agamas’ thus rests entirely on the dogmatic belief that ‘the speakers of the Jain Agamas were self-realized (i.e. omniscient, P.F.) persons’ (MĀLVANIYĀ (1968: 3)). The normative basis of traditional hermeneutics euphemistically stated: ‘In substance, this means that the absolute standpoint mainly keeps the listener in view while determining the

role of scriptures in Jain discourse see also FOLKERT (1993) and GRANOFF (1993). I am less concerned with the problems of textual hermeneutics here than with the pragmatics of religious discourse.

¹³⁷ According to TS 1.9–35, valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is of two types, direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*). Direct knowledge (PN) is based on immediate intuition. It includes *kevala* (omniscience), *manah-paryāya* (mind reading), and *avadhi* (clairvoyance). Indirect knowledge (VN) is based on mediated intuition. It includes *mati* (empirical knowledge, acquired through the senses and the mind) and *śruta* (knowledge acquired through instruction). *Mati* is subdivided into four sub-categories: *smṛti* (memory), *saṃjñā* (recognition), *cintā* (reasoning), *abhinibodha* (perception). *śruta*, scripture, is knowledge communicated with the help of material symbols such as words and gestures. There are a variety of views in Jain philosophy how the following four conventional means of knowledge derived from Nyāya philosophy relate to *mati* and *śruta* (mostly they are associated with the latter): *paccakkha* <*pratyakṣa*> (perception), *aṇumāna* <*anumāna*> (inference), *ovamma* <*upamāna*> (analogy), and *āgama* (verbal testimony of a person of authority, or scripture) (Ṭhāṇ 4.504, AṇD 436). See NYAYAVIJAYA (1998: 327 n. 1), TATIA (1951: 27–80), also TULSĪ (1985: 26 ff., 177–81).

¹³⁸ Generally, Jain ascetics use the local vernacular. They reject the idea of the intrinsic sacredness of Sanskrit or other liturgical languages. However, with the canonisation of the scriptures, Ardhmāgadhī gained an equivalent esoteric status. Many later Jain writings were composed in Sanskrit, the language of the Brāhmaṇic elite. The *āgamas* are in need of interpretation through a person of authority, i.e. an individual who knows the language and who has privileged access to religious insight (*darśana*). Initially, only the authority of Mahāvīra was accepted, the presumed author of the teachings in most transmitted texts, but later also the authority of the *śruta-kevalins*, and of the *ācāryas*, who now interpret the *āgamas* for their disciples. The Jain doctrine of testimony thus legitimates the institutional hierarchy of religious authority. However, there are numerous problems, because Jains are also realists acknowledging the power of words as sources of valid knowledge, because they are connected with things, as well as with a speaker’s intentions, and linguistic conventions. The logical arguments which were put forward, for instance by the NSā 5–8 or by MĀLVANIYĀ (1996: 2), to support the idea that the moral authority of the speaker is always more important than the content of his speech are, however, debatable (cf. SHAH (1966: 226 f.)). On the role of normative authority in Nyāya theories of testimony see GANERI (1999: 38 ff.).

validity of the scriptures, and the empirical standpoint mainly keeps the speaker in view while determining the same' (MĀLVANĪYĀ (1968: 2)).¹³⁹

Although *kevala-jñāna* (omniscience), the highest form of *pāramārthika* knowledge according to Jain doctrine, cannot be achieved in the present age, even today's ascetics are supposed to have mind reading (*manaḥ-paryāya*) and clairvoyance (*avadhi*) capacities. Through their training in non-identification they are expected to be capable of switching perspectives between *pāramārthika-naya* and *vyavahāra-naya*, and, thus, to look at the same phenomenon both directly and indirectly (note that from PN, VN appears as a form of indirect cognition). This has significant consequences for the apprehension of verbal utterances. From the religious point of view (PN), language appears merely as a superficial ornament, which disguises the essential truth and beauty of the inner soul, of pure consciousness, which can be experienced through meditation only.¹⁴⁰ In other words, the ambiguity of the concept of *āgama* is itself understood in terms of the 'absolute' and 'practical' points of view, which permit distinguishing clearly between ultimate religious meaning and linguistic means.¹⁴¹ The main consequence of this perspective is the cognitive de-substantialisation of everyday conceptions of language. From the worldly point of view (VN), the propositional content of a word (*śabda*) depends on convention (and on its power of signification).¹⁴² The semantic, and pragmatic, implications of a grammatically correct verbal utterance vary according to context. Speaker's intention (*abhiprāya*) is one of the contextual conditions of meaning. Yet, it is rarely discussed in the context of objectivist Jain (and Nyāya) semantics.

My general argument is that the doctrinal distinction between practical and transcendental orientations, and the learned ability of reversing perspectives, informs both the discernment and the systematic generation of plural, multivocal meanings in Jain discourse.¹⁴³ In my view, the cognitive competence of perspective alternation

¹³⁹ Cf. Matilal's theory of the 'ideal hearer' discussed by GANERI (2006: 115 f.).

¹⁴⁰ Examples are discussed by RYAN (1998: 77) and FLÜGEL (1993).

¹⁴¹ Cf. PYE (1991), FAURE (1993: 209, 213) and GOMBRICH (1996: 24) on the Buddhist doctrine of skilful means (*upāya*).

¹⁴² Similar relationships between 'authentic knowledge' (*jñāna*) and 'discursive/reflective knowledge' (*vijñāna*) can be found in Buddhism. Cf. LAMOTTE (1992: 21), BHARATI (1975: 169), SEYFORTH RUEGG (1985: 309–12).

¹⁴³ In a modified form, the argument also applies to Mādhyamika Buddhism, and can be extended to any context informed by universalistic two truth theories. Cf. KOKOSZYNSKA (1936) on absolute truth (ideal language) and relative truth (everyday language). See ALBERT (1991: 124 ff.), (2003: 128) for Popperian criticism of (a) double truth theories, (b) of Cartesian recourse to 'god', and (c) Apel's and Habermas' recourse to the 'hermeneutical god' of the 'ideal community of communication' as guarantors of certainty instead of a real, fallible consensus. Albert argues that all double-truth theories are dogmatic 'immunisation strategies': 'Particular viewpoints are intro-

is a fundamental presupposition of Jain hermeneutics and rhetoric, and can be used both for the pursuit of insight and power.¹⁴⁴ Rooted in Jain ontology, the distinction between empirical and transcendental perspectives was an implicit feature of Jain doctrine even before its philosophical conceptualisation. The fundamental religious problematic of Jainism, framed by the asymmetrical soul/body, non-violence/violence codes, creates paradoxes and pragmatic ambiguities which require interpretation and contextual specification/conditioning with the help of additional coding.¹⁴⁵ How to translate these asymmetrical codes into practice? Many Jain texts address this problem. According to classical Jain philosophy of standpoints (*anekāntavāda*), the epistemic tension created by the basic soul-body dualism of Jain doctrine, can only be resolved, if at all, by a process of perpetual alternation of PN-VN perspectives.¹⁴⁶ In Kundakunda's *Samaya-sāra* (SSā), this epistemic necessity is endowed with a soteriological function. The technical Jain *syād-vāda* philosophy, the conditionalisation of assertions, by contrast, is based on the conventional point of view (VN).¹⁴⁷ How do these two types of Jain perspectivism deal with the problem of multivocality? The Jain religious point of view (PN) infuses all phenomena with

duced that supposedly allow the separation of some problem areas from others, with the intention of eliminating any possibility of criticism from that direction; in short, one applies *dogmatic shielding principles*' (ALBERT (1991: 126). DUMONT's (1980) theory of the complementary opposition of status and power in Hinduism could be cited as another example of a dualism thesis.

¹⁴⁴ For different interpretations of the (potential) social functions of Jain perspectivism see for instance MATILAL (1981), and JOHNSON (1995b), (1999). Cf. HOUTMAN (1999) for the political functions of insight meditation (*vipassanā*) in Buddhist Burma.

¹⁴⁵ See LUHMANN's (1982) theory of 'steering differences' which tend to have the form of 'distinctions directrices', applied to the Jain context in FLÜGEL (1995–6: 164 f.). LUHMANN (1990: 215) argues that binary codes, which define self-referential systems in an unequivocal functional way, and ambiguous semantics are complementary: 'Durch semantische Ambiguität wird die Willkür in der Schließung des Systems und in der Ausschließung aller weiterer Werte aus dem Code des Systems berücksichtigt. Ambiguität ist gleichsam das kommunikationsinterne Korrelat für das, was im Beobachten und Beschreiben "zwischen" die Pole der Unterscheidung, besonders zwischen "wahr" und "unwahr" fällt. Die Ambiguität entspricht der Stille, die nicht mitspricht, wenn man spricht, oder auch die Weiße des Papiers, auf das man schreibt, und sie vertritt im System all das, was an Stelle dieser Leere eigentlich der Fall ist. Der Widerspruch von Eindeutigkeit und Mehrdeutigkeit kann auf diese Weise durch Differenzierung aufgelöst werden.'

¹⁴⁶ Cf. JAINI (1979: 90 f.).

¹⁴⁷ JOHNSON (1995a: 252 f.) argues that there is 'a fundamental incompatibility between *syād-vāda* and the absolute *vyavahāra-niścaya* distinction. The former is essentially an intellectual strategy for evading confrontation ... The latter, on the other hand, has ... a soteriological function.' For GANERI (2001: 133) *anekānta-vāda* and *syād-vāda* are complementary: the former provides the epistemology and the latter the semantics. On the technical definition of alternation (*anyataratvādīnā*) in *syād-vāda* theory see p. 143 f.

new meaning by re-coding them in terms of the doctrinal body/soul distinction. I shall designate this type of systematic distortion or appropriation of conventional meaning which at the same time opens up new semantic space, 'ontological ambiguity', in contrast to 'linguistic ambiguity',¹⁴⁸ in a wider sense, including expressions whose implications are semantically and/or pragmatic underdetermined (vagueness, indexicality, indirectness, presupposition etc.). Ontological ambiguity is not the same as linguistic ambiguity. But it can only be expressed in linguistic form. Therefore, both can be easily confused. Systematically distorted communication qua doctrinal re-coding and latent strategic communication are both predicated on the intentional creation of multiple meanings. Like latent strategic communication, ontological codes imply disguised generalised indexicality in form of the asymmetry of the binary code. Hence, from a practical point of view, both are social practices of symbolisation. Only their purposes, and perspectives, are different. From the point of view of Jain philosophy, the estranged view of the everyday world, which is intentionally created by the transcendental Jain perspective, is a product of discriminating knowledge, not of deliberate deception. This does not mean that it is unambiguous. LUHMANN (1990) argues, in my view convincingly, that every binary distinction creates at the same time clarity on one level, and ambiguity on another, *ad infinitum*. Different types of ambiguity become visible in the light of different distinctions. For instance, for someone applying the dogmatically prescribed Jain philosophical standpoints (*naya*) (TS 1.34), and the corresponding procedures for disambiguating contextual meaning, plurivocality becomes problematic in the light of conventional univocality, etymology etc.

More research is required to delineate different types and functions of multivocality in Jain discourse. However, one aspect of the Jain analysis of ambiguity deserves to be mentioned at this point. According to Jain logic, linguistic ambiguity¹⁴⁹ should not be confused with vague or incomplete description, which Jain *naya* philosophy contrasts with the epistemic ideal of definite description.¹⁵⁰ The problem of definite description has recently been discussed by HARE (1981: 40–3) regarding the media-

¹⁴⁸ Cf. HEIDEGGER (1925) on the difference between 'ontological' and 'ontic' perspectives; and LUHMANN (1990) on the difference between 'code' and 'semantics'.

¹⁴⁹ Analytical philosophers such as DONOVAN (1976: 1) broadly define religious uses of language as 'oblique' and 'evocative' or 'expressive', in contrast to plain 'informative' language (DONOVAN (1976: 11)): 'In very broad terms, what happens in religious interpreting can be described thus: the kinds of things in life found in one way or another to be religiously significant by those who practice religions are taken to have meanings over and above their scientific, historical or every-day meanings. These distinctively religious meanings they attempt to grasp and to communicate through the use of words, concepts, imagery, or stories drawn from the traditions of religious belief' (DONOVAN (1976: 100)).

¹⁵⁰ GANERI (2001: 133 ff.), BALCEROWICZ (2003: 46 ff.).

tion of general principle and specific situation, e.g. moral conflict.¹⁵¹ Hare advocates a variant of the two-level theory of ethics. He argues that an exhaustive description of a particular situation from the point of view of intuitive *prima facie* principles is impossible, because they must be very general and simple. To inform moral choices, *prima facie* principles need to be supplemented by exceptions, or by critical principles, which ‘can be of unlimited specificity’.¹⁵² Both *prima facie* principles and critical principles are universal prescriptions. However, critical principles can only be universalised on condition of unlimited processes of specification by an infinite intelligence, that is, an omniscient being. Because a superhuman ‘ideal observer’¹⁵³ can only serve as a theoretical vanishing point for finite cognition, the need for *prima facie* principles and exceptions arises (HARE (1981: 44 ff.)).¹⁵⁴ HARE’s (1981: 58) characterisation of the cognitive preconditions of ‘the rigor of pure prescriptive universality’ enables us to recognise the similarities between the Jain ideal of definite description, as a standard against which incomplete or vague propositions can be measured, and Habermas’ ideal consensus of an infinite community of interpretation, against which both systematically distorted and latent strategic communication can be assessed. The subject-philosophical role of ‘omniscience’ and the universal pragmatic role of ‘infinite discourse’ are functionally equivalent.¹⁵⁵ The comparison suggests also that the Jain ideal of omniscience is a logical consequence of Jain epistemology, and not a mere product of fanciful religious speculation.¹⁵⁶ The question whether in specific contexts vague utterances are ambiguous or

¹⁵¹ Cf. *supra*, the discussion of rule-specification. See the critical discussion by WELLMER (1986: 32–7), who argues that the problem of exceptions can only be solved in concrete situations on the basis of ‘reasons’, not through processes of unlimited norm specification of ‘principles’, in analogy to unlimited processes of specification of causal laws in the natural science. In human history, the idea of a complete description does not even make sense as a regulative idea. Therefore, this attempt to synthesise universal principles and specific situations cannot solve problems of practical ethics. WELLMER (1986: 31) himself derives secondary moral norms by way of negation of non-universalisable maxims.

¹⁵² HARE (1981: 41): ‘Briefly, generality is the opposite of specificity, whereas universality is compatible with specificity, and means merely the logical property of being governed by a universal quantifier and not containing individual constants. The two principles “Never kill people” and “Never kill people except in self-defence or in cases of adultery or judicial execution” are both equally universal, but the first is more general (less specific) than the second.’

¹⁵³ The term was introduced by Adam Smith.

¹⁵⁴ HARE (1981: 40): ‘Critical thinking consists in making a choice under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the moral concepts and by the non-moral facts, and by nothing else.’

¹⁵⁵ Infinite discourse also presupposes infinite knowledge (Lafont, in HABERMAS (2004: 256)).

¹⁵⁶ This observation applies mainly to the historically later concept of ‘absolute omniscience’ as opposed to ‘complete self-realisation’.

merely semantically underspecified¹⁵⁷ cannot be rationally determined from a non-omniscient perspective. From a participant's point of view, under given normative conditions, any utterance can be created or perceived as an intentionally plurivocal symbol, even if the implicit indexical meaning or normative command can be inferred unequivocally. Everything depends on the pragmatic context.

A peculiarity of the Jain theory of speech, derived from the Jain *karman* theory, is that utterances are seen as material substances which stick to the impure soul but not to a pure one. In fact, speech as a technique of social influence is not only an important subject for proselytising ascetics, trying to attract followers (systematic distorted and latent strategic action are identical in this case),¹⁵⁸ but also an explicit topic of the Jain doctrine of *karmic* bondage, that is, the mechanism of binding (*bandha*) the soul of a listener, through the medium of his/her passion (*kaṣāya*) and desire (*rāga*), via an influx (*āsrava*) of insight-generating pure matter (*śuddha-pudgala*) (cf. TS 5.22). It is not necessary to recall the details and history of this doctrine, because SCHUBRING's (2000: 174, § 84) authoritative depiction of Jain cosmology implicitly operates with a theory of Jain rhetorical influence. Schubring shows, for instance, how processes of possession, which are considered to be the reverse of insight, are explained in certain texts in terms of the sending of inauspicious atoms (*aśubha-pudgala*) (SCHUBRING (2000: 151, § 69)); and how individuality (which increases with social standing) and thus, ideally, the degree to which *karman* is felt, generates the power of acting upon others, and to influence and bind people by imprinting (*dhāraṇā*) certain *karmic* perceptions onto their soul via the ejection of *pudgala* (SCHUBRING (2000: 181–7, § 87–91)):

‘This process [of speech] is, to put it briefly, the ejaculation (*nisarai, nisṛjati*) of substances (*davva*) taken in (*geṇhai*) previously (now being ready either for use or in store). They consist of ∞ atoms (*aṇanta-paesiya*), occupy the space of *ṛ* units, last for 1 *sam*. and own all qualities possible with reference to colour, smell, taste and sensation. Their reception is meant to bring about a close contact (*puṭṭha, oḡāḍha*), i.e. with the units of the soul (*ātma-pradeśa*, Prajn.), and to it both fine and coarse particles (*aṇu* and *bāyara*) are subjected, which is discussed circumstantially. The reception takes place either with or without interruption (*antara*) in that either reception *or* ejaculation, or both reception *and* ejaculation occur within 1 *sam*., and then, by the way (267a), they will belong to the same content of speech (true, false etc.) for which they were taken in. Their destiny depends on the inten-

¹⁵⁷ A question raised by GANERI (2001: 133 ff.), and answered in the negative

¹⁵⁸ Cf. SUNAVALA (1922: 26).

sity of speech. As we learn from Prajn. on Pannav. 262b. and from Vy. on Vij. 621b, when speaking [in a] low [voice] the particles of speech leave the mouth in coarse portions (*abhinna*), but they do not reach far and will perish soon, whereas when speaking loud they are finely divided (*bhinna*), and in this case speech will increase infinitely and reach the boundaries of the world' (SCHUBRING (2000: 149, § 68).

The strategic production of religious influence via *karmic* binding is of course not the primary concern of Jain *karman* theory, but certainly one of the possible consequences of the application of Jain categories to worldly problems. From the conventional point of view (VN), Jain scriptures describe speech as a potential weapon (*duppautta-maṇo-vāyā* <*duṣprayukta-mana-vacana*>) (Ṭhāṇ 10.93): 'Speech, so Pannav. 255b says, originates in the soul, while it becomes manifest in the body in the shape of a thunderbolt ... [and] exists only the moment when being spoken' (SCHUBRING (2000: 148 f., § 68).¹⁵⁹ Yet, fundamentally (PN) it is described only as an external ornament of the soul without any intrinsic power, except the power of signification:

'[1] Speech is different from the self (*no āyā bhāsā, annā bhāsā*). It is concrete (lit. fashioned, *rūvim*), devoid of consciousness (*acitta*) and inanimate (*aḥiva*) though peculiar to living beings (*jīvāṇaṃ bhāsā, no aḥivāṇaṃ bh.*). [2] Speech exists and is divided' (*bhijjai*) neither before nor after but only during actual speaking.' (Viy 621a = 13.7.1ab, summarised by DELEU (1970: 199 f.)).¹⁶⁰

If the hearer is aware of this s/he cannot be bound. Both interpretations derive from the dualistic doctrinal distinction between soul and body, and their asymmetrical hierarchical relationship.¹⁶¹

We can conclude from the foregoing discussion that, from the point of view of Jain doctrine, both linguistic conventions and intentional language are *vyavahāra*—worldly oriented—and ultimately of no religious value. Any pragmatic use of language, even for purposes of religious instruction, has only relative value, because the speaker is forced to orientate him/herself toward the external world, and to turn away from the ideal meditative focus on the potentialities of the soul. From this perspective, one can hardly speak of a Jain concept of 'religious language' at all. Jains never fully acknowledged the religious significance of *mantras* and other types of

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Viy 102b, 621a, MĀLVANĪYĀ (1971: 321–6).

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Āyār 2.4.1.5. JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 3) points out that the commentator uses categories of Vaiśeṣika philosophy to explain the meaning of this verse.

¹⁶¹ Cf. HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW (1995: 214) on the paradoxes generated by the Jain *karman/jīva* code; and GANERI (2001: 137) on Jain 'discourse pluralism ... organised in a vertical hierarchy.'

mystical utterances, which could be distinguish as ‘religious’ from ‘non-religious’ language. This applies even to Ardhmāgadhī, the liturgical language of the oldest scriptures. The only religious ‘languages’ which Jains clearly recognise are silence and meditative sounds, like Mahāvīra’s legendary *divya-dhvani*.¹⁶²

Because Jain (and most Buddhist) philosophers recognise that language is rooted in convention and mainly used for everyday communication, and other practical purposes, discourse theoretical perspectives promise a useful new angle on the neglected question of the socially constitutive function of Jain discourse. Studies of the Jain philosophy of language to date focus almost exclusively on Jain semantics, in particular on the seven *nayas* and the *sapta-bhaṅgī*, that is, pre-defined (but in principle infinite) perspectives for the analysis of the semantics of words or sentences under different contextual conditions. However, MATILAL (1981: 60 f.), JOHNSON (1995a: 253), and GANERI (2001: 137), (2002: 275, 279 f.), following earlier 20th century authors, interpret the Jain *naya*-schemes as models of ‘discourse pluralism’, intended to integrate different perspectives in a syncretic and ultimately, that is, from the perspective of unlimited perspectives, ‘complete account’. The underlying theory of ‘intellectual *ahimsā*’ is doubted by CORT (2000: 341) with reference to (a) scriptural examples of the ‘history of Jain struggles with non-Jains’, and (b) criticism of the assumption that omniscience is ‘the sum total of all possible *nayas*’: ‘The Jains posit that there is an *absolutely* true perspective’ (CORT (2000: 332)). The argument could be strengthened by a slight modification. Mistaking the ‘partial truth’ of a one-sided (*ekānta*) statement for the ‘whole truth’ is not the only way of being wrong (*durnaya*) (CORT (2000: 331)) according to Jain philosophy. Jain perspectivism is only concerned with the relationship between partially and wholly true testimony (*pramāṇa*), not with entirely false testimony (*apramāṇa*), which is excluded at the outset.¹⁶³ Hence, it is not admissible to say that, by definition, ALL statements contain an element of truth. Strictly speaking, Jain *naya* doctrines are not theories of discourse, since they are focused exclusively on semantics. Yet, the Jain scriptures and commentaries dealing with the practicalities of ascetic life contain a general theory of the pragmatics of language usage, based on Jain discourse ethics, and show how Jain principles applied to worldly problems generate unique analytical possibilities of perceiving and manipulating speech. In contrast to Jain semantics, which privileges the perspective of the listener, Jain pragmatics privileges the perspective of the speaker.

¹⁶² On the systemic function of monastic silence and paradoxical language in general see FUCHS (1989: 37).

¹⁶³ Cf. BALCEROWICZ (2003: 46). The negative truth value (f) in the *sapta-bhaṅgī* relates only to (underdetermined) existential predicates, not to statements that are doctrinally ‘false’, and exposed as such in the polemical Jain literature.

— VII —

Although Jain ascetics use the vernacular of their local followers, and reject the Brāhmaṇical idea of the intrinsic sacredness of certain words (MDhŚ 4.256), they do maintain a clear distinction between religious and non-religious ways of USING a given language, that is, the intrinsic structural (not metaphysical) features, intentions and functions of an expression.¹⁶⁴ In accordance with their basic religious principles, they emphasise not the religious (*dharmika*) qualities of a language *per se* but of speaking (and writing) as a social practice, and of the importance of the underlying rules as well as the intention and function of speech.¹⁶⁵ Already in the early canonical scriptures, Jain ascetics developed a normative doctrine of religious language usage, a discourse ethics supplemented by casuistic context-sensitive rules, which, as I will now show in greater detail, shares certain concerns and features with universal pragmatics.

Normative principles and rules of speech are constitutive for Jain discourse to the extent that they are used by speech communities, both to generate and to interpret speech. The way in which actual communication is informed by these principles is a matter of empirical investigation. Characteristically, Jain norms of speech are presented in the form of hierarchical levels of universality and corresponding competence of judgement and restraint of the speaker. Principles and rules of speech inform practice in varying degrees, according to their level of abstraction. For the following presentation, I distinguish four relevant dimensions of Jain doctrinal reflection on and prescription of ways of speaking:¹⁶⁶

- (1) Principles and criteria for religious speech (*ahiṃsā* and *satya*);
- (2) General rules and clauses for language usage (*bhāṣā-jāta*);

¹⁶⁴ BALCEROWICZ (2003: 53) observes: ‘No utterance is simply either true or false. In order to ascertain its truth-value one has to ascribe it to its specific viewpoint type, that supplies the contextual information that is lacking.’ Similarly, no utterance is simply religious or non-religious.

¹⁶⁵ Interestingly, speaker’s intention is not included in the list of Jain philosophical standpoints.

¹⁶⁶ The underlying method of specification is akin to Jain methods of progressive specification through fixed standpoints. See GANERI (2001: 133) for an analysis of the Jain view that linguistic expressions are contextually ‘underspecified’ and contain ‘a hidden indexical element’ which Jain dialecticians seek to systematically expose through the methods of *syād-vāda*, using actual values or quantifiers such as *syāt* (GANERI (2001: 139)). For another example of the ways in which Jain logicians contextualise utterances through a method of ‘progressive indexication’ of formalised conditionally valid viewpoints (*naya*) or ‘context indicators’ which gradually specify the relevant context in a controlled way see BALCEROWICZ (2003: 44 ff.). In contrast to the analysis of implications offered by universal pragmatics, Jain scholastic hermeneutics is based on dogmatically fixed viewpoints considered in form of a monological pluralism.

- (3) Context-sensitive rules for proper ways of speaking;
 (4) Examples (considering *karmic* and social implications) (*dr̥ṣṭānta*).

(Ad 1) The main criteria for identifying ‘religious’ language-usage are (a) non-violence (*ahiṃsā*), and (b) truth (*satya*), that is, the first two of the five great and small vows (*mahā-vrata* and *aṇuvrata*) of Jainism,¹⁶⁷ which have to be accepted by anyone who wants to be formally recognised as a practising Jain.¹⁶⁸ ‘Non-religious’ language is characterised by the opposite qualities—violence (*hiṃsā*) and non-truth or from the point of view of the agent (the two perspectives are not clearly differentiated): non-truthfulness (*asatya*).¹⁶⁹

(Ad a) *Ahiṃsā* is the most important criterion for religious language usage. Jains, like Buddhists, regard speech as an active force and a potential weapon which, if misused, implies violence and negatively affects the *karman* of the one who handles it.¹⁷⁰ However, they also emphasise the fundamental connection between pure speech and spiritual advancement, which the Buddhist *Subhāsita-sutta*¹⁷¹ seems to deny.¹⁷² In order to minimise violence, Jain *ācāryas*, like other South Asian legislators (cf. MDhŚ 4.138 f.), laid great emphasis on the rules concerning proper speech, which they systematised probably for the first time in Indian philosophy.¹⁷³ ‘the Jains insist on the absolute necessity of refraining from directly or indirectly aggressive speech’ (CAILLAT (1984: 67)).

(Ad b) Truthfulness or truth (*satya*) is the one fundamental Jain principle that is directly related to language use. Its importance for the Jains is indicated by the fact that it is second only to the all-encompassing *ahiṃsā-vrata*, whereas it is given fourth place in the Buddhist *dasa-sīla* list. The *Āyār II*, one of the oldest texts of the Jain tradition, gives the following wording of the *satya-vrata* (in Jacobi’s translation):

‘I renounce all vices of lying speech (arising from anger or greed or fear or mirth). I shall neither myself speak lies, nor cause others to

¹⁶⁷ ‘All the prohibitions and injunctions included in the two relevant lessons of *Āyār* and *Dasav* can be shown to proceed from the above fundamental principles, observance of truth based on *saṃjama*, and observance of *ahiṃsā*’ (CAILLAT (1991: 10)).

¹⁶⁸ Most laity treats the *aṇuvratas* only as regulative ideals.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. BRUHN (1987a: 110), (1993: 28).

¹⁷⁰ CAILLAT (1984: 64).

¹⁷¹ On well spoken language: ‘O Bhikkhus, the Bhikkhu speaks well-spoken (language), not ill-spoken; he speaks what is right (dhamma), not what is unrighteous (adhamma); he speaks what is pleasing, not what is unpleasing; he speaks what is true, not what is false. O Bhikkhus, the speech that is provided with these four requisites, is well-spoken, not ill-spoken, both faultless and blameless to the wise’ (SN 3.3).

¹⁷² CAILLAT (1991: 14).

¹⁷³ CAILLAT (1984: 61).

‘speak lies, nor consent to the speaking of lies by others. I confess and blame, repent and exempt myself of these sins in the thrice threefold way, in mind, speech, and body’ (Āyār 2.15.3.1–5).¹⁷⁴

Noticeable in this statement is, firstly, that lying is ‘renounced’, i.e. the possibility is explicitly recognised, but deliberately excluded. Truth is not defined positively but negatively, through the exclusion of what it is not; which has been a popular approach in South Asian philosophy in general. Secondly, the vow refers to contexts of communication (speech acts such as consenting, causing others to do something). Thirdly, speaking the truth and lying are conceived as effects of the emotions which motivate the speaker’s intentions (as the clauses indicate). Truth is here not primarily perceived in terms of the representational function of language, as a propositional relationship between words and things, but in terms of the expressive and regulative functions of language. After all, the intention of Jain authors was not primarily to produce a sound semantic theory of truth, but a pragmatic method for the liberation of the soul. The expressive aspect of speech, or truthfulness, is related to the character of the speaker, that is, his/her ‘purity’ of insight and sincerity:¹⁷⁵ ‘truth means the state of being true’ (TULSĪ (1985: 84)). The ethical and social dimensions of language are addressed in Āyār 2.4 and DVS 7.11 (see *infra* p. 161 and 162) in terms of the dispositions of the speaker and the effects of language on speaker and hearer. Viy 25.1.4.a (854b) reflects on fifteen kinds of activity (*joga*) which are affected by the four modes of inner sense (*maṇa*) and of speech (*bhāsā*), which are seen as intrinsically connected.¹⁷⁶ In all cases, pivotal importance is given to avoiding violence.

It is worth noting that both the Jain theory of speech and the theory of communicative action privilege pragmatic notions of truth. Habermas’ analysis of validity claims focuses on the interplay of the dimensions of propositional truth, sincerity of expression and intersubjective rightness. Separately, these aspects are also distinguished in Jain texts on ways of speaking. The multi-functional nature of utterances, the context-relativity of truth values *cum* truth acts,¹⁷⁷ and the relationship between belief and meaning,¹⁷⁸ etc., requires further investigation. In his analysis of intermodal transfer of validity between speech acts, HABERMAS (1981: 442 f.) / (1984–1987 I: 444 f.), (1984: 105–12, 126)) demonstrates that performative and ethical or aesthetic statements also contain propositions, which can be questioned by interlocutors. Vows, for instance, are expressives which also carry a strong normative element; while most

¹⁷⁴ Cf. DVS 4.12.

¹⁷⁵ SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 74).

¹⁷⁶ DELEU (1970: 267) points to the parallel in Paṇṇ 317a where *joga* is replaced by *paoga*.

¹⁷⁷ See FAUCONNIER (1981: 183) etc.

¹⁷⁸ See DAVIDSON (1984: 153) etc.

commissives and declaratives cannot work without emphasising the expressive component.¹⁷⁹ Declarations of sincerity, however, cannot be redeemed by argument but only through behavioural practice. This observation makes us aware that one of the functions of Jain ascetic practice is the public validation of sincerity, which is converted into generalised acceptability *qua* prestige and moral authority.¹⁸⁰

(Ad 2) The principles of *ahimsā* and *satya* are too abstract to be useful for judging actual behaviour. This is why Jains have added further, lower order rules of language usage, which supplement the general principles and facilitate translating them into practice (speaking and writing). Two of the ‘senior’ canonical Jain texts deal with language usage in greater detail—the chapter on modes (‘species’) of speech (*bhāsā-jāya* <*bhāsā-jāta*>)¹⁸¹ in the Āyār 2.4.1–2 and later parallels in the canon,¹⁸² and the chapter on pure speech (*vakka-suddhi* <*vākya-suddhi*>) in the *Dasa-veyāliya* (*Daśa-vaikālika*, DVS 7), which is probably derived from the Āyār, but offers further clarifying statements.¹⁸³ In addition, there are several passages in the *Viyāha-pannatti* (*Bhagavatī*, Viy),¹⁸⁴ and the more systematic but on the whole ‘strikingly ill-assorted’¹⁸⁵ explanations of the modes of speech (language) in Chapter 11 of the *Pannavaṇā* (*Prajñāpanā*, Paṇṇ) which, according to tradition, was composed c. 79–37 BCE by an ascetic called Ārya Śyāma. The relevant passages of the *Pannavaṇā* and its principal commentary, Ācārya Malayagiri’s (c. 1131–1203) *Prajñāpanā-ṭikā* (Paṇṇṭī), were summarised by SCHUBRING (2000: 148 f., § 68; 157 f., § 74), MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 321–26) and, in passing, by CAILLAT (1991: 10 ff.).¹⁸⁶ The

¹⁷⁹ APEL (1993: 49).

¹⁸⁰ Cf. HABERMAS (1981: 270 f.) / (1984–1987 II: 181 f.).

¹⁸¹ Sanskrit *chāyā* of Prakrit words is indicated by the symbols <>.

¹⁸² Uttar 24.22, Ṭhāṇ 4.23 (238) [183b/464b].

¹⁸³ SCHUBRING’s (2000: 157 n. 2, § 74) opinion that the DVS version is derivative from the Āyār has been challenged by GHATAGE (1938: 137), who tried to prove the reverse. OKUDA (1975: 126) distinguishes between the Uttar (= Āyār which is not mentioned) and DVS variants. Cf. CAILLAT (1991: 2).

¹⁸⁴ Viy 1.10 (103b), 10.3 (499b), 13.7 (621a).

¹⁸⁵ SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 74).

¹⁸⁶ In addition to these key texts there are many scattered *ślokas* concerning proper speech in the DVS 7–9. These texts are concerned with ‘humility’ and relate to the monastic environment, i.e. the *guru-śiṣya* relationship. Similar passages can be found in the Āyār and other texts which deal with problems of monastic discipline, e.g. Uttar 1. They do not concern speech as such but rather contextual factors, which I will discuss in the next section. DIXIT (1978: 59) notes, that ‘the problem of employment of speech ... is conspicuous by its absence in the old *Cheda-sūtras*’, and that speaking is rarely mentioned in the later literature (but see FLÜGEL (1994: 110–115)). There is, however, an extensive *śrāvākācāra* literature, which specifies some of the old monastic rules of the Āyār and the DVS for the Jain laity. See WILLIAMS (1983: 71–8). I will refer to this literature

categories of speech of the *Āyāraṅga* (*Āyār*), and one of the lists of sub-categories of the *Pannavaṇā* appear also in *Mūlācāra* (MĀc) 5.110–120 of the Digambara author Vaṭṭakera. This text is generally dated 1st–3rd century CE (OKUDA (1975: 12 f.)), and must have been composed after the *Pannavaṇā*.

The situations which are depicted in these texts as problematic invariably show individual ascetics interacting with the wider social environment, coinciding with our paradigmatic speech situation type c. They are distinctly different from situations of monastic politeness (*vinaya*), formal sermons (*pravacana*), or public debates (*prayoga*), which will be briefly discussed later.

The presentation of the *bhāṣā*-rules in the *Āyār* is hierarchically structured in accordance with Jain principles and ethos. It begins with the *satya-mahā-vrata*, explaining its various modes: referential truth, grammaticality, clarity of expression, the avoidance of doubt, and of false promises etc. Then, various modalities of the *ahiṃsā-mahā-vrata* are described, such as the avoidance of harsh words, politeness, and indirect affirmation of violent deeds of others.¹⁸⁷ In addition to the vow of *satya*, five general clauses are given to the neophyte. They explain how to avoid false speech. That is, to speak with deliberation, and not in anger, fear, or mirth, because these states of mind might move one to ‘utter a falsehood’ (*Āyār* 2.15.3.1–5). Two further maxims are important for the ascetics: the observance of the *bhāṣā-samitis*, the circumspection regarding all speech acts, and of the *bhāṣā-guptis*, the controls of the four types of speech, which are laid down in the *Uttarajjhayaṇa* (*Uttarādhyayana*, Uttar) 24.¹⁸⁸ Like *ahiṃsā* and *satya*, they are intended to direct the attention away from violent speech, from the expression of desire, and ultimately away from speech at all. These maxims and rules are not linguistic in any technical sense, and not conventional or customary in a folkloristic sense. They rather resemble the Gricean postulates, and hence, I would argue, function within Jain philosophy in a manner similar to operationalisations of HABERMAS’ (1980: 400) formal pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action. That is, as principles, or general interpretive procedures,

only in footnotes. Because I am interested in the pragmatic aspect of speech, I will not discuss the technicalities of the analytical-pedagogical *nikṣepa* (transferring epithet) method and similar purely exegetical devices of the Jains, which are used to delineate the true (intended) contextual sense of an utterance through elimination of unwanted multivocality. It is important to note that ‘clear literal meaning’ is an explicit aim in (VN) Jainism.

¹⁸⁷ *Ahiṃsā* is here not taken as a general principle, but only related to language. One could distinguish these two meanings as *ahiṃsā* I and *ahiṃsā* II. *Satya* takes precedence over *ahiṃsā* in this context, because it is necessary to spell out rules of truthful speech first if one wants to discuss ways of avoiding their violation. Cf. footnote 305.

¹⁸⁸ Uttar 24.2, 24.22–23. See also TS 9.4–5. For further canonical references see SCHUBRING (2000: 304 f., § 173).

which theorise the normative conditions of the acceptability of statements, and hence of the ability of language to avoid violence and to enable, or generate, both non-violence and social co-operation (which is therefore seen as problematic).

In the following, I will analyse and compare these Jain modes of speech, both with Habermas' validity claims of truth, truthfulness and rightness, which correspond to constative, representative, and regulative aspects of speech acts (which are differently weighted in different contexts), and with the Gricean postulates, which from the perspective of Habermas' model further specify empirical pragmatic conditions of validity claims. The discussion of some of the implications of the major *bhāṣā*-rules follows, for purely formal reasons, the sequential order of Grice's cooperative principle and conversational maxims, though a mode of presentation oriented towards Jain principles could have equally been chosen.

GRICE (1975: 45 f.) defines the 'cooperative principle' (CP), and the four main 'conversational maxims', which he labelled in analogy to the pure categories of understanding (*reine Verstandesbegriffe*) in KANT's (1794: 118 f.) transcendental logic, as follows:

- CP: 'Make your conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.'
- Quantity: 'Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purpose of the exchange). Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.'
- Quality: 'Try to make your contribution one that is true: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.'
- Relation: 'Be relevant.'
- Manner: 'Avoid obscurity of expression. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). Be orderly.'

Although the Gricean postulates are widely accepted as a theory of general principles of human communication, it is clear that partners in a conversation have to resort to more than just the rules of their language and the cooperative principle. For instance, to (1) conventional meaning of words and context, (2) background meaning, such as common cultural assumptions etc. That is, dimensions such as those listed as the seven Jain *nayas*. What counts as an appropriate, informative, true (plausible), relevant, and unequivocal expression cannot be judged in abstract, but only by the participants in a specific discourse. But it is the task of the analyst to elicit both the unspoken conditions of communicative success and the social conditions of fulfilment of speech acts in concrete situations. Here, I only indicate simi-

larities and differences between the Gricean conversational postulates and analogous categories of the Jain analysis of speech and discourse ethics, and attempt to elicit the implications for a comparison with the theory of communicative action.¹⁸⁹

Cooperative principle—non-violence (*ahimsā*)

Grice regards the cooperative principle as fundamental for any conversation. His notion of ‘appropriateness’ corresponds to Habermas’ more general notion of ‘communicative intent’, which presupposes a commitment to the universal validity claims of propositional truth, expressive truthfulness and normative rightness, in addition to the basic condition of linguistic comprehensibility. Despite their differences, both notions are grounded in Kantian moral philosophy, rather than in utilitarian principles.¹⁹⁰

Interestingly, in the two key Jain texts mentioned, no equivalent to the cooperative principle *per se* can be found, nor, of course, is there any mention of a specific consensus orientation. This is in accordance with the individual- or *jīva*-centred attitude that is recommended from the ‘ultimate point of view’ (PN).

However, a passage in Kundakunda’s *Samaya-sāra*, whose importance has been emphasised by CAILLAT (1984: 71 n. 54), clearly states the necessity to observe the ‘accepted purpose of the talk exchange’ (here: religious instruction), as maintained by Grice’s principle. The purpose of this statement is to explain, why the teaching of (ultimately incommunicable) Jain doctrines forces ascetics to give up their ideal meditative silence temporarily to use worldly pragmatic language (VN) in agreement with conventional standards of comprehensibility and rightness:¹⁹¹

‘Just as a non-Aryan (foreigner) cannot be made to understand anything except through the medium of his non-Aryan language, so the knowledge of the Absolute cannot be communicated to the ordinary people except through the *vyavahāra* point of view’ (SSā 1.8).

¹⁸⁹ Amongst the few South Asianists who considered Grice’s categories for understanding the nature of religious language are WHELOCK (1982) and SEYFORTH RUEGG (1985) and for text interpretation OETKE (1991: 61 ff.). The latter accepted the Gricean standards as cultural universals and as a tool for the methodical reconstruction of an author’s ‘original intention’ (OETKE (1991: 35)), arguing that ‘the Nyāyasūtras and the philosophical *Sūtra*-texts in general seem to be tailored to an application of the Cooperative Principle and Grice’s conversational maxims’ (OETKE (1997: 140)). See BRONKHORST (1993a). GÖHLER (1995b: 75), by contrast, argued that the speech act theories of Austin and Searle are hardly applicable to written texts.

¹⁹⁰ On Kant’s influence on the theory of communicative action see HABERMAS (1991).

¹⁹¹ The acceptance of linguistic conventions was generally taught in ancient India. See SCHARF (1995) on Patañjali.

The true insights of Jain teaching, it is stated here, cannot be understood by pupils and the wider public if ascetics do not orientate themselves towards the capacities and expectations of their audience and take a co-operative attitude. This is a Jain version of the theory of 'skilful means' (*upāya*).¹⁹² The commentator Amṛtacandra explicitly states that ascetics should direct their utterances towards the pragmatic 'purpose of the discussion':

'The ultimate reality must be subjected to an intellectual analysis and the constituent elements so obtained must be selected and emphasised according to the interest of the student and also consistent with the purpose of the discussion. The variations in the context and the intellectual aim will naturally determine the nature of the descriptions adopted with reference to the reality studied. The method of selective description to suit the purpose of the context is the method adopted by the ordinary man ... Since the method is determined by a purpose of practical interest, the investigation will be relevant only to that purpose and the conclusion obtained must therefore be partial' (Commentary on SSā 1.8; p. 18 of Chakravarti's rendition).

Supporting the spiritual quest of others is one of the duties of the (*thera-kalpa*) ascetic (DVS₁ 9.4.5). Yet, ultimately, social co-operation is not seen as a religious value in itself, but as a hindrance for the process of self-purification. Teaching religion to others is merely a 'method determined by a purpose of practical interest', but not directly oriented towards salvation itself, and therefore akin to the attitude 'adopted by the ordinary man who is engaged in his pursuit in life' (SSā 1.8, Commentary p.18).¹⁹³

The doctrine of the ultimately (PN) non-religious character of teaching religious knowledge is, I think, the prime reason for the conspicuous absence of any mention of a functional equivalent of the cooperative principle itself in the Āyār. From the 'practical point of view' (VN) co-operative intent is acceptable, and even assumes a religious function, if the objective of the conversation is the furtherance of non-violence. In fact, the only difference between worldly co-operation (*laukika-upakāra*) and religious instruction or supra-mundane co-operation (*lokōttara-upakāra*) is the purpose of co-operation itself; that is, either the pursuit of worldly aims, or of the purification of the soul.¹⁹⁴ The same holds true for the difference between 'worldly' and 'religious' rhetoric, as we will see later. One should, therefore, expect mentioning of the cooperative principle in the AS's discussion of pragmatic language

¹⁹² For Buddhist notions see for instance PYE (1978).

¹⁹³ See the discussion of the 'maxim of relation' below.

¹⁹⁴ TULSĪ (1985: 174 f.).

usage as well. In order to explain its absence, I suggest an additional argument, derived from the observation that violence is the main threat to co-operation, and, conversely, that non-violence is its fundamental pre-condition. Thus, we find that the value of *ahimsā*, which ultimately promotes total non-action (*ayoga*) in the world, also reflects, on a secondary level, the potential of total (hierarchical and non-violent) co-operation, in the sense of opening spaces, refuges, for existence (*Seinlassen*). Accordingly, many Jain texts emphasise that the implication of *ahimsā*, non-violence, is *dayā*, compassion. The *ahimsā-mahā-vrata*, therefore, implies the sought-after cooperative principle, although it does not say so explicitly. Indeed, from a Jain point of view, it could be argued, with good reason, that the positive notion of communicative intent is merely an application of the more general negative moral principle of non-violence within the sphere of social life. This begs the question: How universal are the cooperative principle and the formal pragmatic validity claims? Does communicative intent presuppose a more fundamental commitment to an ethics of (physical) non-violence?¹⁹⁵ The cooperative principle, albeit apparently only concerned with straightforward information transmission from speaker to hearer, implies normative conditions such as physical non-violence (and of non-silence) to ensure ongoing linguistic co-operation. But it remains indifferent to the distinction between violent and non-violent aspects of overt speech (and of thought) itself. Communicative action considers form and content of speech also only under formal aspects, that is, acceptability, which may include violent communications. The Jain principle of *ahimsā*, by contrast, implies not only formal but also qualitative conditions for the perpetuation of co-operation.

Numerous examples of rules concerning violent speech in the *Āyār* and DVS implicitly refer to non-violence as a condition for co-operation and as form of co-operation, as in the following *śloka*:

‘Revered is he who speaks not ill in one’s absence, who uses not a sharp tongue in one’s presence, who speaks not with assertion, nor uses words that are harsh’ (DVS₂ 9.3.8–9).

It is not apparent from this statement why these attitudes should be revered, apart from general considerations of the detrimental effects of violence on the karmic

¹⁹⁵ Christian theologians attacked the self-limitation of universal pragmatics to formal conditions of social communication from similar vantage points. PEUKERT (1984), (1992), for instance, argues for the priority of the ‘resource’ of ‘universal solidarity’ in the lifeworld over communicative ethics. The objective idealist HÖSLE (1997: 248 ff.) complains about the moral indeterminacy of formal consensus (reasonable/unreasonable) and calls for a defence of ethics based on substantial values; as do other ‘Neo-Aristotelians’ discussed by HABERMAS (1983), (1991), who accepts this point and modifies his position in HABERMAS (2004).

constitution on the speaker. But it is clear by implication that one who avoids ‘sharp tongue’ etc., is revered also because, otherwise, the continuation of co-operation is threatened and might be terminated. This and many similar statements implicitly stress the value of completely avoiding ‘face-threatening acts’, although not saying so openly. They are presented in the form of negations of non-universalisable maxims.¹⁹⁶ The closest one can get to an explicit, positive postulate of a ‘co-operative principle’ are statements concerning the ascetic values of offering fearlessness (*abhaya-dāna*) and supra-mundane co-operation (*pāramārthikōpakāra*) for the upliftment of the soul, which are seen as the greatest gift to society, in fact, constituting its fundamental condition.

Paradoxically, however, the methods of liberation taught by Jain ascetics do not emphasise co-operation but its direct opposite: separation and non-interaction with the world. This paradox is the main obstacle for an understanding of the social implications of the principle of *ahimsā*. SEYFORD RUEGG (1985) addressed this problem in Gricean terms in an interpretation of the *Ābhiprāyika*- and *Neyārtha-sūtras* of Tibetan Buddhism. He argues that the Buddha’s way of teaching non-cooperation amounts to an act of ‘flouting’ not only of the conversational maxims, but of the co-operative principle itself. But because the Buddha’s acts of ‘flouting’ are not intended for the achievement of worldly gains, but for the spiritual liberation of others, SEYFORD RUEGG introduces the terms ‘salvific principle’ and ‘salvific violence’ as religious supplements to the pragmatic Gricean ‘cooperative principle’:

‘In fact Grice’s Cooperative Principle yields in such *Sūtras* to what we might call a Salvific Principle put to use in a perlocutionary manner. Still, in conformity even with this Salvific Principle of the Buddha, ‘flouting’—or more specifically *upāya*-governed salvific exploitation—of the Conversational Maxims are to be found in *Ābhiprāyika* and *Neyārtha Sūtras*, just as they have been recognized in Grice’s second type of conversational implicature involving exploitation of conversational maxims’ (SEYFORD RUEGG (1985: 317)).

SEYFORD RUEGG’s remarks are useful for understanding salvific violence, which ‘conquers violence’. At the same time, his analysis is problematic, because he does not clearly distinguish between linguistic co-operation and social co-operation. Even the Buddha (or Mahāvīra) was of course forced to observe the cooperative principle during his sermons, like everyone else who wishes to communicate (SEYFORD RUEGG (1985: 315)), even if esoteric Buddhist (and Digambara Jain) schools deny this. From a pragmatic point of view, the ‘salvific principle’ of insight creation

¹⁹⁶ Cf. WELLMER (1986: 24 f.).

through acts of symbolic violence appears merely as a culturally specific norm, a systematic distortion of communication which, indeed, as SEYFORT RUEGG (1985: 318) argues, cannot be inferred from the surface meaning of a communication, only elicited via a systematic hermeneutics of the doctrinal system as a whole. Yet, from an emic point of view, the non-motivated ‘intentional ground’ of socially ‘purposeful’ communication, cannot be simply identified with the codified doctrinal system of Buddhism, as SEYFORT RUEGG (1985: 314 f.) suggests, because it refers to the existential conditions of meaning *per se* which can be explored only through direct meditative experience. From an etic point of view, the Buddhist intention to put an end to intention as a value, compared for instance with the phenomenological theory of the constitutive role of the structure of intentionality of consciousness or *Dasein*, is one ideology amongst others, and must be communicated in a conventional way.¹⁹⁷

The conundrum of ideal non-cooperation becomes clearer, if we consider not only discourse but also religious practice. The practice of renunciation, which Buddhist and Jain doctrines aim to stimulate, is a religiously sanctioned act of social separation and selective non-cooperation, which does involve what might be termed ‘sacred violence’, in opposition to ‘physical violence’ and ‘symbolic violence’ (flouting) in the two forms of latent strategic action and systematically distorted communication (‘salvific violence’). Within a hierarchical system, renunciation is a paradoxical act of status encompassment which creates at the same time new asymmetrical social relationships (renouncer/renounced, guru/devotees) and symmetrical social relationships (between devotees). In this way, acts of social separation and religious self-limitation are socially constitutive and culturally regenerative. Renunciation does not necessarily violate the conversational ‘cooperative principle’. But, as a one-sided act of transcendence and symbolic incorporation of already established links of social co-operation, it contributes to the legitimation of stratified systems of functional differentiation and moral divisions of labour. Following DUMONT (1980: 197) and SEYFORT RUEGG (1985), I therefore propose to distinguish between the ‘salvific’ violence of (Jain) religious rhetoric and the ‘sacred violence’ of the quasi-sacrificial act of renunciation itself.¹⁹⁸ Effectively, Jain renouncers do not live outside society, but ‘unbound ... amongst the bound’ (Āyār 2.16.7). After renunciation, linguistic co-operation is strictly regulated, but continues. Worldly social co-operation, however, is severed more radically, although only unilaterally, while the scope of social co-operation in religious contexts is actually widened.¹⁹⁹ Sacred violence differentiates the levels of institutional non-violence and violence, while conditioning the patterns of selective co-operation. The necessary violence

¹⁹⁷ See FAURE (1991), SHARF (1995).

¹⁹⁸ On ‘sacred violence’, see for instance GIRARD (1977) and his critics.

¹⁹⁹ FLÜGEL (2006a: 333 f.).

(*ārambhajā hiṃsā*) of the social world is always presupposed by Jain ascetics, in form of Brāhmaṇic household rites, the state and the socio-economic institutions and activities of their followers, which grant them one-sided material support:

‘The lay estate ... cannot exist without activity and there can be no activity without the taking of life; in its grosser form this is to be avoided sedulously but the implicit part of it is hard to avoid’ (Āśādharma’s 13th CE *Sāgara-dharmāmṛta* 4.12 summarised by WILLIAMS (1983: 121)).

Institutionalised *ahiṃsā*, therefore, does not only imply *dayā*, but also *hiṃsā*, within a structure of moral division of labour. That is, conceptually as well as practically, it necessarily implies—even presupposes—its own opposite.

In all these cases, from the practical point of view (VN), the principle of co-operation is implicitly presupposed, if not constituted, by unconditional acts of one-sided renunciation, although only the avoidance of violence is expressed. From the transcendental point of view (PN), however, *ahiṃsā* requires total non-cooperation with the world. Both possibilities of action, co-operation and non-cooperation, are open only to an individual which, by positing renunciation as the norm, is able to ‘offer cooperation’, or withdraw it,²⁰⁰ selectively. It is mainly because the interdependence (and potential conflict) between the renouncer and the world cannot be stated openly in systems of hierarchical co-operation, that the Jain principle of *ahiṃsā* fulfils the functions both of the linguistic cooperative principle and of the constitutive principle of social co-operation only implicitly: without saying so.²⁰¹ In fact, most Jain norms for well spoken language do not advocate positive values, but the avoidance of their violation. Negative principles such as these are of a different kind than positive prescriptions *à la* Grice, who demands ‘do cooperate’, whereas the Jains implicitly say, ‘do not not cooperate’. Thus, co-operation is implied in *ahiṃsā*, but in a modalised form.

The method of universalisation of specific moral norms and maxims *qua* double negation has been defended by WELLMER (1986: 21–37),²⁰² against HABERMAS (1991: 167 f., 172 f.) objection that consequentialist concepts of universal morality, predicated on norms of prohibition *qua* single or double negation, are inspired by the restricted ‘liberal’ aim of creating spaces of negatively defined individual freedom, contrasted with positive maxims, which are oriented towards publicly negotiated common interest. According to Habermas, the individualist conception of morality is based on a

²⁰⁰ Cf. SHARP (1960), (1973).

²⁰¹ DUMONT (1980: 44, 60).

²⁰² WELLMER (1986: 21 f.) argues that because obligatory norms of specific content cannot be derived from the categorical imperative of Kant, secondary moral norms are necessary which can only be derived by way of negation of non-universalisable maxims. See also the work of SINGER (1961) and HARE (1981), critically discussed by Wellmer.

negative reading of the monologically applied categorical imperative. In contrast to positive duties, negative duties (and positive permissions) derive their plausibility from the qualities of apodictic prohibition: (a) unconditional validity, (b) determinateness of content, and (c) unequivocal specification of addressees. From the perspective of the potential victim, to every negative duty corresponds a right; for example, to the duty not to kill, the right to body and life. Yet, a principle of morality which permits only the legitimation of general norms of prohibition cannot serve as an unequivocal basis for the constitution of a positive common will. WELLMER (1986: 31 f.) and HABERMAS (1991: 170 f.) agree that neither positive nor negative duties can claim absolute validity, because every situation is different, and requires the invocation of different norms. In discourses of norm application, as opposed to norm legitimation, both negative and positive rights and duties can act as reasons for appropriate action,²⁰³ though positive norms tend to be more unspecific. Yet, in concrete situations, moral norms themselves cannot be legitimated privately, only from the perspective of 'common interest', determining what is equally good 'for all'. While positive norms are burdened with discourses concerning concrete aims (problem of prognostics, performance, attribution of outcomes and unintended consequences, expectation and moral division of labour, evaluation of a result in terms of quantifiable aims), negative norms seem to remain aloof of problems of application, which cannot be avoided altogether though. Negatively defined principles can only protect the integrity and subjective freedom of the potential victim and, by implication, the freedom of the individual moral person itself. This may be the general principle underlying the Jain practice of deliberate renunciation of all violent action.²⁰⁴

The absence of positive principles in Jain ethics has frequently been criticised. In HABERMAS (1991: 166 f.) view, positive duties cannot be based on negative duties, but only on the principle of mutual recognition informing communicative action.²⁰⁵ In

²⁰³ HABERMAS (1991: 170): 'Die unwahrhaftige Auskunft, die einem anderen das Leben rettet, ist moralisch ebenso geboten, wie die Tötung in Notwehr oder die unterlassenen Hilfeleistung zur Vermeidung größerer übel moralisch erlaubt sind.'

²⁰⁴ See the 'ten commandments' of GERT's (1973) 'minimal ethic', and C. FRIED (1978: 29) cited by HABERMAS (1991: 172): 'What we may not do to each other, the things which are wrong, are precisely those forms of personal interaction which deny to our victim the status of a freely choosing, rationally valuing, specially efficacious person—the special status of moral personality.'

²⁰⁵ According to HEGEL (1981: 148 ff.) voluntary death is the absolute proof of freedom in the struggle for recognition. Liberation, both in a social and a religious sense, is also the positive implication of the Jain practice of *sallekhanā*, the culmination of the process of implementing the negatively formulated rule of non-violence. HABERMAS (1991: 173 f.), similarly, notes the fundamental nature of 'self-referential' norms which implicitly define the duty of fulfilling the pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action, i.e. the positive norms of preserving the physical integrity of the body and life and personal freedom which seems sometimes more important than death.

his conception of morality, private morality and public justice differ not in principle, only in terms of the types of institutionally mediated interaction. The positive normative equivalent of the apodictic prohibition of speaking the untruth (“you should not lie”) from the communication theoretical perspective is phrased in the following way:

‘Act with an orientation to mutual understanding and allow everyone the communicative freedom to take positions on validity claims’ (HABERMAS (1991: 173) / (1993: 66)).

Interestingly, this is not a maxim of truthfulness, but a reformulation of the cooperative principle. Being truthful, does not only imply the renunciation of deception, but is a positive act which contributes to the constitution of a social relationship.

There is another, practical, reason for the negative formulation of the cooperative principle. A negative statement forces the ‘user’ or interpreter of such a principle to work out the implied positive contextual presuppositions. This process involves the personal experiences of the individual concerned, in such a way that the positive ‘implied’ meanings and/or functions of the formal principle appear to be generated from the inner pool of values and expectations of the individual itself, and not as an externally imposed rule. The realm of ‘sociability’ or of ‘the social’ itself is theorised as an aspect of personal character, and not as an independently existing dimension of intersubjectivity (as in modern law, moral philosophy and sociology). From the perspective of Jain ethics, positive rules are generally regarded as lower order specifications of negative rules, whose conditions of application are implicitly presupposed. Negative rules secure a higher degree of formality and universality than positive rules, and hence greater contextual adaptability.²⁰⁶ These are some of the reasons why positive principles are seldom expressed explicitly in the *āgamas*, but left to the interpretative imagination of their users, who have to work out their conditions of fulfilment.²⁰⁷ However, if *ahimsā* is the functional equivalent of the cooperation principle, likewise do the modalities of the *satya-mahā-vrata* correspond to the conversational maxims, to which I will turn now.

Quantity—restraint (*saṃjama*)

There is no equivalent Habermasian validity claim for Grice’s quantity-maxim, although it could be easily constructed. Functional equivalents of the maxim among the Jain rules of speaking are the principles of deliberation, moderation, and restraint (*saṃjama* <*saṃjama*>). Even if something is true, but is not to be said

²⁰⁶ Cf. GONDA (1959).

²⁰⁷ Closest to Grice’s formulation of this principle is Āyār 2.4.1.6–7 (examples: Āyār 2.4.8–11, cf. DVS 7.11, Āyār 2.4.2.19).

(*avattavva* <*avaktavya*>), because it may create harm, or if it cannot be understood, one should not say it. The purpose of the latter maxim is to avoid unintentional ambiguity due to ignorance of the listeners (cf. SSā 1.8).²⁰⁸ The information processing aspect is expressed in Jain texts in general terms, such as ‘speaking with precision’ or ‘straightforward’ (*rju*). Often prescriptions are mixed with moral considerations, thus overlapping with the manner aspect, as the following example demonstrates:

‘A monk or nun, putting aside wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, considering well, speaking with precision, what one has heard, not too quick, with discrimination, should employ language in moderation and restraint’ (Āyār 2.4.2.19).²⁰⁹

There is no mention here of the recipient of an utterance, nor of the ‘information’ to be communicated. The reasons are similar as in the case of the ‘cooperative principle’ *ahiṃsā*. Restrained speech is regarded in Jainism primarily (PN) as an exercise in self-purification, to be measured in terms of the strength of the commitment to Jain values, and the degree of Jain interactional competence. Only indirectly (VN) is restrained speech regarded as a vehicle for the univocal transmission of information. This, again, derives from the fact that the realm of the ‘social’ is only presupposed as a background for the individual ‘path of purification’.²¹⁰

The problem of ambiguity resulting from the fact that, from the perspective of PN, VN might be taken as a ‘mixture of truth and untruth’ is important. Interestingly, it is discussed in the Āyār and DVS itself in the context of half-true speech, or *satyāmṛṣā bhāṣā* (see *infra* pp. 162–169):

²⁰⁸ Cf. CAILLAT (1975: 80). See VANDERVEKEN’s (1993: 378) generalisation of this maxim in terms of the ‘strength’ of illocutionary acts, ‘in the sense that they have more conditions of success, of non-defective performance ...’ For similar Jain formulations see BALBIR (1993: 71). From the hearer’s point of view (which is not mentioned in the Āyār sections on speech), the most important quality is the ability to ‘conquer one’s senses’ and not to become restless through the ‘lashes of words reaching the ears’ (DVS₂ 9.3.8).

²⁰⁹ CARRITHERS (1990: 157–9) singles *saṃvara* out, as the singular ‘aesthetic standard’ ‘underlying both the rules and the morality’ of Jainism. This concept of aesthetics (which is linked, in a footnote, with the concept of habitus) does not account for the normative religious aspects of *saṃvara*. The same applies to LAIDLAW (1995: 159).

²¹⁰ BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 218 ff.) suggest corresponding off-record strategies to Grice’s quantity-maxim: understatement, overstatement, and tautologisation. STRECKER (1988: 194) sees silence as an extreme-form of the off-record strategy of understatement and thus as a violation of the quantity maxim. From the ‘practical point of view’ this may be correct. For Jains, silence is the prime vehicle of exercising restraint, as indicated by the *bhāṣā-guṇṭi*, and counts as a form of penance. For instance, an ascetic who fasts for one month ‘may express himself by four ways only: by begging for alms, by putting a question, by making a request for lodging and by giving an answer’ (Thāṇ 183b, in SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74).

‘Speaks not the wise something which is not known, or which generates confusion—whether this or that sense is right’ (DVS₂ 7.4).

Ideally, a mendicant should remain silent. Otherwise, straightforward speech should be used. All language that could be both truth and false should be avoided:

‘In speaking (a monk) should use as few words as possible; he should not delight in another’s foibles; he should avoid deceiving speech, and should answer after ripe reflection.—One will repent of having used the third kind of speech (which is both true and untrue—P.F.); a secret should not be made known. This is the Nirgrantha’s command.—[A monk] should not call one names, nor “friend”, nor by his Gotra; “thou, thou” is vulgar; never address one by “thou” (Suy 1.9.25–27).

Quality—truth (*satya*)

The equivalent of Grice’s quality-maxim is *satya*, or truth. VANDERVEKEN (1993: 377) has shown that the maxim of quality can be generalised to cover commissives and directives, as well as assertives. A maxim of truth is expressed in the *satya-mahā-vrata*, which Jain ascetics recite twice a day during their obligatory *pratikramaṇa* ritual (see *supra*).²¹¹ However, in accordance with the preferred Jain method of negative determination, the general principle of truth is treated in this context only in terms of its characteristic violations (*aticāra*), that is, as the opposite of non-truth (*asatya*). The precise implications of the maxim of truth for language usage are specified elsewhere in form of a distinction of four types or ‘species’ of speech (*bhāsā-jāya* <*bhāsā-jāta*>), which are at the centre of the Jain theory of discourse, which looks at speech primarily as an object, and not from the perspective of the speaker. These analytical categories should be known and utilised by mendicants (ideally by all Jains) to prevent both the preparation and performance of violence (*ārambha*):

‘A mendicant should know that there are four kinds of speech: The first is truth; the second is untruth; the third is truth mixed with untruth; what is neither truth, nor untruth, nor truth mixed with untruth, that is the fourth kind of speech: neither truth nor untruth’ (Āyār 2.4.1.4).²¹²

²¹¹ WILLIAMS (1983: 73) quotes Somadeva’s (959 CE) ‘casuistic analysis’ of the *satya aṇuvrata* for the laity with the help of this tetrad as an original statement, although it is clearly only a restatement of Āyār 2.4.1.4.

²¹² Āyār 2.4.1.4: *aha bhikkhū jāṇejjā cattāri bhāsā-jāyāim, taṃ jahā—saccam egam paḍhamam bhāsā-jāyam, biyam mosam, taiyam saccā-mosam, jam ṇ’eva saccam ṇ’eva mosam ṇ’eva saccā-mosam—asaccā-mosam ṇāma taṃ cautham bhāsā-jāyam*. CAILLAT (1991: 8 n.4) located the following parallels to the above *sūtra* in the Śvetāmbara canon: Uttar 24.20–23, Ṭhaṇ 4.23 (238), Viy

Notably, the same scheme of four modes is applied to speech and to cognition (*maṇa* <*manas*>) or knowledge (*ñāna* <*ñāna*>) (Viy 622b/8.7.1b, 874b/15.1.4). Hence, the four *bhāsā-guttis* <*bhāsā-guptis*>, or controls of speech, and the four *maṇa-guttis* <*mano-guptis*>, or controls of the inner sense, are both characterised by the same terms in Uttar 24.19–23. The four modes, thus, represent general attitudes towards truth, both in mind and in speech:

- | | |
|--|---------------------------|
| 1. <i>saccā</i> < <i>satyā</i> > | truth |
| 2. <i>mosā</i> < <i>mṛṣā</i> > | untruth |
| 3. <i>saccā-mosā</i> < <i>satyā-mṛṣā</i> > | truth mixed with untruth |
| 4. <i>asaccā-mosā</i> < <i>asatyā-mṛṣā</i> > | neither truth nor untruth |

The formal structure of the four alternatives (tetra-lemma) is known as *catuṣ-koṭi* in Buddhist literature, but used differently here.²¹³ As the frequent use of the four

13.7.1a (621a-b), Pannaṇā 11 (860–866). See also Viy 16.2.2b (701a), 18.7.1 (749a), 19.8 (770b), Samavāya 13.1, and DVS 7.1–3. OHIRA (1994: 14, 155) is of the opinion that the four modes were first taught at the time of DVS 7, which she dates between 5th–4th century BCE.

²¹³ There is an extensive academic literature on the *catuṣ-koṭi* in Buddhist philosophy. See for instance SCHAYER (1933), RAJU (1954), MURTI (1955), BAHM (1957), ROBINSON (1957), STAAL (1962), SMART (1964), JAYATILLEKE (1967), CHI (1974), SEYFORTH RUEGG (1977), WAYMAN (1977), JONES (1978), GUNARATNE (1980), (1986), BHARADWAJA (1984), SCHROEDER (2000), and others. STAAL (1962: 52 n. 4) suggests the earliest passage to be *Majjhima-nikāya* 63. Nāgārjuna's (2nd CE) positive formulation of the 'tetralemma' (ROBINSON (1957: 303)) in his *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* 18.6 attracted most academic interest (even more so the negated forms): 'Everything is either true or not true, or both true or not true, or neither true or not true; that is the Buddha's teaching' (Translated by ROBINSON (1957: 302), cf. MMK 18.8). In contrast to the debate on the use of the *catuṣ-koṭi* in 'Buddhist logic', focusing largely on the 'negative dialectic' of Nāgārjuna, the cited Jain cases indicate that the *catuṣ-koṭi* was used (at least by Jains) as a quasi-systematic scholastic frame for the discussion of logical alternatives, without specific doctrinal implications being connected with the frame itself. MURTI (1955: 129) noted early on: 'Four alternative views are possible on any subject' (referring to Madhyamaka and Jainism: he also cites Haribhadra) (see also CHI (1974: 298)). Notably, the four alternatives in Āyār 2.4.1.4 etc., are disjunctive, not additive, as stereotypical representations of 'Jaina Logic' generally assume. Because Jain usage of *catuṣ-koṭis* was ignored, and because of the almost exclusive focus on Nāgārjuna, Buddhist scholars compared the 'four-cornered negation' only with the 'Jain relativism' in general. They derived the *catuṣ-koṭi* either speculatively from Jain *syād-vāda* (GUNARATNE (1980: 232)) or vice versa (BAHM (1957: 128)), or (and) contrasted it with 'the relativistic logic proposed by the Jains, to which Buddhism was opposed' (JAYATILLEKE (1967: 82)). According to RAJU (1954), the mythical Sanjaya framed the four alternatives already in the 7th century BCE, negating all of them, whereas 'Jaina logicians saw a relative truth in each pole and thus adopted a more positive and determinate attitude toward our cognitions of the world.' For recent, less logocentric, views on Nāgārjuna, focusing on 'skillful means', see for instance JONES (1978), SCHROEDER (2000). A similar four-valued theory of truth was defended by the Megarians (PRIEST-ROUTLEY (1989: 13)), which demonstrates that no specific philosophical position is associated with the form itself, only with its uses.

alternatives (*catur-bhaṅga* or *catur-bhaṅgī*) as a classificatory scheme in Ṭhāṇ IV, for instance, indicates,²¹⁴ the *catuṣ-koṭi* is used in Jain scholasticism in a similar way as the *nikṣepa* pattern, described by BRUHN-HÄRTEL (1978: v) as a formal ‘dialectical technique (often employed in a “pseudo-exegetical function”)’.²¹⁵

JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2) understood the first three modes to refer to assertions and the fourth to injunctions. According to Paṇṇ 860 (255b), the first two modes are distinct (*pañjattiyā* <*paṇyāptā*>) ways of speaking, which can be analysed in terms of the true/false distinction, and the third and fourth are indistinct (*apañjattiyā* <*apanyāptā*>) ways of speaking, whose validity or non-validity is indeterminable. The sub-categories of distinct speech are true speech (*satyā bhāṣā*) and false speech (*mṛṣā bhāṣā*), and the sub-categories of indistinct speech are true-as-well-as-false speech (*satyā-mṛṣā bhāṣā*) and neither-true-nor-false speech (*asatyā-mṛṣā bhāṣā*). A *muni* should use only the first and the last mode of speech, and avoid the remaining two ‘by all means’ (DVS₂ 7.1) in order to minimise harm:

‘A monk or a nun, considering well, should use true and accurate speech, or speech which is neither truth nor untruth (i.e. injunctions); for such speech is not sinful, blameable, rough, stinging, &c.’ (Āyār 2.4.1.7).²¹⁶

²¹⁴ See DUNDAS (2007: 50 f.) on the analogy between four types of armies and four types of ascetics in Ṭhāṇ 292 (4.280–1). ALSDORF (1966: 186 f., cf. 190 f.) discussed a different type of *catur-bhaṅgas* in Jaina literature, made up of combinations of two positive and two negative possibilities. He pointed out that the use of the ‘fourfold combination’ is ‘very typical of the scholastic who never misses an opportunity to make a “caturbhaṅga”, i.e. the four possible combinations of two positive and two negative possibilities...’ (p. 186).

²¹⁵ Ṭhāṇ 3.239 offers also a trilemma: (1) to state the truth (*tavvayaṇa* <*tadvacana*>), (2) to state the untruth (*tadaṇṇavayaṇa* <*tadanyavacana*>), (3) to state something meaningless or negative (*no-avayaṇa* <*no-avacana*>); Ṭhāṇ 7.129 a heptalemma: (1) speech (*ālāva* <*ālāpa*>), (2) taciturnity (*aṇ-ālāva* <*an-ālāpa*>), (3) flattery (*ullāva* <*ullāpa*>), (4) insult (*aṇ-ullāva* <*an-ullāpa*>), (5) dialogue (*saṃlāva* <*saṃlāpa*>), (6) prattle (*palāva* <*pralāpa*>), (7) contradiction (*vi-ppalāva* <*vi-pralāpa*>).

²¹⁶ I do not give the original wording in all cases. In different words, the same teaching is expressed in DVS₁ 7.1–3, which may be the oldest text concerning this subject:

*cauṇham khalu bhāsāṇam parisamkhāya pannavam /
doṇham tu viṇayam sikkhe, do na bhāsejja savvaso // 1 //*
*jā ya saccā avattavvā saccāmosā ya jā musā /
jā ya buddhehi ’ñāinnā, na taṃ bhāsejja pannavam // 2 //*
*a-sacca-mosam saccam ca aṇavajjam akakkasam /
samuppeham asaṃdiddham giram bhāsejja pannavam // 3 //*

‘[1] Of the four kinds of speech, the thoughtful monk] should, after consideration, learn the training in two, [but] should not use the other two ones at any occasion.

(α) Speaking truthfully can either be interpreted ethically, as straightforward and accurate talk (on-record), or ontologically, as an assertion of the way things are.²¹⁷ Both perspectives can be found in the Jain and non-Jain commentary literature alike,²¹⁸ often mixed together, as the identical characterisation of the four *guptis* of mind and speech illustrates. *Satyā bhāṣā* refers both to the psychological and the normative conditions of truthfulness, that is, sincere, grammatically accurate and contextually acceptable speech, and to propositional truth.²¹⁹ It is explicitly recognised in the Jain scriptures (though not in these terms) that, as a speech act, propositional language has also an expressive and normative content. The normative, the expressive, and the propositional components of spoken language are altogether necessary to communicate something.

Paṇṇ 862 states that ‘the truth or validity of the speech depends on various situations and conditions’ (MĀLVANĪYĀ (1970: 325)). Ten different dimensions or ‘validity conditions’ of truthful speech are distinguished²²⁰ (the compound *-saccā* <*satyā*> can be translated as ‘sincere’ or ‘true’ ‘according to the conventions of ____’):²²¹

1. <i>janavaya-saccā</i> < <i>janapada-satyā</i> >	Country
2. <i>sammata-saccā</i> < <i>sammata-satyā</i> >	Consensus
3. <i>ṭhavaṇā-saccā</i> < <i>sthāpanā-satyā</i> >	Representation
4. <i>ṇāma-saccā</i> < <i>nāma-satyā</i> >	Name
5. <i>rūva-saccā</i> < <i>rūpa-satyā</i> >	Form

[2] That [form of speech] which is true, [but] not to be uttered, that which is half-true, that which is [quite] untrue and which is not practised by the Jinās, the thoughtful monk should not use.

[3] [But] he should, after deliberation, use a speech not exposed to doubt, [a speech] which is neither true nor untrue and [a speech] which is true, provided that it is not to be blamed [and] rough’ (SCHUBRING (1932: 101)).

See Āyār 2.4.8–11 and cf. DVS 7.11, 7.2 for examples.

²¹⁷ Cf. HABERMAS’ (1980: 419 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 312 ff.) defence of his clear-cut distinction between claims to truth and claims to truthfulness.

²¹⁸ Mookerjee, in TULSĪ (1985: 107): ‘Truthfulness is the revelation of truth. (Gloss) Truth means the straight-forwardness [rjutā] in deed (physical movement), intention and word, and non-discrepant behaviour. The revelation (disclosure) of that truth is called truthfulness.’ (Note) Here “truth”, as an ethical principle, is defined and explained. Umāsvāti [*Tattvārtha-bhāṣya* 7.9], however has included revelation of ontological reality also as an aspect of truthfulness.’

²¹⁹ Ṭhāṇ 308 (4.349) gives the *nikṣepa* of *satya*: name, object, knowledge, knowledge and action according to truth. Ṭhāṇ 254 (4.102) distinguishes four types (aspects) of truth defined in terms of unequivocality or sincerity (*ujjuyayā* <*rjutā*>) of (1) gesture, (2) speech, (3) mind, (4) seamless combination of the three, with the intention not to deceive.

²²⁰ See also Ṭhāṇ 10.89.

²²¹ JACOBI (1895: 160) translated *bhāva-satyā* as ‘sincerity of the mind’, and *yoga-satyā* as ‘sincerity of acting’.

6. <i>paḍucca-saccā</i> < <i>pratītya-satyā</i> >	Confirmation
7. <i>vavahāra-saccā</i> < <i>vyavahāra-satyā</i> >	Custom
8. <i>bhāva-saccā</i> < <i>bhāva-satyā</i> >	Inner Meaning
9. <i>joga-saccā</i> < <i>yoga-satyā</i> >	Practice
10. <i>ovamma-saccā</i> < <i>aupamya-satyā</i> >	Analogy

The same list is given and explained in *Mūlācāra* 5.111–116, with exception of *yoga-satyā*, which is replaced by category No. 8 *sambhāvanā-satyā*, translated by OKUDA (1975: 128) as ‘truth of possibilities’ (*Möglichkeitswahrheit*; see *infra* p. 161).²²² There is no apparent systematic connection between the categories in this list. Yet, the list is clearly informed by the four ‘doors of disquisition’ (*aṇugaddāra* <*anuyoga-dvāra*>) of canonical hermeneutics (AṇD 75), especially by the method of contextual interpretation (*aṇugama* <*anugama*>) through progressive specification via fixed standpoints (*naya*) (AṇD 601–606).²²³ The occurrence of the terms *nāma*, *sthāpanā* and *bhāva* indicates the deliberate incorporation of a variant of the ‘canonical’ *nikkheva* <*nikṣepa*>, as BHATT (1978: xv, 20) suggested, although the *davva* <*dravya*> standpoint is missing.²²⁴ A *nikṣepa* is a scholastic scheme which delineates fixed perspectives for the analysis of the principal dimensions of the possible contextual meanings of a word (contemporary linguistics is still struggling to establish comparable categories). The original purpose of the list of ten, as a whole, may have been similar. That is, assessing the meaning of an utterance from several commonly relevant perspectives.²²⁵

Most categories are self-explanatory. Truthful utterances based on the linguistic conventions of a country are explained by the commentaries through the example that ‘in Konkan *piccam* is said for *payas* and that by the *gopāla* the lotus is called *aravinda* only’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 157 n. 4, § 74)). Because terms such as these are synonyms, they are all equally true.²²⁶ Similarly, what is accepted by many people, i.e. linguistic

²²² MĀc 5.111: *jaṇa-vada sammada ṭhavaṇā ṇāme rūve paḍucca-sacce ya sambhāvaṇa vavahāre bhāve opamma-sacce ya.*

²²³ According to AṇD 605, contextual interpretation (*aṇugama*) of the meaning of a *sutta* should progress in the following sequence: ‘Know that the characteristic features (of exposition) are sixfold, viz. (1) the (correct) utterance of the text (*saṃhitā*), (2) disjunction and parting (of words), (3) paraphrasing, (4) expounding of compound words, (5) anticipation of objections, and (8) establishment (of the correct meaning).’

²²⁴ Cf. Ṭhāṇ 4.349.

²²⁵ BHATT (1978: 14) emphasises that the *nikṣepa* in Paṇṇ 863 ‘has no execution in the canonical context.’ The material is therefore likely to belong to ‘post-canonical works from which it was taken before the canon acquired its present shape.’ He lists similar passages in the canon and the commentary literature (BHATT (1978: 157)).

²²⁶ PaṇṇU 81: *jana-pada-satyam nāma nānā-deśi-bhāṣā-rūpam apy avipratipattyā yad ekārtha-pratyāyana-vyavahāra-samartham iti, yathōdakārthe koṃkaṇādiṣu payaḥ piccam nīram udakam ity-*

expressions, is conventionally true (*sammata-satyā*).²²⁷ Pragmatic theories of truth would fall under this perspective. A figurative representation, such as a statue which is not god itself, may itself not be accurate, but that what it symbolises can be recognised as true (*sthāpanā-satyā*).²²⁸ The same applies to a name such as Devadatta or ‘given by god’ (*nāma-satyā*) (MĀc 113).²²⁹ Allusions to external appearance in form of prototypes such as ‘white cranes’ (not all cranes are white) are examples of *rūpa-satyā*.²³⁰ According to the commentators Haribhadra (PaṇṇV) and Malayagiri (PaṇṇṬ), the term *pratītya-satyā* designates an utterance which is true only under certain conditions, and thus predicated on empirical confirmation.²³¹ Examples are relative size (‘this is long’) or the relative state of transformation of objects at a given time (cf. MĀc 114).²³² Like other conventional expressions which, under certain conditions, could equally be classified as ‘truth-mixed-with-untruth’, common or idiomatic utterances such as ‘the *kūra* (i.e. the cooked rice) is cooking’ (MĀc 114) are acceptable as customarily true (*vyavahāra-satyā*).²³³ The Śvetāmbara commentators explain the inner truth (*bhāva-satyā*) expressed by certain utterances with the example of a ‘white crane’ (*śuklā balākā*),²³⁴ which MĀc 113 uses to illustrate *rūpa-satyā*, whereas Vaṭṭakera interprets the term as designating the ‘higher truth’, i.e. saying something untrue in order to avoid injury to someone (MĀc 116). This perspective is also applied to

ādi, aduṣṭa-vivakṣā-hetuvān nānā-jana-padeṣv iṣṭārtha-pratipatti-janakatvād vyavahāra-pravṛtteḥ satyam etad iti, evaṃ śeṣeṣv api bhāvanā kāryā. PaṇṇṬ₁ 257a.1: ity-ādi “jaṇa-vaya-saccā” iti taṃ taṃ jana-padam adhikṛtyeṣṭārtha-pratipatti-janakatayā vyavahāra-hetuvāt satyā jana-pada-satyā yathā koṅkāṇādiṣu payah piccam ity-ādi.

²²⁷ PaṇṇU 81: *sammata-satyam nāma kumuda-kuvalayōtpala-tāmarasānām samāne paṃkaja-sambhava gopālādīnām sammataṃ araviṃdam eva paṃkajam iti.*

²²⁸ PaṇṇU 81: *sthāpanā-satyam nāma akṣara-mudrā-vinyāsādiṣu yathā māśako ‘yam kārṣāpaṇo ‘yam śatam idam sahasram idam iti.*

²²⁹ PaṇṇU 81: *nāma-satyam nāma kulama-varddhayann api kula-varddhana ity ucyate dhanam avarddhamāno ‘pi dhana-varddhana ity ucyate, apakṣas tu pakṣa iti.*

²³⁰ PaṇṇU 81: *rūpa-satyam nāma tad-guṇasya tathā rūpa-dhāraṇam rūpa-satyam, yathā prapañcayateḥ pravrajita-rūpa-dhāraṇam iti. PaṇṇṬ₁ 257a: yathā dambhato grhīta-pravrajita-rūpaḥ pravrajito ‘yam iti.*

²³¹ OKUDA (1975: 127) translates *pratītya-satyā* as ‘relative truth’.

²³² PaṇṇU 81: *pratītya-satyam nāma yathā anāmikāyā dīrghatvam hrasvatvam cēti, tathā hi tasyānānta-pariṇāmasya dravyasya tat tat-sahakāri-kāraṇa-sannidhānena tat tad-rūpam abhivyajyata iti satyātā. PaṇṇṬ₂ 257a uses the expression *pratītya-āsṛitya*, recourse to confirmation. PaṇṇV 11.17 gives the synonym *apekṣā*, consideration or regard.*

²³³ PaṇṇU 81: *vyavahāra-satyam nāma dahyate giriḥ galati bhājanam anudarā kanyā lomā eḍiketi, giri-gata-tṛṇādi-dāhe loke vyavahāraḥ pravarttate, tathōdake ca galati satī, tathā sambhoga-jīva-prabhavōdarābhāve ca satī, lavana-yogyā-lomābhāve cēti.*

²³⁴ PaṇṇU 81: *bhāva-satyam nāma śuklā balākā, saty api paṃca-varṇa-sambhava.*

other contexts in the Śvetāmbara texts Āyār 2.4.1.6 and DVS 7.11. An example of truth based on association with practice (*yoga-satyā*) is to describe someone according to his/her activity, for instance the designation *chattrī* (a *kṣatriya* who should protect his realm performs *chattrā-yoga*), or *daṇḍī* (who performs *daṇḍa-yoga* or punishment).²³⁵ Instead of *yoga-satyā*, the *Mūlācāra* 115 has *sambhāvanā-satyā*, which means that assuming the possibility of something is a valid condition of truthful language: ‘If he wanted, he could do it. If Indra wanted, he could overturn the Jambudvīpa’ (OKUDA (1975: 128)). As an example of speaking the truth, using comparison or analogy (*aupamya-satyā*),²³⁶ MĀc 116 mentions the word *palidovama* <*palyôpama*>, literally ‘like a sack of corn’, which designates a high number.²³⁷ *Aṇugaddārāim* (AṇD) 368–382 demonstrates the practical ‘usefulness’ of this simile through the *naya* method of progressive disambiguation.²³⁸

(β) Untruthful language or speaking untruthfully (*mṛṣā bhāṣā*) is the proscribed opposite of truth or truthfulness.²³⁹ In contrast to the ten conditions of truth, featuring the semantics of propositional utterances, the ten conditions out of which untruth ‘arises’ (compound: *-niṣsiya* <*niḥṣṛita*>), listed in Paṇṇ 863, are primarily psycho-physical conditions.²⁴⁰ According to SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 69), ‘speech springing from emotion is by itself understood as *mosā*’.²⁴¹ Eight of the ten categories overlap with the standard Jain list of the eighteen sources of sin (*pāva-thāṇa* <*pāpa-sthāna*>),²⁴² starting with the four passions (*kaṣāya* <*kaṣāya*>), and attachment and aversion, which in the Paṇṇ are the sole cause of karmic bondage, disregarding *yoga*, or activity (MĀLVANIYĀ (1970: 384)). Most types of untrue speech, conditioned by these factors, can be categorised as expressive utterances. The last two categories, *ākhyāyika-*

²³⁵ PaṇṇU 81: *yoga-satyam nāma chattrā-yogāc chattrī daṇḍa-yogād daṇḍīty evam ādi*.

²³⁶ Cf. UPADHYAYA (1987: 105–7) on Hemacandra’s examples of *upācara*, secondary meaning of a word based on similarity.

²³⁷ PaṇṇU 81: *upamayā satyam nāma samudravat taḍāgam*.

²³⁸ The problem of the vagueness of the concept of ‘heaps’ is also addressed in the so-called sorites paradoxes attributed to Eubulides.

²³⁹ Ṭhāṇ 254 (4.102) distinguishes four types (aspects) of untruth defined in terms of equivocality or insincerity (*aṇujyvatā* <*aṇjukatā*>) of (1) gesture, (2) speech, (3) mind, (4) contradictory combination of the three, with the intent to deceive.

²⁴⁰ According to Jain philosophy, cognitive and motivational factors are linked. See also HYMES (1972a: 283) notion of communicative competence: ‘The specification of ability for use as part of competence allows for the role of non-cognitive factors, such as motivation, as partly determining competence. In speaking of competence, it is especially important not to separate cognitive from affective and volitive factors, so far as the impact of the theory on educational practice is concerned; but also with regard to speech design and explanation.’

²⁴¹ Arguably, conditions such as anger and pride can also evoke (painfully) true statements.

²⁴² Viy 1.9.1 (95a).

*niḥṣṛita*²⁴³ and *upaghāta-niḥṣṛita*,²⁴⁴ do not refer merely to an underlying negative psycho-physical state in general, but to the unspecified psycho-physical conditions of two specific types of self-referentially defined commonly untrue speech acts—hearsay and false accusation—with predominately constative and regulative attributes.

1. <i>koha-nissiya</i> < <i>krodha-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Anger
2. <i>māṇa-nissiya</i> < <i>māna-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Pride
3. <i>māyā-nissiya</i> < <i>māyā-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Deceit
4. <i>lobha-nissiya</i> < <i>lobha-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Greed
5. <i>pejja-nissiya</i> < <i>premana-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Attachment
6. <i>dosa-nissiya</i> < <i>dveṣa-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Aversion
7. <i>hāsa-nissiya</i> < <i>hāsyā-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Ridicule
8. <i>bhaya-nissiya</i> < <i>bhaya-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Fear
9. <i>akkhāiya-nissiya</i> < <i>ākhyāyika-niḥṣṛita</i> >	Hearsay
10. <i>uvaghāya-nissiya</i> < <i>upaghāta-niḥṣṛita</i> >	False Accusation

CAILLAT (1991: 11) observed that the Paṇṇ presents the *kaṣāyas* as the cause of untruth, not of injury, as in Āyār 2.4.1.1 and DVS 7.11. This change of perspective, from *ahimsā* to *-satya* as the main criterion, may reflect the shift of emphasis in classical Jain *karman* theory from act to intention. The ten categories seem to have in common that they refer to acts which, intentionally or unintentionally, produce unwholesome perlocutionary effects in the addressee (and the speaker as well). They are either factually false, ethically wrong or both.²⁴⁵

(γ) The category ‘partially true speech’²⁴⁶ or ‘truth-mixed-with-untruth’ (*saccā-mosā bhāsā* <*satyā-mṛṣā bhāṣā*>) should not be mixed up with the conditionally true standpoints of *syād-vāda*, which apply only to valid statements, not to false

²⁴³ Following Haribhadra (PaṇṇU 82: *ākhyāyikā asambhavyābhidhānam*) and Malayagiri (PaṇṇT₁ 258b.9: *ākhyāyikā-niḥṣṛitā yat-kathāsv-asambhāvyaḥbidhānam*), *akkhāiya* <*ākhyāyika*> is usually understood as a narrative (*kathā*) of something non-existing or impossible, based on mere ‘legend’ or hearsay. See RATNACANDRA (1988 I: 59), and GHATAGE (1996 I: 64). This betrays the spirit of realism of Jain philosophy. Though, *kathā* may also refer to ‘talk’, ‘discussion’ or ‘disputation’. Potentially negative consequences of knowledge based on mere hearsay are explained in Vīy 9.31(430a–438a). Ṭhāṇ 7.80 lists seven types of gossip (*vi-kahā* <*vi-kathā*>).

²⁴⁴ *Uvaghāya/uvagghāya* <*upaghāta*> is explained by Malayagiri (PaṇṇT₁ 258b.10) through the example *cauras tvam* (‘you are a thief’), understood here as *abhyākhyāna*—false and groundless accusation. The term *upaghāta* generally designates an act of violence, but here more specifically an insult. See also Āyār 2.4.8 for this and similar examples of ‘sinful speech’.

²⁴⁵ Ṭhāṇ 6.100 lists six types of unwholesome speech. Ṭhāṇ 6.101 lists six types of false accusations, related to the context of enumeration (*pathārā* <*prastāra*>) in confession.

²⁴⁶ See for instance NYAYAVIJAYA (1998: 343–5).

knowledge (*apramāṇa*). ‘Truth-mixed-with-untruth’ designates intentionally or unintentionally ambiguous or unclear speech, which is strictly prohibited.²⁴⁷ The meaning of the term is explained by DVS 7.4–10:

‘4. But this and that topic which confines the Eternal within limits—this half-true speech the wise [monk] should avoid.

5. By a speech which is untrue, though its appearance is that of a true one, a man is touched by sin, how much more a man who speaks plain untruth!’ (DVS₁ 7.4).²⁴⁸

Satyā-mṛṣā bhāṣā is sinful language, based on the whole on non-universalisable ethical principles. For instance, the language of heretical forest-monks, who do not abstain from killing, whose thought, speech and behaviour is not well controlled:

‘They employ speech that is true and untrue at the same time: “do not beat me, beat others; do not abuse me, abuse others; do not capture me, capture others; do not torment me, torment others; do not deprive me of life, deprive others of life”’ (Suy 2.2.21).

The ten types of truth-mixed-with-untruth listed in Paṇṇ 865²⁴⁹ do not explicitly address expressive or regulative aspects of speech acts, but only propositional content; despite the fact that performatives can also be both true and untrue. According to the commentaries, all types deal with indiscriminate speech, and with semantic and logical fallacies, such as category mistakes regarding the quality or quantity of objects or temporal modalities which can be easily ‘mixed up’ (compound: *-missiyā* <*miśritā*>), for instance in utterances designating part-whole relationships.

1. <i>uppaṇṇa-missiyā</i> < <i>utpanna-miśritā</i> >	Born
2. <i>vigaya-missiyā</i> < <i>vigata-miśritā</i> >	Destroyed
3. <i>uppaṇṇa-vigaya-missiyā</i> < <i>utpanna-vigata-miśritā</i> >	Born-Destroyed
4. <i>jīva-missiyā</i> < <i>jīva-miśritā</i> >	Life
5. <i>ajīva-missiyā</i> < <i>ajīva-miśritā</i> >	Matter
6. <i>jīvājīva-missiyā</i> < <i>jīvājīva-miśritā</i> >	Life-Matter

²⁴⁷ On combinations of truth and untruth in behaviour (*vyavahāra*), intent (*pariṇata*), belief (*dr̥ṣṭi*) etc., for instance in succession, theorised in terms of character types, see Ṭhāṇ 241 (4.35–44). See CAILLAT (1965/1975: 80) on types of duplicity to be avoided.

²⁴⁸ DSV 7.4–5:

eyaṃ ca aṭṭhamannaṃ vā jaṃ tu nāmei sāsayaṃ /
sa bhāsaṃ sacca-mosaṃ pi taṃ pi dhīro vivajjae // 4 //
vitahaṃ pi tahārottīṃ jaṃ giraṃ bhāsaṃ nara /
tamhā so puṭṭho pāveṇaṃ, kiṃ puṇa jo musaṃ vae // 5 //

²⁴⁹ See also Ṭhāṇ 10.91.

7. <i>aṇanta-missiyā</i> < <i>ananta-miśritā</i> >	Infinite
8. <i>paritta-missiyā</i> < <i>parīta-miśritā</i> >	Separate
9. <i>addhā-missiyā</i> < <i>adhva-miśritā</i> >	Time
10. <i>addhāddhā-missiyā</i> < <i>ardhādhva-miśritā</i> >	Halftime

The list of ten modalities evidently reflects general issues of particular concern for Jain doctrine. It can be thematically subdivided in two triplets and two pairs. The first triplet—*utpanna*, *vigata*, *utpanna-vigata*—addresses unclear distinctions concerning life and death. The commentators explain the meaning of *utpanna-miśritā* as speaking in non-specific ways about the born, mixed with references to the yet unborn; for instance birth occurring in this or that village or town, that ten or more or less boys were born (‘ten boys were born in this village today’) etc.²⁵⁰ In the same way, *vigata-miśritā* refers to cases of ‘stating mortality in an indefinite way, e.g. saying that ten people have died in this village, etc.’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 400)).²⁵¹ *Utpanna-vigata-miśritā* refers to both true and false, or contradictory assertions (*visaṃvāda*) regarding manifestations of both birth and death.²⁵² The second triplet—*jīva*, *ajīva*, *jīvājīva*—similarly addresses the problem of pointing in a general way to ‘great numbers’ of either living or dead beings, or quantities of mixed living and dead beings.²⁵³ Life (*jīva*) in abstract and concrete form can be confused through vague language, such as the language of sets (*rāśi*), or other numerical expressions. The same applies to matter

²⁵⁰ PaṇṇU 82: *saccā-mosā dasa-vihā uppaṇṇa-miśaga-vigata-miśagādi, uddissa gāmaṃ vā nagaraṃ vā dasaṇhaṃ dāra-gāṇaṃ jaṃmaṃ pagāsaṃtassa ūṇesu ahiesu vā evaṃ ādi uppanna-missiyā*. PaṇṇT₁ 258a: “*uppaṇṇa-missiyā*” *ity-ādi, utpannā miśritā anupannaiḥ saha saṃkhyā-pūraṇārthaṃ yatra sā utpanna-miśritā, evaṃ anyatrāpi yathā yogaṃ bhāvaniyaṃ, tatrōtpanna-miśritā yathā kasmimścīt grāme nagare vā ūṇeṣv adhikeṣu vā dārakeṣu jāteṣu daśa dārakā asminn adya jātā ity-ādi*.

²⁵¹ PaṇṇU 82: *em eva maraṇa-kahaṇe vigaya-missiyā*. PaṇṇT₁ 258b: *evaṃ eva maraṇa-kathane vigata-miśritā*.

²⁵² PaṇṇU 82: *jamaṇassa maraṇassa ya kaya-pariṇāmassa ubhaya-kahaṇe visaṃvādaṇe uppāeṇa-vigata-missitā*. PaṇṇT₁ 258b: *tathā janmato maraṇasya ca kṛta-pariṇāmasyābhidhāne visaṃvādena cōtpanna-vigata-miśritā*.

²⁵³ PaṇṇU 82: *jīvaṃta-mayaga-saṃkhaṇagādi-rāsi-darisaṇe aho maham jīva-rāsi tti bhaṇaṃtassa jīvaṃtesu saccā maesu mosa tti jīva-missitā, ettha ceva bahusu matesu aho mahamto jīva-rāsi tti bhaṇaṃtassa maesu saccā jīvaṃtesu musā iti ajīva-missiyā, saccam mayam amayaṃ vā ubhayaṃ ṇiyameṇa avadhārayaṃtassa visaṃvāde jīvājīva-missiyā*. PaṇṇT₁ 258b: [4] *tathā prabhūtānāṃ jīvātāṃ stokānāṃ ca mṛtānāṃ saṅkha-saṅkhanakādīnāṃ ekatra rāśau dṛṣṭe yadā kaścīd evaṃ vadati—aho mahān jīva-rāśir ayam iti tadā sā jīva-miśritā, satyā-mṛṣātvam cāsyā jīvatsū satya tvāt mṛteṣu mṛṣātvāt, [5] tathā yadā prabhūteṣu mṛteṣu stokeṣu jīvatsū ekatra rāśi-kṛteṣu saṅkhādiṣv evaṃ vadati—aho mahānayaṃ mṛto jīva-rāśir iti tadā sā ajīva-miśritā, asyā api satyā-mṛṣātvam mṛteṣu satyatvāt jīvatsū mṛṣātvāt, [6] tathā tasminn eva rāśau etāvanto ’tra jīvanta etāvanto ’tra mṛtā iti ṇiyamenāvadhārayato visaṃvāde jīvājīva-miśritā*.

(*ajīva*), and both life and matter (*jīvājīva*). The consequence of imprecise language may be unintentional violence against individual living beings (in a ‘heap of dead beings’). According to *Āvassaya-nijjutti* (ĀvNi 8.56–100), one of the principal heretics of the canonical period, Rohagutta, committed the mistake of mixing up categories by positing a third principle, *nojīva* or the half-living, which mediates between *jīva* and *ajīva*. Hence, his heresy was called *terāsiyā*.²⁵⁴ The pair *ananta* and *parīta* addresses indiscriminate language regarding aspects of finite-infinite, part-whole, or singular term-existence relationships. The commentaries explain *ananta-miśritā* with reference to the case of certain plants, for instance root vegetables such as radish (*mūlaka*), which have only one body, yet are composed of an infinite number of souls (*ananta-jīva*).²⁵⁵ The category *parīta-miśritā* focuses, conversely, for instance on the independence and separateness of each individual element within a composite form of vegetation.²⁵⁶ The two ontological levels of the relationship between one and many can easily be mixed up in these cases; which has potential ethical (karmic) consequences. One of the principle concerns of the *Pannavaṇā*, highlighted in Malayagiri’s commentary, is the difference between the categories infinite (*ananta*) and uncountable (*asamkhyāta*).²⁵⁷ With regard to *adhva*, time, speech is both true and untrue if one says, for some reason, that ‘it is night’ during the daytime, or ‘get up, it is day’ when it is night.²⁵⁸ The same applies to the part of a measure of time, or *ardhādhva*, such as a

²⁵⁴ See LEUMANN’S (1885) article on the seven early schisms (*niṅhava*).

²⁵⁵ PaṇṇU 82: *mūlakādi aṇanta-kāyaṃ tasseva paḍirikkaya-paṇḍum-pattehiṃ aṇṇeṇa vā vaṇassaikāeṇa missaṃ daṭṭhūṇa esa aṇanta-kāyōtti bhaṇamāssa aṇanta-missiyā*. PaṇṇT₁ 259a: *tathā mūlakādikam ananta-kāyaṃ tasyāiva salkaiḥ paripāṇḍu-patir anyena vā kenacit-pratyekavanaspatinā miśram avalokya sarvo ’py eṣo ’nanta-kāyika iti vadato ’nanta-miśritā*. Cf. GHATAGE (1996 I: 227). On the *ananta-kāyas* see WILLIAMS (1983: 113–6).

²⁵⁶ PaṇṇU 82: *tam eva samudayaṃ karamette sarittāṇaṃ amilāṇaṃ rāsī-kayaṃ parittam iti bhaṇamāssa paritta-missiyā*. PaṇṇT₁ 259a: *tathā pratyeka-vanaspati-saṅghātam ananta-kāyikena saha rāsī-kṛtam avalokya pratyeka-vanaspatir ayaṃ sarvo ’pīti vadataḥ pratyeka-miśritā*.

²⁵⁷ See MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 271, 430). Ṭhāṇ 10.66 lists ten meanings of the word *ananta*.

²⁵⁸ This characterisation cannot be related to the difference between experienced or conventional time (*samaya*) and imperceptible abstract time (*addhā*) explained in Viy 11.11.1 (532b) (DELEU (1970: 178)), because in this case the speech act would be neither-true-nor-false. As the authoritative work of Jain scholastic hermeneutics, the *Anuogaddārāim* shows, Jains are careful to distinguish semantic ambiguity from philosophical perspectivism (*anekānta-vāda*, *syād-vāda*, *nikṣepa*, *naya* etc.), which is seen as an analytic instrument for disambiguation: ‘Whereas in the fallacy of *chhal* (fraud), one word has two meanings, no word in this argument [of *syād-vāda*] is of such nature. ... To declare the existence of an object from one point of view and to declare its non-existence from another point of view, is not to indulge in a *pun*, and thus to be guilty of this fallacy’ (KANNOOMAL (1917: 16)). Cf. C. R. JAIN (1929: 8, 16–18), GANERI (2001: 133). It should be noted that similes and analogies are considered to be media of disambiguation and not convey-

prahara, a quarter of the bright or dark period of the day.²⁵⁹ The statements may be true in as much as time in general is concerned, but false with regard to time in particular (i.e. it may be bright, although technically it is still night).²⁶⁰

Examples for a potential mix up of the modalities of time, which may have negative moral consequences in cases of promises for instance, are given in *Āyār* 2.4.2, and in *DVS* 7.6–10 as paradigmatic cases for *satyā-mṛṣā* speech. The illocutionary form of these sentences is not essential, since they can be transformed into propositions of the form: ‘x promises (commands etc.), that p’:²⁶¹

‘6. Such speech therefore, as e.g. “we [shall] go”, “we shall say”, “we shall have to do that”, or: “I shall do that”, or “he shall do that”, 7. uncertain in the future or with regard to a matter of the present [or] of the past, a wise monk] should avoid. 8.9. If [a monk] does not know, [or] has some doubt about, a matter which concerns past, present and future, he should not say: “it is thus”; 10. (this he should do only) when there is no room for doubt’ (*DVS*₁ 7.6–10).²⁶²

ors of mixed truth and untruth. Obviously, they can play both roles. On *chala*, features of ‘god’, ‘bad debates’ etc., especially in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, see MATILAL (1999, Chapters 2–3).

²⁵⁹ RATNACANDRA (1988 I: 270 f., 268), GHATAGE (2001 II: 454, 461).

²⁶⁰ PaṇṇU 82: *addhā kālo so divaso rabhī vā, jo tam-missiyāṃ kareti, param turyāveṃto divasato bhaṇati-uṭṭhehi rattī jāyatti, eṣā addhā-missiyā, tasseva divasassa rātie vā ega-padeso addhāddhā, taṃ paḍhama-porisi-kāle taheva turyāṃto majjhaṇhī-bhūtaṃ bhaṇatassa addhāddha-missiyā. PaṇṇṬ₁ 259a: [9] tathā addhā—kālaḥ, sa cēha prastāvāt divaso rātrir vā pariḡrhyate, sa miśrito yayā sādhdhā-miśritā, yathā kaścit kaścana tvarayan divase varttamāna eva vadati—uttiṣṭha rātrir yātēti, rātrau vā varttamānāyāṃ uttiṣṭhōdgataḥ sūrya iti, [10] tathā divasasya rātrir vā ekadeśo ’ddhāddhā sā miśritā yayā sā addhāddhā-miśritā, yathā prathamapauruṣyāṃ eva varttamānāyāṃ kaścit kaścana tvarayan evaṃ vadati—cala madhyāhni-bhūtaṃ iti.*

²⁶¹ HABERMAS (1981: 97–117) / (1984–1987 II: 62–76), and others, showed that semantic content of normative sentences can be transformed into propositional sentences while the reverse is not always possible.

²⁶² *DVS* 7.6–10:

*tamhā gacchāmo, vakkhāmo, amugaṃ vā ñe bhavissā /
 ahaṃ vā ñaṃ karissāmi, eso vā ñaṃ karissā // 6 //
 evamāi u jā bhāsā esa-kālammi saṅkiyā /
 saṃpayāyāṃ aṭṭhe vā taṃ pi dhīro vivajjāe // 7 //
 āyamma ya kālammi paccuppannam aṅāgae /
 jamaṭṭhaṃ tu na jāṇējā “evameyaṃ” ti no vae // 8 //
 āyamma ya kālammi paccuppannam aṅāgae /
 jattha saṅkā bhave taṃ tu “evameyaṃ” ti no vae // 9 //
 āyamma ya kālammi paccuppannam aṅāgae /
 nissāṅkiyāṃ bhave jaṃ tu “evameyaṃ” ti niddise // 10 //*

Somadeva, in his *Yaśas-tilaka* of 959 CE (YT, p. 349–350), mentions a similar example of a statement which is on the whole true but to some extent false, that is, when someone ‘after promising to give something at the end of a fortnight, gives it after a month or a year’ (HANDIQUI (1968: 265)). He also mentions the statement ‘he cooks food or weaves clothes’ as one which is to some extent true but on the whole false because ‘properly speaking, one cooks rice etc. and weaves yarn’. A different example of mixed speech, mentioned in *Viy* 18.7.1 (749a), are utterances of someone who is possessed. The fact that this case, referring to an existentially mixed psycho-physical state rather than to semantic ambiguity, cannot be easily fitted into any of the ten categories illustrates that the list is not exhaustive. From other viewpoints, the examples may also fit the categories of the other lists.

All of the ten enumerated modalities seem to refer to utterances in which the universal and the particular, or modalities of time, quantifiers, or other categories,²⁶³ are mixed up in an indiscriminate and hence ambiguous way.²⁶⁴ Though the mistakes discussed in the texts seem to be primarily based on indiscriminate cognition, producing objectionable uncertainty (cf. *Āyār* 2.4.1–2), the ten categories are very broad and can cover a great variety of motives, logical and semantic conundrums, such as vagueness or paradoxes, and linguistic forms and discursive strategies, such as off-record uses of metaphor, similes, veiled speech and politeness, which Brown and Levinson have analysed as popular forms for saying one thing and meaning another.²⁶⁵ These phenomena deserve more detailed analysis in future studies. For the purpose of this essay, a few comparative notes on the implications of the findings for the question of the stance of Jain philosophy on the law of non-contradiction must suffice.

For PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 3), ‘admission or insistence, that some statement is both true and false, in a context where not everything is accepted or some things are rejected, is a sure sign of a paraconsistent approach—in fact a dialethic approach’, i.e. the assumption that ‘the world is inconsistent’. The Greek word *dialetheia* (two-

²⁶³ See the mixed true-false utterance ‘The god of the sky’ (*Āyār* 2.4.1.12–13) and similar examples of mislabelling discussed in footnote 293.

²⁶⁴ In symbolic logic such problems are discussed under the labels such as ‘no-item thesis’, ‘misleading form thesis’, ‘truth value gap thesis’, and ‘new truth-value thesis’ (HAACK (1974: 47 ff.)). According to PRIEST (1987) the single rationale underlying the theory of different types of truth value gaps, derived from the correspondence theory of truth, is that ‘for certain sentences, α there is no Fact which makes α true, neither is there a Fact which makes $\neg\alpha$ true’, which are to be distinguished from *dialetheia*, or true contradictions such that both statement A and its negation, $\neg A$, are true. In his view, the argument fails, because ‘if there is no Fact which makes α true, there is a Fact which makes $\neg\alpha$ true, viz. the Fact that there is no Fact which makes α true’ (PRIEST (1987: 54)).

²⁶⁵ See for instance BALBIR (1987: 9) and DUNDAS (1996: 62).

way truth) refers to a true contradiction facing both truth and falsity.²⁶⁶ PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 17) were the first to point out parallels between Jaina logic and modern discussive logic, but argue, like most logicians before them, that Jain perspectivism is predicated on the rejection of the law of contradiction.²⁶⁷ However, GANERI (2002: 274) demonstrated in his re-construction of the assumptions underlying the method of seven-fold predication (*sapta-bhaṅgī*), based on an extension of discussive logic via modalised many-valued truth-tables, that Jain logic ‘does not involve any radical departure from classical logic ... The underlying logic *within* each standpoint is classical, and it is further assumed that each standpoint or participant is internally consistent.’ The findings of BALCEROWICZ (2003: 64) on the contextual logic of the seven *nayas* concur with this general conclusion. Both authors show that Jain logic is context-sensitive and a quasi-functional system.

To *syād-vāda* and *anekānta-vāda* the Jain *catus-koṭi* of the modes of speech can be added, as another example of ‘Jain logic’ which clearly operates within the confines of the law of non-contradiction, and does not need to be interpreted as a form of scepticism, nor of syncretism predicated on the notion of a total truth integration of all viewpoints, as MATILAL (1981) argues. Our brief glance at the Jain interpretation of the third mode of the so-called ‘four-valued logic’ of the *catus-koṭi*, applied to language usage, that is, the explicit exclusion of the values ‘false’ and ‘both true and false’, showed that ‘Jain logic’ does not ‘flatly deny’²⁶⁸ the law of non-contradiction. The examples in Jain scriptures for modes of speech which are both-true-and-false, and their explicit rejection, demonstrate, on the contrary, that Jain philosophy is unequivocally opposed to violations of the law of non-contradiction. This conclusion is also borne out by the Jain analysis of the temporal aspects of action (Viy 1.1.1=13a, 9.33.2d = 484a), which explicitly denies the possibility that an action that is being performed is not equal to the completed action, as the heretic Jamāli held (‘has the bed been made or is it being made’). The question of the identity of an action in time has important consequence for the evaluation of karmic consequences, also of speech-acts.

²⁶⁶ PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 14) cite Stoic and other authors from Greek antiquity defending this view.

²⁶⁷ ‘In this respect the Jains anticipate contemporary discussive logic, initiated by Jaśkowski, and they may similarly be interpreted in terms of integration of different worlds, or positions, reflecting partial truth ... Naturally such a theory risks trivialisation unless some (cogent) restrictions are imposed on the parties admitted as having obtained partial truth—restrictions of a type that might well be applied to block amalgamation leading to violations of Non-Contradiction.

Unlike the Jains, the Mādhyamikas apparently affirmed the law of Contradiction. But this does not prevent a certain unity of opposites, e.g. in the negative dialectic of Nāgārjuna, a concept, such as Being, can become indistinguishable from its opposite, Non-Being’ (PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 17)).

²⁶⁸ STCHERBATSKY (1958: 415), cited in PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 16)).

Contrary to PRIEST–ROUTLEY’s (1989) intuitions, it seems, the main technique of argumentation used by Jain philosophers in all these cases resembles Aristotle’s refutation of Heraclitus and other ‘paraconsistent’ thinkers in ancient Greece:

‘Key parts of his analysis involved the use of time to avoid contradiction—instead of saying that a changing thing was both in a given state and also not in that state, it was said that the thing was in that state at time t_1 , but not in that state at a different time t_2 —and the theory of potentiality—required to reunify these now temporarily isolated states as parts of the one (and same) change. The appeal to different temporal quantifiers illustrated the *method of (alleged) equivocation* used since ancient times to avoid contradiction and reinforce consistency hypothesis; namely, where both A and -A appear to hold, find a respect or factor or difference r such that it can be said that A holds in respect r_1 and -A in respect r_2 . It can then be said that a contradiction resulted only by equivocation on respect or factor r. Often however the method of alleged equivocation does not work in a convincing way, and it breaks down in an irreparable way with the semantic paradoxes, as the Megarians were the first to realize’ (PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 8)).

Speech that is both-true-and-untrue is rejected in the Jain scriptures, because it mixes aspects which can be discriminated, if necessary with the help of the method of perspective variation in time. To what extent ancient Jain philosophers would have agreed with Aristotle on this point is a question which can only be clearly answered in a separate study. It seems to me that the Jain theory of time is fundamental, also for Jain perspectivism.

(δ) The most interesting of the four modes of speech (and cognition) is ‘speaking neither truth nor untruth’ (*asaccā-mosā*). That is, speech to which the true/false distinction is not applicable. Muni Nathmal (Ācārya Mahāprajña) characterised *asatyā-mṛṣā* language as *vyavahāra-bhāṣā*, or conventional speech (Ṭhāṇ 4.23, Hindī commentary). Twelve types of the *asatyā-mṛṣā bhāṣā* are distinguished in Paṇṇ 866 = Viy 10.3.3 (499b):²⁶⁹

²⁶⁹ LALWANI’S (1985 IV: 133 f.) rendition of Viy 10.3.34 reads as follows: ‘[Gautama speaks] *Bhante!* There are twelve forms of language—address, order, prayer, question, advice, refusal, consent, enquiry, conviction, confusion, distinct and indistinct. Now, when one says, I shall take lodge, I shall lie, I shall stand, I shall sit, I shall stretch, do these forms conform to the fifth type viz. advice, and it is correct to say that they are never false?—[Mahāvīra answers] Yes Gautama! They conform to the fifth type and they are never false.’

1. <i>āmanṭaṇī</i> < <i>āmanṭraṇī</i> >	Address
2. <i>āṇavaṇī</i> < <i>ājñāpaṇī</i> >	Order
3. <i>jāyaṇī</i> < <i>yācanā</i> >	Request
4. <i>pucchaṇī</i> < <i>pṛcchani</i> >	Question
5. <i>paṇṇavaṇī</i> < <i>prajñāpaṇī</i> >	Communication
6. <i>paccakkhāṇī</i> < <i>pratyākhyāṇī</i> >	Renunciation
7. <i>icchāṇulomā</i> < <i>icchānulomā</i> >	Consent
8. <i>aṇabhiggahiyā</i> < <i>anabhigrhītā</i> >	Unintelligible
9. <i>abhiggahiyā</i> < <i>abhigrhītā</i> >	Intelligible
10. <i>saṃsaya-karaṇī</i> < <i>saṃsaya-karaṇī</i> >	Doubt-Creating
11. <i>voyaḍā</i> < <i>vyākṛtā</i> >	Explicit
12. <i>avvoyaḍā</i> < <i>avyākṛtā</i> >	Implicit

Nine of the twelve categories are also listed in MĀc 5.118–119. The categories 1–7 are identical in both texts. Of the last five, only *saṃsaya* (No. 10) is mentioned by Vaṭṭakera, and a category labelled *aṇakkhara* <*anaḥsara*>, ‘incomprehensible’, which can be read as an equivalent of *aṇabhiggahiyā* <*anabhigrhītā*> (No. 8, maybe also incorporating aspects of No. 12).²⁷⁰

Speaking neither-truth-nor-untruth is interpreted by JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2, 151)²⁷¹ and MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 325 f.) as referring to injunctions. However, considering the great variety of listed speech acts (only the first three are injunctions), it seems better to use AUSTIN’s (1962) term ‘performatives’, which are by definition neither true nor false, to characterise the first seven terms.²⁷² The last five terms cover aspects which Grice discussed under the conversational maxims of relation (‘relevance’) and manner (‘avoid obscurity’). In Austin’s terminology, addressing,

²⁷⁰ On articulated (*akkhara-suya*) evidence, composed of written and oral sources see SCHUBRING (2000: § 74).

²⁷¹ Āyār 2.4.1.4 n., 2.4.1.7.

²⁷² AUSTIN (1962) distinguishes between implicit and explicit, self-verifying, performatives. An ‘explicit performative sentence’, such as taking a vow, ‘indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying something’ (AUSTIN (1962: 6 f.))—this would be a ‘descriptive fallacy’ (AUSTIN (1962: 3)). ‘None of the utterances cited is either true or false’ (AUSTIN (1962: 3)). ‘It is essential to realize that “true” and “false”, like “free” and “unfree”, do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. ... This doctrine is quite different from much that the pragmatists have said, to the effect that the true is what works, &c. The truth or falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meanings of words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances’ (AUSTIN (1962: 144)). The problem of determining truth-values of performative utterances has been discussed, for example, by FAUCONNIER (1981: 182).

ordering, requesting, and questioning etc. are all illocutionary acts. Questions,²⁷³ commands, and exclamations are not propositions, since they can not be asserted or denied; that is, they are neither true nor false. Imperatives (directives), such as orders and requests, and regulatives (commissives), such as consenting and renouncing (promising, vowing etc.), through which the speaker commits him/herself to perform certain actions in future, imply normative conditions which ought to be fulfilled, but which are not fulfilled yet. In this sense, the propositional content is also neither true nor false. Truth, and its opposite, falsity, are properties that belong only to propositions. Propositions are statements that either assert or deny that something is the case. Not all sentences are true or false, because not all sentences make such claims. Commands, questions, and expressions of volition neither assert nor deny that something is the case, and are, consequently, neither true nor false.

ARISTOTLE (PH 4) already noted that ‘every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false.’ Problems related to the ontological and truth-functional status of future events and the grammatical future were also discussed in Greek philosophy, which may or may not have influenced Indian philosophy in this point.²⁷⁴ In *De Interpretatione* (PH), ARISTOTLE offers the following solution to a paradox posed by Diodoros Cronus as to the truth-value of the sentence ‘Will there be a sea battle tomorrow?’ Any definite answer (‘yes’ or ‘no’) to this indecidable question is presently neither true nor false, but if in future one becomes true, then the other becomes false:

‘One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good’ (PH 9).

For Aristotle, as for the Jains, it is both unethical and factually wrong to assume the future is determined, since actions evidently influence events. Although it is not entirely clear what exactly Aristotle and the Jain author(s) had in mind, in both cases the commitment to free will and to the logic of events overrules the logic of

²⁷³ Ṭhāṇ 6.111 lists six types of question-contexts, not all of which can be categorised as neither-true-nor-false; e.g. *vuggaha-paṭṭha* <*vyudgraha-praśna*>, questioning an opponent.

²⁷⁴ On ambiguities created by the use of the future tense see also FAUCONNIER (1981: 180 f.), and others.

propositions. Generally, empirical facts can neither be proven true nor false by logical necessity: ‘Even if I say “It’s raining now” when the sun is shining, I have not said something that is necessarily false, just something that happens to be false’ (HARNAD (1999: 1)).²⁷⁵ From a purely logical point of view, Bertrand RUSSELL (1905) showed that all predicates with variables are not propositions to which a truth value can be attached in an unambiguous way. Hence they are neither true nor false. However, they can be transformed into propositions by replacing the variable with a value or a quantifier.²⁷⁶ It is, of course, difficult to say to what extent ancient Jain philosophers already shared certain intuitions with modern logicians.

The first seven categories, sometimes combined, cover most speech acts a Jain ascetic would conventionally use in contexts of monastic life; for instance taking vows (*paccakkhāṇa*), requesting permission (*āpucchāṇā*), ordering (*ājñā*), confessing (*ālocanā*), begging forgiveness (*kṣamāpaṇā*) etc. *Āmantaṇi* <*āmantraṇi*> speech or language, for instance, is ‘used for attracting somebody’s attention, a vocative word or expression’ (GHATAGE (2003 III.2: 1001)), for instance ‘O Devadatta’.²⁷⁷ MĀLVANAṆIYĀ (1971: 325) gives the following examples of an address and an order: ‘when a person wanting John to come near him says “O! John”’ or ‘when a person says to another person, “Go ahead”.’ However, not in all contexts are such expressions neither-true-nor-false. Under certain circumstances, the first example may represent or can be read as an ‘indirect’ or ‘implicit performative’ speech act clad in form of an address, and it could be argued that, in certain contexts, the second example does not correspond to the prescription in Āyār 2.4 for mendicants to avoid pragmatic interventions.

The last five terms of the list are of a different nature. The term *aṇabhiggahiyā* <*anabhigrahītā*> refers to ‘unintelligible or incomprehensible speech’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 I: 156)), which is either ‘irrelevant’ (DELEU (1970: 169)) or/and ‘unacceptable’ (GHATAGE (1996 I: 237)), but neither-true-nor-false. Its antonym, *abhiggahammi boddhavvā*, intelligible instruction, refers to ‘clear and intelligible

²⁷⁵ HAACK (1974: 58 f., 73–90) criticises the ‘modal fallacy’ in Aristotle’s argument on future contingents, but accepts it as valid if interpreted as a truth value gap theory.

²⁷⁶ See further STRAWSON (1950) and the ensuing debate, on which see also HORN (1985), (2001: 362 ff.), and others.

²⁷⁷ PaṇṇU 82 f.: “*āmantaṇi*” ity-ādi, he deva iti āmantaṇi, eṣā kilāpravarttaka-nivarttakatvāt satyādi bhāṣā-traya-lakṣaṇa-viyogataś cāsatyāmṛṣṭēti, evaṃ sva-buddhayā anyatrāpi bhāvanā kāryēti, kajje parassa pavattanaṃ jahā imaṃ karehitti āṇavaṇi, katthai vatthu-visesassa dehitti maggaṇaṃ jāyaṇi, aviṇṇāyassa saṃdiddhassa vā atthassa jāṇanatham tad-abhijutta-codanaṃ pucchāṇi, viṇṇāyassa uvaeso jahā—pāṇavahāu ṇiyattā havati dīhāyū arogā ya emādi paṇṇavaṇi paṇṇattā viyarāgehiṃ. PaṇṇT 1 258b: “*āmantaṇi*” iti tatra āmantraṇi he devadatta ity-ādi, eṣā hi prāg-ukta-satyādi-bhāṣā-traya-lakṣaṇa-vikalatvān na satyā nāpi mṛṣā nāpi satyā-mṛṣā kevalaṃ vyavahāra-mātra-pravṛtti-hetur ity asatyā-mṛṣā.

language' (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 351)), which is 'relevant' and 'acceptable', and neither-true-nor-false.²⁷⁸ Malayagiri's commentary explains the difference between irrelevant and relevant speech through the following example: 'to the question "What shall I do now?" the answer "Do as you like" is *aṇabhiggahiyā*, the answer "Do this, do not that!" is *abhiggahiyā*' (DELEU (1970: 169)).²⁷⁹

It is not entirely clear why *saṃsaya-karaṇī bhāṣā* <*saṃśaya-karaṇī bhāṣā*>, 'ambiguous language which causes doubt' (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 570)), is regarded as neither-true-nor-false, and therefore permissible. It must be assumed that only the use of strategically ambiguous messages for the purpose of creating *vairāgya*-shocks is seen as legitimate, but not language which creates doubt about Jainism in the minds of believers. He seems to follow Malayagiri (Paṇṇṭī), who argued that from the *niścaya-naya* not only *satya-mṛṣā* but also *asatyā-mṛṣā* statements are false—if they are spoken with the intention of deceiving others' (MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 346)). However, Viy 18.7.1 (749a) states that, by definition, the speech of a Kevalin, because it is harmless, can only be true or neither-true-nor-false.²⁸⁰ The statement associates higher moral truth with this type of speech, which can thus be compared with the 'twilight-language' (*sandhā-bhāṣā*) of Tantric Buddhism, which is also characterised as neither-true-nor-false.²⁸¹ According to OKUDA (1975: 129), MĀc 119 explains *saṃsaya-vayaṇī* <*saṃśaya-vacana*> as 'speech which expresses doubt'. But its commentator Vasunandin (11th–12th century) interprets this as 'speech of children and old people' as well as the sounds of (five-sensed) 'roaring buffalos' etc., which cause doubt as to their meaning, while the Digambara authors Aparājita and Āśādhara and the Śvetāmbara Haribhadra commenting on DVS 7, read *saṃsaya-karaṇī* simply as 'ambiguous speech' (*anekārthasādhāraṇā*). Haribhadra classifies speech of children as *aṇakkhara* <*anaḥṣara*>, incomprehensible, which also figures as the ninth and last category listed in MĀc

²⁷⁸ Paṇṇṭī₁ 259a: *abhigrhītā prati-niyatārthāvadhāraṇam, yathā idam idānīm karttavayam idam nēti.*

²⁷⁹ Paṇṇṭī₁ 259a: *anabhighrahā yatra na pratiniyatārthāvadhāraṇam, yathā bahukāryeṣv avasthiteṣu kaścit kañcana pṛcchati—kim idānīm karomi?, sa prāha—yat pratibhāṣate tat kurv iti.* See SPERBER–WILSON's (1986) arguments for considering 'relevance' as the key to communication and cognition.

²⁸⁰ DELEU (1970: 241).

²⁸¹ Jambūvijaya's edition of the Ṭhāṇ 4.23 (238) contains the following commentary of Jinabhadra's *Viśeṣavaśyaka-bhāṣā* (VĀBh) 376–7: *aṇahigaya jā tisu vi saddo cciya kevalo asacca-musa.*

119, which Vasunandin reserves for expressions of animals of two-four senses, and for sounds created by snipping fingers etc. (OKUDA (1975: 129)).²⁸²

Vyākṛtā bhāṣā refers to clear distinct speech with explicit unambiguous meaning (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 511)).²⁸³ There is no example given by the commentaries for distinct speech which is neither-true-nor-untrue. *Avyākṛtā-bhāṣā*>, refers to indistinct involuted or poetic speech consisting of obscure or unintelligible words ‘with deep and profound meaning’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 445), cf. GHATAGE (2001 II: 800)).²⁸⁴ *Mantras* or *sūtras* may be fitting examples. The fact that the *Mūlācāra* does not mention these two categories reinforces the suspicion that they are redundant, and overlapping with the category of incomprehensible language.

The most interesting case is *pannavañī-bhāṣā* <*prajñāpanī-bhāṣā*>, explanation, the generic term which Mahāvīra himself employs in the scriptures²⁸⁵ to designate his discourse, which also gives the *Pannavañā-suttam* its name. Like all descriptions of speech acts, *pannavañī* is a somewhat ambiguous term, because it refers both to the illocutionary act, locutionary content, and perlocutionary effect of proclaiming something. This ambiguity is reflected in different translations of the word. SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 69) and DELEU (1970: 169) translate *pannavañī* as ‘communication’ (*Mitteilung*). According to SCHUBRING (2000: 157 f., § 69), the examples for ‘communication’ given in *Viy* 10.3.3 (499b) = *Paṇṇ* 866, ‘We want to [wollen] lie down’ (*āsaissāmo*) etc., refer to ‘expressions of an intention’ (to do something). However, DELEU (1970: 169) and LALWANI (1985: 133) translate *āsaissāmo* <*āśayiṣyāmaḥ*> as ‘we will lie down’ and ‘we shall lie down’ respec-

²⁸² *Paṇṇ*Ṭ₁ 259a: *saṃśaya-karaṇī yā vāk anekārthābhīdhāyitayā parasya saṃśayam utpādayati, yathā saindhavamānīyatām ity atra saindhava-śabdo lavaṇa-vastra-puruṣavāḥjiṣu*. SCHUBRING (2000: 157 f., § 74): ‘All animals with two to four senses and beings with five senses express themselves in the neither true nor wrong way, but the latter will employ the first three modes just as well (Pannav. 260a) provided they have learnt to do so or carry along with them a higher ability.’

²⁸³ *Paṇṇ*Ṭ₁ 259a: *vyākṛtā yā prakāṭārthā*.

²⁸⁴ *Paṇṇ*Ṭ₁ 259a: *avyākṛtā atigambhīra-śabdārthā avyaktākṣara-prayuktā vā avibhāvītārthātvāt*.

²⁸⁵ The Pāli equivalents of *pannavañā* and *pannatta* are *paññāpana*, *paññatta* (MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 212)). The word *pannatti* <*prajñāpti*>, teaching, information, instruction, is frequently used in the canon, for instance at *Viy* 2.1.90, or *Viy* 16.6 (709b) where the verbs *pannaveti parūveti* <*prajñāpayati prarūpayati*> are used in to describe Mahāvīra’s preaching activity. Hence, his teachings are called *pannavañā* <*prajñāpana*>, exposition, or *parūvaṇa* <*prarūpana*>, explanation (AṇD 51, MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 210)). The ‘proclamations’ (*Kundmachung*) or preachings of the unattached ones are also called *niggantha pāvayaṇa/pavayaṇa* <*nirgrantha pravacana*> in *Viy* 2.5.5 (134b), 20.8.5 (792b) and *Ṭhāṇ* 176a. See SCHUBRING (2000: 73, § 37).

tively, that is, as the description of a future action or state.²⁸⁶ MĀLVANĪYĀ (1971: 211), who points to kindred views in the Pāli text *Puggala-paññatti*, prefers the word ‘describing’ as a translation of *pannavanī* which he renders as ‘speech that intends to describe a thing’. In this, he follows the 13th century commentary of Ācārya Malayagiri who stated that *pannavanī* ‘means the speech that intends to describe the thing (or event) [as it is]’.²⁸⁷ It is a form of *asaccā-mosā* speech, ‘a speech which has nothing to do with norm (validity or invalidity) but which only describes the thing (or event)’: ‘To be more explicit, the speech which has nothing to do with religious dos and do-nots but which simply describes the thing is called *Prajñāpanī*’.²⁸⁸ MĀLVANĪYĀ (1971: 212) cites the example quoted by the commentator Malayagiri’s *Prajñāpanā-ṭīkā*, ‘Those who refrain from killing living beings live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth)’,²⁸⁹ and notes: ‘The *gāthā* in point contains no command “do not kill” but simply describes the fact that those who do not kill live long and remain healthy.’ Such speech ‘has nothing to do with religious dos and do-nots’ (MĀLVANĪYĀ (1971: 211)). Hence, it should be distinguished from implicit performative speech. But, of course, it may be interpreted as such by a listener who infers an ‘ought’ from the ‘is’. MONIER-WILLIAMS’ (1986: 659) *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* translates the causative *prajñāpana* as ‘statement, assertion’.

²⁸⁶ DELEU (1970: 169) writes: ‘*āsaissāmo* is *āsayiṣyāmaḥ*, not, as Abhay. says, *āsayiṣyāmaḥ*.’ According to the rules of speech in Āyār 2.4.1.5 and DVS 7.8–10 one should avoid such a statement if one cannot be entirely sure.

²⁸⁷ Paṇṇṭī 249b: *yathāvasthithārthābhīdhānād iyaṃ prajñāpanī*, in MĀLVANĪYĀ (1971: 211, cf. 346).

²⁸⁸ Contrary to MĀLVANĪYĀ’s (1971: 211) view that *asatya-mṛṣā* speech ‘has nothing to do with norm’ it is obvious that by referring to situations that ought to be both imperatives, commissives (vows), and declaratives imply normative conditions, even if used by an enlightened being. Only assertives attempt to represent situations as they are. Searle showed that from the hearer’s perspective even literal speech implies a contextual horizon to be intelligible (HABERMAS (1980: 452) / (1984–1987 I: 337)). According to Paṇṇ 246b, *asatya-mṛṣā* speech signifies not only *ohāraṇī* <*avadhāraṇī*> or determinative expressions such as ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’, but all attempts to communicate transcendental truth through descriptive (*prajñāpanī*) speech, which is assumed to be context-free and thus by definition neither-true-nor-false (*satyā-mṛṣā*). The Paṇṇ accounts for the use of certain classificatory terms and words which express universals (e.g. masculine, feminine, neuter) without clearly specifying their contextual range of meaning. Imperatives such as ‘go ahead’ belong to this category too. For instance, we may ‘order a person of any gender and this person may or may not carry out orders. ... This *ājñāpanī* (imperative) speech too could not be held as false. It should be regarded as a case of *prajñāpanī* speech’ (MĀLVANĪYĀ (1971: 326)).

²⁸⁹ Paṇṇṭī 249b:

*pāṇivahāu niyattā havaṃti dīhāyā arogā ya /
emāi paṇṇattā paṇṇavaṇī vīyarāgehim //*

LALWANI (1985 IV: 133) apparently follows the *Illustrated Ardhamāgadhī Dictionary* of RATNACANDRA (1988 III: 443), based on Malayagiri, in using the word ‘advice’ (*upadeśa*).²⁹⁰ What is probably meant by the term *pannavanī* is that from the conventional point of view, which underlies the Jain ‘*catuṣ-koṭī*’ of language usage, the testimony of an authoritative person is neither true nor untrue, because its meaning may be incomprehensible for a hearer, similarly to unintelligible utterances of non-enlightened creatures. With imperatives and addresses expressing universal truths or ideals has in common that no referent exists *in re* at a given place and point of time (as for instance in Malayagiri’s example which should not be read as a prediction relating to a specific individual). The multidimensional implications of a general statement or rule such as this cannot be understood entirely in an instant, as WITTGENSTEIN (1953: 53–55, § 138–40) noted in his remarks on the relation between meaning and use of a word (WITTGENSTEIN (1953: 190 ff., § 138 f.)). Moreover, the example given by the commentaries concerning the necessary link between non-violence and health cannot be proved or disproved from a conventional perspective. It must be accepted on the basis of the authority of the speaker. Interestingly enough, the two truth theory is not invoked by the commentaries in defence of the concept of transcendental speech, being neither-true-nor-false, in spite of its capability to immunise any statement against criticism.²⁹¹

Paṇṇ 832–857 gives another example for speech which is neither-true-nor-false by discussing the question of the ‘congruity of grammatical and natural gender and number’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74)). It argues that words such as *go*, *cow*, which express (genderless) universals but are employed in masculine singular, are not false or both-true-and-false, say, with regard to female cows, but neither-true-nor-false. The same applies to imperatives (*ājñāpanī*), since ‘we may order a person of any gender and this person may or may not carry out our orders’ (MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 326)).²⁹²

The last of the four variants of *ohāraṇī-bhāsā* <*avadhāraṇī-bhāṣā*>, or determinate speech, is another example of speech which is neither-true-nor-false. Reflexive

²⁹⁰ Uttar 28.16 ff. lists amongst the ten sources of right insight (*samyag-darśana*) communications such as *upadeśa*, instruction, *ājñā*, command, *bija*, seed (suggestion), as well as *abhiḡama*, comprehension of the sacred scriptures, and *viśtāra*, complete course of study (including proofs, *pramāṇa*, and perspectives, *naya*): *nisagguvaesa-ruī, āñā-ruī sutta-bīya-rui-meva / abhiḡama-vitthāra-ruī, kiriyā-saṃkheva-dhamma-ruī //*.

²⁹¹ Cf. MURTI (1955: 129) on transcendental language which expresses truth which is beyond language; and GANERI (2002: 271) on the non-assertible (inexpressible) in classical Jain seven-valued logic (*sapta-bhaṅgī*), which may be conceptually related to incomprehensible speech.

²⁹² This example could be interpreted as an early version of the ‘misleading form thesis’ addressed by RUSSELL (1905) and others. See HAACK (1974: 53–55). By contrast, the example ‘Devadatta, give me the cow’, mentioned by GLASENAPP (1915: 46), is neither-true-nor-untrue as a simple performative.

expressions such as ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’ are said to be capable of expressing any of the four modes of speech, depending on whether they serve religion (*ārāhiya* <*ārādhita*>), in which case they are true by definition, harm religion (*virāhiya* <*virādhita*>), in which case they are false, both serve and harm religion, in which case they are true-as-well-as-false, or whether they do neither, in which case they are neither-true-nor-false (Paṇṇ 830–831 [246b]).²⁹³

The examples show that in the Jain philosophy of speech pragmatic efficacy, that is, non-violence, supersedes propositional truth:²⁹⁴

‘It goes with the sphere of *ethics* that all four modes of speech, and consequently the mode of wrong speech as well, are admitted, provided they are employed in a pious way of mind (*āuttam* = *samyak*), while even true speech coming from a sinner’s mouth will count for nothing (Pannav. 268a)’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74).

Conversely, as mentioned before, ‘a mode of speech springing from emotion is by itself understood as *mosā*’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 74)). In other words, the speaker’s beliefs, attitudes or intentions (if not his/her *Being*), and the specific pragmatic context is decisive, not the words themselves, or the propositional meaning. Arguments relating to the ‘higher truth’ of morality based on similar considerations. HANDIQUI (1968: 266) notes that the 10th century Digambara *ācārya* Somadeva is more concerned with ethics than with propositional truth:

‘Somadeva appears in certain circumstances to attach greater importance to self-preservation and philanthropic considerations than to speaking the truth. He opines that the truth must not be spoken if it is likely to endanger others and bring inevitable ruin to oneself.’

Another example of this attitude is given by the Śvetāmbara *Ācārya* Hemacandra who, in his 12th century *Yoga-śāstra* (YŚ 2.61) and self-commentary, narrates that the sage Kauśika, who was famous for speaking the truth, ‘went to hell because accurate information given by him led to the capture and killing of a band of robbers’ (cited by HANDIQUI (1968: 266 n. 4)):

‘On the other hand (*api*), even though a statement may be true, it should not be spoken if it causes affliction to others [This is] because,

²⁹³ Cf. SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74), MĀLVAṆĪYĀ (1971: 325 f.).

²⁹⁴ Cf. CAILLAT (1975: 80), QVARNSTRÖM (2002: 41 n. 4).

even if it is accepted [by all the people] in the world, Kauśika was sent to hell [on account of making such a statement]' (YŚ 2.61).²⁹⁵

The explanations of the four modes of speech in canonical Jain literature and its medieval Sanskrit commentaries show that they are conceived as meta-rules, on a level of abstraction comparable to the discourse ethics of universal pragmatics, while the sub-categories and examples correspond to the level of empirical semantics and pragmatics. The levels of abstraction of the lists of examples in the commentaries vary, since the Jain lists are relatively unsystematic, although some may have been intended as scholastic devices for cumulative indexicality *qua* fixed analytical perspectives. From the point of view of comparative analytical philosophy, some examples could serve as illustrations for one or other of the conversational postulates *à la* Grice ('be relevant' etc.), Searle, or Habermas, while others can be related to the modern logical investigations of vagueness, category mistakes, quantifiers, or modalities of time in particular. In contrast to modern intentionalist semantics, Jain philosophers of language analyse examples of fundamental types of speech rarely with reference to the intention of the speaker, but prefer an objective or listener's standpoint. That is, they investigate the structure of the utterance as a whole, from the de-contextualised point of view of the four combinations of the basic true/false distinction, seen from the perspective of discourse ethics. The same perspective is preferred by universal pragmatics.

We can conclude from this brief discussion of the explanations of the four modes of speech in the Śvetāmbara canon and commentaries that the rules of Jain discourse are less concerned with referential truth than with the pragmatics of speech,²⁹⁶ in particular with the expression of the 'higher truth' of religious insight gained through direct self-experience, and speaking in accordance with the ethics of non-violence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that truth in Jain discourse is always defined as an aspect of objective illocutionary force, depending on the form of the utterance and the intentional state of a speaker alone, without the need to be backed up by argument in processes of critical inquiry. The primacy of pragmatic ethical and moral considerations, considered from a monological perspective, makes the Jain theory of speech in many ways akin to Habermas' theory of communicative action. The analysis of the implications of the Jain maxim of truth for language usage show that it combines as it were the validity claims two, three and four:

²⁹⁵ For discussion of the ethical implications of this dilemma, for instance in terms of appropriateness, see for instance GERT (1973), HARE (1981), WELLMER (1986: 26 ff.), and HABERMAS (1991: 170).

²⁹⁶ GANERI (2002: 277) shows that the *sapta-bhaṅgī* is also 'not strictly truth-functional', but suggests a solution to this problem.

propositional truth, normative rightness, and expressive truthfulness. Despite the primacy of non-violence and sincerity of expression, there are numerous examples for rules concerning referential truth, the ideal of univocal or straight (*rju*) speech, and the avoidance of deception, especially Āyār 2.4.1.1, Āyār 2.4.2.19, and DVS 8.46.²⁹⁷ Such rules of avoidance of false representations (including false references

²⁹⁷ Interestingly, some *ślokas* are similar to the last of Grice's quality maxims: 'Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence', which invokes questions of referential truth and of the relationship between representational and expressive functions of language. The definition of the concept truth and falsehood, or of aspects thereof, is a notoriously difficult problem for modern science and philosophy, whose discourse is constituted by this fundamental distinction according to FOUCAULT (1981) and LUHMANN (1990). It is therefore interesting to see how the Jains tackle this issue, which is one of their foremost concerns. There is a note by LALWANI added to DVS₂ 4.12 which identifies three types of falsehood: '(i) to deny what is, (ii) to establish what is not, and (iii) to alter the meaning'. They can be illustrated by the following examples:

- (i) Jains are epistemic realists. Hence, it is not surprising that there are explicit statements defending the ideal of objective truth in the scriptures, as opposed to mere appearance, opinion, or consensus. The following passage stresses the necessity for ascetics to use their faculty of judgement to discover the truth of a given phenomenon, and not to be deceived by false appearances: 'Employing their judgment, they should know something for certain and something for uncertain: (1) Having received food or not having received food, having eaten it or not having eaten it, has come or has not come, comes or does not come, will come or will not come' (Āyār 2.4.1.1–2). This orientation toward the world, predicated on a realistic analysis of the modalities of time, is diametrically opposed to Brāhmaṇism and Vedāntic concepts such as *māyā* etc. This is evident in the following passage, which implicitly criticises the confusion of natural phenomena with illusory imagery of divine agency: 'A monk should not say: "The god of the sky! the god of the thunderstorm! the god of lightning! the god who begins to rain! the god who ceases to rain! may rain fall or may it not fall! may the crops grow or may they not grow! may the night wane or may it not wane! may the sun rise or may it not rise! may the king conquer or may he not conquer!" They should not use such speech. ... But knowing the nature of things, he should say: "the air; the follower of Guhya; a cloud has gathered or come down; the cloud has rained"' (Āyār 2.4.1.12–13).
- (ii) False appearance and deception should be avoided by all means: 'A *muni* speaks of appearance, ignoring the truth, encounters a sin. Then what to speak of one who indulges in whole untruth [Note by LALWANI: When a woman is dressed as a man and if she be called a man, it is a falsehood, though in her dress she appears like a man ...].' (DVS₂ 7.5, cf. Āyār 2.4.1.3). Ways of 'establishing what is not', such as vague promises and speculation, are also seen indiscriminate or deceptive utterances, because of the confusion of past, present, and future. Language which may create doubt ('maybe or not') has to be avoided by all means: 'When one knows not true implication, in the context of the present, past, and future, says not one, "surely it's like this". When one is in doubt about implication, in the context of the present, past and future, says not one, "surely it's like this". "Surely it's so",—says one when one has not an iota of doubt of implication about the present, the past and future' (DVS₂ 7.8–10, cf. DVS₂ 7.6–7, Āyār 2.4.1.5). It is remarkable, that early Jainism already insists on the correct use of temporal modalities, which must be related to

to past, present and future) and non-deceptive speech etc., can be understood as expressions of a pragmatic anti-illusionist (anti-Brāhmanic) realism, that is, as anti-deception strategies. From the perspective of politeness theory, one could add that the underlying cognitive realism does not only serve as a strategy of self-protection, as WILLIAMS (1983: xix) argues, but also to calculate the karmic consequences of speech acts, and functional demands on social inferiors, who (have to) read and fulfil the pragmatic implications of intentionally ambiguous statements of social superiors.

Relation

The Gricean maxim of relation, concerning the relevance of a statement, is generally determined by the ‘purpose of the talk exchange’ as already stressed by the cooperative principle, of which it is but a mode²⁹⁸ (and therefore absent in Habermas’ scheme).²⁹⁹ The principle of relevance is vital for the selection of appropriate contextual references of both utterances and standpoints of interpretation. In religious discourses, the implicit limitations inscribed in the semantic structure of the ideological system, enforced by a system of related institutional and social sanctions, play an important role in the discrimination of relevant contextual references.³⁰⁰

the philosophy of transmigration, but also with the critique of the Brāhmanic sacred-word theory: ‘speech exists only the moment when being spoken’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 149, § 68). The practical value of all the cited examples is the same: reducing illusory appearances to their ‘real’ content.

- (iii) There are no further maxims concerning ‘changing the meaning’ in the texts on the ways of speaking. Effectively, however, Jain narrative literature is based on a method of ‘changing the meaning’ of Indian folklore (HERTEL (1922)). The combined systematicity and context-sensitivity of Jain rules and regulations is particularly obvious in the following statement of the Digambara author Vasunandin’s (1100 CE) *Śrāvākācāra* 209, which propagates not only the ‘abstention from untruth spoken out of passion or hate’ but ‘from truth too, if it provokes the destruction of a living being’ (cited in WILLIAMS (1983: 78)). This and similar examples illustrate how the hierarchically superior principle of *ahiṃsā* supersedes the maxim of truthfulness in cases of rule-contradiction. Cf. MĀLVAṆĪYĀ (1971: 325) on the role of the (situational) conditions of truthfulness in the *Pannavaṇā*.

²⁹⁸ Amṛtacandra’s commentary on the *Samaya-sāra* (*supra* p. 147) states this implication openly. Similar references can be found with regard to public debates at the royal court etc. Cf. ĀyārD 4.2.

²⁹⁹ HABERMAS (1980: 418) / (1984 I: 312) remarks that it is hard to establish the universality of this maxim.

³⁰⁰ Śrīmad Rājacandra’s rules of speech recommend avoiding controversial religious themes: ‘1. While you are talking of one thing, you may not, unless it is absolutely unavoidable, bring in another thing. 2. Listen attentively to what the other is saying. 3. You should answer it patiently and with a sense of propriety. 4. Only such words be uttered as do not involve you either in self-praise or self-abasement. 5. For the time being, the less you talk of religion the better. 6. Do not involve yourself with others on issues pertaining to religion’ (in MEHTA (1991: 72)).

I have argued elsewhere,³⁰¹ that the ethical ‘code’ of *ahimsā/himsā* forces limitations and therefore an attitude of reflective distance onto those individuals who observe themselves self-referentially with the help of this semantic differential. Cognitive distance, in turn, generates the potential of a selective, discriminating relationship towards the world, i.e. it allows for choice, by presupposing the perceptibility of potentialities, the modalisation of perception, which—as we have seen—is generated through the practices of meditative introversion and perspective alteration.

In other words, the ways in which contextually relevant references are selected are negatively determined, and channelled, by Jain values and rules, given that they *de facto* orientate practice. Through its in-built directionality, the dominant ethical code of Jainism (*ahimsā/himsā*) regulates pragmatic choices in everyday life, to the extent of the religious commitment and power of judgement of the user. Conversely, any semantically coded generalised strategy of selective choice implies corresponding processes of exclusion of non-relevant references, which form the complementary horizon of the unsaid and the unspeakable of legitimate religious experience. The discriminative functions of implied references to background knowledge and pragmatic conditions of fulfilment of religious claims, can be socially exploited through the off-record strategies of ‘presupposition, hint, give associative clues’ etc., which are associated with the Gricean maxim of relation. Precisely these qualities are associated with the proverbial South Asian ability both to tolerate and to ignore, which HACKER (1985) called ‘inclusivism’.

Manner

The last maxim is explicitly concerned with the phenomenon of intentional multivocal speech, stressing the necessity of grammatically correct and unambiguous speech. The correlates of this maxim are held in great esteem by the Jains. The Āyār refers several times to the necessity of using clear language:

‘Well considering (what one is to say), speaking with precision, one should employ language in moderation and restraint: the singular, dual, plural; feminine, masculine, neuter gender; praise, blame, praise mixed with blame, blame mixed with praise; past, present, or future (tenses), the first and second, or third person’ (Āyār 2.4.1.3).³⁰²

Not only referential truth, relevance, and the syntactically correct use of words is discussed in such contexts (cf. DVS 8.49), but also the orientation towards the intended effect of (religious) speech on the hearer. That is, not to create doubt, and

³⁰¹ FLÜGEL (1993), (1995–6: 163–5) *pace* JAINI (1979: 312).

³⁰² Cf. Āyār 2.4.1.7, 2.4.2.19. See also Ṭhāṇ 10.96 etc.

lack of clarity (DVS 7.4). Manner can be interpreted as a combination of the validity claims of truth and sincerity with the condition of grammatical comprehensibility. Such features are usually considered in conjunction with other aspects of ideal speech acts, such as key, tone, spirit or style.³⁰³ Grammar is not singled out in the Jain equivalent of the manner-maxim and privileged over other aspects of communicative competence, as it is in modern linguistics, but presented together with other rules of use, such as stylistic rules of performance.

Jain ascetic rules of manner directly address the problem of implicit meaning, and the necessity to avoid the (manner related) off-record politeness strategies of ‘vagueness, ambiguity, over generalization, or incompleteness’ (BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 230 f.)). The clauses stating that both politeness (Āyār 2.4.2.3–6) and speech which might harm (Āyār 2.4.2.1–2) is to be avoided at all costs, however, forces the exclusion of a wide range of topics onto the performer of ‘pure speech’. This is what makes Jain doctrinal texts often so dry—most of the ‘juicy bits’ are ‘potentialised’, left out, remain unsaid, although they are implicitly presupposed. In fact this is the area, where the ‘rhetoric’ of silence is, as it were, forced upon the Jain ascetic, who has to select words carefully, in order to steer between the need to communicate with the world and the obligation to observe the principles of *satya* and *ahimsā*.

To briefly summarise the results of the comparison between the Jain rules of speech with Habermas’ validity claims and the Gricean postulates, it is apparent that for all of the universal pragmatic principles and conversational postulates there are functional equivalences amongst the Jain principles and rules of speech, which are by no means ‘primitive’ and ‘ill-assorted’, as for instance the philologist SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 74) believed. Jain principles and rules of discourse are not mere examples of a culture-specific ‘particularistic ethics’, as LAIDLAW (1995: 14) argues, but form a ‘comparatively systematic code which is well-grounded in objective considerations’ (CAILLAT (1991: 14)).³⁰⁴ The Gricean maxims and the Jain rules of speech are similar, though not identical. The norms of unequivocal and grammatically correct signification and transmission of information are fundamental for the Jain understanding of proper language use, but not sufficient for an understanding of its primarily ethical concerns, which overlap with Habermas’ theory of communicative action. The Jain texts deliberately avoid defining certain words as ‘sacred’. However, for Jainism, too, ‘correct speech is of religious value’ (CAILLAT (1984: 71)) in so far as the foremost

³⁰³ Cf. HYMES (1972b: 62).

³⁰⁴ For an early universalistic ethical statement see the ‘very difficult passage’ JACOBI (1884: 31 n. 4) Āyār 1.3.3.1 equating self and world: *saṃdhiṃ logassa jāñittā. āyao bahiyā pāsa. tamhā ṇa haṃtā ṇa viḡhāyae*. All beings intend to live. Knowing the intention, one should not be non-vigilant. Consider all other beings as thyself. Therefore, you should not kill them yourself, nor get them killed by others (ĀyārBh 3.51, p. 214).

requirement for the realisation of Jain norms is restraint (negative politeness) in mind, speech and action. The religious ideal of correct, truthful and non-violent manner of speech is summarised in the following passage, already quoted above:

‘A monk or nun, putting aside wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, considering well, speaking with precision, what one has heard, not too quick, with discrimination, should employ language in moderation and restraint’ (Āyār 2.4.2.19).³⁰⁵

What is manifest in this statement is that the Jain maxims themselves address the necessity of avoiding the violence and the consequential *karmic* results of ‘flouting’ the rules of proper speech by means of off-record strategies. At the same time, negative politeness (especially conventional indirectness) is regarded as mandatory for maintaining the vows of non-violence and truth in language usage. A different matter altogether is the ‘salvific’ use of off-record strategies in contexts of religious instruction which will be discussed below.

(Ad 3) In addition to the general principles and maxims of proper speech discussed thus far, much space of the language related sections in the Āyār and DSV is devoted to experience-near examples and practical rules for selection of what to say and what not to say in accordance with the *satya-vrata*. These regulations do not have the status of general principles or maxims, but are derivatives of the latter, and provide generalised examples or schemata for the interpretation of certain types of situation. Generally single utterances and types of speech-acts (strategies) are discussed in the manner of modern analytical philosophy, often focusing on negative examples (*asatya*). The respective passages are almost identical in both key texts (Āyār 2.4.2.7–16 = DVS 7.22–35). They can be summarised as follows: First and foremost, one should avoid interventions in worldly affairs, particularly those involving value-judgements, taking sides, practical advice, or demands. Recommended speech-strategies are usually forms of negative politeness, such as conventional indirectness, impersonalisation or nominalisation.³⁰⁶ Impersonalisation by way of transforming directives and commissives

³⁰⁵ Conversely: ‘[1.] The monks and nuns may not use the following six forbidden forms of speech: lying, sneering, insult, coarse speaking, worldly speech, or speech renewing atoned matters. 2. There are six cases of idle talk about right conduct: of speaking rashly in relation to others, of damaging living creatures, of untruthfulness, of forbidden appropriation, of a jade, a eunuch, or a slave. Whoever uses those six kinds of idle talk, without being able to prove them fully, ranks as one who has committed the transgression himself’ (KS 6.1).

³⁰⁶ Cf. BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 134 ff.). In Paṇṇī folio 259 B cited by MĀLVAṆĪYĀ (1971: 212), and discussed earlier, the positive karmic consequences of not killing are expressed in this way; avoiding commandments of the form ‘do not kill’ for example by saying: ‘Those who refrain from killing living beings live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth).’

into assertives, that is, a second-person performative perspective into a third-person observer's perspective, is the preferred method; evidently, because in this way 'illocutionary force switches over into the propositional content and thereby loses, if not its meaning, at least its force' (HABERMAS (1993: 27)).³⁰⁷

For instance, one should not say 'this should be done', but 'this is'. And one should not speak about forbidden subjects, such as business-choices etc., at all. One should not ask householders to do something, or 'forecast', or make promises to them (DVS₂ 7.46 f.; 51). Another example of depersonalisation and nominalisation is the 'avoidance of harsh words'. That is, (false) accusations, abuse, and other varieties of face-threatening acts, such as speaking about the other's negative attributes (instead one should select positive ones, without being polite) (Āyār 2.4.2.1–11), or flattery, compulsive requests and rejection.³⁰⁸ The most general strategy of nominalisation is not to mention anything which might lead to violent acts:

'In the same manner, a muni who is wise, Says not "This cow is fit for being milked", or "this ox is catigable" Or "capable of drawing a plough or carrying a load" Or "of drawing a chariot". (But if need be) Permissible is the following vocabulary: "This is a milch cow" "The ox is young" "The bull is thick or short" Or "this is worthy of a chariot"' (DVS₂ 7.24–5).

By the same token, a mendicant is not to say 'this is the murderer' or 'this is a thief' if such a person enters the house in the night, because if s/he gives a warning, either the thief or s/he him/herself might get killed, or 'the householder will suspect the ascetic ... to be the thief' (Āyār 2.2.2.4). The reverse strategy is applied to past acts of violence, as evident in the recommendation not to say 'well done' about an accomplished worldly task but always to stress the amount of unavoidable *karman*-producing violence employed (Āyār 2.4.2.3–6).³⁰⁹ The second generally recommended strategy is thus to avoid references which might imply the potential for future acts of violence in both worlds,³¹⁰ and to condone past and present acts of violence, in order to stimulate

³⁰⁷ See also AUSTIN (1962: 4) and BOURDIEU (1991a: 109) on disguising a performative utterance as a descriptive or constative statement. For somewhat different reasons, the counter-intuitive nominal style is also preferred by scientists and philosophers, as JACOBI (1903) has shown with regard to scientific Sanskrit.

³⁰⁸ SCHUBRING (2000: 308 f., § 176).

³⁰⁹ See WILLIAMS (1983: 71–8) for a discussion of the parallel rules of the *śrāvakâcāras*.

³¹⁰ Umāsvāti's *Śrāvaka-prajñapti* (ŚrPr) 264 says: 'the aim of speech should be the intelligent pursuit of what is best for both worlds and the avoidance of what may cause hurt to others or to oneself or both'; and Kārttikeya defined *satya* as 'the avoidance of harmful, harsh, cruel, or secret speech and the use of balanced language that gives satisfaction to all living creatures and expresses the sacred truth' (in WILLIAMS (1983: 77 f.)).

acts of repentance. The latter is the only case of assertiveness which is explicitly demanded from an ascetic. In fact, a sermon is not considered to be *asatya* by Amṛta-candra (c. 11th CE) and other medieval writers, even if unpleasing (*apriya*) (PASU 91–101),³¹¹ in accordance with the general principle that determinate (*avadhāraṇī*) speech which enhances religion is true by definition.³¹² The determining factor in the Jain literature on speech, rather than the semantics of words, is the non-violent function of the utterance, not the intention of the speaker. Because this would amount to a general absolution for the religious uses of symbolic violence.

There is only a fine line between unnecessary and necessary violent speech, however, especially in the *satyā-mṛṣā* and *asatyā-mṛṣā* modes. The avoidance of transgression requires great analytic skill (which explains why only senior ascetics are permitted to conduct sermons). The statement quoted above, about the required proper knowledge of ‘true implication in the context of past, present and future’ (Āyār 2.4.1.5)³¹³ is relevant here. An ascetic must be able to discriminate temporal modalities so as to avoid and to repent acts of violence. The ability to distinguish between modalities of time is also the general condition of strategic manipulation, of one’s individual purity, for instance, or of others, and of the self-realisation of the individual in the context of the hierarchical Brāhmaṇical system, where ‘the temporal is intellectually subordinate to the spiritual and enclosed in it’ (DUMONT (1980: 196)).³¹⁴ Temporal modalisation, in particular, enables a competent individual to apprehend or create unequivocal speech, and strategic ways of instrumentalising implicitly presupposed background knowledge.³¹⁵ By means of the ideal standards of on-recordness, and of non-violence, a competent Jain can discriminate truth and falseness, and right and wrong,³¹⁶ as well as explicit and implicit meaning, and its facets of false judgement, unclear speech, ambiguity of meaning, and deceptive purpose. The cultural specific conceptualisation of the ideal of clear, unambiguous

³¹¹ Cf. WILLIAMS (1983: 78).

³¹² MĀLVANIYĀ (1971: 325).

³¹³ Cf. DVS 7.8–10. See p. 179 ff.

³¹⁴ Cf. JAINI (1979: 139, 145–7). CAILLAT (1991: 13) dismisses the ‘trivial remarks’ on temporal modalisation as unimportant. However, Jains generally do not consider the ‘social functions’ of speech acts, but only the *karmic*, ‘individual functions’. Hemacandra’s YŚ 2.53–64 describes the consequences of *asatya* as follows: ‘A liar may have his tongue and an ear cut off, may be beaten and imprisoned, treated with contumely, and deprived of his possessions. In another incarnation he may be afflicted with dumbness, speech defects, and fetid breath’ (WILLIAMS (1983: 78)).

³¹⁵ Cf. HABERMAS (1981: 400 ff.) / (1984 II: 267 ff.).

³¹⁶ Cf. HARE (1972).

speech generates also its opposite—an awareness of the implications of speech and the option to exploit them through lies, deception and intentional multivocality.³¹⁷

Compliance with Jain rules of unequivocal, non-violent speech requires reflective monitoring of speech and conscious analysis of conditions of acceptability. The ability to discriminate between various modes of speech renders linguistic and social co-operation as problematic and therefore as manipulable. Rule-generated reflexivity also creates the cognitive potential for the strategic manipulation of social meanings, for instance through the intentional construction of multivocal statements (as it were an instrumentalisation of *anekānta-vāda* and *syād-vāda*). The doctrinally promoted distancing from the world, and the resulting apperception of the variability of perspectives and meanings, can be exploited in many ways—for salvific purposes or for personal gain. There are numerous instances of conscious flouting of (Jain) maxims, for both purposes, for instance in Jain narrative literature. What distinguishes religious and worldly usage of language is, from the point of view of Jain doctrine, only the effect, not the intention of the speaker, nor the words themselves. The speaker has to construct the message from the objective viewpoint of its potential violent/non-violent function, not from a instrumental means-ends perspective. In practice it is difficult to decide which intention prevails—speaker's intention or systemic intention (SEYFORTH RUEGG). The Jains, too, have no other means for judging sincerity of expression, or orientation towards objectivity, but previous conduct. One has to investigate speech acts in context in order to understand the selection and the specific strategic value of certain generalised pragmatic strategies derived from general cultural value-orientations, and recurring functional imperatives. The analysis of isolated types of speech-acts has generally proved to be less fruitful, because it only leads to the proliferation of examples.

(Ad 4) Jains have a keen interest in the actual functioning of their principles (of speech) in particular contexts of speech and of action. Therefore they have added not only meta-rules (concerning the actual observance of rules) but also contextual examples (*dr̥ṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa*) and regulations for specific situations to the general principles, maxims, and generalised strategies or types of speech. And here, too, we can find the discussion of the role of social norms and institutionalised contexts of language usage, which force a certain direction of interpretation and execution of unsaid social intentions of the speaker upon the hearer. GUMPERZ (1995: 130 ff.) coined the term 'contextualisation conventions' to analyse processes of negotiation of implicit socio-cultural presuppositions of different 'activity types' defined by a purpose or goal. In the opening stages of any conversation, he observed,

³¹⁷ One may talk about the 'invention' of the symbolical: of the poetic and of rhetorics in this context.

‘contextualisation cues’ are exchanged to create a platform for co-operation by signalling contextually relevant presuppositions and preferences regarding norm selection. These relational signals ‘are inherently ambiguous, i.e. subject to multiple interpretations’, and may or may not be accepted:

‘Conversational inference is thus not a matter of assigning truth values to instances of talk. An inference is adequate if it is (a) reasonable given the circumstances at hand, (b) confirmed by information conveyed at various levels of signalling, and (c) implicitly accepted in the course of conversational negotiation’ (GUMPERZ (1995: 208)).

The rhetorical and practical significance of examples has been recognised in the Jain scriptures from early on. Examples function as arguments in intersubjective negotiations of situation definitions. Different types of examples are distinguished for instance in *Ṭhāṇ* 4.499–503. At the same time, the texts reflect the awareness that general principles and rules cannot be legitimised with reference to examples alone. *Ṭhāṇ* 4.499 and 10.95 point to the common fault (*āharaṇa-tad-dosa* <*āharaṇa-tad-dosa*>) of using too many examples and quotes during a debate, and to faulty ways of relating example (*udharaṇa*) and rule, amongst other mistakes in the way of speaking.

From a monological observer’s perspective, four paradigmatic contexts of pragmatic ‘religious’ speech discussed in Jain scriptures have been distinguished in this essay. They all concentrate on language usage of ascetics, as paradigms of Jain culture, and presuppose established co-operation: (a) religious debates at royal courts, (b) public sermons of leading ascetics, (c) informal communication of an ascetic with non-ascetics, and (d) communication between ascetics in the context of the monastic hierarchy. I dealt with the third case thus far, and already discussed the implications of narratives presented in public sermons elsewhere.³¹⁸ For the purpose of the argument of this essay, it will suffice to briefly examine cases of hierarchical monastic communication and of public debate to indicate the role of institutionalised normative expectations of reading and fulfilling the social implications of formal language usage.

The discursive context which is most relevant for ascetics in day to day life is the monastic hierarchy. It has three dimensions which sometimes, but not always, overlap: seniority (*dikkhā-pariyāya* <*dikṣā-paryāya*>), *guru-sīsa* <*guru-śiṣya*> relationship, and the administrative hierarchy.³¹⁹ *Qua* rule, it is the duty of lower-standing ascetics to serve higher-standing ascetics (as it is the duty of the laity to serve the ascetics). Non-compliance with this norm is sanctioned by elaborated judicial procedures which might lead to excommunication. That is, the social norms

³¹⁸ FLÜGEL (1993). See also CARRITHERS (1992) on mind-reading.

³¹⁹ FLÜGEL (2006a: 324).

themselves tend to force an implicature upon the juniors, and restraint upon seniors (ideally: silence). I have shown elsewhere in greater detail that a junior mendicant is expected to read the implications of the speech and minute gestures and conversational clues of the *guru*, and obliged to serve him/her politely, that is, to perform *sevā*, as it is the duty of the householder to serve all mendicants.³²⁰ Hence, Jain householders are called *uvāsagas* <*upāsakas*>, or servants of the *samaṇas* <*śramaṇas*>.³²¹ Pragmatic intentions and demands are never stated openly within the *śramaṇa-saṅgha*. But it is a general rule that juniors are supposed to read the implications of seniors and should try to fulfil their unstated wishes:

‘Guessing the teachers thought and the purport of his words, one should express one’s assent, and execute (what he desires to be done). An excellent pupil needs no express directions, or he is (at least) quickly directed; he always carries out his duties as he is told’ (Uttar 1.43 f.).³²²

The way of interpreting the implications of every gesture of superiors and serving (*veyāvacca* <*vaiyāvṛtṭya*>) them in accordance with the rules (*vinaya*), is defined as a religious act of internal asceticism (*abbhantara-tava* <*abhyanantara-tapas*>).³²³ Immersing oneself in the mind of a senior and reading his/her unstated wishes is an act of self-purification *qua* identification with an officially more advanced soul, taken as an external symbolic manifestation of one’s own inner potential, just like a statue in a temple. At the same time, the prestige of seniors who ‘get things done without ever saying so’ is strengthened by this conventional procedure, which through use of implicit language also reproduces a sense of in-group membership.³²⁴ This example is a good illustration of the general fact that multi-functional public roles imply unforced functional contributions from inferiors.³²⁵ The observation also applies to the laity’s duty to serve the ascetics. The asymmetrical relationship between mendicants and laity is conceptualised as a relationship between speakers and hearers—the laity are called both *uvāsagas* <*upāsakas*>, servants, and *sāvagas* <*śrāvakas*>, hearers. In both cases, as I have argued above, it is not a particular form of language usage, but the force of the norms and sanctions of the speech situation which direct the Jains of lower status

³²⁰ FLÜGEL (1994: 324).

³²¹ HOERNLE (1989: 1 n.1), in UD.

³²² Cf. *Vyavahāra-bhāṣya* 10.192, in JAIN (1981: 159).

³²³ Cf. Uttar 30.30–7.

³²⁴ ‘The more work ... hearers do to supply meaning, the deeper their understanding and the greater their sense of involvement with both text and author’ (TANNEN (1989: 23)).

³²⁵ Cf. VĀBh 1.927, 3, 2.54, 4–8, in BALBIR (1993: 267–9, 317–46).

to infer and fulfil the pragmatic intentions of their religious superiors, which are conventionally not openly expressed, but implicitly stated.

Speech situations for which Jain ascetics are especially trained are many. The two most important forms of non-ritualised language usage a Jain ascetic has to learn are the public sermon (*pavayaṇa* <*pravacana*>) to the laity and the art of debate (*paoga* <*prayoga*>) or disputation (*vivāda*) with other ascetics.³²⁶ Both forms of discourse are primarily instruments of social influence, based on the idea of the superiority of the better argument in public discourse or agonistic dialogues, i.e. verbal battles. Polite formal exchanges within the context of a religious hierarchy (type d and c), by contrast, tend to conform with an ideal of ‘speaking in concordance with the one who knows the truth’ (GAEFFKE (1970: 34–8)). *Prayoga* was/is important for gaining or maintaining social influence at the royal courts etc., and played a major role in medieval South Asia. The way in which this art was taught in the more advanced stages of monastic education³²⁷ resembles Aristotelian style rhetorical training, as the following citation from the *Āyāra-dasāo* <*Ācāra-dasāḥ*> (ĀyārD), a Jaina *Cheya-sutta* (*Cheda-sūtra*) text, illustrates:

‘It is of four kinds: (a) application of one’s knowledge after a complete assessment of one’s own powers in debate, (b) application of one’s knowledge in debate after a full assessment of the *parisā* (assembly), (c) application of one’s knowledge in debate after a full appreciation of the environment (*khetta*) of the debate, (d) application of one’s knowledge in debate after a full estimation of the nature of the adjudicators, the ability of the opponent and the attitude of the authorities, etc. (*vattu*)’ (ĀyārD 4.2, in TATIA–KUMAR (1981: 32)).

It is interesting to note the similarity between the four factors considered relevant for strategy selection in public debate, and BROWN–LEVINSON’s (1978: 79 ff.) variables for the assessment of the seriousness of a FTA, that is, social distance and relative power in particular. The view that South Asians traditionally knew only poetry, but not rhetoric, because of the ‘absence of the institution of public speech’ (HACKER (1985: 13 f.)),³²⁸ must be doubted in the light of the evidence presented. I would argue, on the contrary, that self-conscious pragmatic language usage, politeness, and the art of persuasion via the construction of implicatures, is one of the recognised arts of Jain ascetics (and laity).³²⁹

³²⁶ Tḥāṇ 350b, 364b, ĀyārD 4.

³²⁷ Cf. CORT (2001: 339 f.).

³²⁸ Cf. GAEFFKE (1970).

³²⁹ See MATILAL (1999: 31) on rules and regulations for debates (*kathā* or *vāda*) in Indian philosophical texts.

— VIII —

In this essay, I proposed a theoretical interpretation of syncretic processes as forms of symbolic communication, broadly following Habermas' analyses of systematically distorted and latent strategic action, predicated on the work of Grice and sociolinguists such as Hymes, Gumperz, Fishman and Brown and Levinson. The advantage of this perspective, compared to classical hermeneutics, is that social processes within a religious tradition do not have to be understood in terms of an enactment or actualising appropriation of textual meaning, or of rule-specification, but can be investigated as open historical processes for which religious knowledge and linguistic repertoire serves as cognitive resource, which can be used for the pursuit of either power or insight. To the extent that cognition and discourse are historically relevant, production of social meaning and co-operation can be understood in terms of the conditions of acceptability of validity claims. Rarely do human insight and instrumental rationality take precedence over habit and contingencies of life. GADAMER's (1993: 244) objection to Habermas' 'idealisation of the critical power of reflection' and reasons in discourse is therefore justified. However, Habermas' theory of communicative action is more narrowly concerned with a critique of both latent strategic action and mediated systemic forms of social reproduction, without illusions about the overwhelming factual role of power and indeterminacy in contemporary social processes. FOUCAULT's (1981: 56) more radical attack on the repressive aspects of discourse as a form of power itself, especially discourses informed by the 'will to truth' backed up by exclusionary mechanisms, nevertheless puts its finger on a crucial problem in both moral philosophy and organised religion. Habermas' theory of communicative action certainly does not properly account for the poetic 'world-disclosing' function of language, nor for the historical conditions of the theorisation of the 'universal' validity claims itself, which it merely takes as a primitive given of 'successful' prosaic communication. Both SEARLE (1993: 91 f., 99) and APEL (1993: 52 f.), despite their differences, criticise the hidden essentialism of this approach as 'functionalist' (in an old-fashioned sense), and suggest that the acceptance of validity conditions is a contingent 'perlocutionary effect' of the strategic attempt of getting the hearer to agree—an attempt which initially only commits the speaker (as the Jain example shows). Moreover, Habermas' original approach privileges the educated classes, and neglects empirical cases of reaching agreement or dissent through open strategic uses of language. Yet, the alternative reduction of validity to an effect of universally present 'empirico-transcendental' power in Foucault's or similar theoretical scenarios currently *en vogue* in Jaina Studies forecloses the possibility of problematising legitimacy once and for all. This, however, seems unwise, not least because, empiri-

cally, the sources of power and legitimacy often do not coincide. This is one of the reasons why DUMONT's (1980: xxxi) distinction between (political) power (*pouvoir*) and (religious) potency (*puissance*) has gained currency in South Asia research.

Classical Jainism derives its legitimacy ontologically from the presumed direct meditative insight of its omniscient prophets (*tīrthāṅkara*) into the eternal truth of existence (*sat*), i.e. the difference between self (*jīva*) and non-self (*ajīva*). Those who know, who have experienced direct insight, it is said, share an experiential consensus which transcends discourse and rational argument. However, discourse and argument is necessary for the dispersion of religious knowledge amongst the ignorant, although, initially, it can only facilitate first experiences of insight (*samyag-darśana*) by providing some of its conditions through instruction, but not generate insight itself. For Jain doctrine, insight is a psychophysical event which is unexplainable, a mysterious transformation of consciousness, which may or may not occur, once *karmic* bondage is weakened and religious knowledge fuses with personal experience. Paradigmatic activating conditions of insight are temporary feelings of peace accompanied with 'instructing' experiences of loss, suffering, or the sight of a saint. Verbal instruction (*upadeśa*) and suggestion (*dhvani*) may also provoke sudden insight (as a perlocutionary effect).³³⁰ In practice, it usually does so only after a previous history of interaction, involving rational argument and agonistic debate, which prepares the epistemic ground for 'true' or 'dogmatic' insight, which may then be triggered circumstantially, for instance by fitting experiences.

I have not discussed the metaphysics and the psychological conditions of religious experience in this essay,³³¹ especially not the hypothetical experiences of the Jinās, but confined myself to the analysis of the conditions of understanding and accepting Jain religious claims as legitimate (*Einsicht*) and of fulfilment of their pragmatic implications. My argument rests on the observation of a principal two-stage process of Jain religious conversion: first, largely through agonistic discourse, based on rational argument, and, second, largely through non-agonistic instruction.³³² Although, in principle, an initiated disciple 'cannot say "no"' (BLOCH (1975: 19)) to transmitted Jain doctrine anymore after the 'initial acceptance of the code' (BLOCH

³³⁰ Uttar 28.16–27, JAINI (1979: 141 f.). Cf. UPADHYAYA (1987: 105–7) on Hemacandra's examples of *upācara*, secondary meaning of a word based on similarity.

³³¹ See JAMES (1982), and footnotes 21, 28, 29, 61, 143, 286.

³³² See FLÜGEL (1993, (1994: 217–346)). This scheme has been abstracted from documented conversions to monkhood. It corresponds to the textual ideal (e.g. Uttar 23), but does not necessarily cover the Jain *cliché* of lay conversion through miracle-working. Lay conversions are gradual affairs, often starting with taking limited vows after public sermons and subsequently adding more severe restrictions. Jain vows do not compel the adherent to reject his ancestral beliefs and practices—unless they are wholly incompatible—but lead to a re-evaluation of these practices.

(1975: 24)), and subsequently receives religious instruction from his seniors predominantly in the mode of unquestioned conformity to revealed fundamental truth,³³³ debate and rational argument continue on the basis of the accepted ontological and organisational principles (TS 9.25). In other words, although it is predicated on the acceptance of the validity of ultimately incommunicable evidence or feelings, Jain religious discourse, too, is confined to the level of conventional truth (VN), because ‘whatever is beyond the province of speech is inexpressible (or unspeakable)’ (TULSĪ (1985: 190)). According to the proposed model, Jainism appeals to rationality and insight in different ways on both idealtypical developmental stages of conversion, and constitutes a kind of therapeutic discourse, which thrives on the interpretation of experience through a pedagogical scheme of explanation, which runs contrary to everyday perceptions and opens up new perspectives, thus inevitably generating ambiguity by ‘splitting the codes’ (TURNER (1986: 56))³³⁴ and thereby producing the potential for a transformation of meaning and, subsequently, conduct.

Because the appeal to rationality is predominant in Jain discourse, which conventionally contrasts the three jewels (*ratna-traya*) of right insight (*samyag-darśana*), right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) and right conduct (*samyak-cāritra*) to ‘blind ritualism’,³³⁵ it seemed legitimate to privilege the perspective of the ascetics in this essay, which are trained in Jain doctrine. The importance of their power of persuasion for the continuation of the Jain tradition is a universal *topos* of Jain narrative and biographical literature. There, the problem of the moral ambivalence of religious rhetoric is explicitly addressed as a form of necessary violence (*āvassaya-himsā* <*āvaśyaka-himsā*>), to be repented by means of the obligatory ascetic rites (*āvaśyaka*). I have not discussed technical Jain theories of suggestion, implication, figures of speech, or narrative genres, nor any particular linguistic exchange in the manner of the ethnography of speaking, but concentrated on the principles of Jain discourse itself, particularly the ones concerning the illegitimacy of ‘unnecessary violent’ (*anāvassaya himsā* <*anāvaśyaka-himsā*>) speech. In this way, I hope to have shown how structures of traditional authority together with the constraints of given circumstances directly or indirectly pre-empt processes of negotiated meaning by channelling them in a certain direction. Even if the principles of rational inquiry are upheld by Jain doctrine,³³⁶ open critical inquiry as defined by the theory of communicative action is not possible within the confines of the traditional religious institutions.

³³³ Cf. GAEFFKE (1970: 34–8), BALBIR (1993: 40).

³³⁴ Cf. BLOCH (1975: 26 f.).

³³⁵ Statement of a young Jain in London in conversation with the present author.

³³⁶ Cf. BRONKHORST (1999).

The comparison between the theory of communicative action and Jain discourse ethics showed nevertheless significant similarities. Both approaches are rule-oriented, not goal-oriented. That is, they are concerned with the general interest of many, not with the eudaemonic perspective of a single actor, despite the fact that the methods of universalisation are different. The respective ideals of consensus and non-violence mutually implicate each other. Basic non-violence is presupposed by communicative action, and the general interest of all is presupposed by universal non-violence. Though the criterion of generalisability, equal interest, is not theorised in Jain philosophy, and only touched upon with reference to specific negative rights such as the privileged case of the universal interest in avoiding pain,³³⁷ the scope of the moral universe is extended from humanity to all living beings, whose essential spiritual equality is a fundamental principle of Jaina philosophy.³³⁸ The vanishing points of both theories, the ideal consensus of an infinite community of interpretation and the ideal omniscient observer, presuppose absolute knowledge and absolute consensus. Yet, there are two significant differences. The main difference between the transcendental pragmatics of mutual recognition and the monadological Jain ethics of non-violence concerns the nature of the fundamental principles. The former is predicated on positive norms and the latter on norms of prohibition.³³⁹ The implicit method of universalisation of Jain ethics is the double negation, that is, the negation of non-generalisable statements. The resulting priority of physical non-action as a theoretical limiting case (not as a practical maxim) unburdens the doctrine of discussions of specific dilemmas of norm application, thus safeguarding both generalisability and contextual determinateness, while maintaining a perspective of disengagement with the world and non-specific positive duties. The second main difference between the two types of discourse ethics concerns the moral division of labour presupposed by Jain norms of discourse, which does not permit equal communicative freedom to take positions on validity claims, but privileges institutionally verified competent speakers (*āpta*).³⁴⁰ Having emerged

³³⁷ Cf. GERT's (1973) 'minimal ethic'.

³³⁸ See DUMONT's (1977), (1980) works.

³³⁹ The general difference of the two approaches has been pointedly expressed by SCHOPENHAUER (1977: 262, § 121) in his critique of the formalism of Kant's theory of morality and of state-oriented positive concepts of law from a perspective of Indic conceptions of morality: 'Der Begriff des R e c h t s ist nämlich, eben wie auch der der F r e i h e i t, e i n n e g a t i v e r: sein Inhalt ist eine bloße Negation. Der Begriff des U n r e c h t s ist der positive und ist gleichbedeutend mit V e r l e t z u n g im weitesten Sinne, also *laesio*. ... Hiernach sind dann die M e n s c h e n r e c h t e leicht zu bestimmen: Jeder hat das Recht, alles Das zu thun, wodurch er Keinen verletzt.'

³⁴⁰ Habermas is often accused of the same for somewhat different theoretical reasons.

under historical conditions of normative inequality, Jain discourse ethics is not at all concerned with questions of human justice, only with negative individual freedom.

Dumont and Marriott posed the question whether Jainism, built from the same materials as other South Asian religions, can be interpreted as a blueprint for the formation of 'strategic groups', for instance by being connected with a set of specific procedures or dominant strategies, which are derived either from the structure of its dominant ideological codes *jīva/ajīva* and *ahimsā/himsā* and/or the characteristic social position of its dominant lay-followers. Put in this way, any answer of the question must be vulnerable to the critique of socio-cultural 'essentialism' as 'ahistorical' and 'reductionist'. But to ask which principles and procedures the Jains themselves regard as 'essential' for the validation of their own politics of cultural synthesis remains indispensable. At least five derivative, and still accepted, paradigmatic pragmatic orientations for contexts of interaction between mendicants and non-mendicants can be isolated on the basis of the Āyār and the DVS: (1) impersonalisation, (2) nominalisation (objectivation), (3) degrees of non-speech, silence, and selective non-interaction, and (4) avoiding disagreement by presupposing common ground. All these strategies leave a speaker with a number of defensible interpretations which are technically neither true nor false (*satyāsatya*) and therefore useful to gloss over gaps between the often contradictory doctrinal and contextual implications of a speech act. The first three strategy types are those of negative politeness, which generally emphasise the mutual autonomy and non-interference of the interlocutors, for instance, by transforming directives into assertives. The last strategy type is a specific instance of positive politeness strategies, which are used to avoid conflict (and thus violence). For the same purpose off-record strategies are employed, which are considered as legitimate forms of symbolic violence, if used for the furtherance of religious insight. The overall result of this preliminary investigation of Jain discourse resonates with PAINE's (1981: 3) and BRENNEIS'-MYERS' (1984: 12) observation that in many societies, especially in those without elaborated hierarchies or structures of open coercion, conflict or contradiction, while often endemic, is rarely discussed openly, and expressed confrontation or coercion avoided through indirect speech, oriented toward the creation or maintenance of co-operation and the attainment of basic consensus, without saying so. Of course, not only particular speech acts but even the Jain maxims themselves can be read as generalised strategies, because they embody a certain directionality or orientation toward the world. The *differentia specifica* between the elements of Jain ontology and those of the culturally dominant religious systems of Hinduism, then, opens up negatively determined spaces for a distinct style of communicative action and rhetorical manipulation with characteristic multiple ambiguities and syncretic effects to be studied by future sociolinguistic investigations of Jain discourse.

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
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God
vis-à-vis
Proof and Belief



The Distinction *in intellectu* / *in re* in the Ontological Proof and in Bhartṛhari

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In our book *On the Myth of the Opposition between Indian Thought and Western Philosophy* (TOLA–DRAGONETTI (2004a)), reviewed by Ernst STEINKELLNER (2004), we have developed the four following theses and applied them to the *Vedas*, the *Vedas*, and the philosophical system of Sāṃkhya:

1. Up to the 16th century at least, in India on the one hand and in Greece and Europe on the other, there was frequent reflection on the same philosophical subjects ('thematic coincidences'), and it was carried out in the same way ('methodological coincidences').

In support of this thesis we have quoted a number of Indian and Western texts containing parallel philosophical ideas.

2. In the history of Greek and European philosophies are found manifestations of irrationality, limitations in the exercise of the free use of reason and submission of philosophical thinking to interests or purposes alien to philosophy, in many forms and as numerous as they are in the history of Indian thought.
3. Philosophy did exist in India as in the West with the same expectations, with the same weaknesses.
4. The comparison between Indian and Western philosophical thought must limit itself to confront both as they manifested themselves before the end of the 17th century, or even in the centuries that followed, but in this last case only when and if they maintained certain forms of the philosophies previous to that date, prolonging them.

From the 16th century onwards, a series of factors appeared in the West, such as the coming forth of modern science and the modern scientific mind, the discovery of the New World, the increase of European economic and military power, the weakening of ecclesiastical authority and the limitations it imposed on thinking, and the consciousness of the equality of individual rights and liberties. These factors gave a new course to universal history and led to modern

culture. From the 17th century onwards, Western culture in all its expressions began to adopt a wholly novel form, which was different from all previously known forms, many times extraordinarily valuable. India was able to take part in this transformation in a profound way only since the middle of the 20th century due to historical circumstances.

In this article we deal with the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God in Western Philosophy (as proclaimed by Saint Anselm in 11th century) as well as with its refutation by three Western philosophers (Gaunilo, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant) that were opposed to it, because that will give us the opportunity to indicate an interesting point of coincidence between the basis of the rejection of that proof and a principle of Indian thought expounded by Bhartṛhari, the great Indian philosopher of language. This point of coincidence is constituted by the distinction between *existence in re* (in reality) and *existence in intellectu* (in mind). We present a selection of texts that relate to the ontological proof and its refutation, and also to Bhartṛhari's principle in order to point out the similar function that the distinction *in intellectu / in re* has in both.

Moreover the ontological proof gives a good idea of the nature of what we call cultural dogmas in our book mentioned above. By 'cultural dogmas' we understand fundamental principles which, in general, are at the basis of any philosophical thinking in any culture as, for instance, (1) in the West: the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and a first cause, (2) in India: reincarnation and beginninglessness, and (3) in both cultures: the absolute value of the Scriptures, either the Bible or the *Veda*.

These cultural dogmas or basic principles in general are not founded in truly valid rational arguments as the example of the ontological proof clearly shows. This proof lies at the very foundation of all the other principal demonstrations of the existence of God in the West, which we consider the most important cultural dogma in the West.

The ontological proof obviously lacks any proving value or, at least, is of a very precarious and questionable value, and as such has been rejected by powerful minds, such as Saint Thomas or Kant. Nevertheless, the Western cultural dogma of God, based on arguments which in their turn are based on the ontological proof, was characterised, at least up to seventeenth century, by an unshakeable general adhesion in common belief and was the ultimate criterion for the acceptance of philosophical theories or ideas by thinkers who did not want to go beyond the limits of the orthodoxy. If we have to discard a rational basis for the cultural dogmas we must accept that, in a final analysis, their true foundation is faith. And although faith may be worthy of all respect and provide the support for human conduct and philosophical thought, it in no way belongs to the field of rational processes, which are claimed to be the core of philosophy.

We have purposely begun our study of the distinction *in intellectu / in re* in the systems of Bhartṛhari and of the Western thinkers with the latter ones, although such a procedure goes against chronology. We think that to show first the great and lasting interest in the West in the ontological proof that was once developed by Saint Anselm with the purpose to demonstrate the existence of God—despite its evident rational weakness lying in the fact that it overlooks the essential distinction between existence *in intellectu* and existence *in re*—and then to contrast it with the clear and direct way in which Bhartṛhari, five centuries earlier than Saint Anselm, refers to the distinction of the existence *in intellectu / existence in re* with full awareness of their essential opposition and presents that distinction as an obvious rational principle that cannot be left aside, allows us a better appreciation of the merit, importance and modernity of Bhartṛhari's thought in the history of philosophy.

Moreover the vitality the ontological proof enjoyed in the West, disregarding the fact that it is not logically possible to derive the existence in reality from the mere existence in mind—in order to maintain at any cost a cultural dogma or basic principle, God, to which philosophers were traditionally attached by faith—is another instance of our thesis (TOLA–DRAGONETTI (2004a)) that irrationality has been as strong in the West as it was in India, even within philosophy.

Thus the comparative study of Indian and Western philosophical ideas facilitates a better understanding and evaluation of intellectual products of both traditions. At the end of this article we shall briefly refer to some important consequences that the application of the Western ontological proof to some Indian beliefs has for both the proof itself and for Indian beliefs. It can serve as an example of the usefulness or even underlines the necessity of comparing Western and Indian philosophical thoughts, which helps eliminate the barrier that ethnocentric prejudices have built between them.

The Ontological Proof in the West

The ontological proof, also called 'proof of Saint Anselm' or 'Cartesian proof', has no parallel in Indian philosophy at all, which nevertheless did develop a number of proofs for the existence of the Īśvara (God).¹

Saint Anselm's famous ontological proof of the existence of God amounts to affirming that God is a being that is more perfect than which nothing can be thought, i.e. he is by definition the most perfect being; to exist is more perfect than not to exist; to exist is a perfection; consequently, God cannot be only an idea; God must

¹ On the proofs of the existence of God in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophical systems of Indian philosophy, see C. BULCKE (1968: Chap VI).

really exist; God, if he can be thought, must possess the perfection of a real existence; otherwise another being as perfect as he is and, besides, really existing could be thought of; in that case God would not be a being which is more perfect than which nothing can be thought, which is contradictory to the initial assertion.

This proof had numerous defenders among outstanding philosophers who admitted it with some variants and for diverse reasons: Alexander of Hales (1185–1245), Bonaventura (1221–1274), William of de Auxerre (died 1231), Duns Scotus (1266–1308), Descartes (1596–1650), Leibniz (1646–1716), Malebranche (1638–1715) and Hegel (1770–1831). The proof had also many opponents, for instance Gaunilo (a monk in an abbey near Tours, died in 1083), Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Gassendi (1592–1655), Locke (1632–1704), Hume (1711–1776), and Kant (1724–1804).

A. Sertillanges (1863–1948), one of the most active and influential modern neo-Thomist philosophers, points out that the evidence of God was approached by Saint Anselm ‘more philosophically’ but ‘a little sophistically’, due to the inclusion of existence in the notion of God itself (SERTILLANGES (1928: 55)).

The ontological proof was expounded by Saint Anselm (1035–1109) in Chapter II of *Proslogion*. In this exposition Saint Anselm makes use of the distinction of existence *in re* and existence *in intellectu*, without taking into account that it is not possible to derive the first from the second:

‘And indeed we believe that You are something greater than which nothing can be thought. Or does such a nature not exist, because “the fool said in his heart: God does not exist” (*Psalms* 14.1; 53.1)? But certainly when the same fool hears what I say: “Something greater than which nothing can be thought”, he understands what he hears; and what he understands exists *in his intellect*, even if he does not know that it exists. For one thing is that the object exists *in intellectu*, and quite another is to know that the object exists [*in reality*]. When a painter for example thinks in advance what he is going to do, he certainly has *in his intellect* what he has not yet done, but he knows that [it] does not yet exist [*in reality*]. But once he has painted it, he has *in his intellect* what he has already done, and knows that it exists [*in reality*]. So even the fool is convinced that something greater than which nothing can be thought actually exists *in his intellect*, because he understands this when he hears [it], and whatever is understood exists *in the intellect*. And certainly that something greater than which nothing can be thought cannot exist only *in intellectu*. For if it actually exists only *in intellectu*, it can be thought that [it] exists also *in reality*—what would be greater than [that which exists only *in intellectu*]. Consequently, if that greater than which nothing can be thought exists

only *in intellect*, [then] that greater than which nothing can be thought is [at the same time] something greater than which something can be thought. But that is clearly impossible [since it is contradictory]. Therefore, there is no doubt that something greater than which nothing can be thought exists *in intellect as well as in reality*.²

Refutation of the ontological proof:
Gaunilo, Saint Thomas, Kant

Many important philosophers in the West have argued, as we have said, against Saint Anselm's proof. We shall briefly indicate the arguments developed by three of them, viz. the monk Gaunilo, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant. All of them in their reasoning against the proof took recourse to the insurmountable distinction *in re / in intellectu*, which thus becomes the criterion of truth in this matter.

1. The monk Gaunilo, in his small treatise *Quid ad haec respondeat quidam pro insipiente*, begins his refutation with a synthesis of Saint Anselm's reasoning to demonstrating the existence of God as follows:

‘Someone who either doubts or denies that there is any such nature greater than which nothing can be thought is told that it is proved that it exists, first because he himself, on denying or doubting about it (sc. that nature), has it already *in intellect*, since on hearing it spoken of he understands what is said; further, because what he understands must exist not only *in intellect*, but also *in reality*. And this is proved thus: since to exist [*in intellect* and] also *in reality* is greater than [to exist] only *in intellect*, and if that (sc. the mentioned nature) exists only *in*

² ANSELM (1986: 244–246): ‘Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. An ergo non est aliqua talis natura, quia «dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est deus»? Sed certe ipse idem insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico: ‘aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest’, intelligit quod audit; et quod intelligit *in intellectu* eius est, etiam si non intelligat illud esse. Aliud enim est rem esse *in intellectu*, aliud intelligere rem esse. Nam cum pictor praecogitat quae factururus est, habet quidem *in intellectu*, sed nondum intelligit esse quod nondum fecit. Cum vero iam pinxit, et habet in intellectu et intelligit esse quod iam fecit. Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel *in intellectu* aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest, quia hoc cum audit intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur *in intellectu* est. Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse *in solo intellectu*. Si enim vel *in solo intellectu* est, potest cogitari esse et *in re*, quod maius est. Si ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, est *in solo intellectu*: id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet, *et in intellectu et in re*.’ In all the quotations of this article emphasis is ours.

intellect, [then] greater than that will be whatever also would exist *in reality*. And thus the greater than anything else will be less than something else and will not be greater than everything else [as it has been claimed], which is of course a contradiction. And so what is greater than everything else, which has already been proved to exist *in intellect*, must exist not only *in intellect* but also *in reality*, since otherwise it could not be greater than everything else.’³

Gaunilo makes then the following remark, in which he succinctly expresses the central idea of his refutation:

‘And, could I not also be said to have similarly *in my intellect* [ideas corresponding to] things that are false and not existing at all in themselves, since when someone speaks of them, I would understand whatever he could say?’⁴

The fact of a word being understood by somebody, which implies the existence in intellect (*in intellectu*) of an idea, does not guarantee the real (*in re*) existence of the thing designated by that word, i.e. *in intellectu* can exist ideas that have false correlates or no correlates at all *in reality*, and that are nevertheless fully understood.

But the very nucleus of Gaunilo’s refutation of Anselm’s demonstration of the existence of God is found in sections 5 and 6 of his Treatise (GAUNILO (1986: 292–294). His reasoning is as follows:

‘... to that [argument] I reply: If it must be said that something exists *in intellect* that cannot be thought according to the truth (sc. true nature) of anything whatever, then I do not deny that this thing exists also *in my [intellect]*. But since from this [affirmation of the sole existence *in intellect*] it is not at all possible to infer the existence also *in reality*, [then] I do not concede at all to him (sc. the opponent) that this thing [that exists only *in intellect*] exists [also *in reality*] until [such a

³ GAUNILO (1986: 288): ‘Dubitanti utrum sit vel neganti quod sit aliqua talis natura, qua nihil maius cogitari possit, cum esse illam hinc dicitur primo probari, quod ipse negans vel ambigens de illa iam habeat eam *in intellectu*, cum audiens illam dici id quod dicitur intelligit; deinde quia quod intelligit, necesse est ut non *in solo intellectu* sed etiam *in re* sit, et hoc ita probatur quia maius est esse et *in re* quam *in solo intellectu*, et si illud *in solo* est *intellectu*, maius illo erit quidquid etiam *in re* fuerit, ac sic maius omnibus minus erit aliquo et non erit maius omnibus, quod utique repugnat; et ideo necesse est ut maius omnibus, quod esse iam probatum est *in intellectu*, non *in solo intellectu* sed et *in re* sit, quoniam aliter maius omnibus esse non poterit ...’

⁴ GAUNILO (1986: 288): ‘Nonne et quaecumque falsa ac nullo prorsus modo in seipsis existentia *in intellectu* habere similiter dici possem, cum ea dicente aliquo, quaecumque ille diceret, ego intelligerem?’

thing] is proved to me by an indubitable argument. For he who says: “That [greater than which nothing can be thought] exists [not only *in intellect* but also *in reality*] since otherwise that which is greater than everything else will not be greater than everything else”—he does not fully realise whom he is speaking with. For I do not say—even more, I even deny or doubt—that this [greater than everything else] is greater than any real thing, nor do I concede to it an existence [if it is possible to speak of “existence”] different from that [existence one has in mind] when the soul tries to imagine from a word that has been only heard a thing completely unknown to it. How, then, is it proved to me that this greater [than everything else] really exists simply because that is greater than everything else, when until this moment I am denying or doubting that this (sc. the fact of being greater than everything else) has been established, so that I do not [even] say that this greater than everything else exists *in my intellect* or *in my thought* at least in the way that many doubtful and uncertain things exist [*in my intellect*]? For it is necessary that first I become certain that greater [than everything] exists somewhere *in true reality*, and only then, due to the fact that it is greater than everything else, it will not be doubtful that it also exists in itself.⁵

Next Gaunilo gives his well-known example of ‘the Lost Island’ in order to make clear his thought and to ridicule the position of a sustainer of such a proof:

‘Some say that somewhere in the ocean exists an island, which, because of the difficulty or rather impossibility to find what does not exist, some call “[The] Lost [Island]”. And they narrate that this island thrives much more than what it is said of the Blessed Islands with an inestimable abundance of riches and delights, and that, not having possessor or inhabitant, it is superior to all the other lands that human be-

⁵ GAUNILO (1986: 5): ‘... ad hoc respondeo: Si esse dicendum est *in intellectu*, quod secundum veritatem cuiusquam rei nequit saltem cogitari: et hoc in meo sic esse non denego. Sed quia, per hoc, esse quoque *in re* non potest ullatenus obtinere: illud ei esse adhuc penitus non concedo, quousque mihi argumento probetur indubio. Quod qui esse dicit hoc, quod maius omnibus aliter non erit omnibus maius: non satis attendit cui loquatur. Ego enim nondum dico, immo etiam nego vel dubito ulla re vera esse maius illud, nec aliud ei esse concedo quam illud, si dicendum est ‘esse’, cum secundum vocem tantum auditam rem prorsus ignotam sibi conatur animus effingere. Quomodo igitur inde mihi probatur maius illud rei veritate subsistere, quia constat illud maius omnibus esse, cum id ego eo usque negem adhuc dubitemve constare, ut ne *in intellectu* quidem vel cogitatione mea eo saltem modo maius ipsum esse dicam, quo dubia etiam multa sunt et incerta? Prius enim certum mihi necesse est fiat re vera esse alicubi maius ipsum, et tum demum ex eo quod maius est omnibus, in seipso quoque subsistere non erit ambiguum.’

ings inhabit, because of the redundancy of all things worthy to be possessed. If somebody tells me that it is so, I will easily understand what he says—in this there is no difficulty. But if then, as it were a logical consequence, he would add and say: “You cannot any longer doubt that this island, more pre-eminent than all other lands, and which you do not doubt to exist *in your intellect*, truly exists somewhere *in reality*. And, since to exist not only *in intellect* but also *in reality* is more pre-eminent [than to exist only *in intellect*], therefore, this island must exist so (sc. also *in reality*), because if it did not exist [also *in reality*], any other land which exists also *in reality* would be more pre-eminent than it; and thus this same [island], which has been recognised by you to be the most pre-eminent, would not be the most pre-eminent.” If—I say—by these [arguments] he would try to demonstrate to me that, in regard to this island, it is not possible to doubt anymore that it truly exists, either I would think he is joking or I do not know whom I ought to think more foolish, myself if I accept [his proof], or him, if he thinks that he has demonstrated with any certainty the existence of that island, without having instructed me before that the pre-eminence of that [island] exists *in my intellect* as a real and undoubtedly existing thing only, and not at all as something false and uncertain.’⁶

2. Saint Thomas Aquinas, the most prominent philosopher in the European Middle Ages, did not accept the ontological proof to establish the existence of God. As Battista MONDIN (1990: 161) of the Pontificia Università Urbaniana says,

⁶ GAUNILO (1986: 6): ‘Aiunt quidam alicubi oceani esse insulam, quam ex difficultate vel potius impossibilitate inveniendi quod non est, cognominant aliqui ‘perditam’, quamque fabulantur multo amplius quam de fortunatis insulis fertur, divitiarum deliciarumque omnium inaestimabili ubertate pollere, nulloque possessore aut habitatore universis aliis quas incolunt homines terris possidendorum redundantia usquequaque praestare. Hoc ita esse dicat mihi quispiam, et ego facile dictum in quo nihil est difficultatis intelligam. At si tunc velut consequenter adiungat ac dicat: non potes ultra dubitare insulam illam terris omnibus praestantior vere esse alicubi in re, quam et in intellectu tuo non ambigis esse; et quia praestantius est, non in intellectu solo sed etiam esse in re; ideo sic eam necesse est esse, quia nisi fuerit, quaecumque alia in re est terra, praestantior illa erit, ac sic ipsa iam a te praestantior intellecta praestantior non erit;—si inquam per haec ille mihi velit astruere de insula illa quod vere sit ambigendum ultra non esse: aut iocari illum credam, aut nescio quem stultiorum debeam reputare, utrum me si ei concedam, an illum si se putet aliqua certitudine insulae illius essentiam astruxisse, nisi prius ipsam praestantiam eius solummodo sicut rem vere atque indubie existentem nec ullatenus sicut falsum aut incertum aliquid in intellectu meo esse docuerit.’

‘It is something universally admitted that Saint Thomas is resolutely against the ontological argument of the Anselmian type, argument that intends to prove the existence of God starting from the definition of His essence (*id cuius maius cogitari nequit*). According to Saint Thomas this way of proceeding is incorrect, because it is founded on the false assumption that human reason has a pure (and not simply nominal) concept of the divine essence even before it has known His existence.’

Saint Thomas, in his *Summa Theologiae (Prima Pars, Qu. 2, A, I, Resp. ad secundum)*, expresses his view on the ontological argument and confines his criticism to two aspects of the argument, which he clearly marks as separate. Herwy RIKHOF (1990: 137), in ‘A theological analysis of Aquinas’ criticism’, included in the already quoted work *L’argomento ontologico*, indicates which are these two aspects:

1. ‘... not everybody does understand that the word *God* means “that greater than which nothing can be thought”’, and
2. ‘The logical argument that from thinking something it does not follow its existence in reality, but only its existence in the mind.’

Saint Thomas contends thus:

‘... it must be said that perhaps he who hears this word *God*, does not understand that it means :something greater than which nothing can be thought”, since some have believed that God is a body. Even if it is conceded that anybody understands that what is meant by this word *God* is that what is said, i.e. that greater than which nothing can be thought, nevertheless from this fact does not follow that anybody thinks⁷ that what is signified by the word exists—but only that it is not possible to argue that it exists, unless it is [previously] proved that something greater than which nothing can be thought exists, which is not accepted by those who affirm that God does not exist.’⁸

⁷ Battista MONDIN (1990: 161) translates: *non segue ... la persuasione*: ‘does not follow ... the conviction.’

⁸ THOMAS AQUINAS (1988: 12): ‘... dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse *in rerum natura*; sed *in apprehensione intellectus* tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit *in re*, nisi daretur quod sit *in re* aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest: quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse.’

3. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) all along his work was interested in the problem of the ontological proof of the existence of God, always adopting an attitude of rejection, characterised by—as in the case of Gaunilo and Saint Thomas—the contraposition of *existence in intellectu* and *existence in re*. Kant also makes manifest the absurd consequences that derive from the intent of passing without any other argument from the *existence in intellectu* to the *existence in re*.

We quote a selection of relevant passages of Kant, taken from his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* and *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes*:

[a] ‘Notwithstanding this urgent necessity of reason of presupposing something (i.e. an Absolute Being, God) that could fully serve the understanding as a ground for the complete determination of its concepts [in order not to incur in a *regressus ad infinitum*], however reason notices the *idealistic* and *merely fictitious* [nature, i.e. existing only *in intellectu*] of such a presupposition too easily to be persuaded by that alone to assume as an *actual being* [existing *in reality*] a *mere creation of its own thinking* [existing only *in intellectu*]...’⁹

[b] ‘From what precedes it can easily be seen that the concept of an absolutely necessary being (sc. God) [that reason needs, looks for and constructs] is a *pure concept of reason*, i.e. a *mere idea* [existing *in intellectu*], whose *objective reality* (sc. *existence in reality*) is not at all proved by the fact that reason needs it ...’¹⁰

[c] ‘Our *concept* of an object may thus contain whatever and however much it wants, nevertheless we must go out of it in order to provide it with *existence*.’¹¹

[d] ‘Thus, all effort and labour given to this famous ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from *concepts* is lost, and a person could from *mere ideas* become richer in insight, not

⁹ KANT (1998: 662) = A 583–584): ‘Ungeachtet dieser dringenden Bedürfnis der Vernunft, etwas vorauszusetzen, was dem Verstande zu der durchgängigen Bestimmung seiner Begriffe vollständig zum Grunde liegen könne, so bemerkt sie doch das Idealische und bloss Gedichtete einer solchen Voraussetzung viel zu leicht, als dass sie dadurch allein überredet werden sollte, ein blosses Selbstgeschöpf ihres Denkes sofort für ein wirkliches Wesen anzunehmen...’

¹⁰ KANT (1998: 668 = A 592): ‘Mann sieht aus dem bisherigen leicht: dass der Begriff eines absolut notwendigen Wesens ein *reiner Vernunftbegriff*, d.i. eine *blosse Idee* sei, deren *objective Realität* dadurch, dass die Vernunft ihrer bedarf, noch lange nicht Bewiesen ist ...’

¹¹ KANT (1998: 675 = A 601): ‘Unser *Begriff* von einem Gegestände mag also enthalten, was und wie viel er wolle, so müssen wir doch aus ihm hergehen, um diesem die *Existenz* zu erteilen.’

much more than a merchant in money, if he, in order to improve his economic situation, would add a few zeros to his cash balance.’¹²
 [e] ‘However, we have a famous proof, which is based on that principle (sc. from the *concept* of something possible its *existence* is deduced), i.e. the so-called Cartesian [proof]. One conceives firstly the *concept* of a possible *thing* in which one imagines that all true perfection is reunited. Now one assumes that *existence* is also a perfection of things, so from the possibility of a most perfect being one deduces its *existence*. Equally from the *concept* of anything, which is also imagined as the most perfect of its kind—as for instance, only from the fact that a most perfect world is thought—one could deduce its *existence*.’¹³

The distinction *in intellectu* / *in re* in Bhartṛhari

As it is seen in the texts quoted in the previous sections, the central point of the problem of the ontological proof and its refutation lies in the admission of two types of existence, one *in intellectu* and the other *in re*, and in the impossibility to pass from the first to the second one without an adequate proof. The opposition of these two types of existence constitutes the ground for the construction of the ontological proof and its rejection.

It is interesting to remind what Bhartṛhari (6th century CE), says in relation to the same subject of the two levels of existence. For Bhartṛhari this distinction between both types of existence is an obvious fact, which constitutes a fundamental principle of rational philosophical thinking outside any theological preoccupation.

According to Bhartṛhari’s view expressed in his *Vākyapadīya* (*Sambandha-samuddeśa* 39–51), there are two types of existence (*sattā*), one is the ‘principal’ (*mukhya*), ‘direct’ (*saṃprati*) or ‘external’ (*bāhya*) existence, which corresponds

¹² KANT (1998: 676 = A 602): ‘Es ist also an dem so berühmten ontologischen (cartesianischen) Beweise, vom Dasein eines höchten Wesens, aus *Begriffen*, alle Mühe und Arbeit verloren, und ein Mensch möchte wohl eben so wenig aus *blossen Ideen* an Einsichten reicher werden, als ein Kaufmann an Vermögen, wenn er um seinem Zustand zu verbessern, seinem Kassenbestande einige Nullen anhängen wollte.’

¹³ KANT (1998: 730 = A 191–192): ‘Indessen haben wir einen berühmten Beweis, der auf diesen Grund erbaut ist, nämlich den so genannten Kartesianischen. Man erdenket sich zuvörderst einen *Begriff* von einem möglichen *Dinge*, in welchem man alle wahre Vollkommenheit sich vereinbart vorstellt. Nun nimmt man an, das *Dasein* sei auch eine Vollkommenheit der Dinge; also schliesst man aus der Möglichkeit eines vollkommensten Wesens auf seine *Existenz*. Eben so könnte man aus dem *Begriffe* einer jeden Sache, welche auch nur als die vollkommenste ihrer Art vorgestellt wird, z. E. daraus allein schon dass eine vollkommenste Welt zu gedenken ist, auf ihr *Dasein* schliessen.’

to the things of the external world, and the other is the ‘secondary’ or ‘metaphorical’ (*aupacāriki*, *upacāra*^o) existence of all what is expressed by words. The commentator Helārāja *ad Sambandha-samuddeśa* 48.3.1 (VPP, p. 158.10), gives this second type of existence the epithet of *bauddha* (‘mental’). Bhartṛhari’s ‘principal existence’ is the ‘existence *in re*’ of Western philosophers, the ‘metaphorical existence’ is the ‘existence *in intellectu*’.

In the following, we present the relevant verses of VP 3.3.39, 50d–51:

‘When something is named, there is another existence, the metaphorical one, which is proper of things designated by words; it shows the form of all things in all situations.’¹⁴

Bhartṛhari (VP 3.3.49–51) refers to the metaphorical existence (*aupacārikī*), pointing out some of its characteristics in *kārikās* 49 and 50. But the *kārikās* 50d and 51 are those which directly concern the distinction between existence *in intellectu* and existence *in re*:

‘Nothing expressed by a word can go beyond this metaphorical [or mental] existence. And in the *Bhāṣya* it has been taught that it is different from the principal existence.’¹⁵

The existence to which this stanza refers (*etaṁ sattām*) is, as we said, the *aupacārikī* or ‘metaphorical’ existence that Bhartṛhari characterises in *kārikās* 49 and 50 and attributes several epithets to it. The notion or idea that a word expresses can never pretend to have an existence other than the metaphorical one, i.e. *in intellectu*; it is constrained to remain within the limits of mere ‘metaphorical’, ‘secondary’ or ‘mental’ existence, which by essence corresponds to it. Obviously, the ‘principal’ or ‘external’ *in re* existence can be attributed to the object, which is expressed by the notion or idea the word refers to, *if and only* if those who affirm that existence adduce solid arguments in support of it, as the commentator Helārāja expresses in his introductory remarks to *kārikās* 40 and 41.

The existence of something (for instance: God) *in intellectu* does not by itself alone guarantee its existence *in re*. The existence of God or any other existence

¹⁴ VP 3.3.39:

*vyapadeśe padārthānām anyā sattāupacārikī /
sarvāvasthāsu sarveṣām ātma-rūpasya darśikā //*

¹⁵ VP 3.3.50d–51:

*... aupacārikīm //50//
etaṁ sattām padārtho hi na kaścīd ativartate /
sā ca samprati-sattāyāḥ pṛthag bhāṣye nidarśitā //*

supposed to be *in re* would have to be demonstrated by other means of proof, and not only by the fact that the corresponding notion or idea exists *in intellectu*.

Bharṭhari in *kārikā* 51cd and Helārāja in the beginning of his commentary *ad locum* indicate that the foundation of the theory of the two types of existence is found in the *Mahā-bhāṣya* or ‘Great Commentary’, written by Patañjali around 150 BCE.

Let us add, as another, more ancient, antecedent in India of the distinction between the existence *in intellectu* and the existence *in re*, viz. a distinction that appears in the oldest Buddhist texts between an existence *dravyataḥ* (‘as a real entity’), and an existence *prajñaptitaḥ* (‘as [a mere] concept’, i.e. ‘without objective reality’) that correspond to Bharṭhari’s principal, external, *in re* existence and the secondary, metaphorical, mental, *in intellectu* existence respectively.¹⁶

The ontological proof and its consequences for Indian theism

For Hindus, Śiva for some, Viṣṇu for others, is the Supreme Being, conceived by Indian philosophy and religion as the most pre-eminent and excellent God, endowed with all the possible perfections in their utmost degree, enhanced with the most excellent qualities, infinite, omnipotent, omniscient etc.¹⁷

Applying the reasoning of the ontological proof, utilised in the West for demonstrating the existence of God, to the Supreme Being as conceived in Indian philosophy—either under the name of Śiva or under the name of Viṣṇu—one could affirm that Śiva and/or Viṣṇu, conceived as Beings endowed with all the perfections, must possess, among these, also that of *real existence*. This conclusion cannot be but disturbing for any monotheist religion or culture, which pretends that its God not only *exists* but *is unique*.

Similarly, as in the case of the examples devised by Gaunilo (‘the Lost Island’) and by Kant (‘a most perfect world’), the *real existence* of the magnificent worlds or paradises of Viṣṇu or Śiva conceived as the most excellent of their kind, ought to be admitted, if one accepts the ontological proof as a valid argument for establishing the existence of anything that is conceived as the most perfect or pre-eminent in its kind.

These consequences of the ontological proof, when applied to religious beliefs outside the limits of Christian world, should be taken into account together with the logical and epistemological reasons that are adduced when one examines the validity of that ‘proof’.

¹⁶ Cf. TOLA–DRAGONETTI (2004b: XXXII–XXXIV).

¹⁷ See BULCKE (1968).

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Theism—The Culmination of Nyāya Logic

JOHN VATTANKY, S. J.

It is usually stated that the section on inference is the most important part of Nyāya works in general and of Navya-nyāya treatises in particular. What however is not so well known is that the inner dynamism of the logical topics finds its high point in what is usually called *Īśvara-vāda* or *Īśvarānumāna*. In the most fundamental work of Navya-nyāya, *Tattva-cintā-maṇi*, Gaṅgeśa begins his *Īśvara-vāda* with the following words: ‘When inference is thus established, the existence of a supreme person who is the creator of the universe is thereby established.’¹ Here each word, even the smallest one has its own particular purpose. For instance the word, thus (*evam*) implies that according to Gaṅgeśa the connection between the treatise on inference in general and inference for the existence of God is more than casual. It is only on the basis of the nature of inference as examined and established in the earlier sections of *Tattva-cintā-maṇi* that it is possible to offer any proof for the existence of God. Therefore it implies also that the short phrase ‘when inference is thus examined’ (*evam anumāne nirūpīte*) means that what follows is not lined up merely in chronological succession but also in logical consequence. The purpose of this essay is to examine and substantiate this claim, in other words to show that Nyāya logic culminates in a vigorous proposal and defence of theism.

Gaṅgeśa’s *Īśvarānumāna* is the most sustained logical argumentation in the Nyāya tradition to uphold theism. It also is the final culmination of centuries of argumentations in the development of Nyāya thought in this regard. Therefore in order to appreciate fully the achievement of Gaṅgeśa and to grasp the full force of the Nyāya theistic arguments, it would be appropriate to examine a little the history of these ideas in the Nyāya tradition. Already in the *Nyāya-sūtras* of Gautama we find three aphorisms (NS 4.1.19–21) which deal directly with God. These *sūtras* are the following:

‘[19] God is the cause because we find fruitlessness in the actions of men. [20] It is not so because no fruit appears without the actions of

¹ TCM₁ 1.1–2: *evam anumāne nirūpīte tasmj jaganirmātṛ-puruṣa-ghaureya-siddhiḥ*.

men. [21] This reasoning is not correct since they [the actions of men] are influenced by him (i.e. God).²

I have given an elaborate commentary on these *sūtras* in my work *Gaṅgeśa's Philosophy of God*.³ It is not necessary to repeat all that I have developed in this commentary. Suffice to point out here that the early commentators like Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara consider these *sūtras* as proposing the view that God is the cause of the world, and there is no rational justification to reject the opinion of these classical interpreters. It may be noted also that Uddyotakara not only comments on these three *sūtras* but at the end of his commentary on the third of these theistic *sūtras* adds a relatively long section on *Īśvara-prakriyā*. In concluding this part Uddyotakara gives an inference to establish the existence of God with *kāryatva* ('being-an-effect') as the reason. This has remained in its various formulations by different Nyāya authors the central argument for establishing the existence of God.

Vācaspati gives decisive logical interpretations to these *sūtras* and rejects the arguments advanced by the Buddhists against the existence of God. I have also shown in my work that Vācaspati's contribution is seminal in the most important respect of showing the limitations and, ultimately, the untenability of the logical positions of the Buddhists, especially of Dharmakīrti. And Gaṅgeśa borrows freely from Vācaspati and, therefore, the conclusions drawn at the end of this essay after the discussions on Vācaspati are equally valid with regard to the contribution of Gaṅgeśa also.

Udayana also treats about the existence of God in his *Ātma-tattva-viveka*, *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* and *Kiraṇāvalī*. The *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* is entirely devoted to establishing the reality of God. It is probably the first authoritative, systematic and independent work as different from the *sūtras* and their commentaries, to establish with rigorous arguments the main doctrines of the Nyāya system, especially the existence of God, as the culmination of this philosophical enterprise. In the fifth and final chapter of this work Udayana elaborates various proofs for the existence of God. Naturally the most significant proof is the inference with *kāryatva* ('being-an-effect') as the reason (*hetu*). Whatever may be the meagreness of Nyāya literature on the existence of God prior to Udayana, the situation is radically changed after his

² NS 4.1.19–21: [19] *īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṁ puruṣa-karmāphalya-darśanāt*. [20] *na, puruṣa-karmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ*. [21] *tat-karitatvād ahetuḥ*.

³ VATTANKY (1984: 4–11). As an introduction to the translation and interpretation of Gaṅgeśa's *Īśvara-vāda* I have also given an extended treatment on the contribution of various subsequent Naiyāyikas to the problem of God. The arguments of these Naiyāyikas were developed against the Buddhist philosophers who brought in a variety of objections against the existence of God; cf. VATTANKY (1984: 1–150). I have also treated the same subject matter in a different work, see VATTANKY (1993).

work *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, for it is a voluminous and central work in the development of Nyāya system.⁴

Leaving less known Nyāya authors who have contributed to the doctrine of God like Śaśadhara and others I come to the great Gaṅgeśa in whose magisterial work *Tattva-cintā-maṇi* there is a very significant section, *Īśvarānumāna*, establishing the existence of God. Perhaps the towering personality of Udayana and his magnificent work, *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, overshadowed the *Īśvarānumāna* of Gaṅgeśa and so earlier scholars like Jacobi argued that everything that could be said about God in the Nyāya tradition has already been stated by Udayana in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*; but in the light of the studies undertaken in recent times (VATTANKY (1984) and (1993)), it is no more possible to hold such an opinion. In fact a detailed and careful study of the text of Gaṅgeśa's *Īśvarānumāna* shows the considerable originality of the author not only in the organisation of the matter in the Nyāya tradition but also in the developments of the arguments especially in as far as their logical rigour is concerned. The whole work of Gaṅgeśa's *Īśvarānumāna* is a logical and epistemological defence of the basic Nyāya inference: 'The earth and so on have an agent, because they have the characteristic of being-an-effect'⁵, the standard Nyāya inference to establish the existence of God. The defence of this inference is carried out by Gaṅgeśa with such philosophical depth and logical acumen that his *Īśvarānumāna* can easily be ranked as one of the finest philosophical text in any tradition, Indian or Western. But to appreciate the philosophical significance of this statement one should have carefully analysed each sentence and phrase and reflected over them for long. That is the only way to have even an inkling of the philosophical depth and logical acumen of Gaṅgeśa.

We can therefore conclude this section of the present essay pointing out that although the literature on God in the early Nyāya confines itself to the three theistic *sūtras* and the commentaries on them, still the contributions of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati are so significant from the point of view of logic and epistemology that in no way can one assert that the idea of God plays only a minimal role in early Nyāya. With the advent of Udayana and Gaṅgeśa the whole philosophical scene changes and substantial independent works such as the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* and *Īśvarānumāna* (*Tattva-cintā-maṇi*) establish God as the philosophical and logical culmination of the Nyāya system. In doing so these authors display philosophical and logical skills of the highest order and naturally they use precisely defined technical terms. Just to

⁴ Interested readers may refer to the translations and interpretations of the *Ātma-tattva-viveka* and the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* by the distinguished scholar, N.S. DRAVID (1995) and (1996).

⁵ TCM₁ 1.2–3: *kṣity-aṅkurādikaṃ sakartṛkaṃ kāryatvāt*. For easy comprehension this inference is phrased in a way slightly different from the version found in TCM₁.

assert that these refinements are mere subtleties and to dismiss them as Nyāya paraphernalia would be just non-sense. It would be like the statements of Arthur Berriedale KEITH (1977: 35) who dismissed Navya-nyāya as a ‘vast mass of perverted ingenuity’.

We now enter the basic argument itself of the Naiyāyikas to establish the existence of God. The most important proof for the existence of God in the Nyāya tradition is one which makes use of *kāryatva* (‘being-an-effect’) as the reason in the inference. Historically we find such a reason for the first time in the inference proposed by Uddyotakara (4th century CE). The whole proof runs as follows:

‘Likewise one should bring “being-an-effect”, as the reason, when grass etc. are the subject, since these are objects of sight and touch. Likewise, whenever a difference of opinion is given and “being-an-effect” is also seen, one should prove the existence of God with the same argument, with the same example of axe etc., after something has been taken as the subject.’⁶

The full form of the proof must have been something like this: the different things in nature like grass, earth, shoots etc., must have an agent just as things like a pot etc., have an agent, viz., potter. And the cause of the effect like grass, earth etc., is God. It may be noted here that while Uddyotakara explains in detail the other proofs which he brings forward for the existence of God, he does not go into the details of this proof. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that this proof may not be his original contribution but it may have been current at the time of Uddyotakara in the Nyāya school and he just mentioned it as if it were known to all.

But it is Vācaspatimīśra (10th century CE) who really defended this proof against the attack of Buddhist philosophers, especially Dharmakīrti, and drew its philosophical and logical implications. Vācaspati, Udayana (11th century CE) and Gaṅgeśa developed the philosophical and logical aspects of this proof. And it is to these dimensions of the proof for the existence of God that we shall turn our attention but such a discussion on the philosophical, especially the logical aspects of the question presupposes a fairly good acquaintance with the terms and techniques of Nyāya logic especially those concerning the validity of the reason. If a reason is false then the whole syllogism falls. That is why Nyāya theory of logic has elaborate, accurate and profound discussions on the nature and the kinds of fallacies. I shall not enter into any detailed discussion of this topic but mention only two of

⁶ NBh 957.11–13: *evam kāryatvāt tṛṇādīni pakṣī-kṛtya darśana-sparśana-viśayatvād iti vaktavyam. evam yatra yatra vipratipattiḥ kāryatvam ca tat tad anenāiva nyāyenānena dṛṣṭāntena vāsyādīnā pakṣayitvā sādhayitavyam.*

them which are essential to follow properly the discussions on the inference to establish the existence of God, viz. the unestablished invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*) and counter-thesis (*sat-pratipakṣa*).

The fallacy of unestablishedness of invariable concomitance occurs in such inferences as ‘it has fire because it has blue smoke’; here blue smokeness is not the determinant of the state of being reason because of cumbersomeness. Hence there is the fault of unestablishedness of invariable concomitance. In other words, in the inference ‘it has fire because it has blue smoke’, the determinant of the state of being reason is blue smokeness. This is a cumbersome property and so this cannot be accepted as the real determinant of the state of being reason. The reason is that when there is a property which is less cumbersome, a cumbersome property cannot be accepted as the determinant of the state of being reason and here blue smokeness is cumbersome in comparison with mere smokeness which can really be accepted as the determinant of the state of being reason. Hence in the inference ‘it has fire because it has blue smoke’, there is the fault of unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*).

The fallacy of counter-thesis is the subject which has that which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhyā*. As for example, when one argues that ‘the earth and so on have an agent because they are effects’ (*kṣity-anīkurādikaṃ sakartykaṃ karyatvāt*) the opponent argues that ‘the earth and so on have no agent because they are not produced by someone having a body’ (*kṣity-anīkurādikaṃ na sakartykaṃ śarīrājanyaṃ*) and so according to the opponent the reason ‘being-an-effect’ (*kāryatva*) suffers from the fallacy of counter-thesis. Here the fallacy of counter-thesis is that the earth and so on have the characteristic of not being produced by someone having a body and such a characteristic is pervaded, according to the opponent, by the absence of having an agent.

The Naiyāyikas defend their syllogism to establish the existence of God against all the possible attack of the opponents especially the Buddhists. But first of all let us recall the simpler form of the syllogism which the Naiyāyikas bring forward to establish the existence of God: ‘the earth and so on have an agent because they are effects.’ The Buddhists argued that there is no invariable concomitance of ‘having an intelligent agent’ with ‘being an effect in general’, but only with that class of things which although one has not seen being made by someone, but which when seen after having been made, one immediately knows that that thing has been made by someone. The heart of this Buddhist objection has already been explained by Dharmakīrti (PV 1.12–18) and Śāntarakṣita (TSa 12.61–65). In short, it means only that after having seen a jar being made by a potter, when we see a similar jar we can infer that this jar also has been made by a potter, although we have not actually seen this jar being made by a potter. But by the same sort of process we cannot conclude

that the earth is produced by someone. And if one similarly infers the existence of an agent also for the earth, one could infer fire from any white substance as well, though one has never seen any instance of such a substance produced by fire.

Vācaspati's answer (NS 955.14–956.2; NVTṬ 4.1.21) to this objection has been seminal in the sense that later Naiyāyikas such as Udayana and Gaṅgeśa developed only the details of the answer, but the basic elements of the reply remained the same. Vācaspati asks the opponent: in order to have the invariable concomitance of having an intelligent agent, is it enough that the class of things should actually have an agent or should this agent be actually seen? If it is the first alternative, then the Naiyāyika has no objection: he holds that there is actually an intelligent agent for such things as the earth and so on. But if the Buddhist insists that this agent be visible, which is the second alternative, then the Buddhist is denying his own principle. In no instance at all of an effect would one have the knowledge of an intelligent agent if the agent is not actually seen. Therefore, when we see a palace which we did not actually see being built, we cannot conclude that this palace was also built by someone for the simple reason that we did not see someone building it, or to use the example which Vācaspati himself gives, because this cloth which one saw being produced by someone has a maker, one cannot conclude that the piece of cloth in the textile shop is also produced by somebody. This, obviously, the Buddhist also does not admit.

What follows (NS 955.18–21; NVTṬ 4.1.21) is an extremely vital but succinct series of objections on the part of the Buddhists and equally penetrating series of answers by the Naiyāyikas. In fact, all the basic questions about the inference to establish the existence of God are raised and answered here by Vācaspati. The Buddhist objects: that class of things which is established to have an intelligent agent will certainly imply that any member belonging to that class and not any other thing will have an intelligent agent. But to this Vācaspati answers that the class of things having a beginning, e.g. jars, have an intelligent agent; certainly trees and so on belong to the class of things having a beginning. Therefore, they also have an agent.

But of course, the Buddhist does not admit this answer (NS 955.21–23; NVTṬ 4.1.21): he insists that only such a class of things which have been actually perceived as having an agent does have an agent and not others. As for example, we know that individual things in the class of jar have an agent; from this, it does not follow that palaces have agents since they do not belong to the class of things which is perceived to have agents, since they do not belong to the class of jar. Therefore the Buddhist concludes, only such a class of things which is perceived to have an agent can enable us to infer that a member of that class has an intelligent agent, even though we do not actually perceive the agent. This is the final and definitive position of the Buddhist. It shows clearly the nature and limitation of his epistemology

and logic. Whatever details and argumentations may have been developed by subsequent authors, in essence, this is the position of Dharmakīrti (PV 1.13, also commentary of Manorathanandin on this *kārikā*).

Now, Vācaspati definitely destroys this edifice of Buddhist arguments by a decisive blow of his logic (NS 955.23–24; NVTṬ 4.1.21); in fact, Vācaspati meets his adversary on his own and shows him that the class of things which are effects are perceived to have an intelligent agent. A palace is an effect and we know from perception that this palace has an agent; therefore, whenever we see a thing which has the characteristic of an effect, we can conclude that, that thing also has an intelligent agent since that thing also belongs to the class of things which are effects. Thus the earth and so on are also perceived by us as effects. Hence they also have an intelligent agent.

As to the Buddhist objection (NS 956.1–2; NVTṬ 4.1.21) that in that case an anthill should also be produced by a potter, the answer is that we cannot conclude that a potter is the maker of an anthill, since we do not see potters making anthills; but from the fact that the anthill is an effect, we can conclude that it is produced by intelligent agents which are not seen by us. As we have noted already, later Naiyāyikas, including even Udayana and Gaṅgeśa, have only developed the details of this answer.

Further, according to the opponents (TCM_I 58.19–71.3, see also VATTANKY (1984: 221–229, 361–383)), the reason of the establishing inference has the fault of having a counter-reason. The counter-inference itself is as follows: the world and so on are not produced by an agent since they are not something produced by someone having a body. The main objection against the reason of ‘not being produced by body’ is that in comparison with this reason, ‘being not produced’ is simpler and so it has the real invariable concomitance of not having an agent. Hence ‘not being produced by body’, does not have the invariable concomitance of ‘having no agent’. The opponent tries to answer this objection trying to show that there is actually no useless qualification since the qualification here is helpful for producing the knowledge that the reason actually exists in the subject. Further, it is objected that only when the determinant of qualificandness is not the determinant of invariable concomitance, is the qualification such a determinant. In the case of instances such as ‘not produced by body’, ‘blue-smoke’ and so on, the qualificandness alone could be the determinant of the invariable concomitance in question. The opponent rejects this and says that even in the instances mentioned, there is invariable concomitance in the sense of ‘having no deviation’ or ‘having no additional condition’.

All these objections of the opponent are rejected and it is established that such reasons as ‘not being produced by body’; and ‘blue-smoke’ cannot be used as valid reasons, though they have the invariable concomitance of the respective *sādhyas*.

They cannot be used as valid reason because of the general principle that the determinant of invariable concomitance is itself the determinant of 'being reason'. Accordingly in reasons such as 'blue-smoke', the determinant of invariable concomitance is not 'being blue smoke', but simply 'smokeness' because of logical simplicity and so blue smoke cannot be used as a valid reason. Similarly, in the reason of 'produced by body' the determinant of the state of being reason is the 'state of being produced by body'. Therefore 'being produced by body' cannot be used as a valid reason.

From what we have been explaining it is easy to see that the intrinsic nature of the basic principles of Nyāya logic lead ineluctably to God as the culmination of philosophical and epistemological enterprise. What are the basic epistemological principles on which these subtle arguments are based? In Nyāya studies in general, and in Navya-nyāya studies in particular, it is very easy for one to miss the wood for the trees. There are so many different topics in Navya-nyāya that one can easily get lost in particulars, though of course a detailed and exact knowledge of the individual topics is a prerequisite for an appreciation of Navya-nyāya as a whole. What then is the basic concern of Navya-nyāya? Its overriding concern is in its sustained effort to study with unparalleled rigour and exactitude the nature, dimensions and conditions of human knowledge; and, as we know, the philosophical problem *par excellence* is the problem of knowledge. With rare insight Navya-nyāya examines the problems connected with human knowledge and sets forth in detail the exact conditions in which valid knowledge is possible. It should be borne in mind that in and through the analysis of human knowledge Navya-nyāya mediates also a self-understanding of human beings which deserves close examination and probably even unqualified appreciation. Thus its definition of *vyāpti*, invariable concomitance, is not a sterile definition of the concept but an exploration of a profound aspect of human knowledge itself and it may plausibly be argued that its true significance comes out in the *Īśvara-vāda*.

In order to make the problem still clearer let us pose the following question; we know that the logical proof for the existence of God is developed by Vācaspati-miśra, Udayana and Gaṅgeśa against the logical and philosophical arguments of their opponents, especially the Buddhists. What however is most intriguing is that none of these authors nor even later commentators on Gaṅgeśa's work like Jayadeva, Pragalbha or Rucidatta ask the question why is it that according to Nyāya logic it is possible to establish the existence of God? On the other hand neither Dharmakīrti nor any of his followers like Jñānaśrīmitra or Ratnakīrti raise the question why in the Buddhist logical system it is not possible to establish the existence of God? It is also to be noted that none of the modern scholars who studied these texts raise this question, much less answer it. The question has also escaped the

attention of general philosophers who know broadly that the Buddhist tradition does not believe in God, whereas Nyāya is theistic, at least as far as the great works of Vācaspatiśra, Udayana and Gaṅgeśa are concerned. But they never ask the question what is the reason for this difference?

An adequate answer for this question lies naturally in the concept of knowledge in the different systems and hence in the possibilities and limitations of their logic. Therefore it could be asserted without much hesitation that the Nyāya proof for the existence of God presupposes a theory of knowledge according to which it is possible to raise the question of God whereas the Buddhists of Dharmakīrti school propose a theory of knowledge according to which it is radically impossible not only to prove the existence of God but even to conceive an idea of him. Thus the Nyāya system has as horizon a theory of knowledge which renders possible the proofs for the existence of God. That is why it could be validly asserted that in the Nyāya theory of knowledge the Absolute becomes the horizon of all knowledge and therefore also of all human activities. This aspect of the Nyāya theory of knowledge in all its details is not developed explicitly in Nyāya treatises but implied in them. But of course it does not mean that such an interpretation is purely subjective. On the contrary an interpretation of this kind is based on the very foundation of the system itself.

In order to explain this it is necessary to refer to some of the very basic theories of Nyāya epistemology. Intimately connected with it is the fundamental Nyāya theory about what is usually known as invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). In simple terms invariable concomitance is the invariable relationship of the reason with that which is to be established by the syllogism. Thus, when you establish fire by means of smoke, you presuppose an invariable relation of smoke with fire. But the concept is not as simple as that. In fact a large part of Nyāya discussions on the theory of knowledge and inference in general is all about this concept of invariable concomitance. Further this concept is of primary importance in all the major systems of classical Indian thought. In fact prolonged and persistent controversies ranged among the different schools on this point precisely because they sought to justify their different metaphysical positions on the basis of this aspect of the theory of knowledge. The controversy was acute between the Buddhists, especially of the Dharmakīrti school, and the Naiyāyikas. And the point of difference between these two schools is that in Nyāya it is possible from what we have known to assert also what we have not known, whereas the Buddhists tend to deny this. But this of course is an oversimplified statement.

In slightly more technical terms, the Buddhist position would be the following: we know a thing whose existence we have not directly perceived only if that thing belongs to the class of things which could be the object of direct experience. And the Naiyāyikas on the contrary hold that we can, on the basis of the experience of the

class of things about which we have direct knowledge, assert the existence of a thing even if that thing does not strictly belong to the class of things that could be perceived. This in fact in simplified terms is the crux of the problem in the Buddhist and Nyāya theories of knowledge and of invariable concomitance. Consequently the arguments regarding the existence of God became the centre of heated controversies. Nyāya holds that it is possible for us to know the unknown from what we have known. It also means that this unknown need not necessarily belong to the class of things which are already known, but according to the Buddhist system as represented in the school of Dharmakīrti it is necessary that this unknown thing should belong to the class of things that are already known. Otherwise we cannot make any affirmation whatever about this unknown thing.

From what has been said it follows that the epistemological presupposition of Nyāya theory of inference involves by implication first of all the capacity of human intelligence to rise above what is of immediate experience. We could further draw the important conclusion that this Nyāya theory implies that human beings cannot think except in the context of an Absolute. No theory of knowledge is possible without implying at the same time the existence of an Absolute and the inherent capacity of human intellect somehow to grasp this Absolute. And such an explanation of the basis of Nyāya theory of knowledge particularly with reference to the concept of invariable concomitance is quite legitimate. An interpretation of this kind is based on sound philosophical and philological analysis of the texts concerned (VATTANKY (1984: 153 ff.)). This implies therefore that the Nyāya theory of knowledge can be explained and validated only against the background of the basic and inherent capacity of the human intellect to rise above the mere phenomena which are directly perceived by it.

This is also the basic reason why it is asserted that the God of the Naiyāyikas is a transcendent one. The dynamism of knowledge that is implicitly affirmed in the Nyāya theory of inference cannot simply stop at an anthropomorphic God who is immanent to the system itself.⁷ If the God of the Naiyāyikas is just one of the categories admitted by the system then there would not be much point in elaborating the theory of inference which tries to establish objects beyond sense experience. In fact

⁷ Of course this interpretation is not fully in line with the usual idea of God in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system according to which, in the beginning of creation, God produces movement in the atoms according to the various *adr̥ṣtas* of souls. The *adr̥ṣta* itself is insentient and therefore God is needed to activate it. In such an interpretation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea of God, he is not a transcendent reality but he is one of the categories within the system, but does not stand above it. My point here is that although this is the traditional interpretation of God in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, still the theory of knowledge in general and of inference in particular by its inherent dynamism demands the existence of a transcendent God.

as we have explained the dynamic nature of the Nyāya theory of knowledge and inference can be fully understood only in the context of the infinite capacity of the human intellect to reach out to the ultimate.

It is quite possible that some one may disagree with the above interpretation of the Nyāya theory of knowledge and inference on the one hand, and of the Buddhist theory of knowledge and inference on the other, and with the conclusions drawn from such interpretations. But then it is incumbent on the one who disagrees to propose another plausible answer to the question which was raised: why is it that according to the Nyāya logic it is possible to establish the existence of God? On the other hand why is it that in the Buddhist logical system of Dharmakīrti it is not possible to establish the existence of God? The classical authors and their commentators do not give any explicit answer to this question. We have to reflect long on their texts themselves and their implications. I have given one interpretation based on which a plausible answer to this question is given. It is for other scholars either to accept my answer or to challenge it with adequate reasons.

From these discussions, the conclusion seems to force itself upon us. In comparison with the literature on the other topics of the Nyāya system, works on *Īśvara-vāda* are significant. The three theistic *sūtras* and the commentaries on them especially by Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra, the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* of Udayana and the *Īśvara-vāda* of Gaṅgeśa stand out as major contributions to philosophical and logical thought. Gaṅgeśa's *Īśvara-vāda* in particular is a work composed with considerable ingenuity, though dependent on Vācaspati for some of the basic arguments. It is as succinct as it is subtle, as we have seen in the discussion on the fallacy of counter-thesis with reference to the inference to establish the existence of God. But when we study in depth each section of the work analysing each sentence and each expression we can marvel at the subtlety and depth of the author. In a sense concealing his art, Gaṅgeśa deploys various important elements of Nyāya logic, such as the concept of invariable concomitance, the notion of fallacies etc. to substantiate his claims in the sphere of theism. And in doing so he is also communicating a profound understanding of human knowledge and of human being itself, firmly upholding that Theism is an integral element of genuine philosophical anthropology (VATTANKY (1984) and (1993)). Considered in this perspective, it can be asserted on sound principles of textual exegesis and philosophical hermeneutics that theism is the culmination of Nyāya logic.

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What Exists for the Vaiśeṣika?*

PIOTR BALCEROWICZ

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1.1. Introduction: the knowability thesis

In his *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha* (PBh), Praśastapāda ascribes three common properties to all ontological categories: existentiality¹ (*astitva*), nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*). The well-known and often debated passage of PBh₁ 2.3, p. 16 = PBh₂ 11 reads:

T° *ṣaṅṅām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatva-jñeyatvāni.*

* I gratefully acknowledge the feedback I have received from Stephen Phillips on the notion of *astitva* and related issues and thank him for all his comments on the paper.

¹ To translate *astitva*, I deliberately choose 'existentiality', which might appear odd at first, in order not to project any ready-made ideas on the term, the semantics of which first requires proper analysis. Its meaning will become clear in the sequel, esp. p. 256 ff.

‘All the six ontological categories have [the following three properties in common]: existentiality, nameability and cognisability.’

This idea is sometimes simplified to the statement that ‘whatever exists is nameable and knowable;’² however, such a rendering occurs not without a semantic loss of the original statement and prejudging the exact relation, such as co-extension or partial overlap, between the three properties, a relation that should first be studied more carefully. We can call it the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the knowability of everything, or the knowability thesis for short.

The present paper will take up the question again,³ whether these three properties were thought to be coextensive or not, by supplying some additional material, and will demonstrate how far the issue is related to the idea of omniscience accepted by the Vaiśeṣika. I will also argue that the triad of existentiality (*astitva*), nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) entered the system of Vaiśeṣika in the late fifth century CE at the earliest in a package of four interrelated concepts that necessarily complement each other. The other three ingredients are: the belief in god’s existence⁴, belief in god’s omniscience and belief in supernatural perception. What is important, the paper is an attempt to reconstruct early historical developments in the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and not to engage the subsequent development of these ideas. I deliberately avoid discussing such philosophers as Udayana or Gaṅgeśa or ideas (e.g. *upādhi*) that were later developed as, perhaps, a response to some problems also posed by issues discussed in the present paper in order to avoid a methodological error of projecting later ideas onto an early phase of the system.

² See Karl H. POTTER (1968: 275): ‘to be is to be knowable and nameable’, and POTTER (1995: 48): ‘whatever is, is knowable and nameable’.

³ The issue was dealt with already in such works, for example, as POTTER (1968), SHAW (1978), HALBFASS (1989), HALBFASS (1992: 158), POTTER (1995), PERRETT (1999).

⁴ I consistently translate *īśvara* as ‘god’ for a few reasons. First, *īśvara* should be distinguished from *deva* (‘divine being’) in translation. Second, I consider it a better practice to translate Indian Sanskrit terms into English rather than leave them untranslated, because otherwise, in extreme cases, a translation would purely consist of Sanskrit terms embedded in English morphology and be a case of a ‘Sanskritic new speech’, and because even a rough English translation approximates the idea of how we understand a given Sanskrit term, albeit it does not always convey the meaning in a most adequate manner. Third, the Indian concept of *īśvara* does not really overlap with what is understood under ‘God’ in monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity or Islam. Fourth, to an extent the meaning of *īśvara* partially relates to theistic concept of Western-Asian and European traditions, I consider the term ‘god’ (unlike Yahveh/Jehovah, Allah, Śiva etc.) a common noun (albeit with necessarily only one instantiation for the monotheists), not a proper name, and as such it should be consistently written lower case, despite the tradition.

1.2. Other examples of the knowability thesis

Prāśastapāda was not unique in the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. At more or less the same time Uddyotakara alludes to these ideas in the *Nyāya-vārttika* with similar words,⁵ taking the idea of the three properties as already well-known and necessitating no additional explanation.

Likewise Candramati (Maticandra?) refers to these ideas at the end of his *Daśa-padārtha-śāstra* (DPS)—now preserved only in Chinese translation,⁶ that presents the Vaiśeṣika system partly independent of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*—which is cited here in two different English renderings:

‘Which of these (five kinds of *abhāva*—P.B.) are objects of perception; which are not objects of it? All the five non-existences are not objects of perception. On the other hand, even those which exist without being supported by other things are altogether objects of inference. [Section 11.—*Conclusion*]

Which of these ten categories are knowable; which are not knowable? All are knowable and also causes of their recognitions’⁷;

‘[253] Among these five [kinds of absences], how many are the objects of direct cognition, and how many are not the objects of direct

⁵ NV₁ 1.1.5, p. 56.21 = NV₂ 1.1.5, p. 50.17: *sattva-praśmeyatvābhidheyatvādy-anumānam prāptam*.

⁶ NV₂. The passage is quoted in HBṬĀ, p. 317.26.

Worth noting is that Uddyotakara uses the term *astitva* not in the Vaiśeṣika sense of ‘existentiality’, which is discussed in the present paper, as it stands in triad of *astitva-abhidheyatva-jñeyatva*, but in the sense of ontological existence, e.g. in such phrases and contexts as ‘the existence of soul’ (NV₁ 1.1.10, p. 66.17–18 = NV₂, p. 60.11–12: *icchādīnām pratisandhānam ātmāstitva-pratipādakam*; NV₁ 1.1.34, p. 119.8–9 = NV₂ 1.1.33, p. 109.21–22: *tad yathā ātmano ’stitva-nāstitva-vicāraṇāyām iti. ātmano ’stitva-nāstitva-samśayaḥ iti*, etc.) or ‘the existence of god’ (NV₁ 4.1.21, p. 461.4–7 = NV₂, p. 433.7 ff.: *īśvara eva nyāyam. tatra hi pramāṇāny avighātena pravartante iti. astitvāsiddhiḥ iti cet atha manyase siddhe īśvarasyāstitve kāraṇāntara-nirākaraṇam nimitta-kāraṇa-bhāvaś ca siddhyet*, etc.).

⁶ After a first fragmentary attempt by Paramārtha, DPS was eventually fully translated into Chinese by Xuanzang (Hsuan-tsang, 600–664) under the title *Shengzong shijuyi lun* (a rendering of *Vaiśeṣika-nikāya-daśa-padārtha-śāstra*) in 648 (or between 646 and 648), after his return to China from Nālandā; see U (1917: 1) and BAGCHI (1944: 151).

⁷ Translated by U (1917: 119). Cf. also a relevant note of U (1917: 224): “‘Knowable’ represents *jñeyatva*, while *astitva* and *abhidheyatva* are included in “causes of their recognition”.”

cognition? [254] Any [kind of absence] is not the object of direct cognition. But all [kinds of absences], which exist without having any locus other [than their own], are the objects of inference. [255] Among these ten categories of entities, how many are cognizable and how many are non-cognizable? [256] All are cognizable and are the cause of expressions'⁸ (emphasis—P.B.).

The idea is also expressly echoed in the *Praśastamati-ṭīkā* passages quoted in DNC (p. 517.5–7; see below, p. 274) by Mallavādin, albeit it does not seem to be known to the original author(s) of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*.⁹

2. The structure of Praśastapāda's argument

Let us first take a closer look at the structure of Praśastapāda's statement.

2.1. Possible formulations and loss of ontology

As it is well-known, in the Vaiśeṣika ontology, the structure of the world is described as reducible to atomic facts, analysable as follows:

A property (*dharma*, *q*) is related to its substratum (*dharmin*, *p*) with a particular relation (*sambandha*, *R*): $R(q, p)$.

One of the relations possible in Vaiśeṣika, the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), acquired a predominant role and was classified as the sixth ontological category. Praśastapāda defined it as 'the relationship between the locus and the located property'¹⁰. Others defined it later as 'the qualifier-qualificand relationship' (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*)¹¹.

⁸ Translated and reconstructed into Sanskrit by MIYAMOTO (1996: 206), DPŚ₂ 253–256: [253] *etādṛśānām pañcābhāvānām kati dṛṣṭa-viṣayāḥ kati adṛṣṭa-viṣayāḥ?* [254] *sarve 'dṛṣṭa-viṣayāḥ. kim tu ananyāśrītya vartamānāḥ sarve 'numāna-viṣayaḥ.* [255] *eteṣāṃ darśa-padārthānām kati jñeyāḥ kati ajñeyāḥ?* [256] *sarva eva jñeyāḥ. te cāvābhidhāna-hetuḥ.* Cf. also MIYAMOTO (1996: 251): *praśastapāda-bhāṣya-dravya-granthe sādharmya-vaidharmya-nirūpaṇānām ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhidheya-jñeyatvāni.*

⁹ Cf. n. 23.

¹⁰ PBh₁ 12, p. 326.1 = PBh₂ 375: *adhikaraṇādhikartavyayor eva bhāva[h].*

¹¹ Uddyotakara, e.g. NV₁ 1.1.4, p. 32.16.

In the Vaiśeṣika-specific terminology, the Western-type predicate proposition of the form

‘ x is P ’:
 $P(x)$

would thus correspond to:

‘The property P -ness is related to its substratum x with the relation of inherence I :
 $I(P\text{-ness}, x)$,

which can be simplified to:

‘ x possesses the property P -ness.’¹²

This is why the idea expressed by Praśastapāda’s statement: ‘anything that possesses the property of existentiality, also possesses the property of nameability and cognisability’, could be logically converted to a typical predicate statement: ‘whatever is existent is also nameable and cognisable’.

That would not, however, happen without consequence. The transformation would, first, involve the obvious loss of the specific ontological relation between subject and predicate typified by the relation of inherence, and, second, would reduce the property-substratum relation of inherence to a predicate-subject relation. What remains intact is the logical relation between the subject and the predicates, or between the substratum and its properties. In the paper, I shall occasionally use the shorthand ‘whatever is existent is also nameable and knowable’, or similar expressions, for the complete proposition: ‘among all the six categories anything that possesses the property of existentiality, also possesses the property of nameability and cognisability’.

2.2. Possible readings of Praśastapāda’s statement

We notice that the three properties can, theoretically, be coextensive, partially overlap or be in the relation of inclusion. To save paper, I will not discuss all the theoretical possibilities, but only refer to those that are contextually most plausible.

Accordingly, Praśastapāda’s complete statement: ‘All the six ontological categories have [the following three properties, inherently related to them, in common]:

¹² For instances cf. PBh₁ 2.3, p. 19 = PBh₂ 15 (n. 26 below), and DNC, p. 517.5 f.: *yat punaḥ dravyādīnām svata evābhīdhāna-pratyaya-viṣayatvaṁ sattvāt sattādivat* (see n. 30 below).

existentiality, nameability and cognisability’, which assumes the reality of the relation of inherence, can be converted to one of the following predicate statements:

- F1° ‘Among the six ontological categories, whatever is existent, is also nameable which is in turn cognisable’: $astitva \subseteq (jñeyatva \subseteq abhidheyatva)$, or
 F2° ‘Among the six ontological categories, whatever is existent, is also cognisable which is in turn nameable’: $astitva \subseteq (abhidheyatva \subseteq jñeyatva)$, or
 F3° ‘Among the six ontological categories, whatever is nameable, is also existent which is in turn cognisable’ $abhidheyatva \subseteq (jñeyatva \subseteq astitva)$, or
 F4° ‘Among the six ontological categories, whatever is nameable, is also cognisable which is in turn existent’ $abhidheyatva \subseteq (astitva \subseteq jñeyatva)$, or
 F5° ‘Among the six ontological categories, whatever is cognisable, is also existent which is in turn nameable’: $jñeyatva \subseteq (astitva \subseteq abhidheyatva)$, or
 F6° ‘Among the six ontological categories, whatever is cognisable, is also nameable which is in turn existent’: $jñeyatva \subseteq (abhidheyatva \subseteq astitva)$.¹³

What needs to be clarified is also the exact relation between the sets of properties, i.e. the equation/inclusion sign \subseteq should be diambiguated as either = or \subset , e.g.:

$$\begin{aligned} jñeyatva &= astitva = abhidheyatva, \text{ or} \\ astitva &\subset (jñeyatva \subset abhidheyatva), \text{ or} \\ jñeyatva &\subset astitva \subset abhidheyatva, \text{ or} \\ jñeyatva &\subset (astitva = abhidheyatva), \text{ etc.} \end{aligned}$$

The relation between nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) does not seem to pose much difficulty due to the eventually¹⁴ verbal character of cognition, accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but also because the commentators take them both as coextensive: $jñeyatva = abhidheyatva$.

For instance at a much later period, in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, Udayana singles them out and treats in the same manner:

[Objection:] “But these two [categories of nameability and cognisability] exist even with respect to [the seventh ontological category of] absence”. They do, indeed. However, what is intended to be expressed

¹³ The possibilities of formal notation are larger depending on how we use the parentheses, e.g. F2* ($astitva \subseteq jñeyatva \subseteq abhidheyatva$), F2* ($astitva \subseteq abhidheyatva \subseteq jñeyatva$), etc. For our purposes the issue is of no practical importance.

¹⁴ By ‘eventually’ I mean that, even in the case of the contents of the non-conceptual (indeterminate) perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), one becomes aware of it only at a subsequent stage of conceptual (determinate) perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), which in principle can be verbalised.

[here in the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*] is not the difference [between all the ontological categories] with respect to this [absence], but the similarity with respect to six ontological categories.’¹⁵

Similarly, in the *Nyāya-kandalī* (NKan), Śrīdharamiśra says that:

‘Nameability is indeed the intrinsic nature of the real thing, i.e. it is nothing but the intrinsic nature of something that exists; and, in view of the difference of [the particular] condition [of the real thing], nameability is called cognisability.’¹⁶

What remains problematic is how the pair nameability–cognisability actually relates to existentiality, viz. whether it is the equation: *astitva* = (*jñeyatva* = *abhidheyatva*), or the inclusion of either of two kinds: nameability–cognisability is the proper subset of existentiality, viz. *astitva* \subset (*jñeyatva* = *abhidheyatva*), or the other way round, viz. (*jñeyatva* = *abhidheyatva*) \subset *astitva*.

Researchers interpreted Praśastapāda’s thesis in diverse ways. Karl H. POTTER, for instance, took it for granted that all the three properties are coextensive:

“‘To be is to be knowable and nameable’”. The Naiyāyika reads this as fully reversible: whatever exists (in the broadest sense) can be known and can be spoken of, named; furthermore, if something is known, or if it is named, then it exists. Likewise, if something is nameable, it is knowable, and vice-versa. The three abstract nouns in the Sanskrit motto apply to each and every thing in the universe’ (1968: 275),

as well as

‘whatever is, is knowable and nameable’ (1995: 48).

Also Roy W. PERRETT (1999: 401) echoed the thought: ‘Whatever exists is knowable and nameable’. The same interpretation was expressed several decades earlier by Gaṅgānātha JHĀ (1982: 37):

‘Though “beingness” would seem to belong to Abhāva also, and as such the mention of “six” categories only would appear incorrect,—yet when we bear in mind the fact that our author has enumerated only six categories, the incongruity ceases; as to mention “six” categories, as having “beingness” is as much as to say that it belongs to *all things*.

¹⁵ KA, p. 19.5–7: *nanv etad eva dvayam abhāve ’py astīti cet, astu, na hi tad-apekṣayā vaidharmyam idaṁ vivakṣitam, api tu ṣad-apekṣayā sādharmyam.*

¹⁶ NKan₁, p. 16: *tac ca vastunaḥ svarūpam eva bhāva-svarūpam evāvasthā-bhedena jñeyatvam abhidheyatvaṁ cōcyate.*

And any thing that exists is also capable of being “predicated” (emphasis—P.B.).

And in the same spirit Jaysankar Lal SHAW (1978: 259–260) asserted that:

‘To exist is to be knowable and nameable. It is claimed that if something has one of the three properties, it has the remaining two properties as well. ... Every object has the property of being communicable through language. ... This amounts to saying that an object can be an object of knowledge of cognition.’

However, Wilhelm HALBFASS (1992: 158) was far more cautious in his judgments:

“‘All six categories possess is-ness, nameability, and knowability” (*śaṅṅāṃ api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni*).¹¹⁰ Praśastapāda’s short statement is elusive; its simplicity is deceptive. It does not clarify the relationship between *astitva*, on the one hand, and predicability and knowability or objectifiability, on the other. The fact that he coordinates them as common attributes (*sādharmya*) of the six categories does not necessarily mean that he considers them to be coextensive.¹¹¹ The commentators usually include nonbeing (*abhāva*) under *abhidheyatva* and *jñeyatva*, but are reluctant to do so with regard to *astitva*; although we may know and speak of nonbeing, nothing knowable or speakable exists (or “is there”) apart from the six positive categories.¹¹² [¹¹⁰ PBh, p. 16.]’

I will return to this important question whether the three properties are coextensive or not in § 3 below (p. 273 ff.).

2.3. Existentiality and existence

Praśastapāda, Candramati and Uddyotakara are too laconic to judge the way they conceived of the relation of the three properties. Not only do they not define them, but also treat them as meta-categories¹⁷ that underlie the system and its categories and are

¹⁷ Cf. HALBFASS (1992: 1945): ‘*Astitva* is not part of the fundamental “nomenclature of the world.” It is not “listed” and “named” among the categories, but used to describe and analyze them. It is a second-order concept, an abstraction.’ Indeed, the problem of the property of *astitva* to be considered a separate category is pointed out by Śāntarakṣita in TSaP 572:

*saṃjñāpaka-pramāṇasya viśaye tattvam iṣyate /
śaṅṅām astitvam iti cet śaḍbhyo ’nyas te prasajyate //*

too well known to be defined or explained. They must have already become a ‘common assumption’ of the discourse at that time. All Praśastapāda says about them is, for instance, that they apply to all the six categories to which the universe is reducible, i.e. they apply to everything. Most importantly, *astitva* is clearly distinguished from the highest universal (*sāmānya*) of existence (*sattā*), which is possessed only by the first three categories of ‘concrete things’ (*artha*): substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*) and movements (*karman*). Existentiality (*astitva*) along with two other meta-categories, in their turn, are predicated of everything. Only ‘concrete’ things need ‘existence’ (*sattā*) for their existence, whereas the remaining three categories—i.e. universals (*sāmānya*), individuators (*viśeṣa*)¹⁸ and inherence (*samavāya*)—do not and cannot; they do possess, however, existentiality (*astitva*).

Some clarification with respect to the actual relation between the concepts of *sattā* and *astitva* can be found in PBh. In the chapter on the relation of inherence, Praśastapāda explains that

‘Just as the presence (sc. the universal existence, *sattā*) of substances, qualities and movements, which consists in [their] being existent,¹⁹ has no additional association with the universal existence (sc. it needs no second-order universal of existence), similarly inherence, consisting in occurrence has no additional (sc. second order) occurrence; therefore [inherence] occurs in itself.’²⁰

In other words, the highest universal of existence that characterises substances, qualities and movements, does not need any second-order universal of existence; it does need though the quality of ‘being existent’, or ‘having the nature of something existent’ (*sad-ātmaka*), i.e. existentiality (*astitva*).

Thus, the highest universal of existence (*sattā*) is inherently related—through the relation of *samavāya*—to only those entities and all those which can ostensibly be referred to as denotata with specific terms denoting them. Accordingly, the extension, or application, of *sattā* is narrower than that of *astitva*.²¹ This contention finds further

¹⁸ An idea that only partially resembles Duns Scotus’ notion of haecceity (‘thisness’), the main difference being that for Duns Scotus it was the notion of a particular non-qualitative property or aspect of a thing responsible for its distinct individuality or essence, whereas for Vaiśeṣika it is a separate category.

¹⁹ Cf. VS(C) 1.2.4 (*bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva*) and VSV(C) ad loc.

²⁰ PBh₁ 12, p. 328 = PBh₂ 384: *yathā dravya-guṇa-karmanām sad-ātmakasya bhāvasya nānyaḥ sattā-yogo ’sti, evam avibhāgino vṛtty-ātmakasya samavāyasya nānyā vṛttir asti tasmāt svātma-vṛttiḥ*.

²¹ This was eventually perceived as problematic by some. See for instance Bhaṭṭa Vādindra who, in his *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-vārttika* (VSV), equates *astitva* with *sattā* to avoid a range of

support in Praśastapāda's following statement which indirectly associates the property of being related to the universal existence (*sattā-sambandha*) with the property of being nameable according to a linguistic convention that governs the process of conventional naming of the first three categories (substances, qualities and movements):

‘All three [categories, viz.] substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements), possess the relation with [the universal] existence, [possess] the status of [entities] that are endowed with intermediate universals, [possess] the status of [entities] that are nameable with [the help of] speech elements that [express their] denotata [in accordance] with the convention [that applies] to them^{22,23}.

We can see that for Praśastapāda there are two different strategies to denote entities, or—to put it differently—different categories are all amenable to being denoted in two different ways. All the six categories, which are also possessed of existentiality (*astitva*), are nameable (*abhidheya*), whereas the first three of them, which are pos-

difficulties; see ISAACSON (1995: 28–29): ‘What Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra does here is attempt to solve an inherent difficulty in Vaiśeṣika ontology by equating what originally was a “second-order concept,” which fell outside of the supposedly all-inclusive categories, with the highest universal. This attempt to make the description and classification of really existing things as complete as possible with a small set of first-order concepts and avoiding the use of concepts at a higher (meta-) level as far as possible, inevitably entails infinite regress, circularity or *ātmāśrayaḥ* at some key points; how persuasive Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra is in arguing that this does not invalidate his proposals I shall leave to philosophers to debate. No Indian thinker, as far as I know, has followed Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra in this.’

²² This is in accordance with VS(C) 7.2.24: *sāmayikaḥ śabdād artha-pratyayaḥ*.—‘The understanding of the meaning [takes place] by virtue of the speech element governed by a convention.’

A reference to such an understanding of the meaning of a word, which denotes concrete entities (substances and their qualities) as well as their movements, which expresses both the universal and the particular aspect—and only these first three categories possess universals (*sāmānya*) and individuators (*viśeṣa*), may earlier have been referred to by Bharṭṭhari in VP 2.125, which is slightly cryptic:

*niyatās tu prayogā ye niyataim yac ca sādhanam /
teṣām śabdābhidheyatvam aparair anugamyate //*

‘Others conclude that specific application [of words] (sc. universals) and means [to apply them] (sc. particulars) are what is expressed by the speech element.’

²³ PBh₁ 2.3, p. 17 = PBh₂ 14: *dravyādīnām trayāṇām api sattā-sambandhaḥ, sāmānya-viśeṣavattvaṁ, sva-samayārtha-śabdābhidheyatvaṁ, dharmādharma-karṭṭvaṁ ca*.

It is generally accepted by later Vaiśeṣika authors that the idea goes back to Praśastapāda, which further implies that the first to adopt the three properties (*astitva-abhidheyatva-jñeyatva*) common to all ontological categories was Praśastapāda, see VSU 8.2.3, p. 370.3–4: *tad uktam praśastadevācāryaiḥ “trayāṇām artha-śabdābhidheyatvaṁ ca” iti*.—‘It was stated by the esteemed preceptor Praśasta that the three [categories possess] the status of [entities] that are nameable with [the help of] speech elements that [express their] denotata.’

sessed of the highest universal of existence (*sattā*), are in addition nameable through speech elements that express their denotata following the convention that applies to these categories (*sva-samayārtha-śabdābhidheya*). Such an interpretation is additionally strengthened by a mediaeval commentary called *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya-samālocana*:

‘[All first three categories, viz. substances, qualities and movements,] possess the relation with [the universal] existence, which (sc. the relation) consists in inherence. Intermediate universals are substantiality etc. (i.e. qualitiveness (*guṇatva*) and mobility (*karmatva*)). [These three categories also possess] the status of [entities] endowed with these [intermediate universals]. Only three [categories, viz.] substance etc., are named with the help of an independent (sc. not connected with a subordinate word) speech element that [expresses] its denotatum (object), not any other [category]. This precisely is the convention, [expressed] in the own literature of the Vaiśeṣikas, to facilitate practice, just as [the statement] of *The Instruction on Yoga* (YBh): “The triad of meditation, contemplation and concentration with respect to one [object constitute] restraint”.²⁴

Thus, only the first three ontological categories can be related through inherence to existence, whereas such categories as intermediate universals (*dravyatva*, *guṇatva*, *karmatva*), individuators and inherence are excluded; they possess *astitva* (‘existentiality’) instead. *Praśastapāda* explicitly states that they are not nameable in the same way as the first three categories. In other words, universals etc. are not ostensibly nameable, i.e. cannot be ostensibly indicated with an accompanying verbal expression:

‘[The subsequent] three categories such as universals etc. (i.e. individuators and inherence) [possess] the status of [entities] that are existent in their own essence (sc. are self-existent), [possess] the status of [entities] that are characterised (or: recognised) by cognition²⁵, [possess] the status of [entities] that are not effects, [possess] the status of [entities] that are not causes, [possess] the status of [entities] that do not possess

²⁴ PBhS, p. 10.15–20 (ad PBh₂ 14): *sattā-sambandhaḥ samavāya-lakṣaṇaḥ sāmānya-viśeṣā dravyatvādayaḥ tadvattvaṁ nirupapadenārtha-śabdena dravyādayas traya evābhidhīyante nāpare. eṣa eva samayo vaiśeṣikāṇāṁ sva-śāstre vyavahāra-lāghavāya yathā “dhyāna-dhāraṇā-samādhi-trayam ekatra saṁyama”⁸ iti yogānuśāsane.*

^a YBh 3.4: *dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhi-trayam ekatra saṁyamaḥ.*

²⁵ As regards the ambiguity of the expression *buddhi-lakṣaṇa* (‘those whose characteristic is cognition’ or ‘those who are recognised through cognition’) cf. VyV, p. 40.21–22: *tathā buddhir lakṣaṇam yeṣāṁ buddhyā lakṣyanta iti vā buddhi-lakṣaṇās teṣāṁ bhāvo buddhi-lakṣaṇatvam.*

any intermediate universals (i.e. subtypes), [possess] the status of [entities] that are permanent and [possess] the status of [entities] that are not nameable with [the help of] speech elements that [express their] denotata.²⁶

Centuries later, Śāṅkaramiśra restates the idea slightly differently:

‘... even though [universals, individuators and inherence] are bereft of existence, [which is the highest universal], they are the contents of cognition that [they are] existent...’²⁷

All that means is that all the six categories of the classical Vaiśeṣika can become the contents of both verbal expressions (*abhidhāna*) and cognitive acts (*pratyaya*), but only first three of them can be indicated directly (by pointing) as well as both named (with either general or non-abstract singular terms, or names) and veridically thought of as concrete objects, whose qualities or states are spatio-temporarily limited and which are potentially observable directly.

Worth noting is that the same idea is paraphrased (quoted?) and ascribed to Praśastamati by Mallavādin in DNC, where he introduces a longer quotation from the *Praśastamati-ṭīkā*:

‘Further, one may object: “[All three categories, viz.] substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements), are the contents of verbal designation and cognition <as something existent>²⁸ only by their own force, because they are existent (or: because of their existentiality), just as the existence and other [universals are the contents of verbal designation and cognition because they are existent by their own force]. Just as there is verbal designation and cognition of the existence and other [universals] by their own force, not because of their union with [the universal] existence, similarly there is verbal designation and cognition also of [the three categories of] substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) by their own force, not because they are endowed with [the universal] existence”. That is not correct, because [substance, qualities and movements] do not share the na-

²⁶ PBh₁ 2.3, p. 19 = PBh₂ 15: *sāmānyādīnām trayāṅgām svātma-sattvaṃ buddhi-lakṣaṇatvam akāryatvam akāraṇatvam asāmānya-viśeṣavatvam nityatvam artha-śabdānabhidheyatvam cēti*.

²⁷ PBh₁ṬS, p. 177.3–7: *sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām svātma-sattvam. tac ca sattā-sūnyatve sati sat-pratyaya-viśayatvam. buddhi-lakṣaṇatvaṃ cānuvṛtta-buddhi-vyāvṛtta-buddhi-hetu-buddhi-viśayatvam eva lakṣaṇam sāmānyādīnām trayāṅgām ity uktam*.

²⁸ The edition reads: *dravyādīnām svata evābhidhāna-pratyaya-viśayatvaṃ*, but—in view of the recurring reading *sad-abhidhāna-pratyayau* in DNC, p. 517.6, p. 517.6–7 and p. 519.7—we should perhaps read *dravyādīnām svata eva sad-abhidhāna-pratyaya-viśayatvaṃ*.

ture of it (i.e. of universal existence). Since substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) do not have the nature of this [universal existence],²⁹ [their] verbal designation etc. (i.e. cognition) as something existent is based on [the universal] existence, like [the ideas] “the one with no stick” and “the one with a stick” are based on [the idea of] “a stick”.³⁰

Thus, what renders the first three categories ostensibly expressible and cognisable as concrete denotata, i.e. as objects or phenomena that can be directly indicated, seems to be the universal existence that is related to them. The remaining three categories, including universals (the primary of them being existence (*sattā*)), can neither be expressed ostensibly (sc. pointed to) nor be directly cognised in the same manner, i.e. as potentially spatio-temporarily determinable objects that are related to particular qualities, albeit they can be spoken and veridically thought of as general objects or ideas. Praśastamati rejects an unidentified opponent’s opinion that the first three categories (substance, qualities and movements) would not need any additional factor or determinant to be expressed and cognised as existent entities, the way the remaining three categories can, on the grounds that the idea of existence as a universal is already entailed in any statement that addresses an object that exists or an object that does not exist. While Mallavādin subsequently rejects the idea, he nonetheless refers to Praśastamati’s formulations:

‘What has been said, viz. “Since they do not share the nature of it (i.e. of universal existence), verbal designation and cognition of substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) as something existent is [possible]

²⁹ See remark ^b in n. 30. With the reading *asad-ātmatvāt*, as it is (wrongly) printed, we would have to read: ‘Since substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) do not have the nature of something existent [on its own]’.

In addition, the idea of *sad-ātmakatva/sad-ātmatva* corresponds to *astitva* (see p. 257), and what is meant here is the idea that the three categories of substances etc. need the third category to be amenable to verbal expression etc.

³⁰ DNC, p. 517.5–518.1 (Vol. II): *yat punaḥ “dravyādīnām [dravya-guṇa-karmanām]^a svata evābhīdhāna-pratyaya-viśayatvaṁ sattvāt sattādivat. yathā sattādeḥ sad-abhīdhāna-pratyayau svata eva, na sattā-yogāt, evaṁ dravyādīnām api sad-abhīdhāna-pratyayau svata eva, na sattā-yogād” ity ukte ucyate—nūtat, atādātmyāt. dravyādīnām asad-ātmatvā^b sattā-nimittam sad-abhīdhānādi daṇḍa-nimittādaṇḍa-daṇḍitvavad iti.*

^a DNC, p. 517.3: *teṣāṁ trayaṇām.*

^b Read: *atad-ātmatvāt* in view of (1) the preceding *atādātmyāt*, (2) DNC, p. 519.7: *atad-ātmatvād dravyādīnām...* (see n. 31), and (3) DNCV, p. 519.26–27: *atad-ātmatvād ity-ādy asattātmakatvād dravya-guṇa-karmanām sad-abhīdhāna-pratyayau sattā-yogāt.*

Cf. MŚVṬ, III, p. 29.5–8: *tad yadi daṇḍa-puruṣa-sambandho daṇḍi-śabdasyābhīdheyah, tathā satī tan-niṣkarse daṇḍitvam daṇḍitēti tva-talor anuśāsanam upapadyate. yathā go-śabdābhīdheyam sāmānyam gotvam itī tv upratyayena niṣkṛsyate.*

only because they are endowed with [the universal] existence, it is not possible by their own force”, that too is not [correct].³¹

We can further notice that members of the compound *sad-abhidhāna-pratyaya*—resolved as *sad-abhidhāna* (‘verbal designation [of *x*] as existent’) of *Prāśastamati* and *sad-pratyaya* (‘cognition [of *x*] as existent’)—correspond to the triad *astitva-abhidheyatva-jñeyatva* of *Prāśastapāda*.³²

2.4. How do existentiality and existence differ?

The comparison of *Prāśastapāda*’s vocabulary (*astitva-abhidheyatva-jñeyatva*) and that of *Uddyotakara* (*sattva-abhidheyatva-prameyatva*, quoted in n. 5) reveals that the terms *astitva* and *sattva* can, at least on some occasions, be treated as interchangeable, depending on the choice of authors. The specific character of *astitva* (‘existentiality’) and the way it differs from *sattā* (‘existence’) will become clearer when we compare the usage of still another term, viz. *bhāva*, which may at first appear to cover some of the semantics of ‘existence’ and which occurs in selected passages of *Prāśastapāda*’s work and of the *Prāśastamati-ṭīkā* as quoted by *Mallavādin* and *Siṃha-sūri*. The term *bhāva* occurs in at least the following meanings in both works:

³¹ DNC, p. 519.7–520.1: *yad apy uktam “atad-ātmatvād dravyādinām sad-abhidhāna-pratyayau sattā-yogāt, na svataḥ” tad api na.*

³² In his criticism *Mallavādin* directly refers to *Prāśastamati*’s ideas. This also throws additional light on the relations between the three properties (existentiality, nameability and cognisability): DNC, p. 521.7–522.1: *yataś cāvam tasmāt sato bhāvaḥ sattēti vyutpattir dravyādy-vyatirikta-sattārthāva kartari ṣaṣṭhi-vṛtteḥ. yat tat sadbhīr bhūyate ... sad ity-abhidhāna-pratyaya-kāraṇam sarvatra.*—‘Since it is so, [viz. the universal existence of substances etc. is there by its own force,] therefore the presence of that which is existent [is the universal] existence—such is the etymological formation the meaning of which is nothing but [the universal] existence as something different from substances etc., inasmuch as the genitive case is used [to indicate] the agent. ... That which obtains by virtue of existent [entities] (sc. the fact that existent entities occur as such) is the cause of verbal designation and cognition of the form: “[it] is existent” with respect to everything.’ Cf. DNCV, p. 521.20–522.–11: *yataś cāvam ity-ādi, yasmāt svata eva sattā dravyādinām yuktā tasmāt sato bhāvaḥ sattēti yā śabda-vyutpattir bheda-ṣaṣṭhy-āpādanārthā sā dravyādy-avyatirikta-sattārthāva jñāyate satām bhāvaḥ sattēti. kim kāraṇam? kartari ṣaṣṭhi-vṛtteḥ. tad-vyākhyānam—yat tat sadbhīr ity-ādi gatārtham yāvat sad ity-abhidhāna-pratyaya-kāraṇam sarvatrēti.* Comp. also DNCV, p. 535.23–24: *yat tat tena bhūyate sa sattā “bhū sattāyam” [PāDhā 1] iti pāṭhāt sāmānyam.*

- (1) *bhāva* in the sense of ‘presence’, ‘occurrence’, where it is equivalent to *sadbhāva*, viz. ‘*x* is there’, ‘*x* is present here’;³³
- (2) *bhāva* in the sense of ‘existence [of]’, viz. ‘there is’, ‘there exists’;³⁴
- (3) *bhāva* in the copulative meaning of ‘is’, viz. ‘*x* is *P*’;^{35,36}
- (4) *bhāva* in the sense of *sattā-sāmānya*, viz. the highest universal.³⁷

The last meaning is technical, and thus relevant to our discussion, whereas the first three express the ideas of ‘being’ (i.e. ‘being there’, ‘being a *P*’ etc.) in a rather loose sense, especially in ontological, existential or predicative senses respectively. Most importantly, *bhāva* in the fourth meaning is equated with the universal existence, which is in agreement with an earlier tradition of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*³⁸, and it is nowhere associated with the idea of *astitva*, whereas the term *sattva* is. We see that, in other words, existentiality (*astitva*, *sattva*) corresponds neither to the highest universal (*sattā-sāmānya*) nor to existence (*bhāva*) in the ontological sense as ‘presence’, or ‘being there’ etc., nor to the copulative meaning of the verb ‘to be’ (\surd as, \surd bhū).

What is existentiality (*astitva*, *sattva*) then, and how does it differ in its meaning and application from the universal existence (*sattā*, *bhāva*)? It is, in my opinion, the

³³ PB_{h1}, p. 238 = PB_{h2} 270: *ubhayāsiddho ’nyatarāsiddhas tad-bhāvāsiddho ’numeyāsiddhas cēti. ... tad-bhāvāsiddho yathā dhūma-bhāvenāgnny-adhigatau kartavyāyām upanyasyamāno bhāspo* [PB_{h1}: *vāspe*] *dhūma-bhāvenāsiddha iti. Cf. VNT*, p. 14: *vāsa-grhādiṣu tarhi dahanābhāve ’pi dhūma-sadbhāvād vyabhicāra iti cet.*

³⁴ PB_{h1} 10, p. 312 = PB_{h2} 364–365: *aparām dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādy anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-hetutvāt sāmānyam viśeṣas ca bhavati. ... prāṇy-aprāṇi-gatānām anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-hetutvāt sāmānyavīṣeṣa-bhāvaḥ siddhaḥ. See also DNC*, p. 518.1–2: *katham idam tādātmyam (of dravyādi and sattā)? kim sato bhāvāt uta sat-karativāt?*

³⁵ In one of its two meanings, either = or \subset , viz. \in ; cf. BOCHENSKI (1956: 357; § 40.16).

³⁶ PB_{h1} 9.5, p. 308.1 = PB_{h2} 356: *ākāśa-kāla-dig-ātmanām saty api dravya-bhāve niṣkriyatvam sāmānyādivad amūrtatvāt.*

³⁷ PB_{h1} 8, p. 187.3–7 = PB_{h2} 171: *buddhi-sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣa-prayatanānām dvayor ātmanasoḥ saṁyogād upalabdhiḥ. bhāva-dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādīnām upalabhyādihāra-samavētānām āśraya-grāhakair indriyair grahaṇam ity etad asmad-ādīnām pratyakṣam. Comp. the paraphrase in NKan₂, p. 454.9: *sattā-dravyatvādīnām sāmānyānām āśrayo...* See also PB_{h1} 12, p. 326.12 ff. = PB_{h2} 376–377: *sa ca dravyādibhyaḥ padārthāntaram, bhāvaval lakṣaṇa-bhedāt. yathā bhāvasya dravyatvādīnām svādhāreṣu ātmānurūpa-pratyaya-kartrtvāt svāśrayādibhyaḥ parasparataś cārthāntara-bhāvaḥ, tathā samavāyasyāpi pañcasu padārtheṣv ihēti-pratyaya-darśanāt tebhyaḥ padārthāntaratvam iti. na ca saṁyogavan nānātvaḥ, bhāvaval liṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣa-liṅgābhāvāc ca. tasmād bhāvavat sarvatrākaḥ samavāya iti. [here: *bhāva* = *sattā-sāmānya*. Comp. the paraphrase in in NKan₁, p. 236.21.**

³⁸ VS(C) 1.2.4: *bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva. Cf. VSV(C) ad loc.: bhāvaḥ sattā sāmānyam eva, triṣv api dravyādiṣv anuvartamānatvāt na viśeṣaḥ.*

capability of any category of the Vaiśeṣika system to enter the ontological structure of the word and to relate to other categories, viz. it is that peculiar capacity that enables any category to be a part of the atomic facts (see § 2.1., p. 252) down to which the world structure is analysable. In other words, in terms of extension, the property of existentiality of entities that can be parts of atomic facts concerns primarily such entities that are subjects of existential statements ‘*x* exists’/‘there is *x*’, and as such the property seems to be characterised by existential entailment, controversial as it may seem (especially having taken into consideration Kant’s argument). This aspect is highlighted centuries later by Śaṅkaramiśra, who avails himself of Navya-Nyāya terminology to make it unequivocally clear that *astitva* attaches to absolutely everything that is there, can be thought of and accordingly categorised:

‘With respect to these [six categories] existentiality means precisely the fact [that all these categories] are referred to as “*x* exists”. Further, this [property of existentiality] is indeed traditionally [considered] as something different, i.e. as [a property] common to absences. Accordingly, one should understand that everything, whether having the status of a property or a property-possessor, shares a common property of being universally present.’³⁹

If my understanding of the above is correct, existentiality is, consequently, such a property that typifies a reification of the ontological commitment expressed in existential statements.

Precisely such reification is questioned by the Buddhist opponent Kamalaśīla, who—while referring to T° (PBh₁ 2.3, p. 16 = PBh₂ 11)—argues that to postulate such a property lacks any objective basis insofar as it never occurs separately from and as something separate from all the six categories; to say that ‘*x* possesses existentiality’ and ‘there is *x*’ is one and the same thing and the difference is merely linguistic, but not ontological:

‘In such [statements as] “the six ontological categories have existentiality” and “there is a group of six [categories]”, even though there is no real difference [in what they express], the genitive form is used. For you do not admit existentiality as something over and above the six categories.’⁴⁰

³⁹ PBhṬS, p. 175.4–7: *tatra cāstītvam astīti-viśayatvam eva tac cābhāva-sādhāraṇam anyad yathā-śrutam eva. evaṁ ca dharmatva-dharmitvādikam api sarvaṁ kevalānvayi sādharmyam iha pratyetavyam.*

⁴⁰ TSaP 572, p. 192.9–10: *ṣaṅṅām padārthānām astītvam teṣām ca ṣaṅṅām varga ity-ādāv asaty api vāstave bhede ṣaṣṭhy-ādi bhavaty eva. nahi bhavadbhiḥ ṣaṭ-padārtha-vyatiriktam astītvādiṣyate.*

The property of *astitva* singles entities as a part of the ontological framework, whereas the property of *sattā* ('existence') turns them into elements of our concrete experiences. The latter thus concerns merely entities that are potentially⁴¹ amenable to ostension, i.e. they are capable of being demonstrated e.g. by pointing, and are *relata*, i.e. the loci of relations. At the same time, *sattā* points to the entities' capability of being subjects of predicative sentences of the type 'x is P' as entities that are loci of relations and thus are predicated of as being endowed with properties, i.e. as related to other entities by a relation different than a relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Accordingly, we can predicate of qualities (*guṇa*) and movements (*karman*) of substances (*dravya*), and of other properties or relations (but not qualities) of qualities and movements, whereas we cannot predicate of any properties of the remaining three categories that do not possess *sattā*, but only possess *astitva*.

The relation between *astitva* and *sattā* is, therefore, additive in the sense that all the six categories possess the former, and some (i.e. the first three) are, in addition, endowed with the latter: *sattā* adds to *astitva* in some cases, but the converse of the relation does not hold. We could also use the term 'bare existence' for *astitva* in a very particular sense to imply that an entity is merely there at least as an object of thought in its bare form, divested of all its possible properties and relations; however it would not imply that the entity actually and objectively exists as an observable part of atomic facts, i.e. that it is endowed with various relations and properties. What is important, *astitva* in no way implies an object's existence in mind or an intentional content of a thought (*vide supra*, p. 269). Further, we could use the term 'actual existence' for *sattā* in the sense that an entity actually and objectively is a part of an atomic fact and, therefore, is possessed of particular properties and is related to other *relata*, i.e. that it is actually instantiatable. Since *sattā* only attaches to entities of which we can predicate properties and relations, we could also call it 'predicative existence'.

Interestingly, what we might thus provisionally call 'bare existence' will be described by subsequent authors exclusively and emphatically in positive terms, e.g. as '[the property of] being endowed with intrinsic nature' by Śrīdharamiśra (*sva-*

⁴¹ In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, not all concrete entities are directly perceptible to an ordinary eye, e.g. atoms are not, being of infinitesimal size beyond ordinary perception. Similarly, qualities and movements of such entities are not directly perceptible to an ordinary eye, e.g. the vibrating movement of atoms (*spandana*) is not, unless—as the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika believed—one is endowed with a kind of suprasensory perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) or the so-called seers' perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa*), known also as intuition (*pratibha* or *pratibhā*), see VS(C) 9.28 (see n. 162) and PB₁ 8.12, p. 258 = PB₂ 288 (see n. 161). However, all these objects are potentially amenable to ostention, provided one is endowed with a special kind of suprasensory perception, or adequate sensory apparatus to perceive them.

*rūpavattva*⁴²), ‘the ability to be cognised in a cognitive act primarily through affirmation’ by Śaṅkaramiśra (*vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-vedyatva*)⁴³, ‘the ability to become the datum for a cognitive act primarily as affirmation’ by Udayana (*vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-viṣayatva*)⁴⁴) as well as ‘the existence of the thing in its intrinsic nature’ and ‘the ability to become the datum for a cognition primarily as affirmation’ by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra in his *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya-sūkti* (*svarūpa-sattva vidhi-mukha-pratīti-viṣayatva*)⁴⁵).

Thus, the usage of the term *astitva* as well as its subsequent paraphrases highlight the affirmative aspect of all the ontological categories and accentuate the opposition to the Buddhist *apoha* theory: all categories are amenable both to cognitive and verbal acts directly, as they are, not via the semantic exclusion (*apoha*).

2.5. Existentiality, existence and non-existence

If, as it seems, by ascribing a property of existence (*sattā*) to an entity that belongs to one of the first three categories, one is ontologically committed, how would it harmonise with the non-existence of such objects as a hare’s horn (*śaśa-viṣāṇa*) or sky flower (*kha-puṣpa*) that we can think of and speak of?

To answer this, we should first see how the ascription of a property of existentiality (*astitva*) to such non-existent entities is compatible with its ontological commit-

⁴² NKan₁ p. 16: **astitvaṁ** svarūpavattvaṁ ṣaṅṅāṁ api sādharmyaṁ yasya vastuno yat svarūpaṁ tad eva tasyāstitvam. **abhidheyatvam** apy abhidhāna-pratipādana-yogyatvaṁ, tac ca vastunaḥ svarūpaṁ eva bhāva-svarūpaṁ evāvasthā-bhedena **jñeyatvam** abhidheyatvaṁ cōcyate.

⁴³ PBhṬS, p. 174.14–175.3: *nirūpitā ṣaṭ-padārthī vaidharmyam* (recte: *vaidharmyam*) *api nirūpitam eva lakṣaṇa-prasaṅgena samprati sādharmyaṁ nirūpyate. ṣaṅṅāṁ astitvaṁ abhidheyatvaṁ jñeyatvam. tatrāstitvaṁ vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-vedyatvam. nanu abhāvo ’stīty abhāve ’py etat sādharmyaṁ gatam iti cet na nañ-uparāgena vidhitva-pratikṣepāt. tamo ’stīti pratītir astīti cet na nañ-arthāntar-bhāveṇāva tamaḥ-pada-pravṛtteḥ bhābhāvo hi tama iti. abhidheyatvam abhidhāna-karma-bhāvatvaṁ sat-padābhidheyatvaṁ vārthābhidheyatvaṁ vā. jñeyatvam api sattā-prakāraka-jñāna-viṣayatvaṁ jñāna-viṣaya-bhāvatvaṁ vā.*

⁴⁴ KA, p. 19.3–7: **astitvam**—*vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-viṣayatvam; pratiyogy-anapekṣa-nirūpaṇatvam iti-yāvat. abhidheyatvam*—*abhidhāna-yogyatā. śabdena saṅgati-lakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ. jñeyatvam*—*jñāna-yogyatā, jñāpya-jñāpaka-lakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ. nanv etad eva dvayam abhāve ’py astīti cet, astu, na hi tad-apekṣayā vaidharmyam idaṁ vivakṣitam, api tu ṣad-apekṣayā sādharmyam.*

⁴⁵ PBhSū, p. 114: [Sūkti] **astitvaṁ** svarūpa-sattvaṁ tac cōbhayāvṛtti-dharmavattvam. *abhāvasyālakṣyatve tu tāḍṛśa-bhāvatvaṁ vācyam. evam agre ’pi. astitvaṁ vidhi-mukha-pratīti-viṣayatvam. tac ca—pratiyogy-anapekṣa-nirūpaṇa-viṣayatvam ity ācārya-vyākhyānantu cintyam. nirūpaṇaṁ hi tatra yadi sāḅṣāt-kāras tadātindriye dravyādāv avyāptiḥ. yadi ca jñāna-mātraṁ tarhy abhāve ’ti vyāptiḥ, anapekṣānta-vaiyarthyaṁ ca syād iti. abhidheyatvaṁ pada-śakyatvam. jñeyatvaṁ jñāna-viṣayatvam.*

ment within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika framework, insofar as it is the property of existentiality that carries the ontological commitment, whereas the property of existence (*sattā*), that applies to a narrower set of things, merely inherits it.

It seems that the latter three categories of universals (*sāmānya*), individuators (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) do not pose any significant difficulty once their existence is accepted within the ontological framework of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. This is precisely what the list of the ontological categories (*padārtha*) is all about: it offers a catalogue of all that is there. Since the three categories, by definition, have no properties, they cannot function as subjects of predicative sentences that predicate a mismatched quality of, say, movement of them. Such sentences would suffer from defective construction of faulty ascription of a incompatible property. The problem, therefore, is with the first three categories that seem to allow for such entities as a hare's horn (*śaśa-viṣāṇa*), a sky flower (*kha-puṣpa*), a trembling of the hands etc. of the son of a barren woman⁴⁶, a colourless paint, or immovable wind. They 'allow' in the sense that it is only in the context of these first three categories that we can face the problem of a combination of incompatible or contradictory constituents into one contradictory, impossible or empirically unattested whole.

We should remember that, *generally* (there might be some exceptions though), the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika do not distinguish between non-existent objects, such as 'Pegasus', a donkeys's horn (*khara-viṣāṇa*) or a crow's teeth (*kāka-danta*), that are generally not impossible but are merely not attested in experience, i.e. *empirically not instantiated*, on the one hand, and, on the other, purely fictitious objects, such as 'the present king of the Republic of India' or 'a barren woman's son' (*vandhyā-suta*), that contain contradictory properties, which makes them *logically impossible*. All of these are subsumed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika under the same category of absolute non-existence, or absence (*aṭyantābhāva*, *sāmānyābhāva*, see VS(C) 9.5). It seems that such a two-fold distinction is conceived of only by Candramati in his DPŚ 1.11, where he additionally speaks of relational non-existence, or absence (*saṃsargābhāva*), i.e. the absence of (at least) two (or more) particular constituents that are not related in a particular place.⁴⁷

So, the question arises whether, for the early Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika, the property of existentiality (*astitva*) can also be predicated of such fictitious, non-existent objects?

⁴⁶ The example is taken from NBhū, p. 109: **vandhyā-putrasya pāny-ādi-kampa*-°.

⁴⁷ DPŚ₁, p. 101: 'Natural non-existence is that whereby existence, substances, ad so on do not yet come either to conjoin with or entirely to abide in one another', DPŚ₂ 1.11 [81], p. 181: 'Relational absence: That in which the highest universal, substances and so on are neither connected with nor inherent in some place is called relational absence (*saṃsargābhāva itī yasmin sattā-dravyādīny ekaikapradeśe 'samyuktāny asamevatāni vā sa eva saṃsargābhāva itī ucyate*).'

Or, does it attach to existent objects only? If it does, what is the status of fictitious objects? Do they possess existentiality or not? If they do not, how is it possible to claim, as Praśastapāda does, that all the six ontological categories, including fictitious entities, have the property ‘existentiality’? Further, how does existentiality relate to the fact that something exists or to the fact that something does not exist? Some light on the problem is shed by the pre-Dharmakīrtian⁴⁸ Naiyāyika Aviddhakarṇa, whose view is referred in passing to by Śāntarakṣita (inexplicitly) and Kamalaśīla (explicitly) as follows:

‘Aviddhakarṇa, however, formulated the following reasoning to prove the permanence (eternality) of atoms: indivisible atoms do not possess anything that can be accepted as [their] producer which is [at the same time] furnished with a property [that attaches] to something existent, because it is not a datum [that can be cognised] by cognitive criteria which demonstrate existence, like a hare’s horn. [To explain word for word:] A property [that attaches] to something existent [means] a property of a thing in existence, [and this property is] existentiality; something that is furnished with this [property of existentiality] means something that is endowed with it; [the above statement] is the negation of such [a property that attaches to something existent]. [All this means] that there is no cause that produces atoms.’⁴⁹

If we accept the veracity of Kamalaśīla’s testimony—and Kamalaśīla generally proves quite reliable in this regard—that this is Aviddhakarṇa’s view, and he was probably not unique, we can see the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika considered existentiality to be a property of real or potentially existent entities (*sad-dharma*). Existentiality cannot therefore attach to such entities as a hare’s horn (*śaśa-viśāṇa*), a sky flower (*kha-puṣpa*) etc.⁵⁰

That would be an indirect reply to a query whether it is at all conceivable that a fictitious compounded entity, e.g. a hare’s horn, which does not possess the highest universal of existence (*sattā*), could be endowed with existentiality (*astitva*). Theoretically it could, the way universals, individuators and inherence do: they possess *astitva* but not *sattā*. Aviddhakarṇa seems to suggest that such a fictitious com-

⁴⁸ His proof of god (‘from the unique structure’, *saṁsthāna-viśeṣa*, *saṁniveśa-viśiṣṭa*), is referred to by Dharmakīrti in PV 1.12 ac (*Pramāṇa-siddhi*).

⁴⁹ TSaP 553, p. 187.3–7: *aviddhakarṇas tv aṅūnām nityatva-prasāadhanāya pramāṇam āha—paramāṅūnām utpādakābhimatam sad-dharmōpagatam na bhavati, sattva-pratipādaka-pramāṇāviśayatvāt khara-viśāṇavad iti. sato vidyamānasya dharmah sad-dharmo ’stivam tenōpagatam prāptam astīty arthaḥ. tasya pratiśedho ’yam. aṅūtpādakam kāraṇam nāstīty arthaḥ.*

⁵⁰ It does, however, attach to their absences, see p. 278 ff.

pounded entity possesses neither. That conclusion is further strengthened by the series of paraphrases referred to above (p. 265), such as: ‘[the property of] being endowed with intrinsic nature’, ‘the ability to be cognised in a cognitive act primarily through affirmation’, ‘the ability to become the datum for a cognitive act primarily as affirmation’, ‘the existence of the thing in its intrinsic nature’ or ‘the ability to become the datum for a cognition primarily as affirmation’. Clearly, such descriptions would hardly apply to fictitious entities. Since such fictitious entities simply do not exist in any way, they can be possessed neither of existentiality nor of existence. Their ‘existence’ even as a content of thought or as an idea is merely an illusion which is a result of erroneous ascription of real properties to a real thing: a hare exists, a horn exists, a relation of a horn to a particular animal likewise exists; however such a property–substance–relation compound does not hold in the case of a hare.⁵¹ That explains why *astitva* is not merely ‘existence in mind’ (*vide supra*, n. 265).

In addition, it is well-known that the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika claimed that words do refer to existent things only, i.e. to things that possess existentiality (*astitva*). That is confirmed e.g. by Praśastapāda’s statement that to say that ‘a speech element does not denote an object’ is a contradiction in terms⁵². That is perfectly in line with what Uddyotakara says elsewhere:

‘For we do not find any single term which is non-denoting. Even if you considered that the term “soul” has the body etc. as its contents (referent), also in that case the inconsistency would not be eliminated. Why [not]? Because then what becomes the contents of the statement “there is no soul” is the following: “there is no body etc.”. [If you say]: “What you imagine to be the soul does not exist”, [we reply]: we do not imagine the soul, inasmuch as what the imagination [of a certain object *x*] is is a cognition of such [an object *x* which is formed] through wrong attribution of the properties of a certain [object onto another object] due to the [imagined] similarity of a certain [object *x*] which is not of that kind to [objects *y*] which are to be of such kind. However, we do not consider that the soul is of that kind. [If you say: “[We consider the soul to be of such kind] as you imagine the soul”, then you are confronted with the following query: In what way do we imagine the soul? [Do we imagine it] as something existent or as something non-existent? If [we imagine it] as something existent, then what is the affinity between something non-existent and some-

⁵¹ See p. 271 ff., and nn. 57, 58.

⁵² PBh₁ 8.12, p. 234 = PBh₂ 267: *na śabda rtha-pratyāyaka iti sva-vacana-virodhī*. Praśastapāda mentions it in the context of logical fallacies (*ābhāsa*).

thing existent (sc. what is the shared property), on the basis of which the soul is the contents of the imagination? And [the existence of] the soul has already been accepted by anyone who advocates the affinity (sc. the shared property) of the soul and non-soul, because there is no affinity between something non-existent and something existent.

If [you] first imagine, in the soul, some personal identity the contents (sc. referent) of which is the body⁵³ and then [you] contradict it, [you do] not eliminate the inconsistency, because in such a way [you] accept the existence of the contents (referent) which is the personal identity as something different from the body etc. If you think that there can by no means exist an object for a single term, for instance the void, darkness etc., that is not [correct], because it [still] does not eliminate the inconsistency. The [denoted] object for the term “the void”, to begin with, is the following: such a substance for which there exists no occupant, because it is [an empty space] fit for dogs (?)⁵⁴, is called “the void”. Likewise, [the denoted object that corresponds] to the term “darkness” is the data such as substances, qualities and movements in the case of which the conditions [that make them amenable] to apprehension have not been reached⁵⁵. Substances etc. (sc. qualities and movements) [found] in all such cases wherever there is absence of light are called “darkness”. Someone (i.e. the Buddhist) who says that the term “darkness” is non-denoting contradicts his own doctrine because darkness consists in the four kinds of clinging [admitted in Buddhism]. Therefore there is no single term which is non-denoting.’⁵⁶

⁵³ I.e. ‘if you, although you deny the existence of soul, claim that, while using the word “soul”, we in fact use the word as referring to a body...’

⁵⁴ The phrase *śvabhyo hitatvāt* is a bit unclear to me; it certainly relates to the etymology of both *śūnya* and *śvan*, traditionally derived from the verb $\sqrt{śū}$ / $\sqrt{śvi}$ (‘to swell, to grow, to become inflated’). It definitely relates to the uselessness of things given dogs, an idea we find e.g. in MDhŚ 8.90:

*janma-prabhṛti yat kiñcit puṇyaṃ bhadrā tvayā kṛtam /
tat te sarvaṃ śūno gacched yadi brūyās tvam anyathā //*

‘Whatever merit you have done since your birth, my dear, all that will go to the dogs, if you speak untruth.’

⁵⁵ Sc. ‘invisible’; for the expression (an)upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta see KELLNER (1999: 195–198) and BALCEROWICZ (2005).

⁵⁶ NV₁ 3.1.1, p. 340.7–341.6 = NV₂ 3.1.1, p. 320.16–321–9: *na hy ekaṃ padam nirathakam paśyāmaḥ. athāpi śarīrādi-viśayam ātma-śabdam pratipadyethāḥ, evam apy anivṛtto vyāghātaḥ katham iti? na asty ātmēti vākyasya tadānīm ayam artho bhavati śarīrādayo na santīti. atha yaṃ bhavanta ātmānam kalpayanti sa nāstīti na vayam ātmānam kalpayāmaḥ. kalpanā hi nāmātathā-*

Clearly, such descriptions as ‘a hare’s horn’ or ‘a sky flower’—and, similarly, names (expressing complex ideas) such as ‘Pegasus’ or such compounded descriptions as ‘the present King of the Republic of India’—do not denote any real entity taken as a whole, and are non-denoting expressions. On the other hand, these expressions do connote, inasmuch they represent particular cognitive states or intentional objects, albeit non-existent as a whole.⁵⁷ The solution of the problem how such non-denoting expressions are meaningful utterances lies in their composite nature.⁵⁸

In a nutshell, a lucid explanation of the problem is given by Uddyotakara in his commentary on NS 3.1.1, where he defends the existence of soul:

‘Even if the following [argument] is brought up: “[The concept «the soul»] is like [the concept] «the hare’s horn», that too is an unproved example. Why? Because the statement “a hare’s horn” has [a particular] relation as its contents (sc. refers to a particular relation). [Therefore] we negate the relation [of the horn to the hare, but] we do not negate the horn [as such]. [The opponent:] “Let the example be: «the re-

bhūtasya tathā-bhāvibhiḥ sāmānyāt tad-dharmādhyāropeṇa^a tad-pratyayaḥ^b. na cātmanam evam-bhūtaṁ pratipadyāmahe. yaṁ bhavanta ātmānaṁ kalpayantīti bruvāṇo^c bhavān praṣṭavyo jāyate, kathaṁ vayam ātmānaṁ kalpayāma iti. kiṁ sattvenāthāsattvena vā? yadi sattvena kim asataḥ satā sādharmyaṁ yena kalpanā-viṣaya ātmā^d, ātma-sāmānyāṁ cānātmano bruvatā ātmābhyupagato bhavatīti. na hy asataḥ satā sāmānyam astīti.

atha śarīrādi-viṣayam ahaṁkāraṁ ātmani kalpayitvā viparyeti^e evaṁ^f śarīrādi-vyatirikta-ahaṁkāra-viṣaya-satva-abhyupagamād anivṛtto vyāghātaḥ. atha manyase eka-padasya nāvaśyam arthena bhavitavyam iti yathā śūnyaṁ tama iti^g tan na, vyāghāta-anivṛtteḥ. śūnya-śabdasya tāvad ayam artho yasya rakṣitā dravyasya na vidyate tad dravyaṁ śvabhyo hitatvāc chūnyam ity ucyate. tamaḥ-śabdasyāpy anupalabdhi^h-lakṣaṇa-prāptāni dravya-guṇa-karmāṇi viṣayaḥ. yatra yatrāsannidhis tejasah tatra tatra dravyādi tamaḥ-śabdenābhdhīyateⁱ. tamaḥ-śabdaś cānarthaka iti bruvāṇaḥ sva-siddhāntaṁ bādhaṭe caturṇām upādāna^j-rūpatvāt tamasa iti tasmān nānarthakam ekaṁ^k padam iti.

^a NV₁: °-dharmāropeṇa. ^b NV₁: °-pratyaya-viṣayatvam. ^c NV₁: bruvāṇo. ^d NV₁: ātmā. ^e NV₁: viparyasyati. ^f NV₂: evaṁ ca. ^g NV₂: iti ca. ^h NV₂: °-śabdasyānupalabdhi-°. ⁱ NV₁: °-śabdenōcyate. ^j NV₁: °-upādēya. ^k NV₁ omits ekaṁ.

Some portions of the section NV 3.1.1 have been translated by CHAKRAVARTI (1982: 230–231), albeit the references to the Buddhists are not.

⁵⁷ See e.g. SHAW (1974: 336).

⁵⁸ Much has been written on how such non-denoting expressions can be meaningful utterances, and how the analysis of such compounded expressions on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account—to the excitement of a number of scholars—compares to various Western logicians, mostly Bertrand Russell; see e.g. McDERMOTT (1970), MATILAL (1970), MATILAL (2005: 92 ff., Chapt. ‘4. Empty Subject Terms in Logic’), SHAW (1974), SHAW (1978), SHAW (1980), CHAKRAVARTI (1982), PERSZYK (1983), PERSZYK (1984), MATILAL (1985: 78–88), CHAKRAVARTI (1985). Most of these authors focus, however, on later Nyāya tradition.

lation of the hare and the horn»”. That too is not correct, because sometimes there can occur a relation of a hare and a horn, [e.g. we can tie a real horn to a real hare]. [The opponent:] “[But] that stands in contradiction with what people know. If you maintain that there is a horn on a hare, [you] contradict what people [know, i.e. you commit a formal fallacy called «a faulty example»]”. We do not contradict, because the activity of people [occurs] by way of the denial of the cause-effect relation (sc. what the people are concerned with is the denial of the causal relation between the hare and the horn). People, to begin with, deny that the hare has a horn either as its effect or its cause. There is no cause-effect relation between a hare and a horn the way there is cause-effect relation between a cow and a horn. And, by [merely] denying a cause-effect relation [between the two, we do] not [assert] non-existence [of either of them], because it is not the case that if x is neither the effect nor the cause of y , x does not exist, like in the case of Devadatta’s blanket (sc. we can deny that Devadatta has a blanket, but we do not have to assert the non-existence of the blanket as such or the non-existence of Devadatta as such, even though there is no causal relation or possession between the two). Further, if [you] say that a hare’s horn does not exist, then you [have to] answer the query: is it a generic (absolute) denial or a specific (partial) denial? If it is a generic (absolute) denial, then it is not correct, because it is not possible. [From the statement] “the hare does not have a horn” also follows that “the hare does not have any horns of a cow etc.”, and that [thesis] is not possible [to assert], because it is not the case that the [horns of a cow] do not exist [or that one cannot tie a cow’s horn onto a hare’s head]. If it is a specific (partial) denial, then [we] deny a particular horn of a [particular] hare, [such a horn] of which the hare is not the effect and which is not the cause of the hare. What [we] deny is precisely such a cause-effect relation [between the hare and the horn]. On the other hand, a cause-effect relation that is found in other cases is denied here [in this particular hare-horn case]. Therefore, the example [of a hare’s horn] is not applicable when you [want to] prove the absolute non-existence [of something]. By the same token the non-existence of a sky flower is understood to have been explained.’⁵⁹

⁵⁹ NV₁ 3.1.1, p. 343.3–20 = NV₂ 3.1.1, p. 322.20–323.11: *yad apīdam ucyate śaśa-viṣāṇavad ity ayam apy asiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ. katham iti śaśa-viṣāṇa-śabdasya sambandha-viṣayatvāt. sambandha-pratiśedho na viṣāṇa-pratiśedhaḥ. śaśa-viṣāṇa-sambandha udāharaṇam bhaviṣyatīti so 'pi na yuktaḥ,*

Accordingly, the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika do not assert the reality, in any sense, of such non-existent entities as a hare's horn (*śaśa-viṣāṇa*) or a sky flower (*kha-puṣpa*), which, it seems, can neither possess the property of existentiality (*astitva*) nor the property of existence (*sattā*). In the case of a non-existent object of this kind, all the three elements exist, viz. the hare, the horn and a causal relation. However, what is non-existent is a compound of all the three.⁶⁰

For the above reason, such compounded fictitious entities cannot apparently possess the property of existentiality (*astitva*). Likewise, the expressions that seem to refer to them do not turn out to be non-denoting terms, possessing neither *astitva* nor *sattā*, but what they actually denote are existent components of such a compound, albeit causally or factually unrelated. It follows that the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika neither postulate that such expressions may refer to fictitious, non-existent objects, the way MEINONG (1904), PARSONS (1980) or ZALTA (1983) and (1988) did, nor do they claim that these expressions are meaningful, albeit they cannot be assigned any truth-value, the way STRAWSON (1950) did.

What still remains unclear is the status of such fictitious entities and how they can be thought of if they are denied existentiality and, with this, a place within an ontological framework of entities that can be thought of.

3.1. Do the properties overlap?

After we (have gained an impression that we) have understood the meaning of the property of existentiality (*astitva*) and the way it differs from the highest universal of existence (*sattā*), we should return to the issue brought up in § 2.2, namely whether ex-

kadācid viṣāṇena śaśasya sambandhōpapatteḥ. loka-virodha iti cet. atha manyase yadi śaśe viṣāṇam asti nanu loko viruddhyata iti. na viruddhyate kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-pratiṣedha-dvāreṇa laukika-pravṛtteḥ. lokas tāvat kāryam kāraṇam vā śaśasya viṣāṇam nāstīty evam pratiṣedhati. yathā gor viṣāṇasya ca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ, nāvam^a śaśasya viṣāṇasya ca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ. na ca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-pratiṣedhād asattvam na hi yad yasya na kāryam na kāraṇam tan nāsti. yathā devadattasya paṭa^b iti. idam ca śaśa-viṣāṇam nāstīti bruvāṇaḥ praṣṭavyaḥ kim ayam sāmānya-pratiṣedho 'tha viśeṣa-pratiṣedha iti. yadi sāmānya-pratiṣedhaḥ tan na yuktam aśakyatvāt. śaśasya viṣāṇam nāstīti gav-ādi-viṣāṇāny api śaśasya na santīti prāptam etac cāśakyam. na hi tāni na santi. atha viśeṣa-pratiṣedhaḥ kimcid viṣāṇam śaśasya pratiṣiddhyate yasya śaśo na kāryam yac^c ca śaśasya na kāraṇam iti. so 'yam kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha eva pratiṣiddhyate. kārya-kāraṇa-sambandhas tv anyatra^d dṛṣṭa iha pratiṣiddhyata iti nātyantāsatva-pratipādanē dṛṣṭānto bhavati. etena kha-puṣpādy-asattvam vyākhyātām veditavyam.

^a NA₁: na cāvam. ^b NA₁: ghaṭaḥ. ^c NA₁: tac. ^d NA₁: °-sambandhas cānyatra.

The passage has also been translated in CHAKRAVARTI (1982: 232–233).

⁶⁰ The issue whether fictitious, non-existent objects have *sattā* or *astitva* is different from the question whether the *absences* of such fictitious objects have either of them; see p. 278 ff.

isentiality, nameability and cognisability are coextensive properties or whether they partially overlap. A useful hint as regards the relationship between the three properties as they were understood in the sixth century can be found in the *Praśastamati-ṭīkā* passage, already quoted above (see p. 261 and n. 30) and reproduced in DNC, p. 517.5–7.

I leave aside the question whether the author of the *Praśastamati-ṭīkā* is the same person as the author of the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, or whether ‘Praśastamati’ is just another name for Praśastapāda.⁶¹ What is beyond doubt is, however, that both the

⁶¹ A number of scholars opted for Praśastamati being different from Praśastapāda, e.g. B. BHATTACHARYYA (1926: lxv): “Śāntarakṣita² refers to the opinions held by another Naiyāyika scholar who is called Praśastamati. This author seems to be different from the Vaiśeṣika. Like his compeer Aviddhakarṇa we have no information about him, his doctrines, opinions and his time. All that we can hazard to say is that he flourished before Śāntarakṣita, and the latest date that can be assigned to him is *cir.* 700 A.D.’ Also Surendranath DASGUPTA (1922–1955: I: 306, n. 1) assigns Praśastapāda to ‘5th or 6th century A.D.’ and, following B. BHATTACHARYYA (1926), Praśastamati to ‘A.D. 700’ (1922–1955: II: 172), implying that these two were different authors. Some other scholars claim that Praśastamati and Praśastapāda are one and the same person, e.g. Anantalal THAKUR (1961: 14–16, esp. 14/15): ‘This goes to prove that this Praśastamati is identical with Praśastapāda’, George CHEMPARATHY (1970), Wilhelm HALBFASS (1989: 555), (1992: 170), and Johannes BRONKHORST (1996), (2000).

The question of the identity of Praśastamati and Praśastapāda does not seem conclusively settled to me, though, for various reasons. In the most comprehensive analysis of the question so far, CHEMPARATHY (1970: 249–251, §§ 9, 10) lists a number of quotations ascribed to Praśastamat / Praśastamati in various sources, and tries to find either their direct source or equivalents in PBh. Of the largest portion of them (§ 9, § 10, (a)–(g)), he himself opines that ‘It is to be observed that none of these fragments from the TSP [= TSaP] mentioned hitherto can be traced in PDS’ (1970: 250). The remaining instances (§ 10, (h)–(i)), he cites, are indeed fragments found in TSaP ‘slight modifications and the order of the sentences being changed’, ‘or leaving out of phrases or short sentences of the original’ (1970: 250). CHEMPARATHY (1970: 251) arrives at his conclusion that ‘Of the ten names under which we have classified these references and quotations, all, except that of Praśastamat, are clearly identical with Praśastapāda, either because they are associated with the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* as author or because the fragments handed down under these names have been traceable in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*.’ However, CHEMPARATHY’S methodology follows the (logically faulty!) scheme:

- P1** If passages ascribed to authors named 1. Praśasta, 2. Praśastācāra, 3. Praśastadeva, 4. Praśastadevācārya, 5. Praśastadevapāda, 6. Praśastakara, 7. Praśastakaradeva, 8. Praśastakāra, 9. Praśastamat, 10. Praśastamati, are found in PBh, then all of these authors are identical with Praśastapāda.
- P2** Indeed some passages are traceable to PBh.
- C** Ergo, all these authors are identical with Praśastapāda.

Indeed, most (if not all the authors 1–8) seem identical with Praśastapāda, also because their quotations are traceable to PBh. However, it is not the case with Praśastamati. Close similarities of Praśastamati’s fragments to passages of PBh may be simply due to the fact that both Praśastapāda and Praśastamati (if we suppose they are two distinct persons) were propounders of the same modified system of Vaiśeṣika and, naturally, expressed their ideas in similar words. That

texts belong to more or less the same period and to the same philosophical system. For practical reasons and out of cautiousness, I will treat Praśastamati, an important exponent of the Vaiśeṣika system, as different from Praśastapāda. My argument will, however, be equally valid in case Praśastapāda and Praśastamati are one and the same person.

Clearly, what Praśastamati (DNC, p. 517.5–7) calls ‘being the scope for verbal designation’ (*abhidhāna-viṣayatva*) and ‘being the scope for cognition’ (*pratyaya-viṣayatva*) corresponds to Praśastapāda’s nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*); similarly, Praśastamati’s *sattva* is equivalent to Praśastapāda’s *astitva*.⁶²

The following passage contains a proof formula (*prayoga*) that shows exact logical relations between the terms:

Thesis (*pratijñā*): ‘Substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) are the contents of verbal designation and cognition as something existent only by their own force’ (*dravyādīnām svata evābhidhāna-pratyaya-viṣayatvam*).

Logical reason (*hetu*): ‘Because they are existent’ (*sattvāt*).

Example (*drṣṭānta*): ‘Like existence and other universals’ (*sattādivat*).

Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*): ‘Just as there is verbal designation and cognition of the universal existence and other universals by their own force, not because of their union with the universal existence, similarly there is verbal designation and cognition also of the three categories of substance etc. by their own force, not because they are endowed with the universal existence’ (*yathā sattādeḥ sad-abhidhāna-pratyayau svata eva, na sattā-yogāt, evam dravyādīnām api sad-abhidhāna-pratyayau svata eva, na sattā-yogāt*).⁶³

should not surprise anybody who knows how much similar ideas are expressed in very similar terms by philosophers of the same school who are not so distant in time. And both Praśastapāda and Praśastamati lived sometime between 450-550 CE. A decisive proof of the identity of the two would be based on (1) an exact quote of Praśastamati that is traceable word for word in PBh, and supported by (2) a certain opinion propounded by Praśastapāda and Praśastamati, but rejected by other followers of the Vaiśeṣika system. On the other hand, a conclusive argument to prove that these two were different authors would be Praśastamati’s opinion that stands in contradiction with views held by Praśastapāda and expressed in PBh. And there are still reasons (see n. 62) that make the identity of the authors improbable. I for myself consider it not unlikely that the two are one and the same person, however as far as I can see the reasons presented heretofore to assume such identity are insufficient.

⁶² Also Uddyotakara has *sattva* instead of *astitva*, see n. 5. The difference of vocabulary might be one of such hints that point to different identity of Praśastamati and Praśastapāda.

⁶³ For the complete text see n. 39.

It does not bear on the cogency of my argument that the above proof is subsequently rejected by Praśastamati, because the reasons for the rejection are of different nature (i.e. faulty relation of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*)) and thus irrelevant to the ontological framework in which the argument is formulated; they concern neither the structure of the proof formula as such nor the relations between the members of the formula.

Both the properties of ‘being the contents of verbal designation’ (*abhidhāna-viśayatva*) and ‘being the contents of cognition’ (*pratyaya-viśayatva*), which correspond to nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) respectively, are the pervaders (*vyāpaka*) and stand in the same relation to existentiality (Praśastamati: *sattva* = Praśastapāda: *astitva*), which is thereby implied to be the pervaded property (*vyāpya*). In other words, the extension of *abhidheyatva* and *jñeyatva* is either identical with or larger than the extension of *astitva*. Accordingly, the passage clearly and logically eliminates other options listed in § 2.2 above and stipulates that it is existentiality that is the subset or proper subset of nameability–cognisability:

T1° $astitva \subseteq (jñeyatva = abhidheyatva)$.

It is still left to be decided whether the set covered by existentiality (*astitva*) and the set covered by both nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) are coextensive or whether the former is a subset of the latter.

3.2. Coextensiveness of meta-categories?

Before I return to this problem, let us first examine the question whether for the Vaiśeṣika of the sixth century (Praśastamati, Praśastapāda, Candramati) there were indeed things which possessed nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*), but would not possess existentiality (*astitva*). The problem boils down to the question which of the alternatives of the sentence ‘whatever is existent is also nameable and knowable’ holds true in the Vaiśeṣika system:

Q1 $astitva \subset (jñeyatva = abhidheyatva)$,
‘*x* is existent only if it is nameable and cognisable’,

or

Q2 $astitva = (jñeyatva = abhidheyatva)$,
‘*x* is existent if and only if it is nameable and cognisable.’

Through conversion by contraposition, the two propositions yield the following statements, both equivalent to the assertion ‘whatever is neither nameable nor knowable is non-existent’:

Q1* (*ajñeyatva = anabhidheyatva*) \subset *anastitva*, or
‘*x* is neither nameable nor cognisable only if it is non-existent’,

or

Q2* (*ajñeyatva = anabhidheyatva*) = *anastitva*,
‘*x* is neither nameable nor cognisable if and only if it is non-existent.’

The bold claim of the Vaiśeṣika that follows propositions Q1, Q2, Q1* and Q2* would seem to be not only that anything which can, potentially, enter the conceptual framework can at the same time be known and referred to in language,⁶⁴ but also—which is a much stronger claim—that anything which exists can at the same time be known and referred to in language.

The difference between the pairs Q1/Q1* and Q2/Q2* is that the former expresses the idea that the set of things that are nameable and cognisable is larger than the set of things that are existent, whereas the latter postulates that there are no existent things which are not amenable to cognition and not amenable to verbal designation: there is a concept and a name for everything, and there exists nothing for which there would be no name and which would remain beyond all cognition.

Most importantly, the latter claim of the pair Q2/Q2* is not ontological, but should be understood merely within the conceptual framework of Vaiśeṣika categories that help us to analyse the world.

The first implication of the pair Q1/Q1* would therefore be that some entities could both be named and cognised without being existent in the Vaiśeṣika framework of categories; in other words, something could have its verbal denotation and could function as an idea, but it would not be a category of the system. And we are not talking here merely of compounded entities that happen to be at the same time

⁶⁴ This claim would not only be uncontroversial, but to a certain degree even tautological, given the Indian context in which anything that is conceptualised can be referred to by speech. The context was greatly influenced by ‘the grammarian paradigm’ of Indian philosophy. In contradistinction to Western philosophy, which took recourse to mathematics in search of the paradigm of philosophising and science, Indians turned to grammar, and the grammatical way of thinking, linguistic structuring of the world etc., greatly influenced Indian philosophy, including logic. A good example of the grammarian paradigm in the realm of Indian logic is the development of the grammatical relations *anvaya* and *vyatireka* and their impact on Indian philosophy, cf. CARDONA (1967).

fictitious (see pp. 271–273) but of primary entities, e.g. individuals (*avāntara-viśeṣa*, intermediate particular), that are further unanalysable.

The consequence of such a claim would be disastrous for the system: the carefully designed fabric of a complete⁶⁵ set of categories and relations to optimally and economically describe the universe, viz. the primary design of the Vaiśeṣika to name all the irreducible categories, and only such categories that are absolutely necessary to accurately represent all the phenomena of the world by eliminating any other potential, redundant category that can be reduced to or which overlaps with another category, would be in ruin.

The second implication of the pair Q1/Q1* would be that things could have a name and a concept the mind corresponding to them without actually having any kind of existence in mind, which would be a contradiction.

For the above reasons I consider the interpretation Q1/Q1*—according to which, first, the set of existent entities is a subset of entities that can be named and cognised, and, secondly, a set of entities without a name and concept for them is smaller than the set of entities that do not exist (*ergo* there are ‘non-existential’ entities for which we have a name and concept)—as a genuine exegesis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system highly unlikely, and would rather advocate the interpretation Q2/Q2*, viz. to treat the three properties (or meta-categories) as coextensive: *astitva* = *abhidheyatva* = *jñeyatva*.

My conjecture that the meta-categories of existentiality, nameability and cognisability are coextensive seems to gain support in Candramati’s statement of DPS₂ 254 (*vide surpa*, p. 251), which pertains to the extended system of ten ontological categories:

‘Any [kind of absence] is not the object of direct cognition. But all [kinds of absences], which exist without having any locus other [than their own], are the objects of inference.’⁶⁶

According to Candramati, even the fivefold category of absence (*abhāva*) should ultimately possess existentiality (*astitva*) in order to become nameable and cognisable. The two properties of nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) are implied in the passage by the fact that absences (*abhāva*) are not directly perceived, but are inferred, i.e. are expressible as a concept (i.e. are cognisable) endowed with verbal dimension (i.e. are expressible).

⁶⁵ Cf. NKan₁ (p. 230): *ṣaṭ-padārthebhyo nānyat prameyam asti.*—‘There is no cognoscible thing other than the six ontological categories.’

⁶⁶ Translated and reconstructed by MIYAMOTO (1996: 206), *sarve ’dṛṣṭa-viṣayāḥ. kim tu ananyāśritya vartamānāḥ sarve ’numāna-viṣayaḥ.*

This conclusion is corroborated also by Praśastamati's statement quoted in DNC (p. 517.5–518.1) by Mallavādin (see p. 30 above), who explains that that predicative existence (see p. 265) of entities, such as substances, qualities and movements, which are known to primarily possess existentiality (*astitva*) and to be elements of the ontological structure of the world, attaches to them only secondarily by virtue of their possessing the highest universal of existence (*sattā*), which renders them predicable:

‘Since substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) do not have the nature of this [universal existence], [their] verbal designation etc. (i.e. cognition) as something existent is based on [the universal] existence, like [the ideas:] “the one with no stick” and “the one with a stick” are based on [the idea of] “a stick”.’ (*dravyādīnām atad-ātmatvāt sattā-nimittam sad-abhidhānādi daṇḍa-nimittādaṇḍa-daṇḍitvavad iti.*)

The passage would, therefore, lead us to accept the following conclusion of co-extensiveness of all the three meta-categories:

T2° (*jñeyatva = abhidheyatva*) \subseteq *astitva*.

In addition, the passage shows that it is the idea of universal existence (*sattā*) that introduces a relational character by virtue of which the first three categories become invested with predicative existence, i.e. they can be referred also in other sentences than existential ones. Just the way compounded, relational concepts, such as ‘a person without a stick’ (*adaṇḍa*) and ‘a person with a stick’ (*daṇḍin*),⁶⁷ involve a relation that links them to another entity, e.g. to a stick (*daṇḍa*), in the same manner substances, qualities and movements, which are possessed of existentiality (*astitva*), become predicable, i.e. ‘acquire’⁶⁸ their nameability (*abhidheyatva*), when they are linked to universal existence (*sattā*).

Also Śāṅkaramiśra, who explicitly claims that existentiality attaches to absence (*abhāva*)⁶⁹ as well, lends some support to my interpretation. He relates the pair of nameability and cognisability to existentiality in a similar manner, taking the pair as logically subordinate to, i.e. subsets of, existentiality:

⁶⁷ Of course, such objects as ‘a person’ and ‘a stick’ (*daṇḍa*) exist independently of other entities and, as such, are not relational concepts, at least on this level of description.

⁶⁸ Clearly, this is purely conceptual and, generally speaking, atemporal, i.e. it is not the case that some entities first exist without their existence (*sattā*), and at a certain point of time they acquire it through some process that extends in time. On this problematic relation of entities with the universal existence (*sattā-sambandha*) in the context of the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality see: HALBFASS (1989).

⁶⁹ See n. 39.

‘Nameability is the capacity to become an object of verbal designation, which is either the capacity to be named with a word that refers to something existent or the capacity to be named as a concrete thing. Also cognisability is the ability to be an object of cognition that reproduces [the object’s] existence or the ability to become the contents of cognition.’⁷⁰

In both cases, i.e. Praśastamati’s and Śaṅkaramiśra’s, the manner of exposition is very alike: for nameability (*abhidheyatva*) we have ‘verbal designation etc. as something existent’ (*sad-abhidhānādi*) and ‘the capacity to be named with a word that refers to something existent’ (*sat-padābhidheyatva*), respectively; and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) corresponds to ‘[cognition] as something existent’ (*sad-jñāna*)⁷¹ and ‘the ability to be an object of cognition that reproduces [the object’s] existence’ (*sattā-prakāraka-jñāna-viśayatva*), respectively.

We can easily see that one and the same author Praśastamati, on one occasion (see p. 39 and 274), expresses the ideas that entail thesis T1°:

T1° $astitva \subseteq (jñeyatva = abhidheyatva)$,

and, on another occasion (see pp. 30 and 279), he implies thesis T2°, which is supported also by Śaṅkaramiśra’s reading:

T2° $(jñeyatva = abhidheyatva) \subseteq astitva$.

The conjunction of T1° and T2° yields the only conclusion possible:

T3° $astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva$.

The controversial character of the equation $astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva$ —which is a statement of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the knowability of everything—could be considered to be delusive. First, the equation implies that any thought or idea can be formulated with words and that its elements are existent as entering into relations with other elements of the idea.

Interestingly, the equation $astitva = jñeyatva$ corresponds to what is nowadays called ‘knowability principle’ PK, which claims that all truths are knowable:⁷²

⁷⁰ PBhṬS, p. 175.1–3: **abhidheyatvam** *abhidhāna-karma-bhāvatvaṃ sat-padābhidheyatvaṃ vārthābhidheyatvaṃ vā. jñeyatvam* *api sattā-prakāraka-jñāna-viśayatvaṃ jñāna-viśaya-bhāvatvaṃ vā.*

⁷¹ This is, of course, implied by the °*ādi* in *sad-abhidhānādi*.

⁷² Although it is the case that truths are not things, but to say ‘all truths are knowable’ is equivalent to the claim that we can know all of everything, which is the gist of the equation $astitva = jñeyatva$. If everything can be known, it means that it is possible to the contents of all true statements about everything and to know that they are true.

KP $\forall p (p \rightarrow \diamond Kp)$,

where the symbol ‘ \diamond ’ is the modal operator: ‘it is possible that ...’. The principle, frequently taken for granted also in Western science, states that for everything that exists it is possible that one can, in principle, know it. In other words, there are no logical limits to our cognition, except for factual limits: we just happen not to know some (perhaps: most?) truths, but there is intrinsically logically nothing that could prevent one from knowing these truths at some time.

Secondly, it is an obvious condition for meaningfulness of philosophical reflection: we can know and sensibly predicate of things that exist, and there is nothing in the world which could not, even potentially, become the contents of our judgements. It does not, however, have to imply that our knowledge has no limits in the sense that we will eventually know everything. Conversely, absolutely non-existent things cannot become the contents of our thoughts and utterances;⁷³ even dreams and illusions are made up of real things. That would be an unequivocal statement of realism of the Vaiśeṣika system.

The most troubling problem, however, is how to account for such an equation (*astitva = jñeyatva = abhidheyatva*), also within the conceptual framework of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and whether there could be anyone who might practically attest that indeed all that exists can be known and expressed, or whether it is a matter of (rather optimistic) belief⁷⁴. What the equation actually called for in Indian context presently discussed was a being who would epitomise all the cognitive faculties needed to validate the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claim.

3.3. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika knowability thesis and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability

This brings us to a strictly logical-epistemic problem which eventually, since the publication of a seminal and much debated paper by Frederic Brenton FITCH (1963)⁷⁵,

⁷³ When absolutely non-existent, fictitious things are claimed to become the contents of our cognition all that means is either that the contents are compounded wholes that consists of reals components related in a *fictitious* way or that names we use are empty terms the contents of which is analysable to a set of real elements.

⁷⁴ For one thing is to know that something is logically not impossible and another thing is to know that something is *actually* the case.

⁷⁵ FITCH’s paper seemed to be neglected for some time and received wider recognition much later, after the Paradox of Knowability was revived in HART (1979: esp. 164–165, n. 3.). A handy account of the paradox is given by BROGAARD–SALERNO (2004).

came to be known as Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. In it, FITCH (1963: 139) formulates THEOREM 5, relevant for our discussion, which states that

'If there is some true proposition which nobody knows (or has known or will know) to be true, then there is a true proposition which nobody can know to be true.'

He bases his THEOREM 5, first, on an general notion of a truth class α of propositions for which every member of it is true, symbolically expressed as $(p) [(\alpha p) \rightarrow p]$ (where ' \rightarrow ' stands for strict implication), which later serves him as a model to substitute a range of operators that map what he calls value concepts ('striving for', 'doing', 'believing', 'knowing', 'desiring', 'ability to do', 'obligation to do', 'value for'). One of such operators, 'knowing', corresponds to what is now generally known as the epistemic operator K: 'somebody at some time knows that ...', or 'it is known by someone at some time that ...'. Thus, with the epistemic operator K instantiating α (other such instantiations are 'truth', 'causal necessity', 'logical necessity', 'doing', 'proving' etc.), one arrives at the assumption: $\forall p (Kp \rightarrow p)$ ('for all propositions p , if one knows that p , then it is the case that p '). Second, the theorem rests on his THEOREM 1:

'If α is a truth class which is closed with respect to conjunction elimination, then the proposition, $[p \ \& \ \sim \alpha p]$, which asserts that p is true but not a member of α (where p is any proposition), is itself necessarily not a member of α .'⁷⁶

Again, using the epistemic operator K, one can reformulate the theorem to say if there is truth p which is unknown, $(p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$, then it is itself unknowable that it is an unknown truth.

The condition for both the theorems, and further proofs which FITCH lays down, is the idea of closure with respect to conjunction elimination: 'a class of propositions ... will be said to be closed *with respect to conjunction elimination* if (necessarily) whenever the conjunction of two propositions is in the class so are the two propositions themselves'⁷⁷, i.e. $(p) (q) [(\alpha(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (\alpha p) \ \& \ (\alpha q))]$. Again, what it means in our context of the epistemic operator K is that, for instance, if one knows both that Vincent d'Indy was French (p) and that Sigismondo d'India was Italian (q), then one also knows that Vincent d'Indy was French (p) *and* one knows that that Sigismondo d'India was Italian (q): $K(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (Kp \ \& \ Kq)$.

⁷⁶ FITCH (1963: 138).

⁷⁷ FITCH (1963: 136).

Accordingly, what THEOREM 5 eventually states is that from the assertion that there are truths that merely happen to be unknown, $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$, it follows that ultimately there are necessarily unknowable truths, $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim \diamond Kp)$, which is a paradox. Further, the conclusion that there are truths that c a n n o t be known is in conflict with the knowability principle PK: $\forall p (p \rightarrow \diamond Kp)$, according to which any truth can, in principle, be known.

As I have pointed out above (p. 281), the knowability principle corresponds to the (Prašastapāda and post-Prašastapāda) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation: existentiality = nameability = cognisability. Consequently, FITCH's conclusions seem to threaten precisely this equation.

It was Nicholas RESCHER (1984: 150 ff.) who took up FITCH's conclusions and devised a proof⁷⁸ that has stimulated a prolonged debate, to the effect that there are logical limits for science and any cognitive enquiry, provokingly adding that 'perfected science is a mirage; completed knowledge a chimera'. And RESCHER's elaborated proof that not every truth can be known seems directly relevant to the (in)validity of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation, inasmuch as it seems to invalidate the latter. A rather similar line of reasoning based on FITCH's proof is applied by Roy W. PERRETT (1999) to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation.

Following RESCHER, let us consider four elementary theses of epistemic logic which all seem perfectly acceptable:

K1° 'Authentic knowledge is inherently veridical: $Kp \rightarrow p$.'

In other words, it is not possible to know anything that is false. K1° would also be a thesis accepted by the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika realists who claimed that all that enters our minds and all we know is a result of something that is factual: if we know a proposition, then it is true.

K2° 'A conjunction can only be known if both its conjuncts are known: $K(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (Kp \ \& \ Kq)$.'

If we know a conjunction of two propositions to be true, then we also know both the conjuncts. This corresponds to FITCH's (1963: 136) closure with respect to conjunction elimination (*vide supra*, p. 282).

⁷⁸ The proof is also reproduced and discussed for instance in SCHLESINGER (1986), which is later incorporated *in extenso* in SCHLESINGER (1988: 36 ff.), as well as in ZEMACH (1987), who attempts to demonstrate that RESCHER's, and thus also FITCH's, proof is valid only when taken in *de re* reading, not in *de dicto* (*vide supra*, p. 286 f.). A different approach, taking into account intuitionistic approach, to defend the Paradox of Knowability to the effect that not all truths can be known is found in FLORIO-MURZI (2008). See also Rafał PALCZEWSKI (2007: 460 ff.).

K3° ‘Some truth is not known: $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$.’⁷⁹

It is a premise of FITCH’S THEOREM 5. Since there are a vast number of propositions which we do not know, it is a thesis that nobody would seriously question, lest we boldly declare we know everything. It is also Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis that some truths are not known to humans. In fact, it is the condition for transmigration (*saṃsāra*) to persist that transmigrating beings do not know all the truth⁸⁰. K3° follows from the fundamental tenet of both systems that the cognition of the true nature of all the categories, either epistemic, in case of Nyāya⁸¹, or ontological, in case of Vaiśeṣika⁸², leads to liberation. As long as

⁷⁹ As regards PERRETT’S (1999: 405 ff.) analysis (*vide infra*, n. 84), in itself an inspiring and valuable endeavour, of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation and his attempt to demonstrate that ‘the human knowability thesis is demonstrably false’, he asks us to ‘consider first the following pair of theses:

Human Knowability: All truths are knowable by humans.

Human Knownness: All truths are known by humans.

Indeed, as he rightly points out, ‘Nyāya *affirms* human knowability and *denies* human knownness.’ Further, he asks us to ‘symbolize these two Nyāya theses thus:

T₁: $p \rightarrow \Diamond Kp$.

T₂: $\sim(p \rightarrow Kp)$.’

PERRETT’S T₁ is, of course, an instantiation of our knowability principle PK: $\forall p (p \rightarrow \Diamond Kp)$, arrived at by universal instantiation.

We may have doubts whether PERRETT’S T₂ is an accurate description of the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika’s denial of the *Human Knownness* thesis. What the *Human Knownness* thesis states actually is:

T_{HK}: $\forall p (p \rightarrow Kp)$.

Therefore, its denial by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school should merely state:

D_{HK}: $\sim\forall p (p \rightarrow Kp)$,

which is equivalent to

$\exists p \sim(p \rightarrow Kp)$,

and to

$\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$,

which is our K3°. From K3° one can easily obtain, by existential instantiation, PERRETT’S T₂, which is a much stronger claim, however, not vice versa. I am not quite sure whether the application of the inference rule of existential elimination is at all legitimate here. On some problems concerning the existential instantiation in this proof—i.e. from $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$ deriving $(p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$ —see ZEMACH (1987: 529). Having this in view, one would have to redraft the whole argument, albeit the flaw does not render PERRETT’S demonstration pointless.

⁸⁰ *Vide infra*, p. 290.

⁸¹ NS 1.1.1: *pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍā-hetv-ābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigraha-sthānānāṃ tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*.

⁸² PBh₁ 2.1, p. 6 = PBh₂ 2, p. 1.6–7: *dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharma-vaidharmya-tattva-jñānāṃ niḥśreyasa-hetuḥ*. See p. 295, n. 111.

we do not know the categories, which is tantamount to saying that there are some truths unknown to us, we transmigrate and endure existential pangs.

K4° ‘All truths are knowable: $p \rightarrow \diamond Kp$.’

This is precisely an instantiation of the knowability principle PK (pp. 281, 283), and is also admitted by Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika in the equation *astitva = jñeyatva*.

RESCHER’s demonstration that the above four rules are inconsistent runs in nine steps as follows:

- | | | |
|----|--|--|
| 1. | $K\sim Kp \rightarrow \sim Kp$ | substitution in K1° [Kp/p]. |
| 2. | $\sim(K\sim Kp \ \& \ Kp)$ | from 1 by the definition of ‘ \rightarrow ’ [$(P \rightarrow Q) \equiv \sim(P \rightarrow \sim Q)$]. ⁸³ |
| 3. | $K(\sim Kp \ \& \ p) \rightarrow (K\sim Kp \ \& \ Kp)$ | substitution in K1° [Kp/q]. |
| 4. | $\sim K(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 2, 3 by <i>modus tollens</i> . |
| 5. | $\Box \sim K(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 4 by the rule of necessitation RN (anything derivable from necessary truths is a necessary truth). |
| 6. | $\sim \diamond K(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 5 by the equivalence: $\Box \phi \leftrightarrow \sim \diamond \sim \phi$. |
| 7. | $\sim(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 6, K4° by <i>modus tollens</i> . |
| 8. | $\forall p \sim(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 7 by generalisation. |
| 9. | $\sim \exists p (\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 8. |

Since step 9 contradicts K3°, therefore the set of theses K1°–K4° is incongruous, because they lead to a contradiction. Theses K1°–K3° appear to be legitimate, and therefore it is thesis K4° that should be rejected. ‘We must concede that some truths are unknowable’, concludes RESCHER (1984: 150).⁸⁴

⁸³ Cf. an inspiring discussion in BENETT (2003: esp. 20 ff.).

⁸⁴ PERRETT’S (1999: 405–407) demonstration applied to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is based on a rather similar, with some reservations (see n. 79) though, set of assumptions K1°–K4°, and he likewise dismisses thesis K4° (in his notation T₁), that corresponds to knowability principle PK.

His argument in full starts with the following theses and assumptions as follows (PERRETT (1999: 406)):

- | | | |
|------------------|--|---|
| T ₁ : | $p \rightarrow \diamond Kp$ | Nyāya’s <i>Human Knowability</i> thesis (‘All truths are knowable by humans’). |
| T ₂ : | $\sim(p \rightarrow Kp)$ | Nyāya’s denial of <i>Human Knownness</i> thesis (‘It is not the case that all truths are known by humans’). |
| A ₁ : | $Kp \rightarrow p$ | Assumption one (‘what is known is true’). |
| A ₂ : | $K(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow Kp \ \& \ Kq$ | Assumption two (‘knowledge distributes over conjunction’). |

Should we, therefore, completely dismiss the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation: *astitva* = *jñeyatva* = *abhidheyatva* as illogical and invalid? There are two issues involved here. Firstly, it is whether FITCH's / RESCHER's argument indeed is correct or, granted that it is, under what conditions it is correct. Secondly, supposing that the logical structure of the Paradox of Knowability is in principle right, how far does it invalidate Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claims?

There is here no room even for a brief discussion of (in)validity, lest for a mere review of numerous supporters and critics, of FITCH's/RESCHER's argument.⁸⁵ What is, however, vital to note is that Paradox of Knowability⁸⁶ does not merely boil down to SCHLESINGER's (1986: 26) observation that 'The final conclusion "($\exists p$) $p \& \sim PKp$ " states nothing more noteworthy than that there is some true proposition which at the present time is in principle unknowable'. It is not simply about some empirical observation that our knowledge, or science for that matter, faces some practical or technical limits at a given point of time, but it declares that it is *p r i n c i p a l l y* *a n d l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e* to know some true proposition. This point seems to have been far too often misunderstood.

A possible way to defend against the paradox would be, for instance, the one taken by Eddy M. ZEMACH (1987) who proposes to distinguish two readings of the

Next, 'the *reductio* proof of the inconsistency of the premise set (T_1, T_2, A_1, A_2) goes through as follows:

- | | | |
|-----|-----------------------------|------------------|
| (1) | $p \rightarrow \sim Kp$ | From T_2 |
| (2) | $\diamond K(p \& \sim Kp)$ | From (1) & T_1 |
| (3) | $\diamond (Kp \& K\sim Kp)$ | From (2) & A_2 |
| (4) | $\diamond (Kp \& \sim Kp)$ | From (3) & A_1 |

Since (4) is a contradiction, we know that at least one of our original assumptions is false. ... Hence the conclusion to be drawn is that T_1 is false.'

Steps (1)–(4) in PERRETT's arguments are *identical* to MACKIE (1980: 90), reproduced in EDGINGTON (1985: 558), to an extent which does not seem coincidental. See also PALCZEWSKI (2007: 460), in which the premisses are extended.

⁸⁵ Just to mention a few critics, on different grounds: George N. SCHLESINGER (1988: 39 ff.), E.M. ZEMACH (1987), Michael DUMMETT (2007: 348–350), cf. for a brief review: BROGAARD–SALERNO (2004), and most recently Rafał PALCZEWSKI (2007), who makes use of additional operators and applies the idea of group knowledge and group knowability; this, although the author does not states it explicitly and may even not be aware of, presupposes Karl R. POPPER's (1970), (1972) notion of 'the third world', the world of the products of the human mind as a group knowledge.

⁸⁶ Which is basically an off-shot of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, just as its opposite, verificationism (i.e. a view that all meaningful/true statements are verifiable) is related to what Gödel's first incompleteness theorem invalidates (i.e. a view that we can construct a consistent and complete theory).

epistemic operator K , *de dicto* and *de re*.⁸⁷ To illustrate the distinction, let us take one of the opacity verbs that cause some interpretation problem in the following sentence:

S1° Jago believes that someone is faithful.

This ambiguous sentence could be interpreted either (syntactically) *de dicto* ('of word'):

S2° Jago believes that there are faithful women. $B_{\text{Jago}} \exists x (Fx)$,

or (syntactically) *de re* ('of thing'):

S3° Jago believes of a particular woman that she is faithful. $\exists x (B_{\text{Jago}} Fx)$.

Now, let us suppose that Barbie once learnt Thales' theorem in a TV talk show, but has forgotten its contents the very next morning and all she knows now is that Thales' theorem is true. Is the statement asserting of Barbie that she knows Thales' theorem true or not? In other words, is $K_{\text{Barbie}} p$ (where p stands for 'Thales' theorem') true, and if it is, is it true unconditionally? If we read it *de re* ('Of a proposition called «Thales' theorem», Barbie knows that it is true') $K_{\text{Barbie}} p$ is true. However, if we read it *de dicto* ('Barbie knows that if A, B and C are points on a circle where the line AC is a diameter of the circle, then the angle ABC is a right angle'), $K_{\text{Barbie}} p$ turns out to be false. We can see that Kp may yield two different results when read it either *de re* or *de dicto*.

Let us now see whether the statement 'Barbie knows that she does not know Thales' theorem' is true or not? This is the case of the proposition $K\sim Kp$, which occurs in RESCHER's argument. Under what conditions is $K\sim Kp$ true of Barbie and Thales' theorem? Indeed, we can justifiably claim that 'Barbie knows that she does not know Thales' theorem', but that can make sense only when read *de re*: 'Barbie knows that she does not know what «Thales' theorem» is all about'. It would not be very understandable when read *de dicto*: 'Barbie knows that she does not know that if A, B and C are points on a circle where the line AC is a diameter of the circle, then the angle ABC is a right angle'. This shows that $K\sim Kp$ in RESCHER's argument may not be as unproblematic as it seems at first. Even taken intuitively, to claim that 'I know that I do not know that I am listening to music', in which p is 'I am listening to music', may seem puzzling. As ZEMACH (1987: 530) and EDGINGTON (1985: 560 ff.) point out, 'although " $\sim Kp$ " may be read *de dicto*, if it is embedded in an-

⁸⁷ For the distinction see Willard Van Orman QUINE (1956), Alvin PLANTINGA (1969), that also contains some brief historical sketch of the distinction, Ernest SOSA (1970) and Roderick CHISHOLM (1976). Thomas MCKAY (2005) highlights some additional points by distinguishing three different conceptions of the *de re* / *de dicto* distinction: syntactically, semantically and metaphysically.

other *de dicto* epistemic operator relative to the same person, it must be read *de re*. “ $K_S \sim K_J p$ ” (i.e., “Smith knows that Jones does not know that the car is stolen”) is true iff Smith knows the contents of p , and that Jones does not know it. ... But for “ $K_J \sim K_J p$ ” to be true, it is not required that Jones knows the content of p (that the car is stolen) and that he does not know it.⁸⁸ Taking the *de re / de dicto* distinction into account, we will see that RESCHER’s argument stalls at a certain point.⁸⁹

The same strategy that distinguishes between *de re* and *de dicto* readings may cast doubt on assumption $K2^\circ$: $K(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (Kp \ \& \ Kq)$, instead on $K4^\circ$.⁹⁰ Suppose Barbie heard from a reliable source, say, her boyfriend Ken the arithmetician, that Gödel’s theorems are true. Hence Barbie knows that both Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are true⁹¹: $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q)$. Does it follow from $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q)$ that Barbie knows both that (p), i.e. that it is not possible to construct an effectively strong arithmetic theory which is both consistent and complete, because one can construct an arithmetical statement that is true, but not provable in the theory, and that (q), i.e. that the consistency of an arithmetic theory cannot be proved in the arithmetic itself, because the theory could contain a statement of its own consistency only if the theory were inconsistent? In other words, does it follow from $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q)$ that $K_{\text{Barbie}} p \ \& \ K_{\text{Barbie}} q$? Suppose Barbie has, surprising as it may be, never heard anything more detailed about Kurt Gödel and has never studied arithmetic and logic. Read *de dicto*, the statement $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (K_{\text{Barbie}} p \ \& \ K_{\text{Barbie}} q)$ is true, because Barbie does not have to know the contents of both p and q to have a justified true belief (thanks to Ken the arithmetician) that p and q are true. However, when read *de re*, the assumption $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (K_{\text{Barbie}} p \ \& \ K_{\text{Barbie}} q)$ is plainly false, because Barbie neither knows what a theorem is nor what consistency and completeness of an arithmetic theory are, etc. She probably would not even be able to genuinely grasp the difference between Gödel’s completeness theorem and his two incompleteness theorems at all.

Under the *de dicto* reading, assumption $K2^\circ$ would also bring us to an undesired conclusion that if we know something of p and if a piece of information r is logically entailed by p ($p \rightarrow r$) or is a part of p ($r \subset p$), we would automatically know r .

⁸⁸ In ZEMACH’s convention, roman ‘p’ is a schematic letter substituting for propositions, whereas italicised p is taken as a name of a proposition, not a proposition itself; in my notation, it is p and ‘ p ’ respectively.

⁸⁹ For details see ZEMACH (1987: 530–531).

⁹⁰ Cf. ZEMACH (1987: 531–532).

⁹¹ That her knowledge is indeed a case of justified true belief can be seen on various counts, e.g. it fulfils Fred DRETSKE’s (1971) conclusive reasons or the conditions of Robert NOZICK’s (1981: 172–178) truth-tracking account (1. p is true; 2. S believes that p ; 3. if p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p ; 4. if p were true, S would believe that p) etc.

Suppose Barbie knows that Thales' theorem is true, astonishing as it sounds, she even knows that if A, B and C are points on a circle where the line AC is a diameter of the circle, then the angle ABC is a right angle. However, does she also automatically know that the sum of the angles in a triangle is equal to two right angles (180°) and that the base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal, which is knowledge entailed by Thales' theorem? This does not automatically follow and she does not have to have such knowledge. Applied consistently on reading it *de dicto*, assumption K2° would lead us to an undesired consequence that one would know everything conceivable, whether already known to somebody at one point in history or so far never discovered by anybody, of p . That would approximate something like ' p -bound omniscience'.⁹²

Therefore it seems far from proven that one would have to, on purely logical grounds, e.g. by applying Fitch's Paradox of Knowability, reject Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claim that all truths are, in principle, knowable and expressible.

Now, there is another problem, reflected in Roy W. PERRETT's (1999: 405 ff.) analysis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation. He takes it for granted that what the equation refers to is what he calls 'Human Knowability' thesis, viz. that all truths are knowable by humans.

Throughout his paper Roy W. PERRETT, assumes that what the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation, as an expression of the knowability of everything, comprises is not only god's but also human knowability: 'I suggest instead that this omission is because the scope of the knowability thesis is not supposed to be restricted just to knowability by God, but is supposed also to include knowability by humans' (1999: 402). Precisely such a postulate of unrestricted human knowability, viz. the knowability of everything *p o t e n t i a l l y* by every human being, can be problematic within the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. My point is that what the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika knowability thesis actually expresses is knowability *o n l y* by god and, perhaps, by a select group of (super-)humans, in other words: the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika knowability

⁹² Cf. NOZICK's (1981: 204 ff., 227 ff.) discussion of non-closure and criticism of the subjunctive principle $K(p \rightarrow q) \& Kp \rightarrow Kq$ ('if S knows that p and he knows that p entails q , then he also knows that q ') and his rejection of the claim that if a person S knows a conjunction, then he also knows the conjuncts, which is our K2°. PERRETT (1999: 407 ff.) considers an intuitionist line of defence, following Timothy WILLIAMSON (1982), for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the knowability of everything. This seems to be completely unnecessary at least for the most of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika till, perhaps, the 16th century and Raghunātha Śīromaṇi, for the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika throughout its classical and mediaeval history admitted the elimination of double negation: $\sim\sim p = p$, viz. that the negation of the negation of p is identical with p , the denial of which is both one of the fundamentals of intuitionistic logic and necessary to evaluate and defend the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation from the standpoint of intuitionistic logic.

thesis directly entails the acceptance of omniscience of god and, perhaps in addition, of certain humans, i.e. most spiritually advanced adepts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or *yogins* whose knowledge, for all practical reasons, equals omniscience (*vide infra*, §§ 4.3 and 4.4). Most importantly, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika knowability thesis does not concern ordinary humans at all and, therefore, it loses some of its attractive flavour to a philosopher.

As I have already pointed out (p. 284), the theoretical edifices of both the systems rest on the assumption that their systems provide us with a scheme of all sufficient categories that comprehensively cover all that exists and with a method to cognise all of them.⁹³ The pragmatic and ethical relevance of such bold claims lay in the fact that the comprehensive scheme mapping all that exists onto a system of categories and relations was both a sufficient and necessary tool to bring transmigration to its end. As long as we do not achieve, apparently complete, knowledge of the categories and what they entail, we are going to endure hardships of *samsāra*. This is the salvific aspect of cognition within Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.⁹⁴ Religious life in conformity with moral law (*dharma*) may secure mundane prosperity and better next birth (*abhyudaya*), but it is the cognition of the true nature of the categories that results in liberation.⁹⁵

There is no doubt that, on logical analysis, the set of premisses K1°–K4° are inconsistent. Usually it is either premiss K2° (p. 288 f.) or the knowability principle K4° (p. 285), or the validity of $K \sim Kp$ (steps 1–3, p. 285 f., viz. the validity of the substitution of either ‘ $\sim Kp$ ’⁹⁶ or ‘ $p \ \& \ \sim Kp$ ’⁹⁷ for ‘ p ’), when read *de dicto*, that are

⁹³ A view expressed in the introductory *sūtras* of Nyāya (n. 81) and Vaiśeṣika (n. 82).

⁹⁴ See NS 1.1.1: *pramāṇa-prameya-saiṅśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍāhetv-ābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigraha-sthānānām tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*, and NBh 1.1.1: *ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*.—‘The attainment of well-being is [possible] by means of the cognition of the true nature of [such categories as] cognitive criterion, the cognoscible ...’

⁹⁵ Cf. VS(C) 1.1.2, see p. 292 f., n. 104. The tradition of Nyāya lays more stress on the cognition of one of the cognoscibles (*prameya*), i.e. the soul (*ātman*), see NS/NBh 4.2.1 ff. However, even that being the case, Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin’s introduction to NS 4.2.1 reveals that it is not only the cognition of the soul and the imperfections responsible for erroneous attribution of the idea of self (*ahankāra*, NS 4.2.1) that is important but also the cognition of other categories. Even the lengthy discussion on the whole and on the atoms which starts with NS 4.2.3 shows how important is the cognition of the environment in which the idea of the soul can be assessed. Further, Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin emphasises the role of cognition as the means to liberation: ‘The cognition of the true nature of [the cognoscibles as the second category] is the means to achieve this [liberation]’ (NBh 4.2.0, p. 259.1: *tasyādhigamōpāyas tattva-jñānam*).

⁹⁶ Questioned in ZEMACH (1987: 530 ff.)

⁹⁷ Questioned in EDGINGTON (1985: 560 ff.).

blamed for the inconsistency. However, the validity of the thesis of the limits of human knowability— $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$, equivalent to $\exists p \sim(p \rightarrow Kp)$ —i.e. that there are some truths that happen not to be known, has never been questioned in the analyses of the Paradox of Knowability, also applied to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation.

Whether various strategies taken to defend against Fitch's Paradox of Knowability (see n. 85) prove indeed successful or not⁹⁸ is rather irrelevant to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the knowability of everything, because—in view of omniscience asserted of god and of certain elevated individuals—the premiss rejected by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is $K3^\circ$.⁹⁹ In other words, since Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admit the existence of at least one being, i.e. god, that knows everything, it rejects the thesis that 'Some truth is not known'. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system explicitly admits a thesis, contrary to $K3^\circ$, that all truths can be, and actually are known: $\forall p (p \rightarrow Kp)$, which is equivalent to $\forall p \sim(p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$, or rather, more specifically, that there is someone α (god, a *yogin*) who knows all truths: $\exists \alpha \forall p (p \rightarrow K_\alpha p)$, equivalent to $\exists \alpha \forall p \sim(p \ \& \ \sim K_\alpha p)$. Therefore, for the proponents of the system, around and after the times of Praśastapāda at the latest, i.e. after the admittance of god into the system, the Paradox of Knowability simply, when based on premisses $K1^\circ$, $K2^\circ$ and $K4^\circ$, does not arise.¹⁰⁰

Nevertheless, even seen on purely logical grounds, what the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation requires is the elimination of assumption $K3^\circ$, i.e. the acceptance of a being that is omniscient. We can easily see that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation seemed controversial on various grounds, and that also includes modern interpretations of anti-realist claims. Indeed, the equation seems to be most defensible in the context of omniscience, and at first sight the equation of the knowability of everything smacks of omniscience (*vide supra*, p. 307).¹⁰¹

4.1. Knowability thesis and the 'knowability thesis package'

The idea of the three meta-categories, i.e. the properties *astitva–abhidheyatva–jñeyatva*, must have entered the system of Vaiśeṣika at a later date, most probably in

⁹⁸ There have been many attempts undertaken. See for instance a rejoinder to EDGINGTON's (1985) Timothy WILLIAMSON's (1987) arguments in favour of Paradox of Knowability.

⁹⁹ For a fruitful analysis of the idea of (un)knowability in the context of (god's) omniscience see Jonathan L. KVANVIG (1989: 488 ff.).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Jonathan L. KVANVIG (1989) for the analysis of the untenability of the claim that unknowable truths may exist vis-à-vis the doctrine of omniscience, and Charles TALIAFERRO's (1993) rejoinder to KVANVIG.

¹⁰¹ Logically, however, the statement '... can know everything' does not entail '... knows everything', whereas the latter does entail the former.

the fifth century, insofar as it is not present in the extant text of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* itself. However, it must have become a part of the system of beliefs either slightly before or, which is much less likely, at the time of Praśastapāda, otherwise it would be hardly difficult to account for its relatively widespread presence in other works such as those of Praśastamati (granted that he is different from Praśastapāda), Candramati and Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja (550–610 CE) around the same time, i.e. in the first half of the sixth century, i.e. after Diñnāga (480–540 CE) and before Mallavādin (c. 600 CE), or even earlier, i.e. in the second half of the fifth century, i.e. the time of Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin¹⁰².

I shall now argue that the reasons that prompted Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers to adopt such a controversial claim were of different nature than philosophical analysis and purely rational concerns.

My thesis is that (1) the idea expressed in the equation *astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva* was adopted by Vaiśeṣika thinkers simultaneously along with three other concepts at approximately the same period: (2) the idea of god's existence, (3) the idea of god's omniscience and (4) the idea of twofold supernatural perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa* and *yogī-pratyakṣa*), which were absent in the original *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, as it existed prior to Praśastapāda¹⁰³. Further, all these latter three ideas were indispensable to justify each other. To wit, it was a package of four tenets that entered Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system in the late fifth century CE.

4.2. Knowability thesis and god's existence

Let me start with the idea of god, which was a foreign body to and incompatible with the system of early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It hardly needs any additional prove now, since it is widely accepted, that the idea of god was absent in the original text of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. There are no references to that idea in VS, and the only passage of VS into which the existence of god is read into by later tradition is VS 1.1.3, which reads in a concrete context:

‘[2] That from which [results] the attainment of mundane prosperity and the highest good is moral law. Vedic tradition possesses cognitive validity, because of **its** statement.’¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Cf. p. 298, n. 125.

¹⁰³ See WEZLER (1982), ISAACSON (1993) and HONDA (1988) and p. 308 ff.

¹⁰⁴ VS(C) 1.1.2–3: *yato 'bhyudaya-nihśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmāḥ. tad-vacanād āmnāya-prāmāṇyam*. VS(C) 1.1.3 is explicitly quoted in PBh₁ 8.12.2.2, p. 213 = PBh₂ 257, see p. 297, n. 123.

The expression ‘because of **its** statement’ (*tad-vacanāt*)—which was later interpreted as referring to god¹⁰⁵—could be, in this particular context, interpreted either as:

- (a) ‘because [Vedic tradition] communicates moral law’ (*tad = dharma*), or
- (b) ‘because [Vedic tradition] speaks of the attainment of mundane prosperity and the highest good’ (*tad = abhyudaya-nihśreyasa-siddhiḥ*), or
- (c) ‘because [Vedic tradition] speaks of mundane prosperity and the highest good’ (*tad = abhyudaya-nihśreyasa*).

All the interpretations could be linguistically plausible here. The idea connoted roughly by the interpretations (a), (b) or (c) is echoed by Candramati with the statement that ‘the *Vedas* and sacred texts proscribe moral law and prohibit unrighteousness [respectively]’ (**śruti-smṛti-vihita-pratiṣiddha-dharmādharma*) in the passage of DPŚ:

‘Of merit and demerit, the cause is the connection of mind with soul after [the production of] desire and aversion, assisted by both pure and impure intention on those means for performing merit and demerit which are ordered and prohibited by the *Vedas* and the authoritative sacred texts.’¹⁰⁶

The anonymous author of the commentary *Vaiṣeṣika-darśana-vyākhyā* clearly interprets the statement in the sense (c):

‘Because of the statement, or the teaching about these two, viz. heaven and liberation, which produces knowledge, Vedic tradition, viz. the *Vedas*, sacred texts, historic stories etc., possess cognitive validity, viz. they are the causes of knowledge.’¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Cf. e.g. Candrānanda and his VSV(C) 1.1.3: *tad iti hiraṇya-garbha-parāmarśo hiraṇyaṃ reto 'syēti kṛtvā bhagavān mahēśvara evōcyate*.—‘The [pronoun] “that” invokes the idea of the golden egg (sc. Brahman). Having taken this to mean “that whose golden [egg] is progeny” it refers to the Supreme Lord.’ See BRONKHORST (1996).

¹⁰⁶ DPŚ₂ 154 (reconstructed): *dharmādharma-icchā-dveṣa-pūrvakaḥ śruti-smṛti-vihita-pratiṣiddha-dharmādharma-sādhana-śuddhāśuddhābhisandya-ubhayāpekṣa ātma-maṇaḥ-samyogaḥ kāraṇam*. = DPŚ₁ 2.2.5.25, p. 110: ‘Merit and demerit are preceded by desire and aversion, and have their causes in contact of self with mind, caused by hearing and reflecting on, or by disregarding the fact that merit and demerit (severally) bring about a pure or impure state in the future life.’

¹⁰⁷ VSV(D) 1.3, p. 2: *tayoḥ svargāpavargayoḥ vacanāt pratipādanāt pramiti-jananād āmnāyasya śruti-smṛtīhāsādeḥ prāmānyam pramiti-kāraṇatvam*.

However, against any philologically possible interpretation of the VS passage, Praśastapāda gives an entirely new sense to VS 1.1.3, by taking *tad-°* to mean ‘god’ (*īśvara-°*):

‘Vedic tradition is based on the cognitive validity of the speaker’
(*vaktṛ-prāmāṇyâpekṣaḥ*),¹⁰⁸

in which ‘the speaker’ for Praśastapāda is the only ultimately reliable and indisputably trustworthy speaker, i.e. god.

With his novel interpretation, Praśastapāda overrides the original meaning of VS 1.1.3 at the very outset of his *Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha*, by stating that

‘This [cognition, operating by way of positive procedure and by way of negative procedure, of the true nature of the six ontological categories] is [attained] because of moral law revealed by god’s injunction.’¹⁰⁹

Interestingly, Praśastapāda’s statement fulfils a double role.

First, it gives a new meaning to VS 1.1.3, as against the original purport of the *sūtra*. Most importantly for the present issue, in the context of moral law (*dharma*) related to Vedic tradition that is considered to be a valid and reliable source of knowledge, Praśastapāda takes Kaṇāda’s phrase *tad-vacanāt* to eventually connote the meaning: *īśvara-codanābhivyaktād dharmāt*. It becomes conspicuous when we compare the argumentative structure of relevant portions of VS(C) and PBh. We obtain the following either causal or explanatory dependence, which is very similar in both cases:

Kaṇāda, VS(C):¹¹⁰

dharma → *abhyudaya-niḥśreyasa*

1. Moral law leads to prosperity and liberation.

tad-vacana → *āmnāya-prāmāṇya* → *dharma*

- 2a. The utterance of/by ‘this’ leads to cognitive validity of Vedic tradition.
- 2b. Vedic tradition leads to moral law.

¹⁰⁸ See PBh₁ 8.12.2.2, p. 213 = PBh₂ 257: *śruti-smṛti-lakṣaṇo ’py āmnāyo vaktṛ-prāmāṇyâpekṣaḥ tad-vacanād āmnāya-prāmāṇyam, liṅgāc cānityo, buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kṛtīr vede buddhi-pūrvō dadātīr ity uktatvāt*. For the translation of the whole passage see p. 297.

¹⁰⁹ PBh₁ 2.1, p. 7 = PBh₂ 2, p. 1.8: *tac cēśvara-codanābhivyaktād dharmād eva. [tat = ṣaṅṅām padārthānām sādharma-vaiddharma-tattva-jñānam]*.

¹¹⁰ VS(C) 1.1.2–3: *yato ’bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmāḥ. tad-vacanād āmnāya-prāmāṇyam*.

Praśastapāda, PBh:¹¹¹*dharma* → *tattva-jñāna* → *niḥśreyasa*

- 1a. Moral law leads to the cognition of the true nature of the categories.
- 1b. The cognition of the true nature of the categories leads to liberation.

īśvara-codanābhivṛtyakto → *dharma*

2. The demonstration of the injunction by god leads to moral law.

In both cases it is ultimately *dharma* ('moral law') that leads, either in one or two steps, to liberation (or mundane prosperity) and in both cases *dharma* is communicated this way or another. Praśastapāda leaves no doubt that the source is the injunction revealed by god.

Second, Praśastapāda's above statement expresses, at the same time, a criticism directed against the Mīmāṃsaka and Jaimini's well-known claim that 'Moral law is something characterised by injunction'¹¹², viz. moral law is known directly from Vedic injunction without the mediation of anyone, including god. It cannot be a coincidence that Praśastapāda avails himself of a rather unusual term for the Vaiśeṣika, which is nowhere attested in VS and occurs only once in PBh. For Jaimini, the atheist, and for his tradition, people's adherence to *dharma* was due to a very special character of the language of Vedic revelation, which was characterised by injunction and therefore required no author or authority, being self-explanatory, or self-enforcing. That was the Mīmāṃsaka strategy to explain what provided the imperative character of Vedic statements that communicated *dharma* without taking recourse to god's authority and reliability. Praśastapāda the theist seems do deliberately refer to Jaimini's thesis, to modify it and augment it with the new element *īśvara-°*:

Jaimini:**codanā-lakṣaṇo dharmah*Moral law is characterised by injunction, *ergo* n o t r e v e a l e d .**Praśastapāda:****īśvara-codanābhivṛtyakto dharmah*

Moral law is manifested through injunction r e v e a l e d b y g o d .

Praśastapāda, with his two-purpose comment, made therefore a statement: an unequivocal manifestation of his conviction as a theist.

¹¹¹ PBh₁ 2.1, p. 6–7 = PBh₂ 2, p. 1.6–8: *dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām ṣaṅṅām padārthānām sādharma-vaidharmya-tattva-jñānam* [PBh₁, n. 5 = PBh₂, n. 2: °-vaidharmyābhīyam tattva-°] *niḥśreyasa-hetuḥ. tac cēśvara-codanābhivṛtyaktād dharmād eva.*

¹¹² MS 1.1.2: *codanā-lakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah.*

There is one more Kaṇāda's passage that was later interpreted in the theistic sense:

'[1] The composition of sentences in the *Vedas* is preceded by conscious design. [2] And it does not [come] from our conscious designs. It is the inferential sign of a seer's [conscious design].'¹¹³

What Kaṇāda says is that behind the rational structure and meaningful contents of the *Vedas* stands a conscious design of a seer, who composed them. The phrasing and contents of Kaṇāda's words contains nothing that would allude to god as such. He merely says that it was a product of a consciousness higher than that of an ordinary being. The expression he uses is *na cāsmad-buddhibhyaḥ* ('not ... from our conscious designs') bears a resemblance to Praśastapāda's wording *asmad-viśiṣṭānām yoginām* (PBh 241, 370: 'yogins ... who are superior to us', pp. 311, 312)¹¹⁴. It is hardly feasible that what he meant was god.¹¹⁵

However, Candrānanda, in his *Vṛtti*, offers a completely different exposition in the purely theistic spirit:

'For our [human] cognition is not of this kind [to know the *Vedas*], having as its scope [only] objects that are present, not concealed [from sight] and [directly] connected [to our sense organs]¹¹⁶. Of such kind is only the cognition of god. For this reason god's cognition has as its scope extrasensory objects.'¹¹⁷

Also Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra (c. 1230–1250¹¹⁸), the author of *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-vārttika* (*Tarka-sāgara*), gives a purely theistic exposition of the *sūtra*: '<And this> vener-

¹¹³ VS(C) 6.1.1–2: *buddhi-pūrvā vākya-ktir vede. na cāsmad-buddhibhyo liṅgam ṛṣeḥ*.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Bhartṛhari's expression: *asmad-viśiṣṭānām* (VP 3.1.46: 'those who are superior to us', p. 321).

¹¹⁵ There existed an idea of *īśvara* being a kind of superman, a powerful superhuman being, 'a particular kind of soul, untainted by afflictions, *karman* and karmic fruition [caused by subliminal disposition]' (YS 1.24: *kleśa-karma-vipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa īśvarah.*) in the tradition of the *Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra* (ca 325 to 425 CE?, for the dating see MAAS (2006: xii–xix) and (2009: 383)). However, that idea is not what Kaṇāda or Praśastapāda refer to.

¹¹⁶ This cognition is exactly the opposite of the *yogin*'s supernatural perception described, e.g., in VSV(C) 1.15, see n. 150.

¹¹⁷ VSV(C) 6.1.2, p. 45.9–11: *na hi yādṛśam asmad-vijñānam vartamānāvyavahita-sambaddhārtha-viṣayaṁ tādṛśam eva bhagavato vijñānam. ataḥ sambhavati bhagavato 'tīndriyārtha-viṣayaṁ vijñānam*.

¹¹⁸ ISAACSON (1995: 4).

able seer is god'¹¹⁹. Clearly, such reinterpretations of Kaṇāda's intention presuppose Praśastapāda's theistic innovation in the system.

4.3. Knowability thesis and god's omniscience

Since, prior to Praśastapāda and his contemporaries, the Vaiśeṣika system as such knew no idea of god's existence¹²⁰, there could neither be any idea of god's omniscience known to the system before that time either. However, the idea of god's omniscience—as a corollary of the belief in god's existence—is present, which is my contention, as early as Praśastapāda's afore-mentioned statements that explicitly refer to god,¹²¹ or even earlier, i.e. at the time of Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin (after c. 450).

There are at least two ideas that, when combined, lead us to the conclusion that Praśastapāda, while accepting the existence of god, also admitted of his omniscience.

First, it is his conviction that the composition of the *Vedas*, which reliably communicate all the knowledge and describe the whole world in its entirety, (a) entails the existence of their author and (b) presupposes prior knowledge of their contents in the author's consciousness:

‘Vedic tradition, consisting in Vedic revelation (*śruti*) and authoritative testimony (*smṛti*), is based on the cognitive validity of the speaker: “Vedic tradition possesses cognitive validity, because of «its»¹²² statement (here: because of god's statement)” [VS 1.1.3]. And [the word (*śabda*)] is [proved to be] impermanent on the basis of the inferential sign, because it has been said [in VS 6.1.1]: “The composition of sentences in the *Vedas* is preceded by conscious design”, [and in VS(C) 6.1.1 = VS(Ś) 6.1.3]: “Benefaction is preceded by conscious design”’.¹²³

¹¹⁹ VSV₂ *ad loc.*, p. 57: <sa ca> *bhagavān ṛṣir īśvaraḥ*. VSV₁ *ad loc.*, p. 298.11 = VSV(D), p. 58.11: <veda-kartā> *bhagavān ṛṣir īśvaraḥ*.

¹²⁰ I don't mean to say that theistic views were altogether unknown to Kaṇāda but that he did not subscribe to them.

¹²¹ See PBh₁ 2.1, p. 7 = PBh₂ 2, p. 1.8 (*tac cēśvara-codanābhivyaktād dharmād eva*) and PBh₁ 8.12, p. 213 = PBh₂ 257; see nn. 109 & 111, and n. 108 respectively.

¹²² See § 4.2, p. 292 ff.

¹²³ PBh₁ 8.12.2.2, p. 213 = PBh₂ 257: *śruti-smṛti-lakṣaṇo 'py āmnāyo vaktṛ-prāmānyāpekṣaḥ* “*tad-vacanād āmnāya-prāmānyam*” (VS 1.1.3), *liṅgāc cānītyo*, “*buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kṛtir vede*” (VS 6.1.1), “*buddhi-pūrvō dadātīr*” (VS(C) 6.1.4 = VS(D) 6.1.4 = VS(Ś) 6.1.3) *ity uktatvāt*. Passage partially cited above on p. 294, n. 108.

Secondly, the admission of the idea of a complete knowledge of all the categories, which is indispensable to construct an exhaustive ontology attempted by the Vaiśeṣika, necessitates the acceptance of the idea of knowledge that embraces all the elements of the universe; and that is eventually tantamount to omniscience.

By the time of Praśastapāda the idea of omniscience as such, i.e. either human or divine, had already entered the body of beliefs professed by the representatives of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and it is already present in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, just to quote two examples:

‘Out of these [twelve cognoscible categories, the first one, viz.] the soul is the perceiver of everything, the experiencing subject of everything, the omniscient, the sensor of everything.’¹²⁴

and

‘[It is known] through scriptural testimony [that] god is the perceiver, the knower, the omniscient. And who could possibly explain god, who is inexpressible [and] beyond the scope of perception, inference and scriptural testimony, by means of the soul’s attributes, such as sentience etc.?!’¹²⁵

These two instances demonstrate that the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* related the idea of omniscience to two categories of the soul (*ātman*). Firstly, it was a potential property of the soul as such, being its dormant innate aptitude that was correlated to its omnipresence and spatial infinity, features that, for Praśastapāda, the soul shared with three other substances.¹²⁶ Secondly, it was an actual property of god, a supreme kind of soul. This twofold division of the souls was later expressed in plain terms, e.g. by Udayana in his *Lakṣaṇāvalī*: ‘Soul is twofold: god and non-god.’¹²⁷

Even though Praśastapāda nowhere mentions god’s omniscience directly, apparently taking it for granted and as something that necessitates no further proof, he does make use of the idea on a few occasions. The first is the description of the act of (re)construction of the world:

‘Now the principle of the construction and dissolution of the four [atomic] material elements is described in the following. At the end of

¹²⁴ NBh 1.1.9: *tatrātmā sarvasya draṣṭā sarvasya bhoktā sarva-jñāḥ sarvānubhāvī*.

¹²⁵ NBh 4.1.21, p. 228.13: *āgamāc ca draṣṭā boddhā sarva-jñātā īśvara iti. buddhy-ādibhiḥ cātma-liṅgair nirupākhyam īśvaram pratyakṣānumānāgama-viṣayātitaṁ kaḥ śakta upapādayitum*.

¹²⁶ PBh₁ 3, p. 22 = PBh₂ 19: *ākāśa-kāla-dig-ātmanām sarva-gatatvaṁ, parama-mahattvaṁ, sarva-samyogi-samāna-deśatvaṁ ca*.

¹²⁷ LA 114 (p. 70): *sa dvividha īśāniśa-bhedāt*.

a hundred years [measured] by Brahma units, at the time of liberation of the current divine being Brahman—simultaneously with the wish of supreme god, the lord of the whole universe, to dissolve [the universe] in order to give rest during the [period of Brahma] night to all living creatures wearied by transmigration—the activity of invisible moral principles, which are present in all souls and which govern [the souls'] bodies, sense-organs and material elements, comes to halt. Then the suspension of the connection between these [atomic particles] occurs by means of the separations of the atomic particles which are the causes of bodies and sense-organs, [the separations being] accomplished through the actions that result from the connection of supreme god's wish, the souls and the atomic particles. Subsequently, the dissolution of these [atomic particles takes place] up to the indivisible atoms.¹²⁸

After the period of the world's dissolution comes to an end, god performs his role through a divine being Brahman and launches the world again to a new round of active manifest existence, having in the first step introduced motion into the universe anew and having brought the first two atoms together to form a particle¹²⁹:

‘And this [divine being] Brahman—being entrusted by supreme god [and] being endowed with cognition characterised by absolute excellence (*sc.* omniscience), and with passionlessness and divine might—gets to know the fruition of the deeds of living creatures (*sc.* souls), [first] begets [his] sons who are made of his mind and are lords of the creatures, [and then he creates] law-givers, divine beings, seers and classes of forefathers, the four social strata that sprung from [Prajāpati's] mouth, arms, thighs and feet, as well as other higher and lower [corporeal] living beings—so that the knowledge, experience and life span [of all these beings] correspond to their previous deeds. [In these acts of construction, divine Brahman] endows [all the created beings]

¹²⁸ PBh₁ 5, p. 48.7 ff. = PBh₂ 57: *ihédānīm caturṇām mahā-bhūtānām sṛṣṭi-saṁhāra-vidhir ucyate. brāhṁeṇa mānena varṣa-śatānte vartamānasya brahmaṇo 'pavarga-kāle saṁsāra-khinnānām sarva-prāṇinām niśi viśrāmārthaṁ sakala-bhuvana-pater mahēśvarasya saṁjihīrṣā-samakālam śarīrēndriya-mahā-bhūtōpanibandhakānām sarvātma-gatānām adṛṣṭānām vṛttnirodhe sati mahēśvarēcchātmaṇu-saṁyoga-ja-karmabhyah śarīrēndriya-kāraṇāṇu-vibhāgebhyaḥ tat-saṁyoga-nivṛttau teṣām ā paramāṅv-anto vināśah.*

¹²⁹ PBh₁ 5, p. 48.19 ff. = PBh₂ 58: *tataḥ punaḥ prāṇinām bhoga-bhūtaye mahēśvara-sisṛkṣānantaram sarvātma-gata-vṛtti-labdhdāṛṣṭāpekṣebhyas tat-saṁyogebhyah pavana-paramāṅṣu karmōtpattau teṣām paraspara-saṁyogebhyo dvy-aṅukādi-prakrameṇa mahān vāyuh samutpanno nabhasi dodhūyamānas tiṣṭhati. etc.*

with their [respective] moral duty, knowledge, passionlessness and divine might that conform to their potencies stored [as their *karman*].¹³⁰

Clearly, such an arduous task, as it probably would have to be, of putting the universe of all living beings together along with their respective *karmans*, to be accomplished by divine Brahman, would have to necessitate absolute and supreme knowledge (*atiśaya-jñāna*), which is c o n s i g n e d, or subcontracted, to Brahman by god (*mahēśvareṇa viniyuktaḥ*) as an act of divine outsourcing.

Another indirect reference to god's omniscience, or at least some kind of extraordinary cognition, is found in the section that describes how dimensions larger than atomic size as well as the idea of plurality in the world originate:

‘Impermanent [dimensions] of all four kinds have their source in number, dimension and multitude. Out of these [dimensions, the idea of] the plural number arises thanks to god's mind with respect to atomic dyads, made of indivisible atoms; [the said plural number] produces [the qualities of] magnitude and length—simultaneously with the formation of colour and other [secondary qualities]—in [complex] substantial things, understood as atomic triads (i.e. particles composed of three pairs of atoms) and as other [larger macroscopic bodies], which are effects brought about by these [atomic dyads].’¹³¹

In other words, it is god's mind that stores the idea of two-atom particles as well as the notion of complex wholes based on the idea of plurality (plural number), inherent in the composition of atomic triads, that are composed of six atoms (i.e. three pairs). Praśastapāda wants us to believe that without that notion present in god's mind complex wholes could not emerge.

Three questions immediately arise here. First, what does the idea of plurality, or duality, have to do with atomic dyads (*dvy-aṅuka*)? Second, what does god have to do with it? And, third, what does it all have to do with god's omniscience?

To answer the first question, i.e. what relates the idea of plurality with two-atom particles, we have to take a closer look at the idea of the cognition of recurrent con-

¹³⁰ PBh₁ 5, p. 49.11 ff. = PBh₂ 59: *sa ca mahēśvareṇa viniyukto brahmātiśaya-jñāna-vairāgyāśvarya-sampannaḥ prāñinām karma-vipākam viditvā karmānurūpa-jñāna-bhogāyuṣaḥ sutān prajāpatin mānasān manu-deva-rṣi-pitr-gaṇān mukha-bāhūru-pāda-taś caturō varṇān anyāni cōccāvācāni bhūtāni ca sṛṣṭvā, āśayāṅurūpair dharma-jñāna-vairāgyāśvaryaiah saṃyojayatīti.*

¹³¹ PBh₁ 8.7, p. 131 = PBh₂ 155–156: *anityam catur-vidham api saṃkhyā-parimāṇa-pracaya-yoni. tatrēśvara-buddhim apekṣyōtpannā paramāṅgu-dvy-aṅukeṣu bahutva-saṃkhyā tair ārabdhe kārya-dravye try-aṅukādi-lakṣaṇe rūpādya-utpatti-samakālam mahattvam dīrghatvam ca karoti.*

tinuity (*apekṣā-buddhi*)¹³², sometimes called enumerative knowledge, and the process through which our mind forms the notion of the number ‘two’ and larger numbers, as was understood by Praśastapāda, who surprisingly devoted a lot of space to the problem:

[130] The [number “two” and numbers larger than “two”] arise, as one should realise, from many [single instances] of oneness combined with the idea of a multiple object, and disappear with the disappearance of the cognition of recurrent continuity. [131] How [does it take place]? ‘When it comes to a contact of the perceiver’s eye with two individual substantial things, belonging either to the same class or to a different class (i.e. two homogeneous or heterogeneous things), there arises the cognition of generality of oneness which inheres in each [individual substantial thing] that is in contact with the [eye; and it has the form: “This is one. This is one”]; then from [three] acts of cognition: one of the generality of oneness and [two] of the relation [of the two single things] to this [oneness], there arises one single notion of two single-instantiated [things] with respect to a multiple object [made of these two individual substantial things]. Then, contingent on this [single notion of two single-instantiated things], the notion of duality emerges with respect to (sc. instantiated in the form of) these two onenesses, each of which having their respective substrata (i.e. the single-instantiated things). And, subsequently, with respect to this [singular notion of duality instantiated in the form of the two onenesses] there arises the cognition of generality of duality. As a consequence of this cognition of generality of duality the cognition of recurrent continuity (here: the cognition of duality dependent on two instantiations) gradually disappears and, from the acts of cognition: of the generality of duality, of the relation [of the two onenesses] to this [duality] and of [this singular] duality, there gradually arises one single notion of the quality of duality—[these two processes take place at] the same time. [132] Then, immediately on the disappearance of the cognition of recurrent continuity (here: the cognition of duality dependent on two instantiations), the quality of duality disappears. [Since] the cognition of the quality of duality is the cause of the disappearance of cognition of the generality of duality, there gradually arises—because of the quality of duality, its cognition and its relation—the notion of [two] individual substantial things of the form: “two individual substantial things”;

¹³² On *apekṣā-buddhi* see e.g. MIYAMOTO (1996: 78–84).

[these processes take place at] the same time. [133] Immediately afterwards there arises the cognition of [two] individual substantial things of the form: “two individual substantial things”, the duality disappears, the notion of the quality of duality gradually disappears; from the cognition of individual substantial thing subliminal impression gradually arises; [these processes take place at] the same time. [134] Immediately afterwards from the cognition of individual substantial thing the notion of the quality of duality disappears; also the notion of individual substantial thing [disappears] due to the subliminal impression. [135] In this way [we] have also described how [the notion of] the number “three” etc. originates. [Their] production proceeds from many [single instances] of oneness combined with the idea of a multiple object, and [their] disappearance follows the disappearance of the cognition of recurrent continuity.’¹³³

This lengthy account on number two, and similar procedures, apply also to numbers larger than two, and shows that to conceive of a notion of number was maintained by Praśastapāda to be a highly complex process that involved a sequence of stages and a special cognitive ability called the cognition of recurrent continuity (*apekṣā-buddhi*). Equally easily can we see that Praśastapāda thought a clearly formed notion of the number ‘two’, or ‘duality’, and that of larger numbers as well, was indispensable for the existence of compounded entities, which by nature are aggregates consisting of numerous (at least two) parts, for instance for the existence of two-atom particles. In other words, the existence of a whole consisting of two ele-

¹³³ PB₁ 8.6, p. 111–112 = PB₂ 130–135: [130] *tasyāḥ* (= *sāmkhyāyāḥ*) *khalv* *ekatvebhyo* *'neka-viṣaya-buddhi-sahitebhyo niṣpattir apekṣā-buddhi-vināśād vināśa iti*. [131] *katham. yadā boddhuḥ cakṣuṣā samānāsamāna-jāīyayor dravyayoḥ sannikarṣe sati tat-samyukta-samaveta-samavetaūkatva-sāmānya-jñānōtpattāv ekatva-sāmānya-tat-sambandha-jñānebhyo eka-guṇayor aneka-viṣayiny ekā buddhir utpadyate tadā tām apekṣyākatvābhyām svāśrayayor dvitvam ārambhate. tataḥ punas tasmīn dvitva-sāmānya-jñānam utpadyate. tasmād dvitva-sāmānya-jñānād apekṣā-buddher vinaśyattā dvitva-sāmānya-tat-sambandha-taj-jñānebhyo dvitva-guṇa-buddher utpadyamānatēty ekaḥ kālaḥ*. [132] *tata idānim apekṣā-buddhi-vināśād dvitva-guṇasya vinaśyattā dvitva-guṇa-jñānam dvitva-sāmānya-jñānasya vināśa-kāraṇam dvitva-guṇa-taj-jñāna-sambandhebhyo dve dravye iti dravya-buddher utpadyamānatēty ekaḥ kālaḥ*. [133] *tad-anantaram dve dravye iti dravya-jñānasyōtpādo dvitvasya vināśo dvitva-guṇa-buddher vinaśyattā dravya-jñānāt saṃskārasyōtpadyamānatēty ekaḥ kālaḥ*. [134] *tad-anantaram dravya-jñānād dvitva-guṇa-buddher vināśo dravya-buddher api saṃskārāt*. [135] *etena tritvādy-utpattir api vyākhyātā. ekatvebhyo 'neka-viṣaya-buddhi-sahitebhyo niṣpattir apekṣā-buddhi-vināśād ca vināśa iti*.

On the process of conceiving the idea of the number ‘two’, the way Praśastapāda understood it, see MIYAMOTO (1996: 59–77) and THAKUR (2003: 203–207): ‘Duality (*dvitva*)’.

ments (e.g. a two-atom particle) entails prior existence of the notion of ‘two’ and a respective design based on this notion.

To understand why—and this is a reply to the second question: what is god’s role in the process—we must recall that for Praśastapāda all movements and actions in the universe ultimately proceed from conscious entities, viz. the souls¹³⁴ of two kinds¹³⁵, because atoms, hence all other material entities composed of atoms alike, are not capable of autokinesis on their own. Further, movement and action is indispensable to produce a whole, therefore any compounded whole is thus a result of a series of events that eventually go back to the first mover, clearly an idea that was used to formulate one of a number of arguments for the existence of god, the argument from the first mover:

‘Material substratum, atoms and *karman* operate, because—as they were put in motion earlier—they are superintended by a cause endowed with cognitive awareness (sc. god), insofar as they [themselves] are unconscious, like an axe etc., viz. just like an axe and other [tools] operate being superintended by a carpenter endowed with cognitive awareness, because they [themselves] are unconscious ...’¹³⁶

Even to combine elements into a smallest possible whole, viz. an atomic dyad (*dyv-ānuka*), it takes a conscious being that would capacitate atoms to conjoin by applying his cognition of recurrent continuity (*apekṣā-buddhi*) to separate elements. We can

¹³⁴ Cf. e.g. PBh₁ 6.4, p. 69.6 ff. = PBh₂ 76: *tasya saukṣmyād apratyakṣatve sati* [PBh₁, n. 5: ‘*pī*] *karaṇaiḥ śabdādy-upalabdhy-anumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate. vāsyādīnām* [PBh₁, n. 7: *vāsyādīnām iva*] *karaṇānām karṭṭ-prayojyatva-darśanāc chabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako ’numīyate.*—‘Since due to its subtlety the [soul] is imperceptible, it is made known through sensory organs such as the organ of hearing whose [existence] is inferred through [the existence of sensory data] such as sound etc. Similarly, since instruments, such as axe etc., are empirically attested to [entail] that they are employed by an agent [with a purpose], and [sensory instruments] are well established to [be employed] with respect to sound and other [data, the soul] is inferred [to exist] as an executor [of all actions].’

¹³⁵ See p. 298, n. 127.

¹³⁶ NV₁ 4.21, p. 461.11–13: *pradhāna-paramāṇu-karmāṇi prāk pravṛtteḥ buddhimat-kāraṇādhiṣṭitāni pravartanta ’cetanatvād vāsy-ādivad iti yathā vāsy-ādi buddhimatā takṣṇā adhiṣṭitam acetanatvāt pravartate ...* Cf. n. 229. The argument was frequently repeated by subsequent authors, e.g. by Udayana in NKA 5, p. 503.15: *paramāṇv-ādayo hi cetanā-yojitāḥ pravartante acetanatvād vāsy-ādivat.*—‘Indivisible atoms etc. operate when propelled by consciousness, because they are unconscious, like an axe etc.’ Jayanta-bhaṭṭa devotes a longer passage to the argument in NMa₁ I: 488–490. Cf. NS 1.1.11: *ceṣṭēndriyārthāśrayaḥ śarīram.*—‘The body is a seat of action, sense organs and objects.’

speak here of something resembling Aristotelian final cause (*causa finalis*)¹³⁷, i.e. of a particular design god has while bringing about a combination of two atoms. Since in the (endlessly cyclical) beginning of the world after the period of its dissolution all other conscious beings are each time dormant, the only conscious agent is god who needs to have a well-formed notion of the number ‘two’ etc. in order to initiate the process of the composition of the universe, from finest particles to large macroscopic wholes.

The problem remains, which is our third question, what does god’s omniscience have to do with all this? After a period of a complete dissolution of the world (*pralaya*), when all conscious beings are dormant and all matter has dissolved into separate, uncombined atoms in rest, god requires—in order to bring the world into existence back again—the ideas of the number ‘two’ etc. in order to initiate the union of two atoms and to induce the process of forming larger wholes. However, as Praśastapāda’s account suggests, the notions of duality and plurality are as such an abstract synthesis derived from experience that requires elements somehow linked together with the help of the cognition of recurrent continuity (*apekṣā-buddhi*). To form a complex whole, necessarily based on notions of duality and plurality, requires a prior knowledge of such an idea of number larger than one. In the world emerging from the dissolution, in the first stage, there is nothing that could serve as a source for an experience that could subsequently trigger the conception of such numbers, because all objects are unitary and no objects are combined in pairs. Therefore, it has to be postulated that god must be possessed of such knowledge that is not derived from experience at all. His knowledge of this sort does not necessarily have to amount to omniscience, however, it certainly remains outside the scope of any experience or ordinary knowledge derived from experience.¹³⁸ No doubt it must be regarded as some kind of extraordinary knowledge: it is beyond the capability of any ordinary being to have knowledge which is not derived from experience of any form, including testimony communicated by another agent, which also entails some kind of experience. To put it plainly, the existence of wholes compounded of atoms rests on the notion of ‘two’ along with a respective design based on this notion; and that presupposes extra-empirical, perfect and, probably, omniscient mind of god, the (re)constructor, in which all such notions are stored.

¹³⁷ *Met* 983^a31-32: τετάρτην δὲ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν ταύτη, τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ πάραθόν (τέλος γὰρ γενέσεως καὶ κινήσεως πάσης τοῦτ’ ἐστίν).—‘The fourth [cause] is the opposite of the latter (i.e. of efficient cause), namely that for sake of which something happens (sc. purposefulness) and goodness, for it is the purpose of all that arises and moves.’

¹³⁸ An argument that god acquired such a knowledge empirically, i.e. before the dissolution, while the complex world was still there in developed form, and therefore, while the world is re-emerging after the dissolution, god’s knowledge of duality and plurality would merely be a case of memory from previous, i.e. pre-dissolution experience, would lead to infinite regress.

Consequently, to postulate such a knowledge of simple numbers, as trivial as it may sound at first, in the context where the universe offers no observable data for one to empirically derive such a knowledge from it, is tantamount to asserting that god possesses at least some kind of supernatural cognition that transcends all a mundane soul could possibly know.

A very similar indication of the same kind of supreme knowledge, which exceeds everything known in the universe, is found in the following passage quoted in Abhayadeva-sūri's *Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinī* and ascribed to Praśastamati:

‘Praśastamati, on the other hand, says: “In the beginning of (re)construction [of the world, verbal] usage of people is preceded by someone else’s instruction, because later on [people’s usage] awakened [after the dissolution of the world] is [properly] delimited with respect to their specific objects¹³⁹, just as verbal usage of children, who have not learnt verbal usage yet, [when properly] delimited with respect to their specific objects, is preceded by the instruction of [their] mothers and other [people].’

In his comment immediately following the passage, Abhayadeva-sūri explicates what is actually self-evident in the quote, that, first, that what Praśastamati has in mind as the primary source of verbal usage, when no knowledge yet exists, is god, and secondly, what lies at the core of god’s capability of bestowing upon the humankind linguistic skills is his supreme cognition:

‘... It is proved that the one by whose instruction [verbal] usage [of people] is preceded in the beginning of [re]construction [of the world] is god; indeed, he is not deprived of excellence of cognition during the dissolution [of the world].’¹⁴⁰

Further, Abhayadeva-sūri either recapitulates or quotes what Praśastamati apparently has to say on god’s omniscience (*sarva-jñatva*), as being related to god’s act

¹³⁹ I.e. people correctly use words and denote objects. The same expression occurs in PBh₁ 8.12, p. 171= PBh₂ 212: *buddhir upalabdhir jñānam pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ. sā cāneka-prakārārthāntyāit praty-artha-niyatatvāc ca.*—‘Cognitive awareness [of an object], apprehension, cognition, comprehension—these are synonyms. This [cognitive awareness] has numerous varieties, because objects are infinite and it is delimited with respect to its specific objects.’

¹⁴⁰ TBV, p. 101.19–23: *praśastamatis tv āha: “sargādau puruṣāṅām vyavahāro ’nyōpadeśa-pūrvakaḥ, uttara-kālam prabuddhānām praty-artha-niyatatvād, aprasiddha-vāg-vyavahārāṅām kumārāṅām gav-ādiṣu praty-artha-niyato vāg-vyavahāro yathā mātrādy-upadeśa-pūrvakaḥ” iti. prabuddhānām praty artha-niyatatvād iti prabuddhānām satām praty artham niyatvatvād ity arthaḥ. yad-upadeśa-pūrvakaś ca sa sargādau vyavahāraḥ sa īśvaraḥ pralaya-kāle tu alupta-jñānātiśaya iti siddham.*

of composition or construction (not an act of creation *ex nihilo*, of course!) of the world:

“Now, on the basis of this [argumentation] it must be taken as proven that god, consisting in multiple causes, is the cause of all the world. But how can it be proved that he is omniscient, so that he could become the object of devotion for all those [people] desirous of the highest good and mundane prosperity¹⁴¹? We say it is because it has been proved beyond doubt that [god] is the constructor of the world.” And this is what Praśastamati and others said along these lines: “[{1. Thesis:} God is omniscient], {Logical reason:} because [he as] the agent has the knowledge of the product, of its material cause, of the tools (assisting causes) [to produce it], of the purpose [of the product] and of its recipient. {Invariable concomitance and example:} For in this world, whoever is the agent [producing] something, he has the knowledge of the material cause of the material cause etc. of that [thing]. For instance the potter, being the agent [producing] a pot [as the product] etc., has the knowledge of a clod of clay, which is the material cause [of the pot]; [he has the knowledge of] the potter’s wheel, which are the tools [to produce the pot]; [he has the knowledge of] the fetching of water etc., which is the purpose [of the pot]; and [he has the knowledge of] the householder as the recipient. That is obvious. {Application:} Similarly, god is the agent [producing] all the world layers, he has the knowledge of their material causes, consisting in atoms etc.; [he has the knowledge of] the tools (immediate assisting causes) [to produce them], i.e. the moral law, space, time etc.; [he has the knowledge of] factual tools [to produce them], consisting in universals, individuators and inherence; [he has the knowledge of] the purpose, i.e. the benefit and [he has the knowledge of] people who are technically called recipients. {Conclusion:} Therefore it is proved that he is omniscient”¹⁴².

¹⁴¹ Two goals mentioned in VS(C) 1.1.2 (v n. 104); *nota bene* the sequence of both the goals is interchanged.

¹⁴² TBV, p. 101.27–35: *atha bhavatv asmād dhetu-kadambakādīśvarasya sarva-jagad-dhetutva-siddhiḥ, sarva-jñatvaṃ tu katham tasya siddham yenāsau niḥśreyasābhyudaya-kāmānām bhakti-viṣayatām yāyāt? jagat-kartṛtva-siddher evēti brūmaḥ. tathā cāhuḥ praśastamati-prabhṛtayaḥ: “kartuḥ kāryōpādānōpakaraṇa-prayojana-saṃpradāna-parijñānāt. iha hi yo yasya kartā bhavati sa tasyōpādānādīni jānīte, yathā kulālah kuṇḍādīnām kartā, tad-upādānam mṛt-piṇḍam, upakaraṇāni cakrādīni, prayojanam udakāharaṇādi, kuṭumbinām ca saṃpradānam jānīta*

What we find embedded in the passage as a quote is a full-fledged, five-membered proof formula of god's omniscience and its authorship is ascribed either to Praśastamati or to his immediate tradition. What is missing in the proof formula is an explicit formulation of the thesis; however, the context is so unequivocal that one can phrase it as follows beyond a shadow of doubt: **īśvarasya sarva-jñatvaṃ* ('god is omniscient').

Whether the Vaiṣeṣika author of the above argument for god's omniscience was Praśastamati himself or his immediate disciples, or whether Praśastamati was Praśastapāda or not, the passage attests to the fact that around the time when Praśastamati and Praśastapāda flourished the idea of god's omniscience not only circulated but attempts were undertaken to prove it. The contention holds valid even when the above five-membered proof formula is not an original formulation but merely a paraphrase: it still attest to the fact that the Vaiṣeṣikas attempted to prove their theistic stance. And that renders a strong support to my thesis that what Praśastapāda himself spoke of as supreme knowledge (*atiśaya-jñāna*, n. 130; or *jñānātīśaya*, n. 140), which was beyond this world and did not undergo the process of dissolution when everything else was temporarily dissolved, was in fact omniscience.

To recap, we can see that although Praśastapāda did not make any consistent attempt, at least in his only extant work, to characterise the essence of god or to prove either his existence or his omniscience, he did, for all practical purposes, use the notion of god and god's omniscience as self-evident. These reservations will not hold if he indeed were the same person as Praśastamati, of course. For, as regards Praśastamati, granted he is different from Praśastapāda, we may not know whether at all or how he defined god's essence, but we do know that either he or someone of his direct disciples conceived of god as an omniscient being and, in addition, provided what he thought to be a valid proof formula for that. In any case, what is beyond doubt is that by the end of the fifth century a clear idea of god as an omniscient constructor of the world was a well-established doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika system.

Although they did not have all the theoretical apparatus of modern logic (*vide supra*, p. § 3.3), the intuition of the Naiyāyika-Vaiṣeṣika seemed quite appropriate to relate the belief in omniscience to either god or to select humans of extraordinary qualities. It is therefore not at all surprising to find the knowability thesis enter their system. It would be too far-reaching to claim that the philosophers thought that the ability to know everything was really applicable to ordinary humans. It must

ity etat siddham. tathēśvaraḥ sakala-bhuvānām kartā, sa tad-upādānāni paramāṅv-ādi-lakṣaṇāni, tad-upakaraṇāni dharmā-dik-kālādīni, vyavahārōpakaraṇāni sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāya-lakṣaṇāni, prayojanam upabhogam, saṃpradāna-saṃjñakāmś ca puruṣān jānīta iti. ata siddham asya sarvajñatvam iti.

have therefore been correlated with the idea of divine omniscience and yogic experience, which warranted their systems completeness and (seeming) consistency.

4.4. Knowability thesis and supernatural perception

The third and last idea that entered the body of tenets upheld by later Vaiśeṣika philosophers simultaneously with the equation ‘existentiality = nameability = cognisability’ (*astitva* = *abhidheyatva* = *jñeyatva*), and was complementary to it was the belief in supernatural perception. It eventually came to be believed to be of two kinds: the *yogin*’s perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) and the seer’s perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa*).

4.4.1. Supernatural perception of the *yogins*

We may safely assume that the admission of some sort of supernatural powers, including extrasensory perception, was quite a widespread popular ‘folk-religious’ belief at quite an early age also in India. However, it was not until the first half of the first millennium CE that the actual term for such a phenomenon, e.g. either *yogi-pratyakṣa* (‘the *yogin*’s perception’) or *ārṣa-pratyakṣa* (‘the seer’s perception’), was coined and found its way into philosophical treatises in general. Attempts to prove the existence of such a belief-based concept are generally even later.

Both the concept and the term are absent in earliest versions of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*; their addition must have taken place later, about the turn of 4th/5th centuries at the earliest, and antedate Praśastapāda, as WEZLER (1982), HONDA (1988) and ISAACSON (1993) convincingly argued. The latter (ISAACSON (1993: 141-142)) also draws attention to the following passage of Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin’s *Nyāya-bhāṣya*,¹⁴³ which directly mentions the idea and explicitly quotes VS(C) 9.13, apparently the earliest Vaiśeṣika reference to supernatural perception.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ NBh 1.1.3 (p. 9.8–9): *pratyakṣam yuñjānasya yoga-samādhiyam “ātmany ātma-manasoḥ saṁyoga-viśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣaḥ” iti.*—‘[Another proof of the existence of soul, beside verbal testimony of an authority or inference, is] perception of a [*yogin*] temporarily [engrossed] in meditation, which is born in the state of concentration in *yoga* [in accordance with] the following [*sūtra*]: “Due to particular connection of the self and the mind in the self [there arises] perception of the self”.’

¹⁴⁴ Indeed, there is a reference to *samādhi* in NS 4.2.38: *samādhi-viśeṣābhyāsāt.*—‘[The cognition of the true nature of imperfections (see NS 4.2.1 and 1.1.18)] arises due to rehearsed exertion of a particular kind of concentration.’ However, one should not take such a reference to

Accordingly, the section into which the discussion of supernatural perception is some time later inserted is VS(C) 9.13–17 and actually, in the version we have in front of us, deals with two kinds of it¹⁴⁵:

[A: The state of a *yogin* temporarily engrossed in meditation (*yukta*, lit. “connected” or “disciplined, concentrated”¹⁴⁶):]

[13] Due to particular connection of the self and the mind in the self [there arises] perception of (through?) the self.¹⁴⁷

[14] [This perception] also [grasps] other substances, [*sc.* atoms¹⁴⁸ of five elements, time, space, mind].

meditative concentration (*samādhi*) as an indication that Akṣapāda Gautama accepted supernatural perception because there is no necessary link between the two. The explanation of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana in NBh ad loc. is a clear indication that what *samādhi* meant was a process that has nothing to do with supernatural perception but was a process of withdrawal of the self’s attention from the sense-data: ‘This [concentration is a connection of the mind with the soul [only, the mind being] withdrawn (*sc.* disconnected) from sense-organs and held under control by a restraining effort, and [this connection] is characterised by a desire to understand the true nature [of the categories]’ (*sa tu pratyāhṛtasyēndriyebhyo manaso vidhārakeṇa prayatnena dhāryamaṇasyātmanā saṃyogas tattva-bubhutsā-viśiṣṭaḥ*).

¹⁴⁵ We should be aware, though, that this two-fold division—achieved through the later insertion of VS(C) 9.15—was most probably subsequently imposed on an earlier interpolation which did not know the two kinds of supernatural perception, and that happened under Praśastapāda’s influence, see FADDEGON (1918: 293), HONDA (1988: 468–469) and ISAACSON (1993: 144–148), cf. WEZLER (1982: 667).

¹⁴⁶ It corresponds to *yujjāna* (‘connecting’ or ‘disciplining himself, concentrating’) of NBh 1.1.3 (see n. 147).

¹⁴⁷ It is quoted in NBh 1.1.3 (p. 9.8–9) as a proof of the existence of the soul: *pratyakṣam yujjānasya yoga-samādhiyam “ātmany ātma-manasoḥ saṃyoga-viśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣaḥ” iti*.—‘[Another proof of the existence of soul, beside verbal testimony of an authority or inference, is] the perception of a [*yogin*] temporarily engrossed in meditation, which is born in the state of concentration in *yoga* [in accordance with] the following: “Due to particular connection of the self and the mind in the self [there arises] perception of the self”.’ VS(C) 9.13 is also quoted in RVār 5.2, p. 440.9 (as indicated by Muni Jambuvijaya in VS(C), n. 15, p. 234.26–27), and not in RVār 5.22, as ISAACSON (1993: 141) indicates.

Also Kauṇḍinya the Pāsupata accepts this kind of supernatural perception as different from ordinary, sensory variety, see PABh 1.1, p. 7.1–8: *tatra pratyakṣam dvididham indriya-pratyakṣam ātma-pratyakṣam ca. indriya-pratyakṣam indriyārthāḥ śabda-sparśa-rūpa-rasa-gandha-ghaṭādyāḥ, vyākhyāna-tāpa-mūtra-purīṣa-māmsa-lavaṇa-prāṇāyāmaiḥ siddham. ātma-pratyakṣam tad-upahāra-kṛtsna-tapo-duḥkhāntādi-vacanāt siddham. yathā prasthena mito vrihiḥ prasthaḥ. paramārthatas tv indriyārtha-sambandha-vyañjaka-sāmagryam dharmādharma-prakāsa-deśa-kāla-codanādy-anugrhitam sat pramāṇam utpadyate. ātma-pratyakṣam tu cittāntaḥ-karaṇa-sambandha-sāmagryam*. See also PABh 3.19, p. 88.20–21: *kṛtsnasya tapaso lakṣaṇam ātma-pratyakṣam vedītavyam* (for the translation see n. 173).

[B: The state of a *yogin* no longer engrossed in meditation (*viyukta*, lit. “disconnected” or “undisciplined, no longer concentrated”):]

[15, interpolation:¹⁴⁹] And [also] due to the contact of the self, sense-organ, mind and object [there arises supernatural perception].¹⁵⁰

(ŚM: And [also] those whose internal organ (mind) is no [longer] concentrated, whose concentration has been interrupted, [acquire perception] of these [other substances].)

[16] And [there is also supernatural perception] of actions and qualities, since they inhere in [the other substances].

[17] And [also there is supernatural perception] of qualities of the self, since they inhere in the self.¹⁵¹

However, as FADDEGON (1918: 293) suspected—on the basis of *tat-°* in *tat-samavāyāt* of VS(C) 9.16 = (VS(Ś) 9.14) referring naturally to VS(C) 9.14 = (VS(Ś) 9.12), not to the preceding *sūtra*—and as ISAACSON (1993: 144 ff., § 4) demonstrated, VS(C) 9.15 (= VS(Ś) 13) is still a later interpolation and its insertion introduced a two-fold division (known to Praśastapāda) of *yogi-pratyakṣa* into *yukta* and *viyukta*, apparently not known to the author of the earlier passage VS(C) 9.13–14

¹⁴⁸ Thus acc. to Candrānanda, VSV(C): ...*vyāpaka-dravyeṣv ātmanāsamīyukteṣv apratiṣiddhātma-samīyogeṣu ca paramāṅv-ādiṣūbhābyām samīyukteṣu...*

¹⁴⁹ See ISAACSON (1993) and HONDA (1988).

¹⁵⁰ Cf. VSV(C) 1.15: *sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṣṣeṣv artheṣu teṣām catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād api pratyakṣam jāyate. tathāsmad-ādi-pratyakṣeṣu.*—‘For these [yogins no longer engrossed in meditation] there arises perception of objects which are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant due to the contact of these four [viz. the self, sense-organ, mind and object]^a. And also of things perceptible to people like us.’

^a On *catuṣṭaya* (as well as on *traya* and *dvaya*) see also DPŚ₂ 146 (p. 191–2): ...*yad jñānam tasyātmēndriya-mano-’rtha-catūṣṭaya-sannikarṣaḥ karaṇam.* Cf. also the sequence of connection in NBhū, p. 170 (apropos of NSā: *viprayuktāvasthāyām catuṣṭaya-traya-dvaya-sannikarṣād grahaṇam yathā-sambavena yojanīyam*): [*catuṣṭaya*:] *tatra rasana-caḥṣus-tvēcām ... ātmā manasā samīyujyate, mana indriyeṇa, indriyam arthenēti.* [*traya*:] *śrotreṇārtha-grahaṇe trayāṅgām ātma-manah-śrotreṇām sannikarṣaḥ.* [*dvaya*:] *manasārtha-grahaṇe dvayor ātma-manaso sannikarṣa iti.*

¹⁵¹ VS(C) 9.13–17 ≈ VS(Ś) 9.1.11–15 ≈ VS(D) 9.11–13:

13: *ātmany ātma-manasoḥ samīyoga-viṣeṣād ātma-pratyakṣam.*

[VS(D) : absent]

14: *tathā dravyāntareṣu.*

[VS(Ś) 12: *tathā dravyāntareṣu pratyakṣam.*]

[VS(D) : absent]

15: *ātmēndriya-mano-’rtha-sannikarṣāc ca.* [= VS(D)]

[VS(Ś) 13: *asamāhīntaḥ-karaṇā upasamīhṛta-samādhayas teṣām ca.*]

16: *tat-samavāyāt karma-guṇeṣu.* [= VS(D)]

17: *ātma-samavāyād ātma-guṇeṣu.* [= VS(D)]

and 16–17. Indeed, when we eliminate *sūtra* 15, we obtain a more consistent, uninterrupted reading, without the unnatural jump in the textual structure.

Praśastapāda's full-fledged description of both kinds of supernatural perception of a *yogin*, either directly engrossed in the practice of *yoga* (*yukta*) or not (*viyukta*), that influenced the later insertion of VS(C) 9.15 into the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* section on *yogi-pratyakṣa*, runs as follows:

‘[240] The grasping of the highest universal (i.e. *mahā-sāmānya*) and of [intermediate universals such as] substantiality, qualitateness, and mobility etc., inherent in a perceptible substratum, through sense-organs which grasp [their] substratum is the [ordinary] perception of people like us. [241] However, in *yogins* who are temporarily engrossed in meditation (*yukta*) [and] who are superior to us, through the mind influenced by moral excellence (*dharma*) produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, there arises an unerring perception of the intrinsic nature with respect to [such invisible substances as] their own self, the self of others, ether, space, time, air, atoms, mind as well as qualities, actions, universals, individuators which are inherent in these [substances]. [242] On the other hand, in [*yogins* who are] no longer engrossed in meditation (*viyukta*) due to the contact of the four [viz. the self, sense-organ, mind and object and] thanks to the efficacy of the influence of moral law produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, there arises perception with respect to objects which are subtle, concealed (from sight) and distant^{152, 153}.

Just as Praśastapāda's references to god implied the existence of an antecedent Vaiśeṣika tradition, albeit of quite a fresh date, in which that idea had already been established, also in the case of Praśastapāda's mature and particularised description of supernatural perception it seems that the idea of *yogi-pratyakṣa* had already been established in the system for quite some time and it was not Praśastapāda's own innovation.

¹⁵² Cf. n. 150.

¹⁵³ PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 240–242: [240] *bhāva-dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādīnām upalabhyādhāra-samavetanām āśraya-grāhākair indriyair grahaṇam ity etad asmad-ādīnām pratyakṣam*. [241] *asmad-viśiṣṭānām tu yoginām yuktānām yoga-ja-dharmānugrhitena manaśā svātmāntarākāśa-dik-kāla-paramāṇu-vāyu-maṇṣu tat-samaveta-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvitatham svarūpa-darśanam utpadyate*. [242] *viyuktānām punaś catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād yoga-ja-dharmānugraha-sāmarthyāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṣeṣu pratyakṣam utpadyate*.

What attests to a mature state of development of the idea of the *yogin*'s supernatural perception is not only the double division mentioned in the above section of PBh, but also the fact that Praśastapāda finds an additional role for *yogi-pratyakṣa* to play in the Vaiśeṣika ontology. For him it serves as an additional tool, or even a direct, perceptual proof of the existence of the individuators (*viśeṣa*), perhaps the most controversial and debatable ontological postulate of the school, and also of the atoms. This is how he attempts to prove the existence of the individuators by taking recourse to supernatural perception:

‘[370] Similarly to people like us who experience the differentiation in cognition occasioned by equal shapes, qualities, actions, parts or relations, with reference to cows, etc. [as different] from horses, etc.— [e.g. in the form] “[this] cow is white, of swift pace, with a fat neck hump, with a large bell”—in a similar manner *yogins*, who are superior to us, [experience] the differentiation in cognition with reference to permanent [entities like] atoms as well as minds and souls of liberated people that [all] have identical shapes, qualities and actions. Since there is no other factor [that would make such a differentiation between seemingly identical things possible], the factors thanks to which [the *yogins* are able to distinguish] each and every substratum [of qualities and actions in the form]: “this is different, that is different”, and [thanks to which in those *yogins*] a recognition arises: “this is that [atom]” with regard to an atom in distant place and time, are ultimate individuators.¹⁵⁴ [371] Suppose, on the other hand, without [postulating the existence of] ultimate individuators, that the *yogins* possessed such a discrimination through cognition as well as recognition [of individual atoms, which they could acquire] through moral law (*dharma*) produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, what would happen then? It would not be possible [for them to distinguish between atoms etc.] in this

¹⁵⁴ Interestingly, while quoting the passage PBh₁ 11, p. 321–322 = PBh₂ 370 in his *Nyāya-viniścaya-vivaraṇa*, Vādirāja-sūri omits the above phrase *deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe ca paramāṇau sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānam ca bhavati*, see NViV 1.121, vol. 1, p. 452.1–3: *tato yad uktam <> yoginām nityeṣu tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktâtma-maṇḥsu cānyanimitâtâsambhava ebhyaḥ nimittebhyaḥ pratyâdhâraṁ vilakṣaṇo ’yam <> iti pratyaya-vyâvṛttiḥ <> te ’ntyâ viśeṣâḥ*. (The dotted underline shows *varia lectio*, the square brackets <> indicate that some portions preserved in the edited text of PBh are missing in NViV).

That could either mean that Vādirāja-sūri omitted phrase *deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe...* deliberately, for it was not relevant to his critique of the *viśeṣa* category (although his way of quoting other work is generally quite faithful), or the phrase was not present in the manuscripts of PBh Vādirāja-sūri used, which might further imply that the phrase is a latter addition to PBh.

way, [i.e. merely through such a supernatural perception]. Just like a cognition of white in something which is not white or a recognition of something completely invisible does not arise through moral law produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, and if it could [arise] it would be false, in the same manner the *yogins* can possess neither discrimination through cognition nor a recognition through moral law born of [the practice of] *yoga* without [the existence of] ultimate individuators¹⁵⁵.¹⁵⁶

The above account apparently refers primarily to *yogins* who are temporarily engrossed in meditation (*yukta*, *yuñjāna*), because what is at stake is the *yogins*' capability of perceiving atoms, viz. the competence Praśastapāda reserves for them¹⁵⁷. Praśastapāda's strategy is to liken, by analogy¹⁵⁸ (*yathāsmad-ādīnām ... tathāsmad-viśiṣṭānām yoginām*), the operation and scope of supernatural perception, allegedly possessed by *yogins*, to commonplace perception of ordinary humans. At the same time supernatural perception functions as a vital tool for 'the cognoscenti' to access the layers of reality which are beyond the scope or ordinary cognitive apparatus and which is at the same time the ontological fundament of Vaiśeṣika universe and metaphysics. We will subsequently see that it is not the sole role assigned to supernatural perception.

¹⁵⁵ The idea of the individuators that make it possible for the *yogins* to distinguish between various atoms is recapitulated in YBh 3.53 (p. 313.7).

¹⁵⁶ PBh₁ 11, p. 321–322 = PBh₂ 370–371: [370] *yathāsmad-ādīnām gav-ādiṣv aśvadibhyas tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyāvayava-samyoga-nimittā pratyaya-vyāvṛttir dṛṣṭā gauḥ śuklaḥ śighra-gatiḥ pīna-kakudmān mahā-ghaṇṭa iti, tathāsmad-viśiṣṭānām yoginām nityeṣu tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātma-maṇḥsu cānya-nimittāsambhavād yebhyo nimitebhyah pratyādhāraṁ vilakṣaṇo 'yam vilakṣaṇo 'yam iti pratyaya-vyāvṛttih, deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe ca paramāṇau sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānam ca bhavati te 'ntyā viśeṣāḥ. [371] yadi punar antya-viśeṣam antareṇa yoginām yoga-jād dharmāt pratyaya-vyāvṛttih pratyabhijñānam ca syāt tataḥ kiṁ syāt? nāvam bhavati. yathā na yoga-jād dharmād aśukle śukla-pratyayaḥ samjāyate atyantādṛṣṭe ca pratyabhijñānam, yadi syān mithyā bhavet, tathēhāpy antya-viśeṣam antareṇa yoginām na yoga-jād dharmāt pratyaya-vyāvṛttih pratyabhijñānam vā bhavitum arhati.*

¹⁵⁷ PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, see above p. 311 and n. 153.

¹⁵⁸ Analogy (*upamāna*) is a cognitively valid procedure also for the Vaiśeṣika, albeit it is not classified as a separate cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) but merely a subvariety of testimony of an authoritative person, see PBh₁, p. 220 = PBh₂ 259: *āptenāprasiddhasya gavayasya gavā gavaya-pratipādanād upamānam āpta-vacanam eva.*—'Analogy based on explanation, by an authoritative person, [what the animal] gayal (Bos Gavacus) [is like by comparing] the unknown gayal to [well known] cow is nothing but a testimony of an authoritative person.' It is considered different from inference, even such that is based on recognition of the whole from the perception of its parts, see VS(C) 2.1.8: *viṣṇi kakudmān prānte vāladhiḥ sāsnāvān iti gotve dṛṣṭam liṅgam.*—'The visible

4.4.2. Supernatural perception of the seers

Supernatural perception acquired through the practice of *yoga* is not the only kind of such an extrasensory faculty admitted by Praśastapāda. The other kind is *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*¹⁵⁹, or perception of the seers (*ṛṣi*) who are endowed with it ‘genetically’,¹⁶⁰ viz. they are apparently born with it by virtue of their past good deeds. However, not only seers have it, as Praśastapāda maintains:

‘The seer’s perception is described as such a cognition which makes things known as they are (*sc.* in correspondence to truth) and which arises, by virtue of the contact of the soul and the mind and due to special moral endowment (*dharma*), in the seers, who are revealers of the Vedic lore, as the insight into past, future and present, and into extrasensory things such as moral law etc., which are expounded in the scriptures and which are not expounded [at all]. This [supernatural perception] is possessed by divine beings and seers in an extensive form, [but] also sometimes by ordinary people, for instance when a girl says: “My heart tells [me] that tomorrow my brother will come”.’¹⁶¹

The new element here is, first, purely extrasensory domain of this supernatural perception and, second, the inclusion of *dharma* in its domain; further it extends to things past and future, rendering predictions, fortune telling, authoritative religious accounts entrusted to scriptural word etc. possible. The seer’s perception, which attracts much less attention in PBh, necessarily requires the contact of the self (*ātman*) and the mind (*manas*), and is considered a tool whereby one can directly, or ‘perceptually’, cognise moral law.

inferential sign [necessary for inference] with respect to “cow” [to be inferred] is that it has horns, it has a hump, it has bristled tail at its end, it has a dewlap.’

¹⁵⁹ The Vaiśeṣika distinguish it from *yogi-pratyakṣa*, even though the critics of the idea (the Mīmāṃsaka and the Cārvāka) take these two varieties, *yogi-pratyakṣa* and *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*, as one and the same phenomenon.

¹⁶⁰ The idea of ‘genetically’ induced supernatural perception is found also in Jainism, see e.g. TS 1.21–22: *dvividho ’vadhīḥ bhava-pratyayo nāraka-devānām*.—‘Clairvoyance is two-fold. [Clairvoyance] occasioned by birth is [possessed] by hell-beings and divine beings.’

¹⁶¹ PBh₁, p. 258 = PBh₂ 288: *āmnāya-vidhātṛṇām ṛṣiṇām atītānāgata-vartamāneṣv atīndriyeṣv artheṣu dharmādiṣu granthōpanibaddheṣv anupanibaddheṣu cātma-manasoḥ saṃyogād dharmaviśeṣāc ca yat pratibhaṃ yathārtha-nivedanaṃ jñānam utpadyate tad āṛṣaṃ ity ācakṣate. tat tu prastāreṇa deva-rṣiṇām, kadācid eva laukikānām, yathā kanyakā bravīti śvo me bhrātāgantēti hṛdayam me kathayatīti.*

The idea of the seer's perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa*), occasionally called intuition (*pratibha* or *pratibhā*), is mentioned as a special kind of supernatural perception also in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* in three recensions: 'The seer's [perception] and the perception of perfected beings [arises] from merits.'¹⁶² This *sūtra* must be again a later interpolation, albeit we find it in all three recensions¹⁶³, because in all of them the *sūtra* is entirely mechanically appended at the very end of the respective chapters, without any direct connection to the preceding portion. The reason for such an insertion was most probably the need to accommodate the two-fold division of supernatural perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa* and *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*) found in the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, but not in an earlier version of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, and to verbalise a reaction to the claims of the Mīmāṃsā school denying the existence of such a perception.

On the other hand, we have clear indications that even at the time of *Praśastapāda* the belief in supernatural perception did not belong to the *Vaiśeṣika* canon of convictions accepted universally by all proponents of the school. A section of *Daśapadārtha-śāstra* (DPS₁, p. 108–109 = DPS₂ 145–148) unmistakably shows that Candramati did not admit the existence of any supernatural perception, for he explicitly asserts that such categories as atoms, qualities of atoms etc., which are considered by *Praśastapāda* to be accessible to *yogi-pratyakṣa*, fall in the category of the imperceptibles. Likewise, in no way does he allude to the existence of or to the mere idea of liberation (*mokṣa*). Hakuju Ui (1917: 11–12) rightly observes that

'The treatise has no mention of Īśvara, as in the case of *V.S. (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra—P.B.)*; there is also no description of the way to emancipation (*mokṣa*); even if the second sort of merit (*dharma*, one of the twenty-four attributes) corresponds to it, it is only a definition of it. As a consequence, the author does not allude to *yoga*, *yogin*, or anything supernatural.'

4.4.3. Supernatural perception and moral law

Both accounts of supernatural perception, i.e. that of a *yogin* and that of a seer, associate it, either directly or indirectly, with moral law (*dharma*) and liberation (*mokṣa*). In the case of *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*, the link is immediate: those who are endowed with this kind of supernatural perception are capable of cognising *dharma* directly. In the

¹⁶² VS(C) 9.28 = VS(Ś) 9.2.18 = VS(D) 9.22: *ārṣam siddha-darśanam ca dharmebhyaḥ*.

¹⁶³ Candrānanda in his exposition (VSV(C), p. 71) recapitulates PBh₁ 8.12, p. 258 = PBh₂ 288.

case of the *yogin*'s supernatural perception the link is a bit less obvious and not so explicit.

To understand it better, we should first see how Praśastapāda defines moral law (*dharma*):

‘[308] Moral law is a quality of the human being. It is the cause of pleasure, good and liberation for the agent;¹⁶⁴ it is extrasensory ... [315] The practice of *yoga* is the moral law (i.e. obligation) [to be followed by] anyone who has [so far] been in any of the [first] three [life stages (*āśrama*)], who has acquired faith, after he has granted (sc. taken the single vow of) permanent amiability (lit. fearlessness) to all creatures [and] has laid down his [mundane] duties, who is not negligent as regards rules (*yama*) and restraints (*niyama*)¹⁶⁵ [and] becomes, due to constant rumination over the six ontological categories, a renouncer [in the last life stage of *saṁnyāsin*]. [316] Moral law arises through the contact of the soul and mind in dependence on these [above-mentioned] means and through purity of intention with no regard of any visible goal.’¹⁶⁶

This succinct account first states that *dharma*, although a quality of the soul (*puruṣa-guṇa*), is not amenable to sense organs (*atīndriya*) and one therefore requires special faculty to cognise it directly or is forced to rely on another person's account who has seen it directly himself. Since *dharma* is the quality of the soul and under normal circumstances the soul, at least for the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika, is incapable of self-cognition, or self-illuminating cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*, *sva-saṁvedana*), what is required for the perception of *dharma* is a direct contact of the soul and mind (*ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharmōtpattiḥ*). Further, Praśastapāda declares that there exists the means to cognise the moral law, which is the practice of *yoga* (*yoga-prasādhana*), being at the same time the moral duty of a renouncer. Commenting on

¹⁶⁴ This is a reference to two-fold goal of moral law as expressed in VS(C) 1.1.2: *yato 'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmah*.—‘That from which [results] the attainment of mundane prosperity and the highest good is moral law.’

¹⁶⁵ These are the well-know first two steps of the eight-fold path of *yoga*, see YS 2.29: *yama-niyamāsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra-dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhyo 'ṣṭāva aṅgāni*. It is certainly not a coincidence to find these two categories of the Yoga school in Praśastapāda's passage, which attests to the influence of *yoga* practice and belief on the latter.

¹⁶⁶ PBh₁, p. 272 = PBh₂ 308, 315–316: [308] *dharmah puruṣa-guṇah. kartuḥ priya-hita-mokṣa-hetur atīndriyo ...* [315] *trayāṅām anyatamasya śraddhāvataḥ sarva-bhūtebhyo nityam abhayaṁ dattvā saṁnyasya svāni karmāṇi yama-niyameṣv apramattasya ṣaṭ-padārtha-prasaṁkhyānād yoga-prasāadhanam pravrajitasyēti*. [316] *dṛṣṭam prayojanam anuddiṣyātāni sādhanāni bhāva-prasādām cāpekṣyātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharmōtpattir iti*.

the passage, Vyomaśiva makes the idea explicit by adding that the practise of *yoga* is the only means to achieve *dharma*.¹⁶⁷ The adept of *yoga* who is engaged in preliminary stages of the eight-fold path of *yoga* (*yama-niyameṣv apramattasya*) has one aim: liberation, which is achieved by virtue of knowing moral law (*kartuḥ ... mokṣa-hetuḥ*).

An additional support for the thesis that Praśastapāda did view the yogic path as a means to liberation is the expression ‘permanent amiability’, or ‘constant fearlessness’ (*nityam abhayam*), which has its parallel in *Nyāya-bhāṣya* defining the state of liberation (*apavarga*):

‘This is [the state of] amiability (lit. fearlessness), without decay, a state of immortality, the absolute, the attainment of tranquillity.’¹⁶⁸

Moreover, the idea of ‘granting permanent amiability to all living beings’ (*sarva-bhūtebhyo nityam abhayam dattvā*) is not an invention of proponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems but is an echo of an earlier expression, i.e. *sarva-bhūtābhaya-pradāna*, well anchored in the tradition of the *Yoga-bhāṣya*:

‘Being [continuously] roasted on dreadful coals of transmigration, I take the refuge in moral rules of *yoga* by granting amiability (lit. fearlessness) to all creatures.’¹⁶⁹

Thus, the direct link between a *yogin*, who acquires supersensory faculties through the practice of *yoga*, and *yogi-pratyakṣa*, being precisely such a supersensory faculty, is therefore quite well established. Similarly well authenticated is the relation between the practice of *yoga*, understood as one’s ultimate duty, and liberation (*mokṣa*). Thus, the explicit link between supernatural faculty and the perception of *dharma*, which was straightforwardly expressed in the case of the seer’s perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa*), also holds in the case of the first kind of supernatural perception, that of a *yogin*. Consequently, such a supernatural perception of any form (either *yogi*-^o or *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*) is ultimately related to the purpose of achieving the final goal, liberation.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ VyV *ad loc.*, vol. II, p. 234.24: *yoga eva tasya dharma-sādhanam*.

¹⁶⁸ NBh 1.1.22, p. 22.3: *tad abhayam ajaram amṛtyu-padam brahma kṣema-prāptir iti*.

¹⁶⁹ YBh 2.33, p. 217.10–11: *ghoreṣu samsārāṅgāreṣu pacyamānena mayā śaraṇam upāgataḥ sarva-bhūtābhaya-pradānena yoga-dharmah*.

¹⁷⁰ The salvific goal does not exhaust all possible motivations why *yoga* was practised: there are other traditions the adepts of which seek supernatural perception and other powers (*siddhi*, *ṛddhi*) for their own sake, not for the sake of liberation, but such a *siddhi*-tradition is not relevant to the present issue.

The direct link between *yogi-pratyakṣa* of the *yukta-yogins* and *dharma* is embedded in Praśastapāda's statement: "in *yogins* who are temporarily engrossed in meditation (*yukta*) [and] who are superior to us, through the mind influenced by moral excellence (*dharma*) produced by [the practice of] *yoga*"¹⁷¹, which relates moral excellence to the practice of *yoga*, resulting in the superiority of *yogins* and in their inner excellence of supernatural perception that eventually grasps invisible substances such as their own selves, the selves of others, ether, space, time, air, atoms, mind as well as qualities, actions, universals, individuators which are inherent in these substances. A similar dependence between the acquisition of supernatural perception and moral law is expressed by Praśastapāda in another passage¹⁷² which postulates that *yogins* can supernaturally perceive ultimate individuators inherent in atoms, accordingly discriminate between the atoms and recognise them after some time thanks to moral endowment (*dharma*) achieved thanks to their engagement with the practice of *yoga*.

The above passages dealing with supernatural perception as well as the recurrent expression *yoga-ja-dharma*¹⁷³ additionally demonstrate that the practice of *yoga* was conceived of as being instrumental in moral upliftment and inner (spiritual) progress.

4.4.4. Supernatural perception and the gradual development argument

I shall now attempt to demonstrate that the acceptance of supernatural perception eventually entails, in the tradition of Praśastapāda and/or alias Praśastamati, the acceptance the idea of omniscience, or supreme knowledge (*atīśaya-jñāna*, *jñānātīśaya*), to which the concept is indirectly and logically related. I would even venture to assert that it was a necessary corollary of the omniscience claim.

In his descriptions of *yogi-pratyakṣa*, Praśastapāda indirectly follows at least two lines of reasoning that may count as hidden arguments for omniscience, already referred to above:

¹⁷¹ PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, see above p. 311 and n. 153.

¹⁷² PBh₁ 11, p. 322 = PBh₂ 371, see above p. 313, n. 156.

¹⁷³ Altogether five occurrences of *yoga-ja-dharma* in PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241–242 (n. 153) and PBh₁ 11, p. 322 = PBh₂ 371 (n. 156). A parallel is found in a commentary on the *Pāśupata-sūtra*, in which Kauṇḍinya explains that supernatural perception arises thanks to ascetic practices, see PABh 3.19, p. 88.20–21: *kṛtsnasya tapaso lakṣaṇam ātma-pratyakṣaṁ veditavyam*.— 'One should know the defining feature of all the austerities is [supernatural] perception of (through?) the self.'

- A1° ‘This [supernatural perception] is possessed by gods and seers in an extensive form, [but] also sometimes by ordinary people, for instance when a girl says: “my heart tells [me] that tomorrow my brother will come”.’¹⁷⁴
- A2° ‘Similarly to people like us who experience the differentiation in cognition occasioned by equal shapes, qualities, actions, parts or relations, with reference to cows, etc. [as different] from horses, etc.—[e.g. in the form] “[this] cow is white, of swift pace, with a fat neck hump, with a large bell”—in a similar manner *yogins*, who are superior to us, [experience] the differentiation in cognition with reference to permanent [entities like] atoms and minds and souls of liberated people that have identical shapes, qualities and actions.’¹⁷⁵

Both these descriptions rely on what I would call ‘gradual development argument’ for omniscience, well attested in Indian philosophical literature.

The underlying structure of such an argument could be phrased as follows:

- T4° ‘Supreme knowledge (omniscience) is possible, because we observe a gradual development of cognitive faculties’,¹⁷⁶

or, alternatively, more universally:

- T5° ‘An invisible perfect condition *x* (e.g. liberation, omniscience, extrasensory perception) is possible, because there is a gradation of the respective faculty”.

A classical and lucid formulation of the argument can be found some time later in Jayanta-bhaṭṭa’s *Nyāya-mañjarī*, who merely recapitulates an older version of it as follows:

‘The proof [of supernatural perception] is the excellence (culmination) of perception. For it is as follows: a person like us whose sight relies [on light] notices a number of things placed in proximity. Cats¹⁷⁷, on the other hand, can recognise even [a thing] that has fallen into a place covered with a layer of mud in the thickest possible darkness. Fur-

¹⁷⁴ PBh₁, p. 258 = PBh₂ 288. *Vide supra*, p. 314, n. 161.

¹⁷⁵ PBh₁ 11, p. 321 = PBh₂ 370. *Vide supra*, p. 313, n. 156.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. BALCEROWICZ (2005: 180–181 and n. 133).

¹⁷⁷ The rare expression *undura-vairin* (‘enemies of mice’) is explained by Jayanta-bhaṭṭa himself later as *vṛṣa-damśa*, see NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 269.6–10 = NMa₂, Vol. 1, p. 157.17: *sampāti-vṛṣa-damśa-dṛṣoḥ*. The term *vṛṣa-damśa* (‘having strong teeth’), i.e. ‘the cat’, is listed, e.g., in the *Amara-kośa* as one of the synonyms of ‘the cat’, see AmK 2.5.6ab, p. 242:

otur biḍālo mārjāro vṛṣa-damśaka ākhu-bhuk /

thermore, one learns from the *Rāmāyaṇa* epic that the king of vultures named Sampāti could even see Sītā (lit. the spouse of Daśaratha's son) in the distance of a hundred miles. This precisely is the excellence (culmination) of perception, just like the culmination of such qualities as white etc., which is based on gradation. Hence it is understood that there is the highest culmination without any higher culmination. And therefore those in whom there is the highest intensity of this [perception] are praised as *yogins*. So the topmost culmination means that [*yogins*'] perception has as its domain [things] that are subtle, concealed [from sight], distant, past, future etc.¹⁷⁸

At first glance, one might say that the above passage only deals with supernatural perception of *yogins* (*yogi-pratyakṣa*), not with omniscience. Jayanta, however, dispels such doubts by himself making a direct link to omniscience, first by quoting Kumārila-bhaṭṭa's criticism of the idea, in which the term *sarva-jñā* expressly occurs,¹⁷⁹ and subsequently by himself referring to the 'all-perceiving *yogins*'.¹⁸⁰ Accordingly, what Jayanta-bhaṭṭa says is the following: some creatures can only see things in proximity when illuminated by light, some can also see objects in the dark, while others can perceive things in distance, and still others can grasp extremely remote objects, etc.; therefore there must be a limit to this gradual increase of perceptive powers which is their complete consummation in the form of omniscience.

The argument rests on an almost universally Indian fear of infinite regress (*anavasthā*), the literally meaning of which is 'lack of foundation', the designation itself quite suggestive of such a fear. Alternatively, what was generally considered a

¹⁷⁸ NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 268.3–11 = NMa₂, Vol. 1, p. 157.1–7: *darśanātiśaya eva pramāṇam. tathā hy asmad-ādir apekṣitāloko 'valokayati nikaṭa-sthitam artha-vṛndam, undura-vairiṇas tu sāndratama-tamaḥ-paṅka-paṭala-vilīpta-deśa-patitam api sampaśyanti. sampāti-nāmā ca ḡrdhra-rājo yojana-śata-vyavahitām api daśaratha-nandana-sundarīm dadarsēti rāmāyaṇe śrūyate, so 'yam darśanātiśayaḥ śuklādi-guṇātiśaya iva tāra-tamya-samanvita iti gamayati param api niratiśayam atiśayam. ataś ca yatrāśya paraḥ prakarṣas te yogino giyante. darśanasya ca paro 'tiśayaḥ sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṣṣa-bhūta-bhaviṣyad-ādi-viśayavam.*

¹⁷⁹ MŚV 2.112 quoted in NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 269.13–14 = NMa₂, Vol. 1, p. 158.1–2:

*ekena tu pramāṇena sarva-jñō yena kalpyate /
nūnam sa cakṣuṣā sarvān rasādīn pratipadyate iti //*

¹⁸⁰ NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 1.271.1–2 = NMa₂, Vol. 1, p. 158.11–12:

*satyam sāhasam etat te mama vā carma-cakṣuṣaḥ /
na tv eṣa durgamaḥ panthā yoginām sarva-darśinām //*

'Surely it would be rash [to claim that] this moral law (*dharma*) [is visible] to physical eyes of you or me. But this is not an impossible path for all-perceiving *yogins*.'

logical fallacy was occasionally¹⁸¹ also called ‘unreachable limit’ (*alabdha-pariniṣṭha*). Any assumption that allows for such an infinite regress must *ex definitione* be wrong. Therefore, while admitting of any gradation of supernatural faculties, one has to admit an upper limit of the gradation, or apex, when the faculties reach their maximum.¹⁸²

Such an argument is not completely new and we find it as early as in Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya*:

‘It is known that the cognition, encompassing all senses,¹⁸³ of those who are superior to us¹⁸⁴ with respect to [imperceptible universals stems] from repeated practise, just like [the knowledge] of specialists as regards certain [objects such as] gems, silver coins etc.^{185,186}

The same idea of gradual progression, or growth, up to the climax, which underlies the above verse, is explicitly expressed by Bhartṛhari elsewhere:

‘[64/63] Whatever common quality *P* of an object (model, standard) *x* to which another object *y* is compared and of the object *y* that is compared to the object (model, standard) *x* is resorted to, some [other] property *R*, different from *P*, stands out that characterises the objects *x*, *y* etc. to which other objects are compared. [65/64] Whatever quality *P*, which is the cause of culmination (the highest degree) [in an object *x*], is specified as independent (topmost), the fact that this

¹⁸¹ Cf. e.g. NAV 29.23, p. 457.4–5.

¹⁸² Apparently one distinguished infinite regress as logical fallacy from actual infinity such as the infinity of the world, which is limitless or endless (*anādi, ananta*).

¹⁸³ The expression *sarvêndriyam* implies extrasensory cognition which transcends all the conventional limitations of sensory organs that are perceptive only of their particular type of sensory data (*viṣaya*), cf. VP 1.155. In other words, the cognition is not sense-dependent and therefore grasps conventionally imperceptible objects.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. VS(C) 2.1.18 [p. 13]: *saṁjñā-karma tv asmad-viśiṣṭānām liṅgam*, and PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, see above p. 311 and n. 153.

¹⁸⁵ See VP 1.35:

*pareṣām asaṁākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate /
maṇi-rūpyādi-vijñānam tad-vidām nānumānikam //*

‘The knowledge of specialists as regards certain gems, silver coins etc., which is not communicable to others, comes about only through repeated practise, it is not inferential.’

¹⁸⁶ VP 3.1.46:

*jñānam tv asmad-viśiṣṭānām tāsū sarvêndriyam viduḥ /
abhyāsān maṇi-rūpyādi-viśeṣeṣv iva tad-vidām //*

[quality *P*] is of the highest degree can be known only through [still another] quality *R* that subsists in it.’¹⁸⁷

Bharṭṛhari’s idea is that any comparison, which in itself entails gradation, of two items *x* and *y* rests on a property *P*, which we can call first-level property, shared by the two items, and the degree of the property *P* in both of the items *x* and *y* is assessed against still another property *R*, let us say a second-level property, being the criterion for the comparison. What may seem a little ambiguous in the above succinct verses is borne out in the commentary of Harivṛṣabha as follows:

‘[63] In the [verse], the following triad is laid down: (1) an object (model) *x* to which another object *y* is compared, (2) an object *y* that is compared to object *x* and (3) a common property of these two. That being the case, a common quality, which is ascertained in an object of comparison [expressed in the sentence:] “The *kṣatriya* studies recitation like a *brāhmaṇa*”, is understood also with respect to the object (model) *x* to which the other object *y* is compared. However, when [in the comparison:] “The recitation study of the *kṣatriya* is similar to the recitation study of a *brāhmaṇa*”, both the students are presented as the relata [of the relation] between an object (model) *x* to which another object *y* is compared and an object *y* that is compared to object *x*, then [first-level] properties such as competence etc. of two such recitation study practices, which are differentiated according to their respective substrata, [i.e. the *kṣatriya* and the *brāhmaṇa*], are ascertained as common properties [of these two substrata]. [That being the case], there are [additional second-level] properties such as absolute perfection etc. [that characterise the first-level properties such as] competence etc., which [in their turn] are relata [of the relation] of both the recitation study practices [accomplished by the *kṣatriya* and by the *brāhmaṇa*]. Hence, there is no limit to differentiation, [because also the second-level properties can be compared by taking recourse to a third-level property]. [64] As long as [anything] is presented [in the form] “this” [or] “that” as the main thing, it is the substance. However, the substance [as such] does not have any higher degree or lower degree. Therefore, an object, with respect to which one intends to express

¹⁸⁷ VP_{1,2} 1.64–65 = VP₃ 1.63–64:

*sāmānyam āśritam yad yad upamānōpameyayoḥ /
tasya tasyōpamāneṣu dharmo ’nyo vyatiricyate //
guṇaḥ prakarṣa-hetur yaḥ svātantryeṇōpadiśyate /
tasyāśritād guṇād eva prakṛṣṭatvam pratīyate //*

culmination (high degree), is graded by way of factors (sc. attributes) which subsist [in it], which are the causes of differentiation, which are dependent on it, which are associated with it, [and] which are instrumental in [manifesting] the culmination (high degree). ... As long as one expresses culmination (high degree) of something which subsists as the main thing of the expression “this” [or] “that”, so long this [process of] expression [of the gradation] has no end, as having the undesired consequence that one can imagine [still] another factor (sc. attribute) [of higher grade].¹⁸⁸

The undesired consequence (*prasaṅga*), mentioned by Harivṛṣabha, indicates a conviction that a process of gradation must have an end: unlimited gradation is the undesired consequence (*prasaṅga*). What was in VP_{1,2} 1.64–65 primarily a linguistic analysis of suffixes *taraP* and *tamaP* that express comparative and superlative degrees of adjectives or substantives was subsequently, in VP 3.1.46, projected onto metaphysics.

The logical structure of the argument of culmination (‘gradual development argument’), based on a gradation of degree until it reaches a maximum point, has the following structure:

$$(\forall x \exists y (y \rightarrow x)) \rightarrow (\exists y \forall x (y \rightarrow x)),$$

If, for any thing *x* there exists some thing *y* which is higher in degree, then there exists some thing *y* which is highest in degree with respect to all things *x*.

The symbol \rightarrow in the formula denotes any sort of antecedence (logical, causal, physical, spatial etc.).¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ VPV 1.63–64 ad VP 1.64/63–65/64: [63] *iḥpamānam upameyaṁ tayoś ca sādharmaṇo dharma iti tritayam etat siddham. tatra “brāhmaṇavad adhīte kṣatriyaḥ” ity upameye śrūyamāṇaṁ sāmānyam upamāne ’pi pratiyate. yadā tu brahmāṇādhyayanena tulyaṁ kṣatriyādhyayanam ity adhyetārau upamānōpameyayoḥ sambandhitvenōpādīyete, tadādhyayanayor āsraya-viśeṣa-bhinnayoh sauṣṭhavādayo dharmāḥ sādharmaṇatvena pratiyante. sauṣṭhavādīnām apy adhyayana-sambandhinām pariniṣpatty-ādayo dharmā iti nāsti vyatirekasyāvachchedaḥ. [64] yāvad idaṁ tad iti prādhānyenōpādīyate tad dravyam. na ca dravyasya prakarṣāpakarṣau sta ity aśritair bheda-hetubhiḥ para-tantraīḥ samsargibhir nimittaiḥ prakarṣe savyāpārāiḥ pracikīrṣito ’rthaḥ prakṛṣyate. ... yāvad idaṁ tad iti-vyapadeśasya prādhānyenāśritasya prakṛṣṭa-vyapadeśaḥ kriyate, tāvad vicchinno ’yaṁ nimittāntara-parikalpanā-dharma-prasaṅga^a iti.*

^a Recte: *avicchinno* and *°parikalpanā-prasaṅga*, cf. VPA ad loc., p. 113.28: *tāvad avicchinno ’yaṁ tatra tatra nimittāntara-parikalpanā-dharma-prasaṅga[h]*.

¹⁸⁹ The structure of this proof resembles the proof of god’s existence which we find in Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae* classified as ‘the forth way’, or the argument ‘from the degrees of

A very similar structure relying on which Praśastapāda's acceptance of supernatural perception leads him to the acceptance of god's omniscience is found on a number of occasions in arguments for the existence or perfection of god, which attests to the fact that the logical argumentative structure was quite widespread in India. The first such type is the arguments which correspond to the cosmological argument: from the first cause (*kāraṇa*), known to Uddyotakara¹⁹⁰ and later to Jayanta¹⁹¹, as well as from the first mover, likewise known both Uddyotakara¹⁹² and to Jayanta¹⁹³.

Still before Uddyotakara, we come across an argument from perfection (**guṇa-viśiṣṭa-sampad*), which proves most relevant for our discussion. It is an Indian version of the well-known argument that there must be a real standard of perfection to make any hierarchy of beings possible. The argument underlies Vātsyāyana Pakṣila-svāmin's formulation of god's qualities:

'God is something more than soul, being distinguished by his special qualities. When one examines the notion of the soul, it is not possible to conceive of this [god] as anything else [other than as a kind of soul]. Since he is something distinguished by complete absence of evil,

perfection'. The logical flaw of this argument is structurally similar to two other arguments of god's existence ('from the movement' and 'from the efficient cause'), for the first time formulated by Aristotle at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*, at least in one respect. What the argument says is that we can order a set of, say, all possible white things in such a way that there will always be another thing greater in degree (whiter), until we reach the maximum white, or the most perfect white, or we reach the most perfect being in the hierarchy of all entities in the world which is god (which would be Thomas Aquinas's argument). Similarly, we can order all acts of perception so that it will culminate in the most perfect perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa* or *sarva-jñāna*), for which there will be other perfection that is better in degree. The grave logical flaw in the argument is that it is not logically permissible to validly interchange the places of the quantifiers in a formula as follows: $\forall x \exists y (T(x, y)) \rightarrow (\exists x \forall y (T(x, y)))$, whereas the following is a tautology: $\exists x \forall y (T(x, y)) \rightarrow \forall y \exists x (T(x, y))$. Besides, there is nothing logically binding that would force us to accept the termination of an infinite succession in a chain of events. In other words, one could admit a gradual quantitative growth of clearness of perception without any qualitative change.

¹⁹⁰ NV₁ 4.1.21, p. 460.16 = NV₂, p. 433.1: *tad-kāritatvāt ... nimitta-kāraṇam īśvaraḥ*.

¹⁹¹ NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 492.2–3, com., Vol. 1, p. 502.10–13.

¹⁹² NV₁ 4.21, p. 461.10–14 = NV₂, p. 433.13–16: *pradhāna-paramāṇu-karmāni prāk pravṛtteḥ buddhimat-kāraṇādhiṣṭitāni pravartante acetanatvād vāsy-ādivad iti. yathā vāsy-ādi buddhimatā takṣṇā adhiṣṭitam acetanatvāt pravartate tathā pradhāna-paramāṇu-karmāny acetanāni pravartante tasmāt tāny api buddhimat-kāraṇādhiṣṭitāni iti.*

¹⁹³ NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 488–490.

wrong cognition and torpidity and by the perfection of righteousness, cognition and concentration, god is something more than soul.¹⁹⁴

The expression *dharmajñāna-samādhi-sāmpad* ('the perfection of righteousness, cognition and concentration') is a clear verbalisation of the conviction, that god stands at the top of the hierarchy of entities with respect to all good qualities. Also humans, or other beings for that matter, are possessed of some degree of righteousness, cognition or concentration. However, what distinguishes god from all other individual souls is that he is the only such a substance in which all virtuous qualities find their perfect completion. He corresponds to what Thomas Aquinas would call *maxime ens*. Interestingly, Vātsyāyana applies the same argument by way of diminution of all negative qualities: it is god in whom all the negative qualities, present in all other individual souls in greater or lesser degree, find their complete annihilation.

This harmonises well with a similar reasoning found in Kauṇḍinya's *Pañcārthabhāṣya* (PABh, c. 500?) comment on the *Pāśupata-sūtra* thesis that 'there is god of all beings'¹⁹⁵:

'In the [*sūtra*] god is [understood] as someone with respect to whom there is nothing supreme.'¹⁹⁶

There is still another relevant argument for the existence of god, the structure of which is in fact a slight modification of the previous argument, embedded in the following rhetorical question posed by Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin:

'Who could possibly manage to prove, by way of attributes (inferential signs) of the soul such as cognition etc., that god is not recognisable [or] is beyond [all cognitive criteria]: perception, inference and scriptural testimony?'¹⁹⁷

The obvious (albeit not really logically sound) reply to the quandary, which is supposed to rectify the doubt, would be the following argument: 'There is god, because he is inferred through such perceptible attributes as cognition etc.' And this involves a gradation of (the intensity of) the attribute, i.e. of perception. Also such an argument would have to rely on the same idea of gradation: we prove the exist-

¹⁹⁴ NBh 4.1.21, p. 228.6–7: *guṇa-viśiṣṭam ātmāntaram īśvaraḥ. tasya ātma-kalpāt kalpāntarānupapattiḥ. adharmamithyā-jñāna-pramāda-hānyā dharmajñāna-samādhi-sāmpadā ca viśiṣṭam ātmāntaram īśvaraḥ.*

¹⁹⁵ PS 5.43, p. 145.1: *īśvaraḥ sarva-bhūtānām.*

¹⁹⁶ PABh 5.43, p. 145.2: *atra niratiśaya aiśvareya īśvaraḥ.*

¹⁹⁷ NBh 4.1.21, p. 228.14: *buddhyādibhiḥ cātma-liṅgair nirupākhyam īśvaram pratyakṣānumānāgama-viṣayātītam kaḥ śakta upapādayitum.*

tence of ordinary souls through the observation of their ordinary attributes, and we know of the existence of god, super-soul, through his extraordinary attributes.

The argumentative structure was well-known among the Jainas, even prior to Praśastapāda, a good example being Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇa-sāra* (ca 4th–5th centuries) and his 'proof' of liberation in which he applies the same gradual development argument, that rests on the idea of gradual purification, or natural development, till one reaches a perfectly pure condition, or perfection (*siddhatva*), tantamount to liberation, characterised by perfect omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*) and perfect 'omni-perception' (*kevala-darśana*).¹⁹⁸

'[45] Perfected souls (saints) [achieve their condition] as a result of merit (or: auspicious *karman*). Their activity is, however, a natural development, which is free from [inauspicious *karman* such as] confusion etc., and therefore it is known as "resulting from the destruction [of *karman*]" (*kṣāyika*)¹⁹⁹. [46] If the soul itself could not become either good or bad by virtue of its own essential nature alone, there would be no mundane world (transmigration) for all the bodies endowed with a soul.'²⁰⁰

Also Samantabhadra (contemporary with Dharmakīrti) avails himself of the same argument in the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*:

'[4] A complete destruction of defects and karmic veils is possible, because a complete consummation [of the gradual purification process] is [possible], just like a [complete] annihilation of both external and internal blemishes in particular cases with the help of respective

¹⁹⁸ Kundakunda also makes use of what we could call a reverse gradual development argument in his *Samaya-sāra* 222–223, in which the development towards perfection of the soul is compared to a conch which is step by step turning into black until it becomes completely black and dirty.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. TS 10.1: *moha-kṣayāj jñāna-darśanāvaraṇāntarāya-kṣayāc ca kevalam*.—'Absolute knowledge [arises] from the destruction of [the *karman* called] confusion and from the destruction of the *karmans* obstructing and veiling [innate] cognition and perception/conation.'

²⁰⁰ PSā 1.45–46:

*puṇṇa-phalā arahaṃtā tesim kiriyā puṇo hi odaiyā /
mohādīhim virahiyā tamhā sā khāiga tti madā //
jadi so suho va asuho ṇa havadi ādā sayam sahāveṇa /
saṃsāro vi ṇa vijjadi savvesim jīva-kāyāṇam //*

Comp. also SSā 204.

causes.²⁰¹ [5] Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant remain [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are inferable, just as fire etc. [is inferable from visible smoke]—such is a proof of the omniscient [Jina].²⁰²

Similar arguments based on the idea of the gradation of attributes can be found also in Buddhist works, e.g. with Dharmakīrti:

‘The *yogin*’s cognition is produced by the ultimate consummation (intensity) of contemplation of existing objects.’²⁰³

Dharmakīrti’s description of supernatural perception achievable to an adept of *yoga* supplies a nucleus of a proof of *yogi-pratyakṣa* which in its crudest form would assume the formulation: ‘Supernatural perception is possible, because it can be achieved by consummation (perfection) of practice (meditation).’ In other words, uninterrupted spiritual practice and meditation have to necessarily lead to their culmination in the form of omniscience. Of course, such an argument in Buddhist (or Jaina) context did not lead one to accept the existence of a divine being endowed with perfect qualities but to accept the possibility of the existence a perfect cognition in a human form (that of Buddha, Bodhisattva or Tīrthāṅkara). Dharmakīrti’s commentator, Dharmottara explains that ‘contemplation (meditation) of an entity is the perpetual (lit. again and again) reflection on it’²⁰⁴, and emphasises the gradual development that finally leads to supernatural perception, by emphatically dividing the process into three stages:²⁰⁵ the consummation (intensity) of contemplation (*bhāvanā-prakarṣa*)²⁰⁶, the apogee of the intensity (*prakarṣa-paryantāvasthā*)²⁰⁷ and, ultimately, the *yogin*’s perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) as the final stage.^{208, 209}

²⁰¹ For the analysis of the verse, being a formulation of a proof of liberation, and its soteriological implications see BALCEROWICZ (2005).

²⁰² ĀMī 4–5:

*doṣāvaraṇayor hānir niḥśeṣāsty atisāyanāt /
kvacid yathā sva-hetubhyo bahir antar mala-kṣayaḥ //
sūksmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā /
anumeyatvato ’gny-ādir iti sarva-jñā-saṁsthitih //*

²⁰³ NB 1.11: *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajam yogi-jñānam cēti*.

²⁰⁴ NBṬ 1.11, p. 67.5: *bhūtasya bhāvanā punaḥ punaś cetasi viniveśanam*.

²⁰⁵ Cf. NAGASAKI (1988: 349–350).

²⁰⁶ NBṬ 1.11 (p. 67.5–6): *bhāvanāyāḥ prakarṣo bhāvya-mānārthābhāsasya jñānasya sphuṭābhatvārambhaḥ*.—‘The consummation (intensity) of contemplation is the beginning of [the process in which] cognition [the contents of which is] the image of the object being contemplated represents [this object] in a clear way.’

²⁰⁷ NBṬ 1.11 (p. 67.6–68.2): *prakarṣasya paryanto yadā sphuṭābhatvam iśad asaṁpūrṇam bhavati. yāvad dhi sphuṭābhatvam aparipūrṇam tāvat tasya prakarṣa-gamanam. saṁpūrṇam tu*

It is difficult at this stage to say when, where or with whom the gradual development argument originated. One of the earliest sources is certainly *Yoga-bhāṣya*:

‘Further, his (god’s) supremacy is without any equal excellence [that could compare with it]. To begin with, [his] excellence is not exceeded by any other excellence, [because] that very thing which would be excelling over [it] would necessarily be this very excellence [of god]. Therefore, where the excellence reaches its upper limit that is god. Moreover, there is no excellence that is equal to his. Why? [Because] when out of two [seemingly] equal things one thing is desired at the same time [and] and the thing is selected (lit. established) as follows: “This one must be new; that one must be old”, then it is automatically follows that the other is inferior because it falls short of [satisfying] the desired expectation.²¹⁰ And it is not the case that for two [seemingly] equal things both are achieved as the desired object simultaneously, because of the contradiction in terms. Therefore the one whose supremacy is without any [seemingly equal excellences is god].²¹¹

In view of the usage of the term *atiśaya* or *niratiśaya* in the *Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya*, the *Pañcārtha-bhāṣya* and the *Yoga-bhāṣya*, it is quite possible that both the for-

yadā tadā nāsti prakarṣa-gatiḥ. tataḥ sampūrṇāvasthāyāḥ prāktany avasthā sphuṭābhatva-prakarṣa-paryanta ucyate.—‘The apogee of the intensity [in such a contemplation] is when the representation of [the object] in a clear way with ultimate intensity is almost complete. For as long as the representation of [the object] in a clear way is not absolutely complete, this is the progress of the consummation (intensity) of such a [contemplation]. But when [it is] complete, then there is no progress [any more]. Therefore, the state prior to the state of complete [representation] is called the apogee of the intensity of the representation of [the object] in a clear way.’

²⁰⁸ NBT 1.11 (p. 68.2–3): *tasmāt paryantād yaj jātām bhāvamānasyārthasya sannihitasyēva sphuṭatarākāra-grāhi jñānam yoginaḥ pratyakṣam.*—‘Such a cognition which is produced by this apogee [of intensity and] which grasps more clear form of the object that is being contemplated as if it were immediately present [in front of the contemplator] is the *yogin*’s perception.’

²⁰⁹ For further description of the three stages see NBT 1.11 (pp. 68.4–69.2). However, Vinīta-deva in his *Ṭikā* distinguishes four stages, see STCHERBATSKY (1930 II: 31, n. 2) and NAGASAKI (1988: 350–354).

²¹⁰ In my rendering and understanding of the passage I consciously go counter the interpretation of the *Vivaraṇa*.

²¹¹ YBh 2.24, p. 56.2–57.4: *tac ca tasyāśvaryaṃ sāmyātiśaya-vinirmuktam. na tāvad aiśvaryāntareṇa tad atiśayyate, yād evātiśāyī syāt tad eva tat syāt. tasmād yatra kāṣṭhā-prāptir aiśvaryasya sa īśvara iti. na ca tat-samānam aiśvaryam asti. kasmāt? dvayos tulyayor ekasmin yugapat kāmīte ’rthe navam idam astu purāṇam idam astu ity ekasya siddhau itarasya prākāmya-vighātād ūnatvaṃ prasaktam. dvayoś ca tulyayor yugapat kāmītārtha-prāptir nāsti, arthasya viruddhatvāt. tasmād yasya sāmyātiśayair vinirmuktam aiśvaryaṃ sa evēśvaram.*

mulations of the gradual development argument phrased by Kauṇḍinya and Praśastapāda go back to the *Yoga-bhāṣya* or to some common source from which the three traditions stem.

What is beyond doubt in all the passages of the number of authors quoted above is that we come across the very same structure of the argument that grades a particular attribute up to its ultimate perfection. The argument is well known also to the Mīmāṃsā school, which refers to it and criticises it.²¹²

Consequently, in view of the logical structure of the argument, consistently applied in India to prove a ‘perfect apex’, it seems justified to hold that Praśastapāda, and/or alias Praśastamati for that matter, saw supernatural perception as pointing to the existence of supreme knowledge, or omniscience. My contention gets additional strength in the fact that it was already Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin who spoke not only of god as such but also of his omniscience, the conviction unambiguously indicated in the statement that ‘god is distinguished by the perfection of cognition (*jñāna-sāmpad*)’²¹³, thus paving the way for Praśastapāda and his tradition to admit of god also in the system of Vaiśeṣika.

I would further maintain that the acceptance of supernatural perception as such was not merely dictated, at least in part, by religious and extra-philosophical convictions of Praśastapāda and of the generation of Vaiśeṣika thinkers around his time,²¹⁴ but it was also an essential rational corollary of his belief in god’s perfect powers, including his omniscience. In other words, to explain the process of how the idea of god entered the body of convictions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *yogi-pratyakṣa* was both a corollary of the belief in god’s omniscience and a intermediary step in an argument for its existence. It was probably a conscious decision of the philosophers to avail themselves of an idea that was well-known to them from the tradition of Yoga.

²¹² See e.g. Sucaritamīśra’s MŚVṬ *ad* MŚV 4.27, p. 215.15 ff., Pārthasārathi Mīśra in NRĀ *ad* MŚV 4.26, p. 102.15-16.

²¹³ See p. 324, n. 194.

²¹⁴ Perhaps the major philosophical function of supernatural perception was to prove the existence of atoms (an idea intimated in the interpolated VS(C) 9.14, see above p. 145, and expressly mentioned in PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, see above p. 311 and n. 153) and individuators (mentioned in PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, and PBh₁ 11, p. 321–322 = PBh₂ 370–371, see above 312 f.).

5. Conclusion

5.1. God's incompatibility with the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

Having analysed all the four components of the 'knowability thesis package', viz. (1) the equation *astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva*, (2) the belief in god's existence, (3) the belief in god's omniscience and (4) the belief in supernatural perception, we see that all of them played an important role in justifying the three remaining ones, and it must have been a consistent step to accept them all.

The problematic and controversial equation (*vide supra*, p. 281 and § 3.3 ff.), a rational proof for which seemed entirely lacking, needed some additional strong support and eventually found it in the new dogmatics of the Vaiśeṣika school. It was god's unlimited cognition which came to be believed to account for the conviction that everything that exists is expressible and cognisable. In other words, god's omniscience was to guarantee that the Vaiśeṣika system was complete and logically consistent in the light of the knowability thesis: anything that is existent enters god's mind, and therefore can always be cognised at least by one person, i.e. god; likewise, it can also be expressed by him. It was god who indirectly provided people with the *Vedas*, that were supposed to contain the gist of all the knowledge about the world. Seen from this perspective, Praśastapāda's equation 'existence = nameability = cognisability' (*astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva*) turns out to be much less controversial. We should remember that this explanation is only partial: it only explains how the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas as philosophers built the idea into their philosophical system. The other important part of the explanatory scheme is their extra-philosophical conviction, i.e. their religious belief which they entertained on account of reasons that were other than philosophical or rational (see below, p. 341 ff.).

The philosophical meaning of strictly religious belief in supernatural perception (§§ 4.4.1–2) lay in the demonstrative force and structure of the 'gradual development argument' (§ 4.4.4), and supernatural perception was merely an indispensable component of the premisses to prove that omniscience was at all possible.

In addition, the admittance of god into the ontology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was no longer a philosophical stance, but a religious belief: all the universe, starting from the indivisible atoms as building blocks of the universe, along with the relations that bind atoms into atomic dyads and triad particles, up to all the ontological categories, is present in god's mind. It is god's mind that stores the design (*vide supra*, p. 297) which precedes the (re)construction of the universe after cyclical periods of dissolution. We know that god is omniscient, because we see the gradation of cognitive faculties in the world, and (faulty) logic, mostly based on the fear of

anavasthā ('infinite regress'), tells us that the gradation must have its apex somewhere. And, indeed, it does find it in god's mind. Since god can know everything, as the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas came to believe, the thesis that everything that exists can be also named and cognised is easily defensible.

The idea of god's existence and omniscience was indispensable in order to accept the equation: existentiality = nameability = cognisability, and *vice versa* the equation was an obvious consequence entailed by the idea of god's omniscience. Even though each of the four components was problematic in itself, they all when taken together, and thus rendering mutual support to each other, made Praśastapāda's decision to introduce all four a consistent move. At the same time the decision demonstrates how philosophical reason eventually capitulated before religious conviction.

What is important, there was nothing in the earlier, pre-Praśastapāda and pre-Vātsyāyana tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that could foreshadow such a development and that would eventually prompt the philosophers to accept the contentious equation as a logical consequence of some ancient teachings. Neither was there anything in the system that would, on purely philosophical or logical grounds, impel the philosophers to accept the doctrine of god's existence and omniscience. What is even more significant, the acceptance of god went against 'the logic' of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, which was strictly realistic.

The theistic shift, correlated with the acceptance of the knowability thesis, eventually proved disastrous to the logical consistency of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of ethics. In the first place it was the objectivity and impersonality of the workings of *karman* that suffered most.

Prior to that, the workings of karmic retribution were essentially mechanistic, automatic and objective, i.e. not influenced by any extraneous controlling agent. Deeds of transmigrating beings, including humans, were directly translated into their fate in the form of the invisible moral principle (*adṛṣṭa*).²¹⁵ It was believed to comprise two aspects: a positive element, merit (*dharma*) and a negative element, demerit (*adharmā*). These two were qualities of the soul (*ātman*) and inhered in it,²¹⁶ being connected via the relation called inherence (*samavāya*), the sixth category (*padārtha*) in the system. These joint properties of merit and demerit had both individual and cosmic dimension: they determined the fate of the soul they inhered in (e.g. the future birth and social status);²¹⁷ the fate after death, the movements of

²¹⁵ On *adṛṣṭa* see FADDEGON (1918: 341–354). On *adṛṣṭa* in early Vaiśeṣika see THAKUR (2003: 14–19), who takes *adṛṣṭa* in early Vaiśeṣika to mean merely 'unknown factor'.

²¹⁶ PBh₁ 6, p. 70 = PBh₂ 79: *tasya* [= *ātmanah*] *guṇā buddhi-sukha-duḥkhêcchā-dveṣa-prayatna-dharmādharmā-samskāra-samkhyā-parimāṇa-prthaktva-samyoga-vibhāgāḥ*.

²¹⁷ NV₁ 1.1.1, p. 19.14.

the atomic mind, its egress from the dead body at the moment of death and its ingress into a new body at a new birth etc., digestion, development of the foetus etc.,²¹⁸ emotional states such as passion,²¹⁹ but also—as a cumulated, collective principle of all souls—they determined the course of world, including the movements of atoms, the attraction of iron particles by the magnet,²²⁰ the circulation of liquids and juices in plants and trees,²²¹ the upward motion of the fire, the sideward motion of wind etc.,²²² untypical movements in the world, different from basic categories of movement enumerated in VS(C) 5.2.1,²²³ all movements of water different than its falling down (e.g. rainfall) as a result of weight in the absence of contact, or support (mentioned in VS(C) 5.2.3), e.g. positive and negative results of rainfalls etc., or absence of rain,²²⁴ and other phenomena of the physical world. The invisible moral principle was thus responsible for all phenomena that would not follow ordinary and known physical rules of the world. People could influence the workings of the invisible moral principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*) by various kinds of morally relevant behaviour, including rituals, religious activities etc.:

‘Bath consecration (i.e. bathing in places of pilgrimage), fasting, celibacy, residing in the family of the preceptor, living in a forest [as a renouncer in the third stage of life (*āśrama*)], sacrifice, charity, purification by sprinkling²²⁵, observances regarding cardinal points, constellations, sacrificial formulas and time contribute to the invisible moral principle’²²⁶.

These two properties of all the souls, when combined, could directly affect the material world, without the agency of the souls themselves, because they were in contact with atoms; at the same time the invisible moral principle was believed to

²¹⁸ VS(C) 5.2.19: *apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśita-pīta-samyogaḥ kāryāntara-samyogās cēty adr̥ṣṭa-kāritāni*.

²¹⁹ VS(C) 6.2.15.

²²⁰ VS(C) 5.1.15: *maṇi-gamaṇam sūcy-abhisarpaṇam ity adr̥ṣṭa-kāritāni*.

²²¹ VS(C) 5.2.8: *vṛkṣābhisarpaṇam ity adr̥ṣṭa-kāritam*.

²²² VS(C) 5.2.14: *agner ūrdhva-jvalanaṁ vāyoś ca tiryak-pavanam aṇu-manasoś cādyaṁ karmēty adr̥ṣṭa-kāritāni*.

²²³ VS(C) 5.2.2: *tad-viśeṣeṇādr̥ṣṭa-kāritam*.

²²⁴ VS(C) 5.2.4: *tad-viśeṣeṇādr̥ṣṭa-kāritam*.

²²⁵ Cf. MDhŚ 5.115c, 118a, 122a.

²²⁶ VS(C) 6.2.2: *abhiṣecanōpavāsa-brahmacarya-guru-kula-vāsa-vāna-prasthya-yajña-dāna-prokṣaṇa-diṅ-nakṣatra-mantra-kāla-nigamāś^a cādṛṣṭāya*.

^a VSV(C) *ad loc.* consistently reads °-*niyama*-°: *diṅ-niyamādayo 'nye viśeṣāḥ. diṅ-niyamaḥ ... nakṣatra-niyamaḥ ... mantra-niyamaḥ ... kāla-niyamaḥ*. Also VSV adopts the reading °- *niyamāś*.

inhere in the souls which were omnipresent, and therefore the results of past deeds stored as subliminal impressions (*saṃskāra*) could in theory be activated, it seems, basically anywhere.²²⁷ The ambiguous term *saṃskāra* ('accumulation') pertained to both material/objective and mental/subjective plains: it comprised physical factors resulting from previous actions and triggering subsequent events, e.g. velocity (VS(C) 5.1.17) of an arrow put in motion, as well as subconscious determinants that were causes activating remembrance (VS(C) 9.22) or as causes, impeding cognitive faculties, of nescience (VS(C) 9.25) etc. Thus, the subliminal impressions mediated in causal relations.

Furthermore, in the causation theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the cause—be it efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) or the 'trigger' of a causal complex (*kāraṇa-sāmagrī*)—was thought to immediately precede the effect.²²⁸ Also karmic retribution was explained as a part of such a rigid causal system, and a delay in either punitive or rewarding sanction, which one would expect to progress immediately after a respective demeritorious or meritorious deed, was mediated by subliminal impressions that temporarily stored the moral potential of the deed in order to activate it in an appropriate future moment. This mechanistic causal system of deeds committed in the past and future retribution for them required no additional agency. It functioned the way atoms could join or molecules could split without anybody's supervision, once a motion was there in the world. And it was there, because souls were believed to be such sources of motion.

The introduction of god brought confusion to the mechanistic principles of the system of karmic retribution and postulated an additional, supervising moral agent, next to moral agents proper, i.e. humans. God came to play a role of the Grand Moral Accountant, or the ultimate supervisor (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) and supreme co-ordinator of how merit and demerit are distributed over to moral agents. The idea of supervision of moral law was immediately used by Uddyotakara to devise an argument from moral law to prove god's existence:

²²⁷ PBh₁, p. 107, 266 = PBh₂ 127, 300: *ātmāṇu-saṃyogāt*; PBh₁ 5, p. 48.7 ff. = PBh₂ 57: *sarvātma-gata-vṛtti-labdhādṛṣṭāpekṣebhyas tat-saṃyogebhyaḥ pavana-paramāṇuṣu karmôtpattau...*

²²⁸ Cf. POTTER (1995: 57): 'One, suggested perhaps by Uddyotakara, has it that the supreme cause is the most effective cause, the event which immediately precedes and brings about the production of the effect.' Early Vaiśeṣika sources do not provide too much information of how causality was conceived. The only passages of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* on causality are the following ones: VS(C) 1.2.1–2: *kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ. na tu kāryābhāvāt kāraṇābhāvaḥ.*—'From the absence of cause follows the absence of effect. However, it is not the case that from the absence of effect follows the absence of cause'; and VS(C) 4.1.3: *kāraṇa-bhāvād dhi kārya-bhāvaḥ.*—'[The effect of that which is eternal is an inferential sign for its existence,] because from the existence of cause follows the existence of effect.' On causality in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the development of the idea see also Sadananda BHADURI (1975: 271–319) and MATILAL (1975).

‘Merit and demerit, being superintended by a cause endowed with cognitive awareness, cause retribution of a human being, because they are ultimate causes (instruments), like an axe.’²²⁹

In other words, since differentiation into morally good and bad actions is, for whatever reasons, accepted as a matter of fact, and if the freedom of human conduct is to be constrained by some principles entailed by some established convention or moral law (‘if not everything is permitted’), and if moral law is to be carried out *in fine*, then a source of morality must exist (sc. ‘god exists’). Uddyotakara’s reasoning is a counterpart of Immanuel Kant’s argument from morality. Absolute god’s mind is, therefore, a warrant for moral order and truth in the world. Otherwise, and Uddyotakara would certainly subscribe to Fyodor Dostoevsky’s paradox, ‘if god does not exist, everything is permitted’.

However, there is nothing binding in Uddyotakara’s (or Kant’s) argument that would compel us to draw a conclusion that ‘god exists’ from premisses that there is the *summum bonum* and some rules of conduct, called moral order, exist in a society. Or, which is logically equivalent, from a statement that ‘there is no god’ it does not follow that moral law does not exist and human conduct is not liable to ethical judgement. From the same premiss, which so much troubled Dostoevsky and probably Uddyotakara, that ‘god does not exist’, we can draw a contrary conclusion, just as Jean-Paul Sartre did: ‘we are alone, with no excuses’. If there is no god, we have to accept that there are no divine regulations which could coerce humans to act accordingly, and often uncritically (merely on the basis of divine authority), and no superhuman commandments which humans could adhere to mechanically and unreflectively in the hope of eternal bliss. ‘Man is condemned to be free’ and nobody can tell what is good and what is wrong, what alleviates the pain of nothingness and what can ease the fear of extinction. Man is condemned to be ‘responsible for everything he does’, to find his own way between good and wrong. And that means full responsibility for one’s own deeds which no authority has jurisdiction to absolve one from.

Similarly, the earlier concept of karmic retribution implied full responsibility of human agents for their actions, albeit some clearly defined moral principles existed, determined by moral law (*dharma*). It was the individual, and nobody else, who was wholly accountable for all he had done. The consequences of his actions would inevitably return to him, and to nobody else, and in the degree proportional to the extent of good or wrong earlier committed by him. That was possible precisely be-

²²⁹ NV₁ 4.1.21, p. 463.13–14 = NV₂, p. 435.5–6: *dharmādharmau buddhimat-kāraṇādhiṣṭhitau puruṣasyōpabhogaṃ kurutaḥ karaṇatvād vāsy-ādivad iti*. Cf. n. 136 and VSV(C) 1.1.3: *iśvaraś ca sādhitas tanu-bhuvanādīnām kāryatayā ghaṭādivad buddhimat-kartṛkatvānumānena*.

cause there was no extraneous agency which would remove the burden of responsibility from him or exculpate him, or suspend the workings of moral law by dint of grace, mercy or caprice.

Seen in this light, admission of god by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas involves a breach in the consistency of the moral law and undermines inevitability of karmic retribution. Uddyotakara's step brings the philosophers closer to strictly religious views and ethical reflection steers them towards devotion to god (*bhakti*), the highest superhuman instance on whose supervision of karmic retribution human fate partly relies. Clearly, such a theistic approach seriously undermined human ethical agency and moral responsibility, rendering the theory of karmic retribution ultimately ineffectual. Alternatively, assuming that the mechanism of karmic retribution retained its force, god's superintendence would become meaningless, because the only role to play for god would merely be that of an uninvolved and completely inactive observer, which would stand in contradiction with the initial premise of his supervision of the process of redistribution of merit and demerit to moral agents.

No wonder such an approach provoked criticism from various opponents who were keen to point out that god is not compatible with *karman*. A Buddhist thinker Vimalamitra (first half of the sixth century?) observed in his *Abhidharma-dīpa* that 'The cause of the world is these [human] deeds, not god etc.'²³⁰. Even earlier, Vasubandhu opined in the often-quoted verse in the same spirit:

'The diversity of the world comes from action (*karman*). This [action] consists in volitional consciousness and all that it brings about'²³¹.

The same criticism was expressed by the Jains. Abhayadeva-sūri (TBV, p. 105) was not unique among them to point out that Uddyotakara's argument in support of god's supervision contradicts the original view found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* that

'The upward motion of the fire and the sideward motion of wind etc., the first movement of the atom and of the mind—all this is caused by the invisible principle.'²³²

Among numerous arguments against the existence of god found in his *Mīmāṃsā-sloka-vārttika* (MŚV 5.16.42ab–117), Kumāriḷa-bhaṭṭa directly refers to the problem faced by Uddyotakara and other theistic Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas and points out, in the latter part of the argument below (83cd), that the existence of god as a moral controller renders merit and demerit, to wit moral law, superfluous:

²³⁰ APr [155], p. 118.13: *karmāṇi etāni lokasya kāraṇam nēśvarādayaḥ*.

²³¹ AK 4.1ab: *karma-jaṃ loka-vicitryam cetanā tat-kṛtaṃ ca tat*.

²³² VS(C) 5.2.14, see n. 222.

‘There cannot be any impure (evil) creation [accomplished] by a pure (good) person (sc. god). And since merit and [demerit] were dependent on [god] himself, any distress resulting from them would be inconceivable. On the other hand, if the course [of the world] were determined by these [merit and demerit], then it would imply a different [agency than god’s].’²³³

If the fate of humans, their rebirth, social status and happiness are determined by merit and demerit, that nullifies god, a thesis which is by transposition equivalent to saying that if god exists, he nullifies merit and demerit. Kumārila exposes the same paradox even more explicitly elsewhere:

‘If you accept that it is god’s will [to activate the accumulated *karmans* of living beings at the time of recreation of the world after its dissolution], then precisely this [will] is the [ultimate] cause of the world, [not the *karmans*]. However, if it is god’s will that determines [the world], then to assume [any role for the accumulated] *karman* is pointless.’²³⁴

Therefore, if one is to take human responsibility and ethics seriously, one is compelled to reject the existence of god: the two notions are not compatible.²³⁵

That this critical judgement concerning the relation between the idea of karmic retribution and god’s incompatibility with it was not restricted to philosophers is attested in a popular passage of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*:

‘[13] [Every] living being is born by the force of *karman*, and it is by the force of *karman* alone that he expires. Happiness, suffering, fear and tranquillity occur by the force of *karman* alone. [14] Even if there

²³³ MŚV 5.16.82cd–83:

*puruṣasya ca śuddhasya nāśuddhā vikṛtir bhavet //
svādhīnatvāc ca dharmādes tena kleśo na yujyate //
tad-vaśena pravṛttau vā vyatirekaḥ prasajyate //*

²³⁴ MŚV 5.16.72:

*īśvarēcchā yadīṣyeta sāiva syāl loka-kāraṇam //
īśvarēcchā-vaśitve hi niṣphalā karma-kalpanā //*

²³⁵ The question how to exculpate god of all the evil in the world, he himself has created (or has been supervising) occurs as early as during the Kuṣāna reign and is found in the so-called Spitzer Manuscript, tentatively dated ca. 250 (FRANCO (2003: 21)). There (*folio* 284, *fragm.*: Sp. 19) we read: ‘Living beings experience undesirable births. Did they offend God, so that he causes them to suffer?’ (FRANCO (2003: 24)).

is some god who assumes the form of (sc. supervises) the results of the *karmans* of others, he himself engages as an agent, for he has no power over someone who is not an agent. [15] What is the use here of a controller of beings propelled by their own respective *karmans*, who is incapable of modifying what has been determined by people's own nature? [16] For the man, dependent on his own nature, follows his own nature. All this [universe], along with divine beings, demons and humans, is founded on [their] own nature. [17] Living being obtains and casts off bodies of low and high status by force of *karman*. It is nothing but *karman* that is [the living being's] enemy, friend, indifferent bystander, the teacher and god. [18] Therefore a person who is firmly settled in (sc. dependent on) his own nature and performs his own *karman* [alone] should worship *karman*. That alone by the force of which he is instantly propelled is his deity.²³⁶

'Taking moral rights seriously', to invoke Ronald Dworkin's famous work, was not the only concern. The first part of Kumārila's above argument (MŚV 5.16.82cd–83ab) highlights another important problem, that of theodicy²³⁷. At first sight, it would be the idea of karmic retribution, involving merit and demerit, which could help the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika avoid the paradox of evil. Taking recourse to the idea of purpose (*prayojana*), one could argue that god—omnipotent, good and omniscient—merely creates initial environment into which all living beings are cast. It would precisely be the invisible moral principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*) of the individuals, or the law of karmic retribution, that exonerate god of all moral responsibility because, after the initial moment of recreation of the world, humans experience (*bhoga*) what

²³⁶ BhāgP 10.24.13–18:

karmaṇā jāyate jantuḥ karmaṇāiva pralīyate /
sukhaṁ duḥkhaṁ bhayaṁ kṣemaṁ karmaṇāivābhīpadyate // 13 //
astī ced īśvaraḥ kaścīd phala-rūpya anya-karmaṇām /
kartāraṁ bhajate so 'pi na hy akartuḥ prabhur hi saḥ // 14 //
kim indreṇēha bhūtānām sva-sva-karmānuvartinām /
anīśenānyathā kartuṁ svabhāva-vihitāṁ nṛṇām // 15 //
svabhāva-tantro hi janaḥ svabhāvam anuvartate /
svabhāva-stham idaṁ sarvaṁ sadevāsura-mānuṣam // 16 //
dehān uccāvacāṅ jantuḥ prāpyōtsṛjati karmaṇā /
śatrur mitram udāsīnaḥ karmāiva gurur īśvaraḥ // 17 //
tasmāt sampūjayet karma svabhāva-sthaḥ sva-karma-kr̥t /
anjasā yena varteta tad evāsya hi daivatam // 18 //

²³⁷ On theodicy, or the problem of evil in the world created by omnipotent and omniscient god see the excellent Chapter 9 'The Problem of Evil' in John L. MACKIE (1982), perhaps the best analysis so far of the problem.

they have sown, an argument used much later by Udayana (ĀTV, 410.2–411.5). The major flaw inherent in this argument, and present in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system from the moment it admitted of god as the Grand Moral Accountant, who *s u p e r v i s e s* merit and demerit, was the contradiction how to explain how morally good, omnipotent and omniscient god, who has a purpose and knows the consequences of his act of creation, creates or supervises a world in which also demerit, or evil, exists and, besides, its workings are beyond his control. This paradox was plainly and succinctly pointed out several decades before Kumāriḷa by the anonymous author of the *Yukti-dīpikā*:

‘Moreover, [the world could not be created by someone endowed with cognitive awareness], **because [the world] is full of utmost suffering**²³⁸. If <this> [world], being a special product, were preceded (sc. caused) by cognitive awareness, then the creator would not have any purpose in furnishing it with utmost suffering. And since the [creator is said to be] omnipotent, he would furnish it with utmost happiness. ... [If you argue that utmost suffering in the world] **is not the fault of god**, [but is there] **because it is occasioned by merit and demerit**, would the following be the opinion [of yours:] “Even though this [world as] a special product is preceded (sc. caused) by god, nevertheless living beings like us, who were brought into existence with utmost happiness at the moment of the initial creation, acquire (lit. come into contact with) lower, intermediate and higher [ranks] of life, caste, character etc. under the influence of merit and demerit. Therefore that is not the fault of god”? **Also this [argument] is not correct**. Why? **Because there is no logical reason to [explain] the origination of demerit** [in the world in this way]. If god had any authority over merit and demerit, he would create only merit, because [it alone] is the cause of happiness for living beings. [He would] not [create] demerit, because [demerit] has no purpose. Or [perhaps the following is your] opinion: “The origination of merit and demerit is natural, following their own causes, [independently of god]?” [Then you face] a contradiction with what you have said [earlier, namely,] that all manifest (sc. the world) is preceded by god’s cognitive awareness (design). Therefore god cannot be the cause [of the world].’²³⁹

²³⁸ The bolded text marks the *vārttikas*, following the convention of Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi, the editors of YDī.

²³⁹ YDī 15d, p. 158.13–15, 19, 23–28: *kiṃ ca duḥkhhōttaratvūt. buddhi-pūrvakaś ced <ayam>^a kārya-viśeṣaḥ syāt kartur duḥkhhōttara-vidhāne prayojanam nāsti, śaktimāṃś cāyam iti*

Another blow to an initial consistency of the karmic retribution dealt by the admission of god to the system was connected with the causal theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, according to which the effect immediately follows its ultimate cause (*vide supra*, p. 333). There opponents were likewise quick to utilise the incongruity. One of the classical formulations is again found in Kumārila's writings:

'Further, it is not consistent [to assume that] for [beings that] have accumulated *karman* there is a period of existence during which there is no [possibility to] experience the [accumulated *karman*], insofar as the results [of the accumulated *karman*] cannot be [temporarily] withheld by another *karman* on account of some other action [e.g. undertaken by god]. And a state in which all [actions exist] without [producing] a result is not possible. Moreover, such a want of fruition [of living beings' accumulated *karman*] cannot be a result of any *karman* at all. On the one hand, if all *karman* were destroyed [during the dissolution of the world], then no [future] creation [of the world] would be conceivable [because there would be no *karman* to determine the course of the new world]. On the other hand, [if the *karman* were not destroyed completely], what would be the causal factor during the time [of recreation of the world] to activate the [accumulated] *karmans* [of living beings, if all *karmans* were dormant]?'²⁴⁰

sukhōttaram eva vidadhyāt ... dharmādharma-nimittatvād adoṣa iti cet. syān matam. yady apīśvara-pūrvako 'yam kārya-viśeṣas tathāpy ādi-sarge sukhōttarāṇām <asmād->^a-utpannānām prāṇinām dharmādharma-parigrahād dhīna-madhyamōtkṛṣṭa-vayo-jāti-svabhāvādi-yogo bhavati. tataś ca nāparādho 'yam īśvarasyēti. etad apy ayuktam. kasmāt. adharmōtpatti-hetv-abhāvāt. īśvaraś ced dharmādharmaḥ utpattāv iṣṭe dharmam eva prāṇinām sukha-hetutvād utpādayet. nādharmaḥ prayojanābhāvāt. atha matam svābhāviki dharmādharmaḥ sva-kāraṇād utpattiḥ. yad uktam sarvam īśvara-buddhi-pūrvakam vyaktam iti [tu]^c tasya vyāghātaḥ. tasmād īśvaro na kāraṇam.

^a 'All the Mss read *asya*' (note 2 in YDī, p. 158).

^b 'All the Mss read *asmad-utpannānām*' (note 3 in YDī, p. 158).

^c According to the convention of Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi (YDī, p. XXX), the editors of YDī, the square brackets mark the text to be deleted.

²⁴⁰ MŚV 5.16.69–71:

*na ca karmavatām yuktā sthitis tad-bhoga-varjitā /
karmāntara-niruddham hi phalam na syāt kriyāntarāt //
sarveṣām tu phalāpetam na sthānam upapadyate /
na cāpy anupabhogo 'sau kasyacit karmaṇaḥ phalam //
aśeṣa-karma-nāśe vā punaḥ sṛṣṭir na yujyate /
karmāṇām vāpy abhivyaktau kiṃ nimittam tadā bhavet //*

The idea of karmic retribution demanded that there be no intermediate period when accrued *dharmā* and *adharma* are suspended by anyone or anything. And that perfectly harmonised with causal contiguity adopted by the two systems. One might at first read Kumāriḷa's argument as formulated against the idea of the cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*). And so it was, in part. The context, however, shows that the reasoning was formulated in a line of arguments to disprove the existence of god. In addition, Kumāriḷa's statement that 'the results [of the accumulated *karman*] cannot be [temporarily] withheld by another *karman* on account of some other action [e.g. taken by god]' (5.16.69cd) demonstrates that what is at stake is god's possible power to suspend the workings of *karman*: no one is omnipotent enough to bring the fruition of the accumulated *karman* to a halt, even for a short while. Any other solution yields inconsistency.

The above arguments formulated by the critics of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika reveal the inherent contradictions involved by the admission of god into the ontology and ethics and indicate that god was indisputably a 'foreign body' in the system.

The critics of the system confirm that the reasons to accept the equation 'existence = nameability = cognisability', along with the existence of god the other two elements of the 'knowability thesis package', could not have been prompted by strictly rational enquiry of the philosophers but must have been motivated by their extra-philosophical and, in essence, non-philosophical religious beliefs. The introduction of the equation alone would have been unwarranted and difficult to defend had it not have come along with god, the guarantor of the completeness of doctrine and attestation to the validity of the equation.

In addition to the above survey of systemic difficulties the creation of god in the world of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika engendered, a handy account of two more serious incompatibilities that the admission of god that the admission of god into the system involved is given by the author of the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā*:²⁴¹ god cannot be included in any of the six categories admitted by the Vaiśeṣika and Kaṇāda did not mention god as a separate category²⁴²; further, god's supervision of the final immobility of atoms during the dissolution of the world and their initial motion after the *pralaya* is problematic.

Why did then the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas adopt the notion of god, if there was neither any rational need for him in the philosophical system (sc. nothing internal or logical necessitated such an improvement of the philosophical doctrine) nor any comfortable room for him in the universe of the categories (sc. such an idea stood in conflict with a range of doctrinal points)?

²⁴¹ Cf. CHEMPARATHY (1965: 130).

²⁴² YDī 15d, p. 160.3 ff.

5.2. The Vaišeṣikas, the Pāśupatas and god

We know that it was probably around the fifth century when religious ideas of the Pāśupatas and other Śaiva movements started to penetrate into the doctrine of Nyāya and Vaišeṣika.²⁴³

The influence was apparently mutual because we find a number of doctrinal or philosophical points among the tenets held by the Pāśupatas that are of strictly Nyāya-Vaišeṣika origin, next to Sāṃkhya and Yoga influences.²⁴⁴ A good example is the enumeration of four constituents of the process of cognition, viz. cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), the cogniser (*pramātṛ*), the cognoscible, or the object of valid cognition (*prameya*) and the resultant cognition (*pramiti*). These well-known four elements are found at the beginning of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*.²⁴⁵ Exactly the same quadruplet is also found in Kauṇḍinya's *Pañcārtha-bhāṣya*:

‘Thus all three are the cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*). ... The soul is the cogniser (*pramātṛ*). The five categories, viz. the effect, the cause etc. are the cognoscibles (*prameya*). The resultant cognition is knowledge (*pramiti*).’²⁴⁶

Another instance of such influence concerns the proofs of the existence of the soul. We know that it was already Akṣapāda Gautama who, in order to proof this claim, availed himself of the idea that no substance can exist without its properties, and *vice versa* no property is possible without its substratum, the substance. Thus, by observing mental phenomena, such as desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain,

²⁴³ On the Pāśupatas (and also on the relation between the Pāśupatas and the Vaišeṣikas) see HARA (1958), SCHULTZ (1958), INGALLS (1962), CHEMPARATHY (1965), HARA (2002), BISSCHOP (2005). There are, of course, numerous elements borrowed from *yoga* practise.

²⁴⁴ Some of them are mentioned by THAKUR (1957: 16): Praśastapāda's ‘classification of inference into *Drṣṭa* and *Sāmanyato-drṣṭa* bears striking resemblance with that in the *Pañcārtha-bhāṣya* of Kauṇḍinya on the Pāśupatasūtras. Kauṇḍinya's classification of perception into *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *ātmapratyakṣa* (P. 7) may equally be compared with the ordinary perception (*asmadādīnām pratyakṣam*) and the perception of the *Yogin* (*Yogipratyakṣa*) of Praśasta°. The Pāśupatas according to Kauṇḍinya accept three means of knowledge, viz. perception, inference and authority and we find a similar classification in the *Vyomavatī*, though the Vaišeṣikas generally accept the first two only’ (*vide supra*, n. 147, p. 309). For another similarity between Vaišeṣika and the Pāśupatas in the realm of the nature of supernatural perception, understood as resulting from ascetic practices see n. 173. See also HARA (1992).

²⁴⁵ NBh 1.1.1: *tatra vasyēpsā-jihāsā-prayuktasya pravṛtīḥ sa pramātā, sa yenārtham pramiṇoti tat pramāṇam, yo 'rthaḥ pramiyate tat prameyam, yad artha-vijñānam sā pramitiḥ.*

²⁴⁶ PABh 1.1, p. 7.19–22: *evam etāni triṇi pramāṇāni. ... pramātā puruṣaḥ. prameyāḥ kārya-kāraṇādayaḥ pañca padārthāḥ. pramitiḥ samvit.*

cognition, we conclude that they must have some substratum, which is the soul.²⁴⁷ Akṣapāda described these mental phenomena as inferential signs on the basis of which one infers the existence of the soul.²⁴⁸ The argument was also well known to Praśastapāda.²⁴⁹ Precisely the same reasoning and the same mental phenomena, with slight modification (change in the sequence and ‘consciousness’ for ‘cognition’) is found in Kauṇḍinya’s work:

‘One accepts the soul’s [existence] on the basis of such inferential signs as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, consciousness.’²⁵⁰

That in this case it was the influence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition on the Pāśupatas can be proved by the fact that the idea to which Akṣapāda refers to is also found in the *Caraka-saṁhitā*,²⁵¹ historically closely associated with the development of the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Moreover, it is also known that Indian philosophers were quite well aware of the links between the Pāśupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas and the fact that the latter had taken over the belief in god from the former. A clear evidence, and perhaps the earliest evidence, to corroborate this is offered by the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā* in the sixth century:

‘The Pāśupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that “God therefore exists”;²⁵²
‘In such a way this [thesis] of the Vaiśeṣikas [that] “god exists” was taken over from the Pāśupatas;’²⁵³

²⁴⁷ On the structure of the argument see CHAKRABARTI–CHAKRABARTI (1991).

²⁴⁸ NS 1.1.10: *icchā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duḥkha-jñānāny ātmano liṅgam*.

²⁴⁹ See his enumeration of the qualities of the soul: PBh₁ 6, p. 70 = PBh₂ 79 (*vide supra*, n. 216).

²⁵⁰ PABh 5.3, p. 112.1–2: *tasya sukha-duḥkhêcchā-dveṣa-prayatna-caitanyādibhir liṅgair adhigamaḥ kriyata ity arthaḥ*.

²⁵¹ CarS₂ 8.43, p. 260A = CarS₁ 3.8.39: *atha pratyakṣam—pratyakṣam nāma tad yadātmanā pañcēndriyaiś^a ca svayam upalabhyate, tatrātma-pratyakṣāḥ sukha-duḥkhêcchā-dveṣādayaḥ, śabdādayas tv indriya-pratyakṣāḥ*.

^a CarS₁: *cēndriyaiś*.

²⁵² YDī 15d, p. 157.13: *asty evam īśvara iti pāśupata-vaiśeṣikāḥ*.

²⁵³ YDī 15d, p. 160.29–30: *evam kāṇḍānām īśvaro ’stīti pāśupatōjñam etat*.

The editors of YDī, Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi, conjecture that this passage may be a later interpolation by hand of a copyist. Even if it were the case, there are numerous similar passages in YDī itself that indicate the Pāśupatas’ theistic influence on the Vaiśeṣikas and, besides, even if the passage does not originate from the sixth century, but a later addition, it still evidences that it was generally a known fact in India that the Vaiśeṣika adopted the idea of god under the influence of the Pāśupatas.

‘Therefore, there is no [room for] god in the system of the author of the *Vaišeṣika-sūtra*;²⁵⁴

and

‘Thus, this is the [logical] error committed by the Pāśupatas when it comes to the acceptance of god. And this also is the error committed by the Vaišeṣikas.’²⁵⁵

Certain doctrinal elements of the Pāśupatas would make it extremely easy and self-evident to formulate some arguments for the existence of god, e.g. the cosmological argument (*vide supra*, p. 324). Among the five categories (*padārtha*) that the Pāśupatas distinguished, two of them have a direct bearing on the question of god and rational arguments to prove his existence. These are (1) the category of effect (*kārya*), understood as all the creation, that comprises consciousness, material entities and living beings, and (2) the category of cause (*kāraṇa*), i.e. god (*īśvara*, Śiva), who is the foundation (*pradhāna*) of the creation, from whom all creation takes its origin, ‘who was in the beginning’ (PABh 5.47, pp. 146–148). Kauṇḍinya the Pāśupata devotes considerable space to causal relations: those between the cause and the effect as well as those between god and his creation (PABh 2.1–27, pp. 55–77). Suppose one accepts a strict cause-effect relation between god and the world, the way the Pāśupatas did, and assumes that on the basis of (1) any relation between *a* and *b* (e.g. $a \rightarrow b$), and on the basis of (2) an act of perception of *a*, one can justifiably infer *b*, precisely the way the Vaišeṣika would infer²⁵⁶ an inferential sign-possessor (*liṅgin*) on the basis of the perceived inferential sign (*liṅga*). Consequently, to come up with an argument for the existence of god based on such an idea of causality is but a natural step.

Another easily discernible influence of the Pāśupatas, relevant for our discussion, is found in the idea of god’s supervision and in Uddyotakara’s moral argument for the existence of god (*vide supra*, p. 334, n. 229) as well as in Praśastapāda’s statement that the divine being Brahman, under the supervision of god (*īśvara*), ‘endows all the created beings with their respective moral duty, knowledge, passionlessness and divine might that conform to their potencies stored as their *karman*’ (*vide supra*, p. 300, n. 130). Precisely such a belief is expressed in Kauṇḍinya’s *Pañcārtha-bhāṣya*:

²⁵⁴ YDī 15d, p. 160.15: *tasmāt sūtra-kāra-mate nāstīśvaraḥ*.

²⁵⁵ YDī 15d, p. 160.2: *evam tāvat pāśupatānām īśvara-parigrahe doṣaḥ. vaišeṣikāṇām cāyam doṣaḥ*.

²⁵⁶ VS(C) 9.18: *asyēdam kāryam kāraṇam sambandhi ekārtha-samavāyi virodhi cēti laiṅgikam*.

‘What is called [god’s] facility to recreate [the word] means the uniting of individual souls²⁵⁷ with the constituents that bear the name of the effects and the instruments²⁵⁸ and with the merit, knowledge, detachment, power, demerit, nescience, absence of detachment, absence of power etc. in agreement with combined net force of the positioning in life, body, sense organs, sensory data [which the soul deserves according to the accumulated *karman*] and according to dimension, division and individual character.’²⁵⁹

We see that god’s authority is to supervise the process of distribution of merit and demerit as well as other positive and negative qualities related to *dharma* at the moment of the creation of the world after its dissolution. This power is called by Kauṇḍinya ‘facility to recreate’, or ‘the production of modification’²⁶⁰ (*vikaraṇatva*).

The author of the *Yukti-dīpikā* quotes, or at least paraphrases, two arguments for god’s existence which were formulated by the Pāsupatas, and accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas:

‘The Pāsupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that “Thus god exists”. Why? [They have two arguments.]

[First argument:] **Because a special product must be preceded** (sc. caused) **by a supreme cognitive awareness.**²⁶¹ In this world, a special product, such as a palace, a vehicle etc., is seen to be preceded (sc. caused) by a supreme cognitive awareness. And indeed this [world],

²⁵⁷ See PABh 2.24, p. 74.2–3, 6–7: *atra kalā nāma kārya-karaṇākhyāḥ kalāḥ. tatra kāryākhyāḥ pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaḥ. ... tathā karaṇākhyāḥ śrotraṁ tvak cakṣuḥ jihvā ghrāṇaṁ pādaḥ pāyuh upasthaḥ hastaḥ vāk manaḥ ahaṁ-kāro buddhir iti.*—‘Here what are called “the constituents” are the constituents that bear the name of the effects and the instruments. Among these, [the constituents] having the name “effect” are [the elements:] earth, water, fire, air, ether. ... Next, what have the name of instruments are: ear, skin, eye, tongue, nose, foot, anus, sex organs, hand, mouth, mind, the centre of personal identity and consciousness.’ Comp. also PABh 1.1, p. 5.5–6: *tatra pāsū nāma kārya-karaṇākhyāḥ kalāḥ.*—‘What are called here individual transmigrating souls are constituents that bear the name of effect and instrument.’

²⁵⁸ The terms *kṣetra* and *kṣetra-jñā* are clearly of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga origin, see YS 2.4, YBh 2.17 (p. 175.2), 3.49 (p. 306.1), BhG Chap. 13, MDhP 12.206.8. See also LARSON (1979: 131 f.).

²⁵⁹ PABh 2.24, p. 74.9–11: *vikaraṇatvaṁ nāma sthāna-śarirēndriya-viṣayādi-saṁniveśeṇa vistara-vibhāga-viśeṣataś ca kārya-karaṇākhyābhiḥ kalābhir dharmajñāna-vairāgyāśvaryaḍhar-mājñānavairāgyānaśvaryaḍibhiś ca kṣetra-jñā-saṁyojanam.* Cf. CHEMPARATHY’S (1965: 128) translation of the passage.

²⁶⁰ CHEMPARATHY’S (1965: 128).

²⁶¹ See n. 337.

being characterised by a complex structure made from the elements, sense organs, creatures etc., is a special product. Therefore, it must be preceded by a supreme cognitive awareness. That by which this [world] is preceded is god. Therefore, god exists.

What else?

[Second argument:] **Because the conjunction of a conscious [being] and an unconscious [thing] is brought about by a conscious [being].**

In this world, the conjunction of a conscious [being] and an unconscious [thing] is seen to be brought about by a conscious [being], for instance [the conjunction] of ox and cart. And indeed this [world] is a conjunction of bodies and souls. Therefore, it must be brought about by a conscious [being]. That by which this [world] is brought about [as a conjunction] is god. Therefore, god exists as the cause.²⁶²

The first of the arguments is a version of cosmological argument, i.e. the argument from the first cause (*kāraṇa*), which was known also to Uddyotakara (*vide supra*, p. 324). Interestingly, the structure of this argument is a combination of a typical cosmological argument and an argument from perfection (*vide supra*, p. 324), based on the idea of a hierarchy of qualities, such as cognitive qualities. The expression ‘supreme cognitive awareness’ (*atiśaya-buddhi*) comes very close to ‘absolute and supreme knowledge’ (*atiśaya-jñāna*) found in *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha* (*vide supra*, p. 300, n. 130), or to Praśastamati’s expression ‘excellence of cognition’ (*jñānātiśaya*), quoted in TBV by Abhayadeva-sūri (*vide supra*, p. 305, n. 140), or to the phrase ‘the excellence of perception’ (*darśanātiśaya*, p. 320, n. 178), found later with Jayanta-bhaṭṭa.

It is very likely that precisely such an argument, probably its earlier formulation, was devised within the ranks of the Pāsupatas and later adopted by Uddyotakara and taken for granted by both Praśastamati and Praśastapāda, who not only adopted logical, argumentative structure but also verbal phrasing.

That Kauṇḍinya may indeed have known the argument, although he does not refer to it explicitly, is attested by a passage from his *Pañcārtha-bhāṣya*:

²⁶² YDī 15d, p. 157.13 ff.: *āha—asty evam īśvara iti pāsupata-vaiśeṣikāḥ. kasmāt. kārya-viśeṣasyātiśaya-buddhi-pūrvakatvāt. iha kārya-viśeṣaḥ prāsāda-vimānādir atiśaya-buddhi-pūrvako dṛṣṭaḥ. asti cāyam mahā-bhūtēndriya-bhavana-vinyāsādi-lakṣaṇaḥ kārya-viśeṣaḥ. tasmād anenāpy atiśaya-buddhi-pūrvakeṇa bhavitavyam. yat-pūrvako 'yam sa īśvaraḥ. tasmād astīśvara iti. kim cānyat. cetanācetanayor abhisambandhasya cetana-kṛtatvāt. iha cetanācetanayor abhisambandhaś cetana-kṛto dṛṣṭas tad yathā go-śakaṭayoh. asti cāyam cenācetanayoh śarīra-śarīriṇor abhisambandhaḥ. tasmād anenāpi cetana-kṛtena bhavitavyam. yat-kṛto 'yam sa īśvaraḥ. tasmād astīśaraḥ kāraṇam.*

‘Inference, in its turn, is preceded (sc. caused) by perception, and its causal complex is made from consciousness, internal organ (mind) and [respective logical] relations; it is effected by the remembrance of [such factors as] merit, demerit, explanation, place, time, injunction etc.; [it concerns] origination, subsistence, disappearance, time etc. And by their means one infers of a cause that it is an agent that accomplishes the subsequent creation [of the world].’²⁶³

While describing the nature of inference, he refers to certain categories on the basis of which we can infer that there is a creator of the world. This would support the above evidence of the *Yukti-dīpikā* attesting to the doctrinal influence the Pāśupatas exercised on the system of Vaiśeṣika.

The second of the above arguments is not found in the early writings of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in precisely this form. However, its logical structure in the form the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā* relates it, makes a rather curious and cryptic impression: it states that if we have a material, unconscious thing and a conscious being that come into union, there must be another conscious being to put these two together. One thing is certain, namely that the argument relies on a conviction, widespread not only in India²⁶⁴ but also in ancient Greece,²⁶⁵ that any movement and activity has soul, or a conscious being, as its source. That is why, the Pāśupatas are said to maintain that there must be some conscious agent (‘meta-soul’) to bring these two elements (unconscious thing and conscious being) into union. However, if there is already a conscious being (soul) in conjunction with the unconscious thing, then the second conscious agent (‘meta-soul’), as a source of action or movement that brings these two elements together, turns out to be redundant, insofar as the conscious being (soul) is already capable of coming into union with the material thing without any extraneous agent. Why should then the argument mention the second conscious agent (‘meta-soul’) at all? The argument, aiming at proving god’s existence, would not make any sense because all one would require for a conjunction of, say, a man and a stick, would be the man alone who can take hold of the stick; similarly, oxen

²⁶³ PABh 1.1, p. 7.8–11: *anumānam api pratyakṣa-pūrvakam cittātmāntaḥ-karaṇa-sambandha-sāmagryam ca dharmādharma-prakāśa-deśa-kāla-codanādi-smṛti-hetukam utpatty-anugraha-tiro-bhāva-kālādi. taiś cōttara-sṛṣṭi-kartṛtvam anumīyate kāraṇasya.*

²⁶⁴ See e.g. NV₁ 4.21, p. 461.11–13 (*vide supra*, n. 136).

²⁶⁵ See Plato’s belief that planets must have a soul, or a conviction shared by the Ionians. According to what Aristotle relates, ‘Also Thales, according to what is recorded about him, seems to have held that soul is a mover, since he said that the lodestone has a soul because it moves the iron.’—*De Anima*, 1.2; 405a19: ἔοιε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἶπερ τὴν λιθὸν ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ.

can easily approach a cart on their own and push it (not draw it, though). In this way, one could easily dispense with any higher agent, and the argument would fail.

My hypothesis is, however, that what we really have here is a version of the argument from the first mover (*vide supra*, p. 303). It states that, indeed, any conjunction (which by definition requires movement), including that of an unconscious thing and a conscious being, is initiated by the conscious being; a series of such events of conjunctions brings us to an initial situation when the souls are, for whatever reason it might be (here it is the *pralaya*), inactive and cannot exercise their capacity to bring about any conjunction. Therefore, there must be a first mover that initiates first motion and capacitates the souls. Accordingly, the argument begins to make a perfect sense when interpreted in the context of the dissolution of the world, when souls' all capacities are dormant. Also the example of the ox and cart would make perfect sense under this view: it is not merely about a n y conjunction of the ox and cart, but the yoking of the ox, which requires some p r i o r d e s i g n of the agent that accomplishes it. Thus, god is the initial agent who brings movement into the world.

Again, also here we may speak of a direct exchange between the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika and the Pāśupatas. What was already taken for granted by Praśastapāda as requiring no explicit proof finds its formulation in the two anonymous arguments cited by the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā*.

This brief review of mutual influences between the doctrine of the Pāśupatas and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika shows that the admission of god, alongside the package of the corollaries, was no coincidence or inner development in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools but one of such influences from the theistic partner.

A good summary of the above discussion could be the opinion of George CHEMPARATHY (1965: 124–125):

‘... [H]e (i.e. the author of YDī—P.B.) then passes on to refute the Īśvara doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas, where he shows that the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras did not accept the doctrine of Īśvara, but that it was introduced by the Pāśupatas into the system. ... Further it seems reasonable to conclude that these proofs, though they appear in formulations foreign to the Vaiśeṣika terminology, might have been accepted by the early Vaiśeṣikas as proofs for the existence of Īśvara, when as we learn from the Yuktidīpikā, the Īśvara doctrine was accepted into the system from the Pāśupatas...’

Perhaps, the attenuation of the rigidity, or mechanicity, of moral law was not felt as a genuine problem by the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika because they had already adopted to the idea of the transfer of merit and demerit, which also seems to stand in opposi-

tion to rigour of karmic retribution. Obviously such a concept of the ceding, to or from others, of one's moral responsibilities and retributions for committed deeds was not in accord with the doctrine of *karman* conceived by the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. It did harmonise, however, with the new idea that the accrued *karman* could be suspended. It seems also that such a belief in the transfer of merit and demerit paved the way to the latter idea.

It is especially the third chapter of the *Pāśupata-sūtra* which describes how a Pāśupata adept can absorb another person's merit and give away his own demerit and take hold of the merit of others by his provoking, obscene or otherwise unusual behaviour that arouses contempt (*avamāna*) for him in, say, bystanders.²⁶⁶ Again, the idea was that one can manipulate one's own *karman* through various ascetic practices, and merit as well demerit may be, respectively, appropriated from and ceded to others, even without their knowledge or consent. Such unusual practices of the Pāśupatas might have made the philosophers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika receptive of the laxity of the system of karmic retribution, which had apparently been treated as rigid. They no longer saw it problematic that accumulated *karman* could be transferred by them or its operation simply withheld for some time, during the dissolution of the world, by god.

5.3. Final word

To conclude, the knowability thesis—i.e. the equation: 'existentiality = nameability = cognisability'—was adopted by the Vaiśeṣika at the time of, or slightly prior to Praśastapāda. Its necessary complements were the following three ideas: god's existence, god's omniscience and supernatural perception, and these two entered Vaiśeṣika around the same time, i.e. late fifth century, although the belief in god's existence became a tenet of the Nyāya dogmatics slightly earlier since it was known already to Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin.

It seems rather certain that the main reason for the Vaiśeṣika to adopt the knowability thesis were not philosophical concerns but their religious belief in god and the knowability thesis was principally an *o f f s h o t* of their theistic belief, not a result of purely rational, philosophical enquiry. The theistic influence came from the side of the Pāśupatas: most probably some thinkers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were primarily followers of the Pāśupata doctrine and took the existence of god as something obvious that needed no rational proof (probably being something 'perceived'

²⁶⁶ See Daniel H.H. INGALLS (1962): 'The Pāśupata Sūtra lays stress on the transfer of sin and merit' (p. 293). INGALLS (1962: 285–291) provides a translation of the third chapter of PāśS.

or sensed through ascetic practices). Perhaps the influence was possible thanks to their family or regional background. A conceivable possibility is that, having been brought up, or having grown up, in a religious environment influenced by the worldview of the Pāśupatas they underwent some training in methodology and logic under the supervision of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika master and eventually joined the ranks of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. But this is just a hypothesis, albeit a very probable one in Indian social context, for which I have no irrefutable proof at present.

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
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Logic and Belief
in
Sāṃkhya and Yoga



Early Concepts of Logic in Sāṃkhya

SHUJUN MOTEGI

*vītāvīta-viṣāṇasya pakṣatā-vana-sevinaḥ /
pravādāḥ sāmkhya-karinaḥ sallakī-ṣaṇḍa-bhaṅgurāḥ //*

[YDī 1.3–4, 2.6–7]¹

Though its originality remains uncertain, the *Yukti-dīpikā* (YDī) starts with this verse which tells us that the Sāṃkhya argue with other schools by means of *vīta* and *avīta* (or *āvīta*) to defend the Sāṃkhya's standpoint and to win disputes. The concepts of *vīta* and *avīta*, therefore, seem to have played an important role in the history of the Sāṃkhya thought.

As these terms are not found in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (SK), the compendium of the Sāṃkhya thought, and the oldest extant text of the school, some modern scholars have examined the concepts of *vīta* and *avīta* mainly in terms of their inclusion in the literature of other schools, especially in Buddhist literature. However, as YDī, a commentary on SK, refers to these terms rather frequently², I shall examine the treatment of the terms found in YDī, that is, their usage in an extant piece of Sāṃkhya literature.

1.1. In YDī, these terms are defined in the description of inference. The Sāṃkhya maintains, at least after SK, that there are three kinds of inference, namely *pūrvavat* (a priori), *śeṣavat* (a posteriori) and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. Among these three types, the existence of invisible beings is inferred by a method called *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa anumāna* (inference based on the observation of similarity). This inference is, again,

¹ 'Accusations against the elephant of Sāṃkhya possessing the direct inference (*vīta*) and inference by elimination (*avīta*) as the tusks and rejoicing in the forest of subject (*pakṣatā*) are fragile like a group of *sallaki* trees' (translated by KUMAR–BHARGAVA (1990–1992: 1)).

² The author of YDī often refers to such old concepts as *ṣaṭ siddhi*, *karma-yoni*, old definitions of *anumānas*, which are rarely referred to in other commentaries on SK. His wide knowledge of old theory is reflected in the frequent citation of the various theories of earlier teachers of the Sāṃkhya, by which some light may be shed on the days before SK.

divided into two subcategories, due to differences in application. They are called *vīta* and *avīta*.³ Their essential nature is described in the following verse:

‘When a reason is used with its own specific sign in order to establish probandum, the reason is *vīta*. The other reason is used to establish probandum as the only remainder through exclusion of the other possible entities.’⁴

The author of YDī further explains both terms along with the meaning of the verse. On the term *vīta* his explanation is as follows:

‘When a reason is used appropriately, with its own specific sign for the establishment of probandum, without reliance upon the standpoint of opponents, the reason is called *vīta*.’⁵

On the other hand, for the term *avīta*, the explanation is:

‘On the contrary, by removing other possible entities, if it is proved that the probandum remains as the only possible entity, [the reason is] called *avīta*. For example, if the world does not originate from atoms, a cosmic person, a creator, conduct, destiny, time, nature, then it originates from the remainder: primordial matter.’⁶

Here, we see that both the terms of *vīta* and *avīta* are ways in which the inference based on general observation (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*) is applied, and their difference is the manner in which the reason is treated. In the *vīta* inference, the proponent is supported by the nature of the reason. However, in the *avīta* inference, the validity of the reason is examined by means of entities which can substitute for the entity maintained by the proponent. It can be said that, while the *vīta* inference is positive in nature, the *avīta* inference is negative in nature. Judging from the general definition of the previously mentioned phrases, both methods of inference may be applied to any topic.

³ YDī 88.20–89.1: *tasmāt siddham sāmānyato-dṛṣṭād atīndriyāṇām arthānām samadhigamaḥ. tasya prayoga-mātra-bhedād dvaividhyaṁ vīta avīta iti.*

⁴ YDī 89.2–3:

*yadā hetuḥ sva-rūpeṇa sādhyā-siddhau prayujyate /
sa vīto 'rthāntara-kṣepād itaraḥ pariśeṣataḥ //*

⁵ YDī 89.7–9: *tatra yadā hetuḥ para-pakṣam anapekṣya yathārthena svarūpeṇa sādhyā-siddhāv apadiśyate tadā vītākhyo bhavati.*

⁶ YDī 89.9–12: *yadā tu sva-sādhyād arthāntara-bhūtānām prasaṅginām kṣepam apoham kṛtvā pariśeṣataḥ sādhyā-siddhāv apadeśyate tad-āvītākhyo bhavati tad yathā na cet paramāṇu-puruṣeśvara-karma-daiva-kāla-svabhāva-yadṛcchābhyo jagad-utpattiḥ sambhavanti prariśeṣataḥ pradhānād iti tadā punar avītākhyo bhavati.*

1.2. This general characteristic of the concepts of *vīta* makes it possible for it to be discussed in the context of the verbal explication (*vākya-bhāva*) of logic, or in syllogistic expressions. Though SK does not refer to any kind of syllogism, the *vīta* inference is connected with syllogistic formulas. In the Nyāya school of logic the syllogistic formula is said to consist of five parts.

The logical expression is said to consist of definite parts common to both sides, thus enabling the attainment of a conclusion acceptable to both sides.⁷ The author of YDī provides us with two kinds of syllogistic expression. The first is utilised for obtaining the right knowledge, which is described as follows:

‘The parts of explanation are desire for knowledge, doubt, purpose, attainment of possibility and negation of doubt.’⁸

The second is syllogistic parts to persuade others, which are common to the five parts of the Naiyāyika:

‘The parts of persuading others are proposition, probans, example, application and conclusion.’⁹

As a result the *vīta* inference is said to have ten parts (YDī 97.5: *daśāvayavo vītaḥ*). In this context the concept *vīta* is partially connected with the five-part syllogism which is developed in Naiyāyikas. However, although each part of the syllogism is further explained or defined, an occurrence of the *vīta* inference expressed with the syllogism formula is not found. Although it is not expressed with the syllogism formula, the essential nature of the *vīta* is, together with *avīta*, in the persuasion of opponents.¹⁰

1.3. In contrast to *vīta*, the author of YDī does not refer to the syllogistic expression of the *avīta* inference.¹¹ But he provides us with the following example of the usage

⁷ YDī 89.12–15: *tatra yadā vīto hetuḥ sva-buddhāv avahīta-vijñāna-svarūpaṃ vijñānāntaram ādadhānena vaktrā pratipādyādau vākya-bhāvam upanīyate vākyam antareṇārthasya buddhy-antare saṃkrāmayitum aśakyatvāt, tad-āvayavi vākyam parikalpyate.*

⁸ YDī 89.16–17: *tasya punar avayavā jññāsā-saṃśaya-prayojana-śakya-prāpti-saṃśaya-vyudāsa-lakṣaṇas ca vyākhyāṅgam.*

⁹ YDī 89.18: *pratijñā-hetu-dṛṣṭānta-upasamhāra-nigamanāni para-pratipādanāṅgam iti.*

¹⁰ In the argument concerning the trustworthy words (*āpta-vacana*) accepted by the Sāṃkhya as the valid means of cognition, an opponent exposed the contradiction within the Sāṃkhya thought. He knew the term *vītāvīta* and interpreted it as the reason to make something known to others verbally, see YDī 71.16–17: *vītāvītāv api hetū para-pratipādanārtham upadīyamānau śabda-vyāpāram apekṣete, tayor apy āpta-vacanatva-prasaṅgaḥ.*

¹¹ In the argument concerning example (*dṛṣṭānta*), the author of YDī mentions why examples in support of *avīta* are not mentioned, see YDī 90.23–91.2: *vyatirekas tv avītasya prasaṅgi-*

of the *avīta* inference, which is the only example of the *avīta* inference, that is, the only instance of its application seen in YDī.

In the explanation of *śeṣavat anumāna* (a posteriori inference), the author of YDī resorts to the *vitāvīta* inference. The opponent raises the objection that there can be supposed some reasons for the *nadī-pūra* other than the rainfall, for example, melted snow (*hima-vilayana*), the destruction of banks (*setu-bhaṅga*), the play of elephants (*gaja-krīḍa*) and so on. Hence, we cannot infer the rain fell upriver from the fact that the river water increased. The author of YDī here resorts to the *avīta* reason in order to make up for the insufficiency of a posteriori inference. Here we see a kind of definition and application of *avīta*. The role of *avīta* is to remove the other possible reasons in order to establish the validity of a conclusion. The author of YDī classifies the application of *avīta* into three aspects, namely from the viewpoint of place (*deśatas*), from the viewpoint of time (*kālatas*) and from the viewpoint of characteristics (*lakṣaṇatas*). By the removal of other possible reasons, the *śeṣavat anumāna* become valid.¹² The author of YDī uses *avīta* in inference in general to compensate for insufficiencies in the method of *vīta*, which are not connected with the inference designed to prove the existence of primordial matter.

1.4. Furthermore, in YDī, the term *vīta* appears in the argument to prove the existence of primordial matter (*prakṛti*).

The Sāṃkhya seem to make a great effort to prove the existence of primordial matter. The reason is that the concept of primordial matter is not derived from traditional philosophical thinking, being the basic concept on which the whole system of the Sāṃkhya school of thought is grounded. As the most characteristic theory of the school is based on this very concept, great efforts were made to prove its existence and to make its validity known to other schools of thought.

dharmāntara-nivṛtti-rūpatvād antar-bhūta iti na tad-arthaṃ vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta ucyate.—‘A counter-example which excludes [the position of opponents] is not mentioned here because exclusion is included in the *avīta*, having a nature which denies possible characteristics of other entities.’

¹² YDī 84.19–85.3: *vitāvīta-sāmarthyāt. vitāvītābhyāṃ hetu-bhūtābhyāṃ abhipretārtha-siddhir iti vakṣyāmaḥ. prasaṅgi-dharmāntara-nivṛtti-mukhena cāvīta-prayogaḥ. tatra yadā prasaṅginām hima-vilayanādīnām deśa-kāla-liṅgaiḥ pratiśedhaḥ kriyate tadā mukta-saṃśayaṃ pratipattir bhavati. deśatas tāvat tad yathā dakṣiṇā-pathe nāsti hima-vilayana-sambhavaḥ. kālato yathā prāvṛṭ-kāle. liṅgato 'pi yasmān mudga-gavedhuka-syāmaka-kāṣṭha-tṛṇa-mūtra-śakṛt-prabhṛtīnām anupalambhas tathōṣma-kaluṣatvādīnām upalabhāḥ. tasmāt pariśeṣato meghyā evāpa iti.*

In the argument of ten main topics (*cūlikārtha*)¹³ in the sixty topics, the author of YDī refers to the term *vīta* as the means to prove the existence and uniqueness of primordial matter.

‘Among them the existence and uniqueness of it is proved by five *vīta* reasons.’¹⁴

The author of YDī enumerates five kinds of *vīta*.¹⁵ The five kinds of *vīta* are the five reasons which prove the existence of primordial matter. They are enumerated in SK 15:

‘[Primordial matter exists,] because (1) specific objects are finite, (2) they possess homogeneity, (3) they act according to their potency, (4) there is distinction between cause and effect, and (5) because of the merging of the world.’¹⁶

These five reasons in SK15 are named *vīta*. Here we see the concept that the term *vīta* denotes a group of five reasons for the proof of the existence of primordial matter.¹⁷

The term *avīta* appears in connection with the proof of the existence of primordial matter in its definition as seen above (p. 364). The same usage is again found in YDī as follows:

‘This word (i.e. the term *prakṛti-kṛtaḥ* in SK 56) is used to end the argument. The existence of primordial matter is established by the *vīta-avīta* inference. It depends on the exclusion of atoms, and so on.’¹⁸

¹³ The concept *cūlikārtha* is the ten topics of the sixty which constitute the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* of Vārṣaṅgaṇya. Ten topics are found in YDī 2.12–13. These are: *pradhānāstitva, ekatva, arthavattva, anyatā, pārārthya, anaiḱya, viyoga, yoga*.

¹⁴ YDī 6.14: *tatrāstitvam ekatvaṁ pañcabhir vītaiḥ siddham*.

¹⁵ The five kinds of *vītas* are seen again in YDī 154.11, which reads as follows:

evam etaiḥ pañcabhir vītaiḥ vyaktasya kāraṇam asty avyaktam iti siddham / (YDī 154.11–12)

¹⁶ SK 15:

*bhedānāṁ parimāṇāt samanavayāc chaktitas pravṛtteś ca /
kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśva-rūpasya //*

¹⁷ The same concept is seen in the argument raised by an opponent who doubts the validity of the reason. The opponent criticises the concept that the five reasons form a group called *vīta*, saying that each individual reason cannot be deemed valid if it is considered independently outside the group of five reasons. This opposition presupposes the concept that *vīta* is composed of five reasons, see YDī 92.26–27: *tatrāpi vītaḥ pañca-prabheda ity ataḥ samudāyān niṣkṛṣṭasyāḱasya liṅgatvam aśakyam vaktum iti*.—‘If the *vīta* reason consists of five kinds, one reason extracted from the collection cannot be said to be an independent reason.’

¹⁸ YDī 261.19–20: *anena vākyā-parisamāpty-arthaṁ vītāvītābhyāṁ siddham pradhānāstitvam aṅv-ādi-pratiṣedham cāpekṣate*.

The author of YDī (89.11–12) tries to show that the existence of primordial matter has been established by the *vīta* and *avīta* inference, in which the exclusion of other possible entities like atoms is also established. The *avīta* inference plays this part of exclusion in the whole inference.

1.5. In the previously cited phrase, we see the concept that both of *vīta* and *avīta* are applied together.¹⁹ If *vīta* and *avīta* are used at the same time, it is said that *vīta* must be used first. The author of YDī (97.5–6, see n. 22) shows that this concept has been widespread.

This is easily understood, as the *vīta* inference has a positive probandum, without which nothing can be excluded.²⁰ The concept that both must be applied together implies that both are not independent methods of inference.

¹⁹ The same concept that both of *vīta* and *avīta* must be used together is seen in the argument of SK 8ab which runs as follows:

saukṣmyāt tad-anupalabdhir nābhāvāt kāryatas tad-upalabdhiḥ /

‘The non-perception of primordial matter is due to its subtlety, not due to its non-existence. Because it is actually known through its effects.’

An opponent raises the objection that it is unnecessary to mention the term *nābhāvāt*, because the Sāṃkhya’s position is adequately expressed by the reason *saukṣmyāt*. The author of YDī responds to this objection by resorting to *vīta* and *avīta*. His point is that the reason *saukṣmyāt* is that of *vīta*. The reason *nābhāvāt* is the application of *avīta*, because it denies other possible entity *abhāva*. If primordial matter is not perceived due to its non-existence then, as the remainder, it is not perceived due to its subtlety. First, the reason *vīta* is mentioned, followed by the reason *avīta* for the completeness of the reasoning process. Using this argument, the author of YDī justified SK 8, which enumerates two reasons for the one theme. The theme here is not about the existence of primordial matter.

The same concept is seen in YDī 244.4–5: *yadā vītāvītaiḥ pradhānam adhigamya tat-pūrvaktvaṃ ca mahad-ādīnām vikārānām.*—‘Understanding primordial material by the *vīta* and *avīta*, and understanding that the evolutes, *mahad* and so on, presuppose it, [a *yogin* is satisfied].’

We further find the same concept in the opinion raised by others (*tantrāntarīya*), in YDī 107.2–3: *yat uktam tantrāntarīyaḥ “na pṛthak-pratipatti-hetū vītāvītau” iti tad iṣṭam eva saṅgrhītam bhavati.*

²⁰ The author of YDī (97.6 ff.) explains the reason why the *avīta* reason comes after *vīta* as follows: The characteristics of *avīta* support the probandum through exclusion. If a conclusion is drawn from the negation of opposites, there is nothing from which an exclusion can be made. If, as in the *avīta* inference, negation comes first, the following inference is possible: if [we know that] things (*vyakta*) did not originate from atoms etc., on the ground that the reason which supports the atoms etc., is negated, likewise [we know that] things did not appear from primordial matter because of the lack of a positive reason for its existence. It must, therefore, be established that things appear from primordial matter by the *vīta* reasons. Here again the function of *avīta* is to exclude other possible entities after the establishment of the existence of primordial matter.

1.6. Let us now summarise the previously cited occurrences of the terms *vīta* and *avīta* in YDī, according to their usages. The term *vīta* is generally used as (1) an inferential reason, connected with the syllogism of ten parts (§ 1.2), and as (2) connected with five reasons that prove the existence of primordial matter seen in SK 15 (§ 1.4). The term *avīta* is generally used as an inference to exclude other possible entities, but specifically to exclude other possible entities which could occupy the position of primordial matter. Both of them must be applied together, first *vīta*, then *avīta*, for the completeness of the inference. Keeping these different usages in mind, let us examine the usage of the terms in the literature older than YDī in order to clarify the concepts associated with them.

2.1. Prof. FRAUWALLNER (1958) made a great contribution to the inference theory of the early Sāṃkhya. In his paper, he analysed the argument of inference found in the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (PS), in its commentary by Jinendrabuddhi, in the *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra* and its commentary, the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* (NAA), by Sīmha-sūri, assuming that the inference theory referred to in these texts is that of the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* (ST) of Vārṣagaṇya and of two commentaries on ST. He finally presented a part of the text of ST which dealt with valid means of cognition, including inference. The presented text, which consists of Sanskrit and Tibetan, includes the following topics:

- (1) The definition of inference (*anumāṇa*): *sambandhād ekasmāt śeṣa-siddhir anumānam.*
- (2) Seven kinds of definite connections (*sambandha*) in the definition of inference: their designations and two examples for each kind.
- (3) The definition and explanation of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*): *śrotrādivṛttiḥ.*
- (4) A short explanation of a trustworthy person (*āpta*).
- (5) Two kinds of inference (*anumāna*): the analogical inference based on particularity (*viśeṣato-dṛṣṭa*) and the analogical inference based on similarity (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*).
- (6) Two kinds of analogical inference based on similarity (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*): *pūrvavat* (a priori) and *śeṣavat* (a posteriori).
- (7) Two kinds of application of *śeṣavat*: *vīta* and *avīta*.
- (8) Parts of verbal expression, or the syllogism of *vīta*: *pratijñā, hetu, dṛṣṭānta, upasamhāra, nigamana.*
- (9) Proof of the existence of primordial matter (*prakṛti*): An example of *vīta* and *āvīta*.

2.2. In the reconstructed text of ST (RST), *vīta* and *āvīta* appear first as two ways of applying the *śeṣavad anumāna*. The relevant portion is as follows:

‘Among them, the inference based on similarity is used as posteriori inference, the reason of posteriori inference is used for cognition of things beyond the range of sense organs. It is divided into two categories by difference in application, that is, *vīta* and *āvīta*. The *vīta* reason is established by the nature of probandum itself. When reason is used for the completion of probandum by its own nature, without depending on the opposite side, then it is called *vīta*. The establishment by *āvīta* is through the remainder. When this reason is used for the completion of probandum, being decided that, as it does not come into existence in any other way, but that it exists, the only reason possible becomes the remainder, and it is called *āvīta*.’²¹

Here, as seen in YDī, the *vīta* and *āvīta* are two ways of applying inference, known as *śeṣavad anumāna*. However, their definitions are not described in connection with an attempt to prove the existence of primordial matter. As seen again in YDī, *vīta* is a reason based on the nature of probandum. Conversely, *āvīta* is a kind of reason that excludes other possible entities as probandum. A kind of general expression of both concepts is continued in the next description of the five-part syllogism, which is regarded as the verbal statement of *vīta*. The relevant text of RST runs as follows:

‘The verbal expression of *vīta* consists of five parts: proposition, reason, example, application and conclusion. Proposition is the assertion of probandum. Reason is the description of probans. Example is its presentation. Application is the union of probans and example. Con-

²¹ RST, after FRAUWALLNER (1958: 44.3–4): *teṣāṃ yad etat sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam anumānam śeṣavat, eṣa hetur atindriyāṇāṃ bhāvānāṃ samadhigame, tasya prayogōpacāra-viśeṣād dvaividhyam, vīta āvīta iti. svarūpād vīta-siddhiḥ. yadā hetuḥ para-pakṣam avyapekṣya svenāva rūpeṇa kārya-siddhāv apadiśyate, tadā vītākhyo bhavati. pariśeṣād āvīta-siddhiḥ. yadā nēdam ato ’nyathā sambhavati, asti cēdam, tasmāt pariśeṣato hetur evāyam ity avadhārya kārya-siddhāv apadiśyate, tad-āvītākhyo bhavati.*

The relevant texts of NAA 313.8–314.3, runs with slight differences: *teṣāṃ vītāvītānāṃ lakṣaṇam tad yathā—prāg anumānam saprabhedam vyākhyāya teṣāṃ yad etat sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam śeṣavad eṣa hetur atindriyāṇāṃ bhāvānāṃ samadhigame, tasya prayogōpacāra-viśeṣād dvaividhyam. vīta iti sāmānyena, viśeṣeṇa tu svarūpād vīta-siddhiḥ, yadā hetuḥ para-pakṣam avyapekṣya svenāva rūpeṇa kārya-siddhāv apadiśyate, tadā vītākhyo bhavati. pariśeṣād āvīta-siddhiḥ, yadā nēdam ato ’nyathā sambhavaty asti cēdam, tasmāt pariśeṣato “hetur evāyam” ity avadhārya kārya-siddhāv apadiśyate, tad-āvītākhyo bhavatīti prayoga-lakṣaṇam, sva-lakṣaṇam tv asya para-pakṣa-pratiśedhena sva-pakṣa-parigraha-kriyā āvīta iti.*

clusion is the repetition of proposition. [Teachers] think that it is proper to use *vīta* first, and then *āvīta*.²²

From the previously quoted statement we know that the five-part syllogism is called *vīta* in RST. The five parts are *pratijñā* and so on, not including *jijñāsā* and so on as in YDī.

2.3. Following the previously mentioned general description of *vīta* and *āvīta*, we can see their real usages in RST. Prof. FRAUWALLNER took the *vīta* inference out of a group of five to cite an example of its use, which is as follows:

‘Primordial matter exists. Because one sees homogeneity in things. One sees the homogeneity of one sort in inner things consisting of effect and cause. <We will explain inner [things which] consists of effect and cause.> Inner things, which are essentially made of effect, are five in number. They are sound, touch, taste, form and smell. They are nothing but combination of three constituents, that is, pleasure, pain and bewilderment. Why? Because these five respectively make one effect. While sound, touch, taste, form and smell are in pleasure, they make, as effect, brightness, lightness, generation, affection, happiness and pleasure. [While these five are] in pain, the effect is dryness, separation (? , *apabheda*), excitement, regret and hate (? , *apadveṣa*). [While these five are] in bewilderment, the effect is covering, exhaustion, concealment, hate (? , *baibhatsya*, FRAUWALLNER: ‘Abscheu’), misery and heaviness, and so on.’²³

²² RST, after FRAUWALLNER (1958: 44.10–14): *vītasya vākya-bhāvaḥ pañca-pradeśaḥ, pratijñā hetur dṛṣṭānta upasamhāro nigamanam iti. tatra sādhyāvadhāraṇam pratijñā sādhana-samāsa-vacanāṁ hetuḥ, tan-nidarśanāṁ dṛṣṭāntaḥ, sādhyā-dṛṣṭāntayor eka-kriyōpasamhāraḥ, pratijñābhyāso nigamanam iti purastād vītasya prayogaṁ nyāyāṁ manyante, paścād āvītasya.*

The relevant text of NAA, 314.4–6, runs again with slight differences: *vītasya [āvītasya] vā bhāvaḥ pañca-pradeśaḥ—pratijñā hetuḥ dṛṣṭānta upasamhāro nigamanam iti. tatra sādhyāvadhāraṇam pratijñā sādhana-samāsa-vacanāṁ hetuḥ, tan-nidarśanāṁ dṛṣṭāntaḥ, sādhyā-dṛṣṭāntayor eka-kriyōpasamhāraḥ, pratijñābhyāso nigamanam iti purastād vītasya prayogaṁ nyāyāṁ manyante, paścād āvītasyeti.*

Here, regarding the order of application (bolded part), we notice almost identical phrase in YDī 97.5–6: *tasmāt sūktam daśāvayavo vītaḥ. tasya purastāt prayogaṁ nyāyāṁ ācāryā manyante.*

²³ RST, after FRAUWALLNER (1958: 44.16–24): *asti pradhānam, bhedānām anvaya-darśanāt. ādhyātmikānām bhedānām kārya-karaṇātmakānām eka-jāti-samanvayo dṛṣṭaḥ, <ādhyātmikānām kāryātmakānām vakṣyāmaḥ>^a ādhyātmikāḥ kāryātmakā bhedāḥ śabda-sparśa-rasa-rūpa-gandhāḥ pañca trayāṇām sukha-duḥkha-mohānām sanniveśa-mātram. kasmāt? pañcānām pañcānām eka-kārya-bhāvāt, sukhānām śabda-sparśa-rasa-rūpa-gandhānām prasāda-lāghava-prasavābhi-*

The reason *anvayāt* corresponds to *samanvayāt* in SK 15. In the *Nyāyāgamānusārīṇī*, on which Prof. FRAUWALLNER depends for reconstruction of ST, there is a somewhat lengthy description of *vīta* and *āvīta*. After this inference, there follow four more *vīta* inferences in NAA, to which Prof. FRAUWALLNER refers by means of the sign ‘*usw.*’. The following reasons are the same as those in SK 15. The second reason is *parimāṇāt* (because of finiteness or limited measure).²⁴ Though the argument to support the first reason is similar to that found in YDī, the argument for the second reason is quite different, and will be briefly summarised in the following paragraph.

To show examples of things of finiteness (*parimāṇa*), the author divides finiteness into three categories: the finiteness of form (*rūpa-parimāṇa*), the finiteness of behaviour (*pravṛtti-parimāṇa*) and the finiteness of result (*phala-parimāṇa*). He further divides the finiteness of behaviour and finiteness of result into two categories. The finiteness of behaviour is divided into two categories according to two purposes, that is, obtaining welfare and avoiding misfortune. Or it is divided into four categories by the purposes of rightness (*dharma*) etc., that is, men who have purpose of satisfaction (*dhṛti*), good behaviour (*sad-ācāra*), love and pleasure (*kāma-sukha*) and cessation (*vinivṛtti*). Again it may be divided into five kinds, due to the nature of breath etc. The third finiteness, that is, the finiteness of result, is divided into two categories, visible and invisible (*dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa*). The finiteness of unseen result possesses two kinds of potency (*śakti*), that is, supreme power (? *prabhuśakti*) and omnipotent power (? *vibhuśakti*). In opposition to this, there are two kinds of impotency (*aśakti*). The beings with potency are god, *gandharva*, *yaksa*, *raksas*, *pitṛ* and *piśāca* (cf. SK 53). The beings with impotency are human beings, cows, deer, birds, serpents and plants. The nature of potency is the cause of body. (On the contrary the nature) of impotency is to be born by means of womb, egg, sprout and wettish heat (*samśoka*). The beings born by means of womb or egg, are generated by a mother and

ṣvaṅgôddharṣa-prīṭayaḥ kāryam, duḥkhānām śoṣatāpabhedadôpaṣṭambhōdvegâpadveṣāḥ, mūḍhānām varaṇa-sadanâpadhvaṃsana-baibhatsya-dainya-gauravāṇi etc.

^a The relevant portion of NAA 314.7–8, runs as follows: *eka-jāti-samanvayo dṛṣṭa iti candana-śakalâdi-dṛṣṭāntam vakṣyati*. In the original text of ST, an example of *candanaśakalâdivat* might have been present.

The relevant text of NAA, 314.4–6, runs again with slight differences: *vīṭasya [āvīṭasya] vā bhāvaḥ pañca-pradeśaḥ—pratijñā hetuḥ dṛṣṭānta upasamhāro nigamanam iti. tatra sādhyāvadhāraṇam pratijñā sādhana-samāsa-vacanam hetuḥ, tan-nidarśanam dṛṣṭāntaḥ, sādhyā-dṛṣṭāntayor eka-kriyôpasamhāraḥ, pratijñābhyāso nigamanam iti purastād vīṭasya prayogaṃ nyāyāṃ manyante, paścād āvīṭasyēti*.

Here, regarding the order of application (bolded part), we notice almost identical phrase in YDī 97.5–6: *tasmāt sūktam daśāvayavo vītaḥ. tasya purastāt prayogaṃ nyāyāṃ ācāryā manyante*.

²⁴ NAA 314.15: *itaś cāsti pradhānam bhedānām parimāṇāt. ādhyātmikānām kārya-kāraṇātmakānām parimāṇam dṛṣṭam*.

father. They have six receptacle (? *ṣaṭ-kośikam*). By the earth are born plants (*udbhidja*). By the heat of earth and water are born worms. (Cf. *Manu-smṛti* 1.43) This is the finiteness of invisible result. The finiteness of visible result contains four kinds. They are *śakti*, *siddhi*, *tuṣṭi*, *indriya-vadha*. Additionally, *atuṣṭi* and *asiddhi* are enumerated, which correspond to fifty topics found in ST, being referred to as ‘the creation of consciousness’ (*pratyaya-sarga*) in SK 46–50. (NAA 314. 15–318.6).

The author seems to show that all the extant beings in the world have finiteness in themselves, by which even their ethical behaviour is limited. And, by this description of the many finite beings, he seems to indicate the existence of something beyond finite beings. This argument as a whole gives impression of being rather unrefined, or old fashioned at least.

In the same way, three more *vīta* inferences continue. The reasons are the same ones as those found in SK 15. However, the interpretation of each reason is rather unique and rather unsophisticated, as it does not appear in the commentaries of SK.²⁵ Observing the function of these inferences using rather simple examples, we

²⁵ The third reason is ‘because of the cause-effect relationship’ (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvāt*). An outline of the interpretation of this reason is as follows:

The constituents of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, existing in sound etc., help each other through illumination, stimulation and obstruction. The *sattva*, as the essence of sound etc., illuminates (*khyāpayati*) the activity of other two. In the same way, *rajas* stimulates the activity of other two, and *tamas* stops the activity of other two.

In this way, the author continues to enumerate other examples, in an effort to prove that all existing beings are in a relationship of mutual help (*upakārya-upakāraṇa*), which is the paraphrase of *kārya-kāraṇa*. With this notion of the mutual relationship among all existing beings, he perhaps tries to prove one existent being that makes this mutual relationship possible. He concludes this inference with the word that things are made by one creator (*eka-kartṛkā bhedāḥ*). (NAA 318.7–319.6).

The fourth reason is ‘because potencies are nothing but the state of having potency’ (*śaktimad-avasthā-mātratvāc chaktinām*).

Potency, which can create its own effects, exists in three stages. Observing that a thing (*vyakta*) has beginning and end, one can infer that it possesses potency. This is because, if potency does not exist, it is impossible for a thing to have a beginning, like a sky-flower. The fact that a thing has a beginning means that it possesses potency. From the fact that the activity of the potency of a thing is seen, that potency, that is, primordial matter, exists. (NAA 319.7–11).

The fifth reason is ‘because of attainment of dissolution of the multi-formed’ (*vaiśvārūpyasyāvibhāga-prāpteh*). The explanation of this reason is as follows: Juice etc., which is changed form of water and earth, has manifold form, and is seen in plants. Then the changed form of plants is seen in animals. Then the changed form of animals is seen in plants. Then of plants in plants, of animals in animals. In this way, everything is seen in everything, because the barriers between the species are not fixed. However, as they are anchored by place, time, appearance and occasion, they do not take the same form at the same time. We think that the manifold form of juice is the one transformed from of water and earth. For other material elements, there are other transformation. In the same way, for other elements there are again other transformation. By ne-

can safely infer that these must have been discussed in earlier literature of the Sāṃkhya school, for example, in ST.

With regards to syllogism, the first line of all the five inferences starts with a syllogistic expression, for example: *pradhānam asti bhedānām anvaya-darśanāt*. After this statement, we see long description of an example or interpretation of reason. Finally the last three inferences end with the expression: *tasmād asti pradhānam*. It is, therefore, difficult to postulate that these inferences are formed from the five-part syllogism scheme.

2.4. By such five *vīta* reasons as (1) *samanvaya*, (2) *pramāṇa*, (3) *upakāra*, (4) *śakti-pravṛtti*, (5) *vaiśvarūpya-gati*, the existence of primordial matter is established. Next, in order to strengthen the conclusion of the five *vīta* inferences, five *āvīta* inferences are mentioned. The essence of the concept of *āvīta* is said to be in denial of the concept propounded by an opponent, by which the standpoint of a proponent is established. The opponents are those who regard cosmic man, God and atoms as the cause of the world, and those whose mind are wicked, and Buddhist. Among these opponents, Buddhists are said to be criticised first.²⁶ These reasons are called *āvīta*. The first argument, which is clearly mentioned as *āvīta*, and is taken as an example of the *āvīta* inference by Prof. FRAUWALLNER (1958: 45), is as follows:

‘If things are born from non-existence, as there is no cause (*yoni*), things come to be one and the same. As primordial matter does not exist, things of the world become equal without distinction. Why? Because we see that individual things presuppose the existence of equality. For example, such individual things as yoghurt, sour cream, curds, fresh butter, clarified butter, buttermilk, coagulated milk and insipidated milk presuppose milk. In non-existence, there exists no existential being (*bhāva*) which is presupposed to exist in any individual thing. Hence, things would come to be one and the same. But this is not the case. Therefore, a thing is not born from non-existence. The world does not originate from existence.’²⁷ As a result, this individual

cessity, there is a state of non-separation, and it is in primordial matter that this non-separation occurs, because the one that has all the shape presupposes the state of non-separation. Therefore the primordial matter exists. (NAA 320.1–8).

²⁶ NAA 321.6–7: *tasyāsya pratipakṣāḥ sarvākāntinaḥ puruṣēśvarāṇu-pravādāḥ vikāra-puruṣā vaināśikāś ca. teṣāṃ vaināśika-pratiṣedham agre vakṣyāmaḥ*. The similar opponents are enumerated in the beginning of YDī 2.2–3.

²⁷ This phrase is not understood. Prof. FRAUWALLNER (1958: 45.8) omits this sentence from his RST.

thing is born from nothing but primordial matter, which is the one remaining possibility. Therefore, primordial matter exists. This is the *āvīta* inference which corresponds to *vīta* reason of homogeneity (*anvaya*).²⁸

This *āvīta* inference first aims to deny the originality of things from non-existence. Second, it attempts to show the contradiction in the assumption of the non-existence of primordial matter. In order to highlight the contradiction they assume that primordial matter does not exist. Another characteristic is that it is connected with one of the *vīta* reasons. It can therefore be said that this *āvīta* inference attempts to show the existence of primordial matter from the reverse viewpoint of the *vīta* inference.

This *āvīta* inference does not deny or exclude the existence of any entities that might substitute for primordial matter, which are enumerated by name (such as God and so on), just before the real application of this *āvīta* inference. That is to say, this inference does not aim to exclude any other entities which might substitute for primordial matter. This is the case with a set of four *āvīta* inferences in NAA. All the four *āvīta* inferences deny that things could have originated from non-existence (*nēdaṃ vyaktam asata utpadyate*).²⁹

²⁸ NAA 321.12–18: *kiṃ cānyat. yadi^a vyaktasyāsata utpattir yony-abhāvād ekatva-prasaṅgaḥ, pradhānābhāvāt sāmānya-mātram idaṃ vyaktam nivīṣeṣam ity etat prasajyeta. kasmāt? sāmānya-pūrvakatvād viśeṣāṇām, sāmānya-pūrvakā hi loke viśeṣā dṛṣṭāḥ, tad yathā—kṣīra-pūrvakā dadhi-mastu-drapsa-nava-nīta-ghṛtāriṣṭa-kilāṭa-kūrcikābhāvāḥ. na tv asati bhāvaḥ kaścid asti yat-pūrvakā vyakti-viśeṣāḥ syuḥ. tasmāt sāmānya-mātram idaṃ vyaktam nirviśeṣam ity etat, na tv idaṃ tādṛk. tasmād nēdaṃ vyaktam asata utpadyate. na cēdaṃ sata utpadyate. pāriśeṣyāt pradhānād evēdaṃ vyaktam utpadyata^b ity etad yuktam. tasmād asti pradhānam iti. eṣo 'nvaya-vītasāvītaḥ.*

^a Prof. FRAUWALLNER (1958: 45.1) starts RST with this term *yadi*. In NAA 321.10–12, before this inference, another inference is drawn which can be regarded as an *āvīta* inference, which runs as follows: *kiṃ cānyat, yadi vyaktasyāsata utpattir bhavaty arthārhtibhis tṛṇa-pāṃśu-vālukāḥ muktā-maṇi-rajata-suvarṇāni kriyeran, kasmāt? abhāva-kriyā guru-kāryā bhāva-kriyā laghvīti. na tv evaṃ kriyate, tasmād ayuktam ity ādi yāvad uktōttaratvād asamyag-vidhiḥ.*—‘Moreover, if a thing is born from non-existence, pearls, diamonds, silver and gold are made from a grass, dust and sand by those who wish to make things. Why? Because the action of non-existent things makes a heavy matter with the help of light existent things (?). This actually does not happen. Therefore that is not right. As far as the answer is concerned, the standpoint is not right.’

Though it is not related to any *vīta* reason, from the nature of its meaning, it must be related to homogeneity (*anvaya*). This inference might be another example of the *āvīta* inference corresponding to one of the five *vīta* reasons, that it, homogeneity (*anvaya*). There is the possibility that more than five *āvīta* reasons are contrived before the number was fixed at five.

^b Here Prof. FRAUWALLNER ends RST with the word *utpadyate*.

²⁹ The following *āvīta* inferences are summarised in the follows:

The reason called *yony-abhāvāt*, which is found in the previous *āvīta* inference, is again used for the next *āvīta* inference which corresponds to *vīta* reason called *parimāṇāt*. Finiteness is in-

Each argument has a somewhat regular expression at the end to show its relation to the *vīta* reasons, which are as follows:

NAA 323.2: *eṣo 'nvaya-vītasyāvītaḥ prasaṅgo vyākhyātaḥ.*

NAA 323.4: *tatra kārya-kāraṇa-vītasya āvītas tāvat.*

NAA 323.11: *kārya-kāraṇa-vītasya āvītaḥ.*

NAA 323.12: *iti śakti-vītasya āvītaḥ.*

NAA 323.17: *vaiśvarūpyāvibhāga-gati-vītasya āvīto draṣṭavya iti.*

In NAA, each *āvīta* inference is considered to correspond to the relevant *vīta* reason. The purpose of the *āvīta* inference is to support the relevant *vīta* reason by ob-

evitably connected with the creation of the world. If primordial matter does not exist, an individual thing will exist without finiteness. Why? Because things in the world are seen to be measured by the rod, measure, hand, fathom, string and one's height (*tulā-māna-hasta-vyāma-rajjv-ātmōpacayaiḥ*) (NAA 322.3). If primordial matter does not exist, anything known by measuring will not exist. Therefore things must have come into existence without being measured. This is not the case. Therefore, a thing does not originate from non-existence, and a thing does not originate from existence. It is born from primordial matter as the only remaining possible being. Therefore, primordial matter exists.

After this inference we encounter another *āvīta* inference connected with the first *vīta* reason called *anvaya* (NAA 322.6–323.2)

Subsequently, in connection with the *vīta* reason called *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvāt*, the *āvīta* inference is mentioned. In the world, things are divided into two categories, cause and effect. If things are born from non-existence, they cannot be related to cause and effect, because they work neither simultaneously nor successively. In the world we see a thing is made, works and perishes. This is impossible without mutual dependence between cause and effect, like an axle and wheel. Therefore, it is impossible to postulate a relationship of cause and effect in things born from non-existence. But things in the world are related to cause and effect. Therefore, they are not born from non-existence. As a result, things are born from nothing but primordial matter, as the one remaining possibility. Therefore, primordial matter exists. This is the *āvīta* inference which corresponds with *vīta* reason called *kārya-kāraṇa* (NAA 323.4–11).

Next in connection with the *vīta* reason called *śakti*, the *āvīta* inference is made as follows. If a thing originates by chance without cause (*nirbijam akasmāt*), that is, from non-existence, it originates without any relationships to others. But, as a matter of fact, a thing originates when it is connected with others. Therefore, a thing does not originate from non-existence. This is the *āvīta* inference of the *vīta* reason called *śakti* (NAA 323.11–12)

As regards the last *āvīta* inference, it occupies the rest of the chapter, exploring the examination of result and its result (?) (*prasakta* and *anuprasakta*). These should be considered as the *āvīta* inference, which corresponds to the *vīta* reason called *vaiśvarūpyāvibhāva-gati* (NAA 323.12–14) Though the text is not so clear, the purpose of the rest of the chapter is to deny origination from absolute non-existence by showing that everything merges into everything else (*vikārasya vināśītvam*), but the primordial matter does not (*pradhānasya vināśītvam iti etad ayuktam*). The means for this proof seem to have been enumerated: recognition, the effect of an act, restriction of cause and result (?), *pratyabhijñānārtha-kriyā-hetu-kārya-niyamādibhiḥ ca hetubhir* (NAA 323.16).

servicing the situation from the opposite standpoint, that is, by the assumption of the non-existence of primordial matter.³⁰

3. Another commentary of SK, i.e. the *Sāmkhya-tattva-kaumudī* (STK), explains the term *vīta* and *avīta* in relation to the classification of inference (*anumāna*). The author Vācaspatimīśra classifies inference into two categories, *vīta* and *avīta*, providing a definition for both: the function of *vīta* is affirmation, and that of *avīta* is negation. He then connects this classification with the three kinds of inference. While *vīta* consists of two kinds: *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*, *avīta* is only *śeṣavat*.³¹ In any case, when he refers to *vīta* and *avīta*, the interest of Vācaspatimīśra is in the well arranged classification of inference. His interest has nothing to do with the proof of primordial matter.

4. Concerning the relationship between the *vīta* inference and a syllogistic expression, an argument in YDī raises the question whether or not ST includes the five-part syllogism. At the beginning of YDī, the elements of *tantra* are discussed to prove that YDī is entitled to be called *tantra*. The author of YDī seems to believe that all ST, SK and YDī are authoritative treatise (*tantra*). They are entitled to be

³⁰ After the final *āvīta* inference we encounter a phrase that acts as a kind of summary of the *āvīta* inference, NAA 323.17–324.6: *evam eṣāṃ pradhānāstitvākyādi-sādhanārtham vītānām tatsadbhāvasya anyathā vyaktāsambhavasya vā darśanena try-ātma-ka-yoni-hetutvam avāśyam ity etad avadhāraṇārthānām cāvītānām atathārthatvam ukta-vidhinā pratipāditam.*—‘In this way, while the *vīta* inference is used in order to prove the existence and uniqueness etc. of primordial matter, the *āvīta* inference is used to confirm that the cause is made of three constituents, that is, primordial matter. For this purpose, the *āvīta* inference will show that things never originate otherwise, and that things do not exist as they do, if the primordial matter does not exist.’

³¹ STK on SK 5: *tatra prathamam tāvad dvividham—vītam avītam ca. anvaya-mukhena pravartamānam vidhāyakam vītam. vyatireka-mukhena pravartamānam niṣedhakam avītam.* Vācaspatimīśra refers to the proofs of the non-difference of cause and effect in SK 9, calling them *avīta*. Here, all the proofs end in *nārthāntaratvam* (‘being not different from’). By means of this negative expression the proofs are regarded as *avīta*.

The view that *avīta* is the negation of an opponent is found in Uddyotakara and Dignāga, see:

NV on NS 1.1.35, vol.1, p.211: *so 'yam avītaḥ para-pakṣa-pratiśedhārtha eva bhavati. tāv etau vītāvīta-hetū lakṣaṇābhyām pṛthag-abhihitāv iti. tatra svarūpeṇārtha-paricchedakatvam vīta-dharmaḥ, avītaḥ punaḥ para-pakṣa-pratiśedhenāva pravatata iti.*

PS, Sde dge 56a1–2: *kun gyi rjes thog ma las bsal te ḥoṅs pa ḥgrub po shes pa la gshan gyi ḥdod pa so sor bkag nas rañ gi phyogs yoṅs su gzuñ baḥi bya ba ni bsal te ḥoṅs paḥo shes grag go / so sor ḥgegs paḥi thabs ni gñis te, dpe dañ ḥgal ba dañ khas blaṅs pa dañ ḥgal ba shes so /*

called *tantra*, if they are possessed of necessary elements. The *tantra* is defined as follows:

‘A philosophical work (*tantra*) is excellent if it contains: suitability of aphorisms, means of gaining knowledge and parts [of a logical syllogisms], no deficiencies [of principles], a description of doubt and decision, a brief statement and detailed explanation, the correct order [of the enumeration of principles] and appellations and [their] exposition.’³²

The author of YDī explains all the terms in the above verse, and tries to prove the three texts are *tantra*. In the explanation of ‘part’ (*avayava*), the author of YDī 4.7 defines that the part consists of two kinds: *jijñāsādayaḥ pratijñādayaś ca*. An opponent raises a question: the parts must not be mentioned, because they are not taught in the treatise, that is, SK. The author of YDī tries to justify his mention of the parts, even if the term does not appear in SK. The third reason that the author of YDī uses in support of his justification is the fact that parts are taught in other authoritative texts (*tantrāntarōkteḥ*). He explains this reason in the following way: teachers like Vindhyavāsin and so on taught the parts in their authoritative texts. These teachers are our criteria (*pramāṇa*). We can, therefore, said the author of YDī, mention the parts, even if they do not appear in SK. Here the author of YDī does not refer to ST to quote a description of the *avayava*, instead, he has recourse to other treatise written by Vindhyavāsin and so on to show that the Sāṃkhya had a tradition of logical expression. The author of YDī here does not refer to Vārṣaganya, even though he seems to have a good knowledge of him and his ST.³³ This fact suggests that ST itself did not refer to syllogism consisting of five or ten parts.

The second reason which may support this suggestion is the method of description of NAA, where a five-part syllogism is certainly included, but in a compact and well-ordered form. On the other hand, the real application of the *vīta* inference does not match the syllogistic expression. Taking long and undeveloped descriptions found throughout the whole section of the *vīta* inference, there seems to be a wide gulf between the description of the five-part syllogism and that of the five *vīta* inference. This contrasted description gives the impression that they were not written by the same person. This impression is strengthened by the fact that we encounter two different kinds of the *āvīta* inference in NAA. One postulates origination from non-existence and non-existence of primordial matter. The other is said to exclude pos-

³² YDī 3.10–11:

*sūtra-pramāṇāvayavōpapattir anyūnatā samśaya-nirṇayōktiḥ /
uddeśa-nirdeśam anukramaś ca samjñōpadeśāv iti tantra-sampat //*

³³ Cf. OBERHAMMER (1961).

sible entities other than primordial matter, but without any real application. Thus it seems that the description found in NAA is not based on a single source, and that the portion of the syllogism and the real application of the *vīta* inference do not originate from the same source. It is therefore possible that this portion of the syllogism should be ascribed not to ST, but to Vindhyavāsin.³⁴ This again leads to a possibility that the syllogism is employed first in Sāmkhya by Vindhyavāsin.³⁵

5. As seen above, there are several different meanings or usages in the *vīta* and *avīta*. Here I would like to explain the different usages of the same expression in terms of a historical change. Based on a description of NAA and YDī, both of which contain real applications of the *vīta-avīta* inference, I shall conclude this paper with the following hypothesis.

The Sāmkhya made a great effort to prove the existence of primordial matter, which is a unique concept of the school. They contrived various reasons in an effort to prove its existence. Finally, five reasons were contrived. They are considered to be a group sharing the same function, called *vīta*. To strengthen their position, the Sāmkhya thinkers tried to highlight the contradiction in the assumption of non-existence of primordial matter. They tried to show that each *vīta* reason does not hold true if primordial matter does not exist. In accordance with the number of *vīta* reasons, this kind of inference is also five or more in number. As they are considered to

³⁴ Prof. FRAUWALLNER (1958: 34.3–5) (= *Kleine Schriften*: 254.3–5) takes a portion referred to by Jinendrabuddhi to be a part of the commentary on ST written by Vindhyavāsin.

³⁵ When we think of influence of Vindhyavāsin, we should perhaps be reminded of the fact that the concept of *viśeṣato-dṛṣṭa anumāna*, which Prof. FRAUWALLNER ascribes to ST, is referred to in the *Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārttika* 5.4 (*Anumāna-pariccheda*) 143 and ascribed to Vindhyavāsin; see MŚV 5.4 (*Anumāna-pariccheda*) 142–143 (p. 86):

tad-deśāsthena tenāiva gatvā kālāntare 'pi tam /
yadāgnir budhyate tasya parva-bodhāt punaḥ punaḥ // 142 //
sandhyamāna-sadbhāva-vastu-bodhāt pramānatā /
viśeṣa-dṛṣṭam etac ca likhitaṁ vindhyavāsinā // 143 //

Translation of the two verses by Ganganatha JHA (1900–1908: 202):

‘On account of his former cognition (of the concomitance of “Fire” and “Smoke”) such a person suspects the existence of “fire” whenever he sees any “smoke”, and finds (on inspection) that in every case, (his suspicion is justified and) “fire” does exist.

The frequent repetition (of such suspicion and its subsequent verification) gives rise to a definite general premise (that “the existence of smoke is always accompanied by the existence of fire”). It is the cognition of such particular relations that has been laid down by Vindhyavāsin.’

These verses, with slightly differences, are again cited in the TSa 1445–1446 (p. 422).

have the same function as the case of *vīta*, they are called *avīta* or *āvīta* as a group. By the application of both *vīta* and *avīta*, the existence of primordial matter was considered to have been completely proved. This is possibly the original concepts of *vīta* and *avīta*.

Being treated as a pair, a set of *vīta* and *āvīta* is considered to be the typical method of reasoning employed by the Sāṃkhya school. However, over time there occurred some changes in the meaning of both terms. An inference based on these five *vīta* reasons also called *vīta*. There is no substantial difference between the *vīta* reasons and the *vīta* inference. With this change, the *vīta* inference is criticised by opponents in relation to syllogistic expressions. But it is not certain that the Sāṃkhya had an interest in syllogism in earlier periods. Even if they had, it seems that the syllogism consisted at most of three parts, not of five parts as found in Vindhyavāsin. Regarding the concept of *avīta*, there occurred a change in its meaning, perhaps during the course of discussions with other schools. It came to mean the exclusion of other possible entities of other schools which might have the same function as primordial matter. As a result an original nature of *avīta* came to be emphasised, that is, *pariśeṣa*, which became a characteristic of the *avīta* inference. With this change *avīta* lost the relationship with five *vīta* reasons.

Both concepts finally came to be regarded as the two ways of reasoning that the Sāṃkhya generally used, distinct from the proof of the existence of primordial matter. At this stage, *vīta* is regarded as positive reasoning, and *avīta* is regarded as negative reasoning through exclusion.

The most important thing for the Sāṃkhya is to prove the existence of primordial matter. It is necessary for them to contrive methods of reason in order to attain this purpose. The concepts of *vīta* and *avīta* are a result of this effort. This is the only thing that concerned the Sāṃkhya, with some exceptions like Vindhyavāsin. As a whole they seemed little interested in the logic itself and they did not make further efforts to elaborate on the terms of inferential logic.

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Valid Knowledge and Belief in Classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga*

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This paper is composed of three parts, starting with a brief description of the textual basis of Sāṃkhya-Yoga. The second part is concerned with the concept of three kinds of valid knowledge as defined in the *Pātañjala-yoga-sāstra* (PYŚ); it discusses the relationship between the definitions of valid knowledge in the *pramāṇa*-section of PYŚ 1.7 and notions of valid knowledge apparent in various other passages of the text. This relation is shown to be a complex one, since the views on valid knowledge applied in the body of the text more than once differ considerably from those one would expect against the backdrop of the *pramāṇa*-section. This result leads to the conclusion that the theories of valid knowledge as expounded in the *pramāṇa*-section are probably innovations to the classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga. The third and final part of this paper deals with the role of the *pramāṇa*-section in the PYŚ. I argue that this passage does not, in the first place, aim at a philosophical clarification. Patañjali upholds his special *pramāṇa*-theories in order to create acceptance for—or belief in—the soteriological efficiency of Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

As is well known, very few primary texts of classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga have survived. Almost all we have is the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali together with its oldest commentary, the so-called *Yoga-bhāṣya*. According to manuscript colophons and secondary evidence, both texts taken collectively bear the common title *Pātañjala-yoga-sāstra*. In the introduction to my critical edition of its first chapter, I have argued—in accordance with BRONKHORST (1985: 191–203), but for different reasons—that probably one single author named Patañjali collected the *sūtras* from different sources and furnished them with explanations which in later times came to be known as the *Yoga-bhāṣya*. The date of the work is still uncertain, but a time span reaching from 325 to 425 CE seems to be most likely.¹

* Many thanks to Susanne Kamüller for having a close look at my English.

¹ MAAS (2006: xii–xix).

For an appropriate understanding of difficult passages in the PYŚ—the number of which could be reduced by critically editing the first chapter, but which are still by no means rare—we can draw upon three sub-commentaries of different value. The most important, i.e. the one being the most faithful to classical Sāṅkhya-Yoga thought, is without doubt the *Pātañjala-yoga-sāstra-vivaraṇa* (YVi). The question of whether or not it is to be attributed to the famous Advaita-Vedāntin Śaṅkara is still open,² and I cannot enter into this discussion here. For my present purpose it may be sufficient to recall that the YVi’s basic text, i.e. the version of PYŚ commented upon by the author of YVi, definitely goes back to quite an early stage of the transmission. The YVi’s basic text not infrequently transmits correct readings which are lost in all manuscripts of the PYŚ available to me.³ As the YVi does not cite any source younger than Kumārila,⁴ accumulative evidence hints to a proximity of the YVi to its basic text not only with regard to its content, but also with regard to its time of composition. An exact dating is difficult to establish, but I can see no reason why the YVi should not go back to the late 7th or early 8th century CE. This, of course, does not mean that we may follow blindly Śaṅkara’s interpretations, for the considerable gap of time between the composition of the PYŚ and its oldest surviving commentary will surely have had an impact on the development of philosophical ideas.

Due to limitations of space and time, this paper is mainly based upon Śaṅkara’s interpretations, but Vācaspatimiśra’s *Tattva-vaiśārādī* (TVś) has been consulted throughout. I did not, however, use the explanations provided by the *Yoga-vārttika* of Vijñānabhikṣu, which, in any case, is not a work of classical Sāṅkhya-Yoga.

PYŚ 1.7, the *pramāṇa*-section, contains a series of definitions of three kinds of valid knowledge. It starts with perception (*pratyakṣa*):

‘Perception as valid knowledge is a mental process (*vyrtti*) which—because the *citta* is coloured (or: affected) by an outer entity by means of the sense-capacities as channels—has this [entity] as its object (*tad-viṣayā*). [Its] main task is to determine particularities of a sense object which consists of generic properties as well as of individual properties. The result is a uniform (*aviśiṣṭa*) awareness of the mental process (*citta-vyrtti*) belonging to the self. I shall explain later [how] the self experiences its mental organ (*buddhi*).’⁵

² Cf. HALBFASS (1991: 223 f.).

³ Cf. MAAS (2006: lxix).

⁴ HALBFASS (1983: 120).

⁵ PYŚ 1.7.2 f.: *indriya-praṇāḍīkayā cittasya bāhya-vastūparāgāt tad-viṣayā sāmānya-viśeṣātmano ’rthasya viśeṣāvdhāraṇa-pradhānā vyrttiḥ pratyakṣam pramāṇam. phalam aviśiṣṭaḥ pauruṣeyaś citta-vyrtti-bodhaḥ. “pratisamvedī buddheḥ puruṣaḥ”, ity upariṣṭād darśayiṣyāmaḥ.*

This definition states that an entity of the outer world (*bahya-vastu*) creates a content of consciousness. The *citta* is related to the outside world by means of the well-known set of sense capacities, i.e. hearing, feeling, smelling, tasting and seeing. These sense capacities provide the *citta* with a representation of the outer entity, the sense object (*artha*).

Patañjali is not very specific as to the kind of involvement of the self. He merely hints at it by using the *vṛddhi*-derivative *pauruṣeya* ‘belonging to the self’ and postpones a more thorough explanation to a later portion of the PYŚ. The passage referred to, i.e. PYŚ 2.20, is not concerned with perception as valid knowledge, but with the generation of mental events in general.⁶

The author of YVi, further illustrates this point by stating that the perception of a blue colour includes the perception of two kinds of properties: the individual property (*viśeṣa*) of being blue, and the generic property (*sāmānya*) of being a colour. Although both kinds of properties are subject to perception, the perception of the generic property, viz. ‘colourness’ is subordinate to the perception of the individual property, viz. blueness.⁷

The determination of generic properties in direct perception therefore accounts for the recognition of class membership and for the application of a linguistic term to the perceived entity. The determination of *viśeṣa*, on the other hand, provides information on an entity as being individual. Śāṅkara’s example clearly shows that *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are relative notions, and not—like in Praśastapāda’s Vaiśeṣika—‘real factor[s] in the real world’⁸, which, of course, would have no place in Sāṅkhya-Yoga metaphysics.⁹ On the whole, the information provided by the PYŚ is too scarce to allow a more thorough examination of these concepts, and, moreover, their discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.

Having in view the metaphysical and soteriological dimension of Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the absence of any discernible reference to specifically yogic perceptions within the definition of perception is surprising.

The author of YVi allows an opponent to formulate objections against the exclusion of yogic perception and introspection from the definition of perception:

[Objection:] The vision (*darśana*) of *yogins*, which is generated in meditative concentration being free from conceptual thinking (*vikalpa*),

⁶ YS 2.20, p. 87.6 f., defines the role of the self in cognition: *draṣṭā dṛṣi-mātraḥ śuddho ’pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ*.

⁷ YVi 177.2–4: *na sāmānyam nāvadhāryate, guṇa-bhūtam tu gṛhyata eva. yathā nīlam rūpam iti nīlāvadhāraṇa-prādhānye saty api rūpam eva nīlam iti guṇa-bhūtam avadhārayati ...*

⁸ HALBFASS (1992: 117).

⁹ Cf. YVi 177.9–11: *sarvam eva hi vastu vastv-antarāpekṣayā sāmānyam viśeṣaś ca*.

because it does not conform to this definition, as well as the knowledge of joy, passion etc., which does not require the sense capacities as channels etc., should either be acknowledged as different means of knowledge, or [the definition of *pratyakṣa*] should have stated that they too are means of knowledge.

[Answer:] [This is] not [true], because [this objection has already been] ruled out by [the definition itself, which states that perception] is dependent on the self's cognition. It is well known (*hi*), that perception is not a mental process without cognition. [The mental process] having cognition obtains its [status of] being perception only because of the appearance of [pure] consciousness (i.e. the self). ... The use of [the expression] "the sense capacities as channels" is only [meant to be] a clarifying explanation (*anuvāda*) for the coming into being of ordinary perception, because otherwise the knowledge possessed by *yogins* and by the supreme lord, which is independent from sense capacities, would not be perceptions. But simultaneous grasping of fine, remote, and other [objects that are imperceptible to ordinary perception] exists by means of the mind-*sattva* which has everything as its object and refers to everything, when it is not restricted by taints, [*karman*, its fruition] and [latent deposits].¹⁰

These objections deal with two kinds of mental events which allegedly are not included in the definition of *pratyakṣa*, as both are independent from sense capacities. These are, on the one hand, yogic perceptions, and on the other hand introspections. If one would deny both kinds of mental events to be valid knowledge at all, the consequences would be severe. The refutation of yogic perceptions would render Sāṃkhya-Yoga meaningless.¹¹ Moreover, the rejection of introspection as valid knowledge would be tantamount to the rejection of the foundations of everyday life.

Although the YVi's dismissal of these objections all in all is not convincing, it seems—at least in part—to be in line with classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga. We can leave its relegation of the definition's opening section to the status of a mere explanation (*anuvāda*) out of consideration. It is not convincing, simply because it is very un-

¹⁰ YVi 178.7–179.1: *nanu ca, yoginām nirvikalpa-samādhi-jam darśanam, tasyānevam-lakṣaṇatvāt, tathā sukha-rāgādi-vijñānasya cānindriya-praṇāḍikā-pūrvatvāt, pramāṇāntaratvam abhyupetavyam, pratyakṣatvam vā vaktavyam, ucyate—na, pramāṇasya puruṣa-pratyayāpekṣatvena parihṛtatvāt. na hy apratyayā vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam, caitanyōdaya-hetor eva sapratyayāyāḥ pratyakṣatvam. ... indriya-praṇāḍikāgrahaṇam laukika-pratyakṣōdbhāvanānūvāda eva; anyathā hīndriya-nirapekṣasya yogīśvarayor jñānasyāpratyakṣatā syāt. asti hi kleśādi-pratibandhābhāve sarvārthena citta-sattvena sarva-viṣayeṇa yugapat-sūkṣma-vyavahitādi-grahaṇam.*

¹¹ Cf. below, p. 391.

likely that the author of the PYŚ would have expressed himself so misleadingly. If his intention had been to solely provide a definition of worldly perception, which excludes yogic and other forms, he would have had to particularly mention a distinction.

The second argument, on the other hand, deserves more attention. The acceptance of all kinds of mental events providing consciousness of individual properties as valid knowledge is in line with the final part of the definition, which refers to the discussion of the relationship of *puruṣa* and *citta* in PYŚ 2.20 and similar passages. As stated above, the passage is not primarily concerned with the perception of entities in the outside world. On the whole, the involvement of sense capacities and the distinction between external and internal entities is not even mentioned.

The final argument, which seems to aim at the conceptual unity of the PYŚ, is obviously circular. It proves the agreement of the definition with other parts of the PYŚ only on condition that this agreement is already taken for granted. There are, indeed, a number of passages which evidently accept yogic states of consciousness as *pratyakṣa*. For example, with regard to ‘the attainment without conceptual thinking’ (*nirvikalpa-samāpatti*) we read: ‘This is the highest perception’ (PYŚ 1.42.9: *tat param pratyakṣam*). According to the perspective of the author of YVi on the PYŚ as a unified whole, this and similar passages prove the inclusion of yogic perception into the above definition. From a more critical point of view, of course, we cannot but notice that the endeavours of the commentator to establish harmony is ultimately futile. The definition of perception seems to be alien at least to the more *yoga*-specific parts of Sāmkhya-Yoga epistemology.

In turning to inference (*anumāna*), we do not need to concern ourselves with the details of its definition, which according to TfpSI (Vol. 1: 47, col. 2, s.v. *anumāna*) point to a ‘peculiar development of the teaching of *anumāna*’ in the history of Indian philosophy. For the present purpose it is sufficient to notice a parallel to the definition of direct perception. PYŚ 1.7,7 runs: ‘... inference is a mental process which mainly determines universals ...’ (... *sāmānyāvadhāraṇa-pradhānā vṛttir anumānam* ...). In spite of the obvious fact that °*pradhāna* at the end of the compound, here as well as in the definition of *pratyakṣa*, means ‘being chiefly concerned with’, the commentator as well as later passages in the PYŚ support a different interpretation. They regard inference as being restricted exclusively to the determination of generic properties, leaving no room at all for the capacity to determine individual properties. The following two passages sufficiently illustrate this point. PYŚ 1.25.6 f. reads: ‘Inference exhausts itself by only drawing together generic properties. It is not able to determine individual properties’ (*sāmānyamātrōpasamhāre kṛtōpakṣayam anumānam na viśeṣa-pratipattau samartham*). A similar statement is met with in PYŚ 1.49.4: *tathānumānam sāmānya-viṣayam eva*.

The author of the *pramāṇā*-passage—although we do not know any details—must have held a different position. If in his opinion *anumāna* had no capacity at all to determine individual properties, he would not, again, have expressed himself so misleadingly.

Similar to the treatment of direct perception, the commentaries, also with regard to verbal testimony or authoritative teaching (*āgama*), give interpretations which go far beyond the wording of the definition, but which are, nevertheless, in harmony with later passages of the PYŚ. The definition of *āgama* runs:

‘A trustworthy person (*āpta*), communicates an object, which he himself has perceived (literally: seen) [or] inferred, in order to transfer his own awareness to another person by means of a verbal expression (*śabda*). The mental process of the listener, which because of [the] words [uttered] refers to this object, is verbal testimony (or: authoritative tradition). Verbal testimony (or: authoritative tradition) is unreliable, if [it is given by] a speaker whose objects of speech are unbelievable, [and/or who] has not perceived or inferred the objects of his speech [himself]; but if he is an original speaker who [himself] has seen or inferred the object, there is no unreliability.’¹²

This passage quite clearly refers to the transmission of information from one human being to another. The inclusion of verbal testimony into the set of means of knowledge must presumably be seen against the backdrop of verbal communication of *yoga* teachers to their pupils. The instructions, advice and descriptions of mental contents to be encountered in meditation would have been taken as supplementary and subsidiary valid knowledge. The interpretations provided by Śaṅkara and Vācaspati are much more comprehensive. Both take *āgama* not as ‘valid verbal testimony’ but as ‘authoritative tradition’. Therefore they interpret the word *mūla-vaktṛ* (‘original speaker’) as designating the supreme lord, Īśvara.¹³ The interpretation of *āgama* as ‘authoritative tradition’ seems to be an attempt to bring the definition into harmony with the bulk of the PYŚ, as it is exactly this meaning of *āgama*—and its synonym *śruta*—which is used throughout the PYŚ. Moreover, even the interpretation of *mūla-vaktṛ* to mean ‘Īśvara’ is not as far fetched as it might seem on first sight. In PYŚ 1.25 we find a citation from the Sāṅkhya teacher Pañcaśikha,¹⁴ which desig-

¹² PYŚ 1.7,9–12: *āptena dr̥ṣṭo ’numīto ’rthaḥ paratra sva-bodha-samkrāntaye śabdenōpadiśyate. śabdāt tad-artha-viśayaḥ vṛttiḥ śrotur āgamaḥ. yasyāśraddheyārtho vaktā na dr̥ṣṭānumitārthaḥ, sa āgamo viplavate. mūla-vaktari tu dr̥ṣṭānumitārthe nirviplavaḥ syāt.*

¹³ Cf. TVś ad PYŚ 1.7 (= YS, p. 12.20 f.): *mūla-vaktā tatrēśvaro dr̥ṣṭānumitārtha ity arthaḥ,* and YVi 195.9: *mūla-vaktari tv ādi-vaktarīśvare.*

¹⁴ According to TVś ad PYŚ 1.25 (= YS, p. 31.16).

nates Īśvara is as the ‘first knower’ who, as the founder of the Sāmkhya lineage of teachers and pupils, expounds the teaching of Sāmkhya-Yoga to Āsuri.

‘The first knower, having taken possession¹⁵ of a mental capacity of magical transformation (*nirmāṇa-citta*)¹⁶, out of compassion, [being] the venerable, most excellent seer [Kapila], taught [the teaching of Sāmkhya-Yoga] to Āsuri, who was desirous to know.’¹⁷

Although the interpretation of *mūla-vakty* as Īśvara is in line with the thought of Sāmkhya-Yoga, it clearly goes beyond the wording of the *pramāṇa*-passage. Moreover, it even seems to contradict this passage, which states that ‘the original speaker has perceived [and/or] inferred himself’. It is hard to imagine how and why the Īśvara, being capable of a direct perception of everything by means of his perfect (*utkṛṣṭa*) *citta*, should acquire knowledge by means of inference. Therefore the definition cannot have been composed with the conveyance of knowledge from the Īśvara to a human being in mind. It refers exclusively to interpersonal communication. If this is true, we are obliged to diagnose a tension between the definition of *āgama* and the concept of authoritative teaching as it is accepted in different passages of the PYŚ.

Within the first chapter of the PYŚ we find, moreover, two statements dealing with the aptitude of authoritative tradition to determine truth which clearly contradict each other. PYŚ 1.25 denies the capacity of inference to provide knowledge of individual properties and ascribes this capacity to authoritative tradition:

‘... Inference is not able to [provide] knowledge of particularities, therefore knowledge of particularities—as for example [the Īśvara’s] omniscience—have to be gained from authoritative tradition.’¹⁸

In PYŚ 1.49, on the other hand, the capacity of *āgama* to provide knowledge of particularities is boldly denied.

‘...knowledge [derived from] authoritative tradition ... has generic properties as its objects, since authoritative tradition cannot convey an individual property.’¹⁹

¹⁵ For the meaning of *adhiṣṭhāya* cf. BHSD: 12, col. 2, s.v. *adhiṣṭhati*.

¹⁶ Cf. BHSD: 302, col. 1, s.v. *nirmāṇa*.

¹⁷ PYŚ 1.25.9–11: *ādi-vidvān nirmāṇa-cittam adhiṣṭhāya kārūṇyād bhagavān parama ṛṣir āsuraye jñāsamānāya provāca*.

¹⁸ PYŚ 25.6 f.: ... *anumānam na viśeṣa-pratipattau samartham iti tasya sarva-jñatvādi-viśeṣa-pratipattir āgamataḥ paryeṣyā*.

¹⁹ PYŚ 49.2 f.: ... *āgama-jñānam ... sāmānya-viṣayam. na hy āgamena śakyo viśeṣo ’bhidhātum*.

These statements could only be reconciled if they would either deal with two different kinds of authoritative tradition or with different kinds of individual properties, but I have not been able to find a hint to such a distinction.

These observations show that the *pramāṇa*-section does not form a unified whole with the remaining part of PYŚ. We find unexplained and inexplicable extensions and limitations of their definitions. With regard to *āgama* we do not only have to ascertain an extension of the definition of verbal testimony to authoritative tradition. We even meet with contradicting statements regarding its aptitude to provide valid knowledge.

If one was asked to account for these findings, historical explanations and the compilatory nature of the text would, of course, be the first things to come to one's mind. The final part of this paper elaborates this explanation.

The PYŚ was compiled at a time when the teaching of the *pramāṇas* had become a fixed part of philosophical treatises. The importance of *pramāṇa*-theories for the various systems of philosophical thought cannot even be touched upon here, but we may just briefly recall that it is not a mere coincidence that 'pramāṇa' is the first word in Gautama Akṣapāda's *Nyāya-sūtra*, which is supposedly older than the PYŚ.²⁰

Although theories of valid knowledge in pre-classical Yoga may not have played a very prominent part, Patañjali includes a *pramāṇa*-theory into his *Yoga-śāstra*. His motives presumably were not exclusively of a philosophical, but also of a strategic nature. He did not only aim at the clarification of the concept of valid knowledge, but was probably at least as much concerned about the acceptance of the soteriological potential of Sāṃkhya-Yoga. Therefore Patañjali not only places the *pramāṇa*-theory at the beginning of his work, but also puts perception at the head of the *pramāṇas*.²¹

On the other hand, Patañjali in his own terms has good reasons for deviating from the outline of direct perception in the bulk of the text. The definition of *yoga* in YS 1.2 calls for the 'shut down of all kinds of mental processes' (*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*), which, of course, includes the shut down of valid knowledge.

With the exception of the *pramāṇa*-section, Patañjali is conspicuously silent about the concepts of inference and verbal testimony. He almost exclusively refers to them when stressing their dependence upon—and inferiority to—perception.²² But the concept of perception in the *pramāṇa*-section is not identical with the concept of perception in the rest of the text. While the former is concerned with a theory of ordinary knowledge dealing with outside objects which cause the content of con-

²⁰ NS 1.1.1, p. 28.2.

²¹ In contrast to the PYŚ's emphasis on perception, the older *Śaṣṭi-tantra* holds inference to be the most important means of knowledge. Cf. TřphSI, Vol. 3: 69, col. 1, s.v. *pramāṇa*, which cites FRAUWALLNER's (1958: 265) reconstruction of the *Śaṣṭi-tantra*.

²² Cf. PYŚ 1.42.9: *ta[t pratyakṣam s]rutānumānāyor bījam. tataḥ śrutānumāne prabhavataḥ.*

sciousness, the latter deals with supernatural knowledge and cognitions in meditation. The acceptance of these cognitions as valid knowledge is of fundamental importance for Sāmkhya-Yoga. If ‘knowledge of the difference’ (*viveka-khyāti*) between the self (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*) was denied the status of valid knowledge, Sāmkhya-Yoga would lose its soteriological potential. Therefore, one aim of the theory of valid knowledge apparently is to foster the belief into the teachings of authoritative tradition; a belief that leads to the support of followers as well as to acceptance with practitioners. With an initial belief once secured, the teachings of tradition and advice of the teacher lead the practitioner to *yoga*-specific cognitions in meditation. These cognitions, if seen as valid knowledge, cause a deepening of the belief in tradition.²³ From this perspective, valid knowledge and belief in classical Sāmkhya-Yoga both embrace the cause of spiritual progress.


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²³ For the interdependence of specifically yogic preceptions and spiritual progress see PYŚ 35,6–10: *yady api sāstrānumānācāryōpadeśair avagatam artha-tattvaṃ tathā-bhūtam eva bhavati, teṣāṃ yathā-bhūtārtha-pratipādana-sāmarthyāt, tathāpi yāvad eka-deśo 'pi kaścit sva-karaṇa-saṃvedyo na bhavati, tāvat sarvaṃ paroḅsam iva, āpavargāt sūkṣmeṣv artheṣu na dṛḍhāṃ buddhim utpādayati. tasmāc chāstrānumānācāryōpadeśōpodbalanārtham avaśyaṃ kaścīd viśeṣaḥ pratyakṣī-kartavyaḥ. tatra tad-upadiṣṭārthāka-deśa-pratyakṣatve satī, sarvaṃ sūkṣma-viśayam apy āpavargāc chraddhīyate.*—‘Even if [a *yogin*] understands by means of authoritative tradition, inference, and the instruction of the teacher, that an object in reality is of such qualities as these [means of knowledge] are able to provide knowledge of the object as it really is, everything seems [still] to be beyond the range of cognition and does not bring forth a firm understanding of subtle objects up to liberation, as long as [the *yogin*] is not able to perceive [at least] in part (*eka-deśa*) something with his own sense capacities. Therefore, in order to strengthen authoritative tradition, inference, and the instruction of the teacher, something particular has to be brought to perception. If one of these (*tatra*) [objects], which has been taught by [authoritative tradition, inference, and the instruction of the teacher], becomes direct perceptible [at least] in part, [the *yogin*] believes the whole [teaching of Sāmkhya-Yoga] even with reference to subtle objects, up to liberation.’

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- TVŚ = Vācapatiśra: *Tattva-vaiśaradī*. See YS.
- YS = Patañjali: *Pātañjala-yoga-sūtra. Pātañjalayogasūtrāṇi. Vācaspati-miśra-viracita-ṭikā-sameta-Śrī-Vyāsa-bhāṣya-sametāni. Āśramasya paṇḍitaiḥ saṁśodhitam...* 4. edition, Ānanda Āśrama Sanskrit Series 47, Puṇyapattana (= Pune) 1978 [first edition: 1904]. Cf. PYŚ.
- YVi = Śaṅkara (?): *Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra-vivaraṇa*. Kengo Harimoto (ed.): *A Critical Edition of the Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra-vivaraṇa. First Part. Samādhipāda with an Introduction*. A Dissertation in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 1999 (unpublished).

Language, Grammar and Belief



Grammarians' Leaving Logic at the Door*

ASHOK AKLUJKAR

— 1 —

1.1. It would not be illogical to think of the Bharṭṛhari-authored passage, *Trikāṇḍī* (later commonly but inexactly referred to as *Vākyapadīya*) 1.30–42, that I am about to discuss, as a piece written, with unbelievable foresight, to serve as the basis for a discussion focusing on logic and belief. The confrontation between willingness to be satisfied with received wisdom, knowledge or information and the insistence on asking for proof, reasoning or critical inquiry that is recurrently witnessed in life has found an explicit and extended expression in this passage. Further, parts of it, particularly verses 34 and 42, namely,

yatnenānumito 'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātyrbhiḥ /
abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathānvôpapādyate //

and

hasta-sparśād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā /
anumāna-pradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ //

(translated under (d) and (f) in the appendix below, p. 405 ff.)

belong to the body of verses that later Indian philosophers quote again and again when they respond to questions such as: What are the relative strengths of the com-

* My thanks to George and Jody Cardona for their observations on the first version.

In the following, I will use 'logic' in its loose, colloquial sense, not as a technical term standing for a specific branch or mode of philosophising. Reflecting the reality of my sources and of the ordinary English usage, I will let 'logic' stand for any activity of the human mind in which inferring, deducing, guessing, speculating, theorising, reasoning, arguing etc. of any kind is involved—for what we sometimes express with 'thinking rationally, reasoning, non-faithbased argument.' Moving from a piece of knowledge (whatever is believed to be true at a given time) to another piece of knowledge on the assumption that the two pieces are related to each other through a cause-and-effect relationship would suffice for me as a definition of 'logic' in the present context.

monly accepted *pramāṇas*? Is a *pratyakṣa*, thought to generate a piece of knowledge directly or to provide empirical confirmation, always more reliable than an *anumāna*, which brings knowledge of the world to us in a roundabout way? Do the *pramāṇas* always operate in dependence on each other, or, to ask the same question differently, should we think of the *pramāṇas* as capable of being related to validity in isolation from each other (see AKLUJKAR (1988))?

1.2. In TK 1.30–42, Bhartṛhari's argument consists of the following six steps (see the correspondingly marked points in the appendix (p. 405 ff.) toward the end for supporting textual evidence):

- (a1) For matters or objects falling beyond perception and inference one needs *āgama* 'received knowledge'.
- (a2) An *āgama* in this context starts with persons having extraordinary cognitive capabilities or experiences.¹
- (a3) If one wishes to explain logically why these persons had the capabilities or experiences they are said to have had, one must assume that there was something different from the ordinary in their backgrounds—i.e. one must admit that the roots of the extraordinary capabilities or experiences must be non-ordinary.
- (a4) This non-ordinary cannot be something utterly undefined or unprecedented, for, then, in putting it forward, one will not really be giving the expected precise cause-and-effect statement; one will, in effect, be saying that anything can result from anything whatsoever. This means that, in a proper explanation, the background in the form of the extraordinary roots or causes must be in accordance with some *āgama*, prescribing a method for certain cognitive cultivation.
- (b) So far in human history, reasoning has failed to impede what people do in the case of religio-spiritual merit, the other world etc. Empirical evidence would not support any assertion of overpowering or displacing role to rationality or logic.
- (c) Inference is a shaky business. Predictions fail to come true as the situational elements change.
- (d) If one logician establishes a thesis carefully through inference, another logician accounts for it in a very different way. There is no uniqueness about the manner of logical establishment (and therefore there is no constancy of philosophical presuppositions or implications).
- (e) Jewellers, musicians etc., through practice, come to possess cognitive abilities, the nature of which they cannot explain to others, no matter how hard

¹ Note the expressions *ṛṣi*, *śiṣṭa*, *āvira-bhūta-prakāśa* and *anupapluta-cetas* occurring in the passages cited in the Appendix.

they think about the situation. The abilities make their cognition content, which has a directness or vividness, indistinguishable from the content of perceptions. Further, the directness or vividness is such that neither they nor those who believe in their abilities would allow inference to override what they say.

- (f) Life being what the points made in (a)–(e) indicate it to be, relatively little business of the world is run or can be run by relying solely on one's inferential ability.

1.3. As in the case of many prophetic, programmatic or repeatedly useful passages, TK 1.30–42 analysed above has a rather specific and relatively narrow context, namely to argue that the Vaiyākaraṇas or grammarians should not be faulted for teaching what expressions one should use, by resting their preference on the *Veda* and the *smṛtis* receiving corroboration in the conduct of the spiritual elite.

Beginning with Kātyāyana (not later than the third century BCE), the second authoritative figure in the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition, we have evidence to the effect that the Pāṇinīyas connected grammatical usage (*sādhu-śabdās*) with religio-spiritual merit (*dharma*). They considered alternative modes of this connection—whether knowing such *śabdās* was sufficient or one must also employ them—and concluded that employment backed by knowledge of the rules of grammar (*sāstra-pūrvaka prayoga*) was required.

The question of whether merit was acquired or simply revealed also engaged their minds. To judge by what Bhartṛhari tells us, they voted in favour of the latter alternative.

The accessed merit could lead to worldly elevation (*abhyudaya*) or serve to cleanse the mind as a preliminary to *brahma-prāpti* or *mokṣa* 'spirit liberation, liberation of the worldly self or personality'.²

— 2 —

2.1. The Pāṇinian statement, given above in a summary form, is a mission statement. Like the university administrators of our time, almost every Indian system of knowledge issued a mission statement, initially as a list of *prayojanas* and later as a part of what came to be known as *anubandha-catuṣṭaya*. However, the Pāṇinīyas, in making a case for the branch of knowledge they were pursuing, appear to have gone

² I have dealt with the issues of understanding the grammarians' concepts of *dharma*, *abhivyakti* ('revelation, manifestation'), *abhyudaya* and *brahma-prāpti/mokṣa* in AKLUJKAR (2004). References to earlier discussions of the issues can be found in the same article.

too far to most modern minds. To connect grammar with worldly elevation seems reasonable enough. Those who speak or write a grammatical form of a language—those who place themselves close to the standard, respectable dialect—do seem to have access to better economic opportunities in most settled or organised societies. But in claiming as much as ‘our branch of study can enlighten you about brahman’, implying ‘we can land you on brahman’, the grammarians appear to have overstated their usefulness. Many witnesses to their claim begin to view them as slavishly imitating systems like the Vedānta or as incapable of shaking off a traditionally received assertion—as sacrificing reasonableness on the altar of belief. Even a grammarian like Bhaṭṭoji-dīkṣita feels compelled to offer the clarification that Bhartṛhari’s elucidation of Brahman is incidental and resembles the gifting of the wish-fulfilling jewel (*Cintā-maṇi*) to a cowrie-seeking reader (cf. ŚK, p. 12).

2.2. However, Bhartṛhari, as the grammarian-philosopher giving us the earliest available and sufficiently detailed statement on the issue, seems to be aware of the possible negative reaction or criticism. In fact, he knew of thinkers who differed radically from him. In the *Vṛtti* on TK 1.182, he refers to anitya-vādins who were quite satisfied in reading a social etiquette, a convention, in the ‘*sādhu* : *asādhu*’ distinction. They did not see any reason for saddling the grammatical or *sādhu* expressions with the additional responsibility of leading to *dharma*. For these thinkers, our approbation of some speech forms and our denigration of some other speech forms were not different from the expectations made of wrestlers etc., namely that the wrestlers should behave only in a certain way when training or competing, should not hold the opponent with this or that part of his body and observe an honour code. All language was natural and, therefore, not blameworthy in itself. It was a human act that some realisations of language were given a position of honour and some not.³

2.3. Bhartṛhari did not have to pulverise this view with blows of counter-arguments. There was no great or absolute loss even if it was followed by the society. It contained an easily verifiable reality.⁴ While thus choosing not to lose his credibility by going for a knockout punch, however, he had to be mindful of the need for cohesion and comprehensiveness in his own philosophy. He knew that, as other considera-

³ TKV 1.182: *anitya-vādināḥ tu ye sādḥūnām dharmā-hetutvaṃ na pratipadyante, mallā-samayādi-saḍśīm [ca sādḥv-a]sādḥu-vyavasthām manyante, te prākṛtāṃ sarvaṃ [prākṛtyāvam ...] sādḥūnām śabdānām samūham ācakṣate. vikāras tu paścād vyavasthāpito yaḥ sambhinna-buddhibhiḥ puruṣaiḥ svāra-saṃskārādibhir nī[rṇī]yata iti.*

⁴ The structural similarity between depending on a *śiṣṭa* for *sādhu* determination and on an Oxford professor for the determination of acceptable English usage is pointed out in AKLUJKAR (2004: § 6.1). The subsequent sections of the same article may be helpful in understanding the differences.

tions led him to posit the language-principle as Brahman and the *Veda* as the first accessible manifestation or image (*anukāra*) of that Brahman, his philosophy would be better off by locating all languages in the stream that started with the language of the *Veda* (what we call Vedic Sanskrit or Sanskrit). Thinking in terms of mutually exclusive languages or language families, each having a different point of origin, was going to be inimical to theoretical economy—causing *gaurava* and losing *lāghava*. Besides, since independent arguments could establish that language can have no beginning in philosophy or logical theory (as distinct from any biological or evolutionary beginning it might have had) and that, for this reason, each system had to depend on *āgama* (that there could be no system that did not invoke anything outside of itself), there was a considerable theoretical advantage in accepting the *Veda* as the most fundamental *āgama* from which all *āgamas*, including those of the Buddhists, Jains etc., sprang.⁵ For this configuration of theses in his thinking, as well as because, he lived in an ethos in which any act involving restraint or self-discipline could be viewed as a Yoga that purified one's personality and made one more eligible for attainment of Brahman (AKLUJKAR (2004: § 6.6)), Bhartṛhari's preferred view had to be that grammatical expressions had *dharma*-potential.

2.4. Bhartṛhari was aware even of the more general and basic problem we would now articulate with such words or phrases as 'textual authority versus empiricism' or 'need for empirical verification in scientific determination'. He knew that there would be opposition to claims such as 'grammatical words have a merit-generating nature' (with or without the qualification that the user of such words must know grammar) if the claimant had no reasoning to back up the claim. A discussion of how a particular property of something is known had taken place before his time. This discussion covered (even or especially) the issue of knowledge of a property (or outcome) thought to be nonmundane or otherworldly (*adr̥ṣṭa*). On such a background, he would not have been able to proceed by assuming a gullible or unquestioning reader even if he so wished. In fact, as I show in a forthcoming article on the concept of *Veda* revelation, Bhartṛhari preserves for us some precious early evi-

⁵ This reconstruction of Bhartṛhari's reasoning—of how Bhartṛhari could have thought—is mine. It would be too much to expect that he would give us an explicit statement on our question—a historical possibility that was unlikely to occur to him, given the different concerns of his works. However, only the configuration is mine and it falls within the bounds of charitable or creative reading that we owe to any ancient thinker. For every component of the configuration there is explicit support in Bhartṛhari's words. For the language-principle and the *Veda*, see AKLUJKAR (forthcoming): 'Veda revelation according to Bhartṛhari'; for one language stream, see AKLUJKAR (2003: § 5), (2004: § 6.1); for beginningless language, see AKLUJKAR (1970: § 4.19, § 5.26); for Bhartṛhari's acceptance of *Veda* as the basis of even the unorthodox philosophies; see AKLUJKAR (1991: § 2.1).

dence of engagement with the issue of need for empirical support. This evidence is precious because it establishes that not only the issue was felt and tackled but also that a refined philosophical theory developed in early India to get over the problem of circularity to which any effort to handle the issue led.⁶ The crucial expression in the evidence is *sākṣat-kṛta-dharman* taken over from Yāska's *Nirukta* in TKV 1.5 and the most revealing reason statement of it is *tatra kecid ācāryā manyante ... parāṇudyate* found in TKV 1.172 (SUBRAMANIA IYER (1966: 224–225)). I have translated the passage in AKLUJKAR (2004: § 2.4) and, in the fifth section of the forthcoming article to which I just referred, I have explained how the notion of *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharman ṛṣis* is, philosophically, a recognition of the need to have empirical evidence of properties attributed to things, as well as an attempt to get over the problem created by the impossibility of getting such evidence in a conception-free or language-free world.

— 3 —

3.1. We have now seen how something appearing in a narrow specific concern can have its antecedents or roots in the whole complex of an author's philosophy. Accurate translations would further enlighten us that, unlike Hajime NAKAMURA (1960), we should not view Bhartṛhari as unqualifiedly holding *āgama* or testimony to be weightier than *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* (cf. AKLUJKAR (1970)) or read him as a narrowly Brahmanical philosopher reacting to the logic-loving Buddhists mainly on the strength of his faith in the Brahmanical way of life. In fact, Bhartṛhari is a proponent of the view that there is a constant interplay between *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*. His model is not one in which valid cognition has three independent routes leading to it, but one in which three routes conjointly take us to validity.⁷ A

⁶ This theory serves also to explain how the *mantra* phenomenon is to be logically understood and how the *ṛṣi* institution has an epistemological justification in addition to any sociological or socio-political justification it may have.

⁷ Following Mokṣākaragupta, one could also speak of two routes, *pratyakṣa* and *śabda/āgama*. Although Bhartṛhari frequently speaks in terms of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda/āgama* and thus gives us justification to speak of three routes as acceptable to him, we could view that talk of his as a concession to philosophers of other persuasions made in order to make the dialogue possible. As *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are infused with *śabda* according to Bhartṛhari, attributing to him the view that ultimately *śabda* alone is the *pramāṇa* at our disposal would also be justified. Those who state that the grammarians accept only *pratibhā* as the *pramāṇa* essentially give expression to the same view.

comparison with Nyāya as presented in the *Tarka-saṃgraha*, for example, may serve to clarify the difference:⁸

Nyāya division: Validity comes from a valid *pratyakṣa*, a valid *anumāna*, a valid *upamāna* or a valid *śabda* (= the same as Bhartṛhari's *āgama* to a significant extent) as the case may be.

Invalidity is that which has a form different from any of these—*samśaya* ('doubt'), *viparyaya* ('perception not matching its claimed object') and *tarka* ('asserting the broader from the narrower')—or which results from a means recognised by some as capable of leading to knowledge (*pramā*) but not given such recognition in Nyāya (that is, everything other than a valid *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*).

Bhartṛhari's division: Validity rests on *pratyakṣa* etc., contributing collectively, but it may appear to have a single source such as *pratyakṣa*, if that source is dominant in a given instance.

Invalidity has the form of a *pratyakṣa* etc., depending on the circumstances, but our determination of validity comes from what we learn collectively from all means of knowing.

3.2. Bhartṛhari's validity, naturally, has a dynamic nature. It goes on changing its constituent elements, very much like the conceptual scheme described by the American philosopher Willard van Orman Quine. As in Quine's conceptual scheme, it has some central, normally unchangeable elements (e.g. expectation of cause-and-effect relationships and I-awareness) and some not so central or permanent elements (AKLUJKAR (1988: §§ 2.6–9)). Accordingly, the tussle between logic and belief or between the means of knowing that are generally more amenable to objectivity and the means that are more prone to losing objectivity has less intensity in Bhartṛhari's thinking than in the thinking of some other philosophers.

3.3. Consonant with the preceding is also the fact that, in the relevant contexts, Bhartṛhari speaks more of *āgama* than of *śabda* and that his *āgama* concept has at least three layers or strata. As established in my 1970 Ph.D. dissertation and as summarised in my (1971) critique of NAKAMURA's (1960) presentation, the most general meaning of *āgama* in the TK is 'inherited lore', 'conceptual inheritance',

⁸ I have not yet studied how older Nyāya and other systems of Indian philosophy viewed, in comparative and collective terms, the relationship of *pramāṇas* to what a person comes to accept as valid.

‘knowledge that one inherits because of birth in a particular biological species or linguistic community’, ‘lore of the forefathers’. Next, in those contexts in which awareness and preservation of knowledge is assumed, come the meanings: ‘tradition’, ‘traditionally inherited body of knowledge’, ‘traditional instruction of conduct’, ‘sources of testimony’, ‘authoritative literature’, ‘imbibed or internalized results of the activity of systematization’, ‘body of knowledge and views preserved by the adherents of a system’ and ‘a single view or piece of knowledge preserved in a system’. Most particularly, in sufficiently specific contexts, *āgama* denotes the *śruti* and *smṛti*. Given this, it follows that, according to Bhartṛhari, we should not flatter ourselves and think that inheriting belief is something under our control. We are probably better than other animate forms, but they and we are not essentially different. Only the spaces or positions we occupy on the spectrum of animate entities are different.⁹

3.4. The kind of thinking delineated above allows Bhartṛhari to connect *āgama* and, through it, belief with induction, which connecting, in turn, serves to reduce the gap between the rational and the non-rational (or emotive) parts of our personalities. Induction, in the sense of ‘outcome or content of the act or process of induction’ (e.g. the concept/universal *gotva* or applicability of the same word *go* to all cows), is essentially indistinguishable from belief. Its genesis is inexplicable in the usual logical ways. The genesis is close to a burst of inspiration and to happenstance. There is no certainty that it will take place after a certain number of steps or recurrences or that we will be able to feel the gradual progression toward an epistemological destiny. Its validity or usefulness is established after the process has taken place. Like belief, we have to take it as a given and then examine, *if the question occurs to us*, if it fits what we expect in the case of a valid piece of knowledge. In the form, especially of universals (or words used for sets of things), we receive instances of induction much in the same manner as beliefs. Language consists of (a) signifiers which extend beyond the individual objects that gave rise to them and (b) signata which sacrifice a part or range of their individualities in finding themselves expressed. Together the signifiers and signata, as it were, add another plane of being (*upacāra-sattā*) that we must hold on to, even if our logical analysis tells us that this additional plane does not exist in the same way as the plane of physical objects and events—that it is a belief infiltrating the very means of our thinking and communication, a situation immune to logical dislodging, an entity which falls short of being a belief only because most of us are not aware of it most of the time.

⁹ In this respect, Bhartṛhari is closer to the general Indian view of man as it is stated in HALBFASS (1991, particularly page 268).

3.5. It would not take much time to realise that the features of induction specified above are largely present also in the phenomenon of intuition and the intuited content. Why a woman staying in her husband's or in-laws' house suddenly gets the 'feeling' that tomorrow her brother will come (to take her to her parents' house to enjoy some festivities and to get relief from her responsibilities in the husband's or in-laws' house) is inexplicable exclusively in terms of inference,¹⁰ whether inference is understood in a well-defined technical sense (*anumāna*, *anumiti*) or loosely as a process of guessing (akin to *ūha*, *tarka*, *sāmbhava*, *arthâpatti* etc.). What happens is more like what the English-speaking world articulates through such words as 'gut-feeling' or 'vibes/vibrations'. There is no awareness of process or moving from thought T₁ to thought T₂. At the most something can be said to take place subconsciously. Also, the occurrence of the thought is frequently sudden, and the thought is not uncommonly borne out by the brother's actual arrival.

3.6. It is thus not surprising that Bhartṛhari's notion of *pratibhā* combines in itself the elements of what we call induction, intuition and linguistic content (sentence meaning and word meaning) and, in the last, bestows prominence on *kriyā* 'action (inclusive of state, primarily as language conveys it and only secondarily as it actually takes place on the physical plane)'. Literally meaning 'what appears on the other side (in front, opposite of the mind's eye)', *prati*√*bhā* has in it a suggestion of involuntariness, of initiative resting with the content or object rather than with the observing subject, of intuition/induction and inspiration, of arising from something within the subject but not being fully explicable in terms of that something, of being (at least partly) a mysterious phenomenon, of being primarily inherited (without losing the amenability for cultivation), and of leading to a 'know-how' with regard to realisation of the content, goal or object that presents itself.

3.7. It is also not surprising, on the background delineated so far, that the distance between hermeneutics or language-based logic applied to a text (found primarily in Mīmāṃsā or Pūrva-mīmāṃsā) and inference on the factual or physical plane (found primarily in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) is ultimately eliminated in Bhartṛhari.¹¹ Another way

¹⁰ The example (*śvo me bhrātāgantā*) given here comes from a traditional Indian social set-up in which women went to live with the families of in-laws after marriage and social customs were developed to enable them to return to the houses of their mothers at least in the first few years of marriage. A culturally Western and modern example can be found in the following 'Quotation of the Day', in the New York Times issue of 11 July 2007. The quotation is attributed to Scott Podsednik, an outfielder for the White Sox baseball team, who was talking about the magic of a perfect bat: 'You can't describe if it's a feel. When you pick it up and take a couple of swings with it, you just know.'

¹¹ TK 1.153: *śabdānām eva sā śaktis tarko yaḥ puruṣāśrayaḥ*.

of stating this would be that Bhartṛhari would distinguish between analytic and synthetic truths only provisionally and only at the lower levels of his philosophising or only while conducting a dialogue with other philosophical schools.

— 4 —

4.1. To return to the passage with which I began in § 1.1–2, the following should be noted: It is with logic or disciplined reasoning that Bhartṛhari argues for the limitations of that reasoning, just as one argues for the definition of *pramāṇa* or for a particular number of *pramāṇas* by using the *pramāṇas* themselves. There is a variety of philosophers in India, as well as elsewhere, which considers this circularity to be the longest nail that can be driven into the heart of philosophy, understood as thinking ambitious enough to aim at certainty about the world.¹² However, Bhartṛhari should be thought of as a thinker holding the view that not all circularity or mutual dependence is a fault in reasoning. His statements asserting that we do not come to this world with a clean slate¹³ or that all philosophers must, at some point, accept a certain given nature of a thing or a postulate¹⁴ make sense only on the assumption that, in his view, the mutual dependence that every philosopher has to face at some juncture in his/her attempt to provide a structure to ‘understand’ the world is not to be taken as proof of the attempt’s failure—as sufficient basis to claim that the attempt should not be made in the first place and that a *laissez-faire* state should be allowed to prevail in philosophy. Even to make this final claim, logic is used, which presupposes a decision regarding what is logical or what can be a *pramāṇa*. Thus, circularity is not avoided even in advocating abandonment of the endeavour of philosophers. If such is the case, why should the philosophers not be permitted to live with circularity at the deepest or highest level? To say this is just another way of admitting that no system of philosophy is complete in itself; it must accept something for which it has not made a case on its own criteria—which, in other words, is accepted as a belief would be.

¹² The variety I have in mind consists of philosophers who maintain scepticism or agnosticism at a very fundamental level of epistemology, not directing it to particular entities or issues.

¹³ TK 1.129–130 and the *Vṛtti* thereto: *yām [= iti-kartavyatām] pūrvāhita-saṃskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate ... samāviṣṭa-vācām ca sva-jātiṣu bālānam api ... ādyaḥ karaṇa-vinyāsaḥ ... na vinā śabda-bhāvanām. anādiś cāṣā śabda-bhāvanā ...*

¹⁴ Cf. TKV 1.30: *sarve 'pi hi vādino dūram api gatvā sva-bhāvaṃ na vyativartante*—‘Every philosopher ultimately comes to a stage at which he/she has no alternative but to say that “such is the nature of things”.’

4.2. True, a part of Bhartṛhari's argumentation pointing out the limitations of logic is based on his observation of the world (cf. § 1.2b, p. 396, and the corresponding TK and TKV passages in the appendix below) and would not be exactly philosophical (and hence proved or respectable enough) in the view of some. Viewed, however, in the light of his (a) emphasis on the importance of context and (b) other philosophical views, his argumentation can and should be deemed as making a good case for not thinking of logic and belief as a 'twain' that shall never meet but as a twain or twins joined at birth and having no alternative to joint survival. When Bhartṛhari advises us not to take logic too far—to leave logic at the door as one would leave one's footwear while entering an Indian or Japanese household or temple, he is in fact establishing that, in some contexts, we logically have no choice but to take the recommended position and that we need to be sensitive to context, in a linguistic sense as well as in the sense of the whole that a theory forms. This stance or awareness of his may even be the very basis of his perspectivism and linguistic approach to philosophical issues.

APPENDIX¹⁵

Text of TK 1.30–42 summarised in § 1.2.

(a1) TK 1.30ab:

na cāgamād rte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate /

'What is good (and what is bad) cannot be settled through reasoning divorced from inherited knowledge.'

¹⁵ Fairly literal and largely reliable translations of the Sanskrit passages I cite below are available in BIARDEAU (1964) and SUBRAMANIA IYER (1965). For this reason, as well as because not all the details in the passages are directly relevant to the main points of the paper, I will not translate each passage. For some passages, I will provide a summarising comment and only cite the part providing examples. Even where I translate, I will aim at making the point clear and not losing the emphasis of the original—not at sticking to the order or each individual word of the original.

The readings adopted, including indications of text definitely or possibly lost provided in bracket or rectangular parentheses, come from my TK critical edition in the making. The variants listed are sometimes reflected in the translation, and sometimes not. They do not make any difference to the theses of the article.

TKV 1.30: ... *sarve 'pi hi vādino dūram api gatvā sva-bhāvaṃ na vyativartante. adṛṣṭārthānām ca karmaṇām phala-niyame sva-bhāva-saṃvid āgama-pratibaddhā. ko hy anavasthita-sādharmya-vaidharmyeṣu nityam alabdha-niścayeṣu puruṣa-tarkeṣu viśvāsaḥ.*—‘... For all discussants (of a particular philosophical or theoretical topic) cannot ultimately escape (the prospect of having to appeal to) own natures (of things). In delimiting the actions intended for non-mundane outcomes to certain outcomes, one must come to know the natures (of the actions). This knowing is tied to (or rests on) inherited knowledge. How can one put one’s confidence (in this area or context) in the inferences of humans—inferences in which the similarities and dissimilarities (that are appealed to) are open to questioning (and therefore) bereft of certainty!’

(a3) TKV 1.30: ... *tarkâtītaḥ ... kaścīd anuttaraḥ puruṣa-dharmaḥ*...—‘... some extraordinary human quality, impervious to (common) ways of making sense ...’

(a4) TK 1.30cd:

ṛṣiṇām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgama-pūvakam //

‘Even in the case of seers, knowledge is preceded by inherited knowledge (that is, by traditionally handed-down guidance as to how one should cultivate oneself in order to transcend the ordinary limitations of senses).’

TKV 1.30: ... *yeṣv api tarkâtītaḥ pṛthag-vidyā-caraṇa-parigraheṣu kaścīd anuttaraḥ puruṣa-dharmaḥ śrūyate, teṣv api [tat-]tad-artha-jñānam āṛṣam ṛṣiṇām āgamikenāva dharmeṇa saṃskṛtātmanām āvir-bhavatīty ākhyāyate. svābhāvike hi tasmin, prayatnaḥ phalād vyatiricyeta, sva-bhāvataḥ ca pratyavāyo 'pi tathā-bhūtaḥ prasajyeta.*—‘Even in those mutually differing schools¹⁶ in which we hear the talk of some extraordinary human quality, impervious to (common) ways of making sense, the seers’ knowledge of this or that thing, to the extent it is born of a mystical or transforming experience,¹⁷ is said to occur when the seers’ personalities are modified by a quality found (i.e. recommended for cultivation) in the *āgama*. If such knowledge were to be something

¹⁶ The meaning of the expression *vidyācaraṇa-parigraha* is not clear as commentator Vṛṣabha’s offering of two possible meanings (*caryā ācāraḥ siddhānto vā*) of *caraṇa* indicates. In fact, one cannot even be certain about reading *caraṇa*; the expression would make a contextually plausible sense even if *ācaraṇa* is read in it. Further, the nature of the compound *vidyācaraṇa* is uncertain. Should we take it as a *dvandva* or as a genitive *tat-puruṣa*?

¹⁷ Following Vṛṣabha, one could accommodate *āṛṣam* and *ṛṣiṇām* in the somewhat convoluted manner indicated by my translation (the intention could have been to convey ‘not everything a seer knows, only what he/she is said to have acquired in a moment or experience of enlightenment’). A stylistically comparable construction is found in *prākṛtam aprākṛta-gamyam* of TKV 1.32. However, one should not rule out the possibility that a redundant *āṛṣam* could have entered the manuscripts under the influence of *ṛṣiṇām* or TK 1.38.

natural—something not requiring cultivation, the effort will exceed (i.e. divorce itself from) the outcome, and even an impediment may come about as an unwelcome outcome from (that) nature (or by the very nature of things).¹⁸

(b) TK 1.31:

*dharmasya cavyavacchinnāḥ panthāno ye vyavasthitāḥ /
na tāml loka-prasiddhatvāt kaścit tarkeṇa bādhte //*

‘And, no one invalidates (i.e. can prove to be wrong or unneeded), through reasoning, the uninterrupted pathways of what is good that have come to be established, as they are well-known in the world.’

TKV 1.31: *bahu-vikalpeṣv api śiṣṭānām caraṇeṣu santi sādharmaṇāḥ prasiddhāḥ puruṣa-hita-pratipatti-mārgāḥ, yeṣv anyathā pravṛttir loka-viraṣā. na ca te tarkeṇa kadācid api vyudasta-pūrvāḥ. kāmam āgamōddeśa-niśrayaṇenāiva [°śrayeṇāiva] kecid vininditam api loka-samācāra-viruddham ācaraṇam pratipadyante.*—‘Although the schools of the learned spiritual elite contain many options, there indeed are certain shared and well-known ways of attaining the good of humans, in the case of which proceeding in any other way turns off people. Reasoning (i.e. mere reasoning) has never been able to uproot them. This is so, even though there are some (persons) who take to behaviour going against what people consider to be proper by resorting to a part of that very inherited knowledge (i.e. by selectively appealing to or quoting out of context parts of the time-honoured written or oral texts and thus temporarily bringing the *āgama* into disrepute).’¹⁸

(c) TK 1.32:

*avasthā-deśa-kālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu /
bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā //*

‘It is very difficult (i.e. well-nigh impossible) to establish through inference that things have such and such nature when what they can do differs with a change in phase, place or time.’

The following three paragraphs illustrate how, with a change in phase, place or time, the properties things exhibit change, making one wonder if there indeed is anything that one can take as the constant part or true nature of things:

TKV 1.32: *ihāvyaibhicaritābhimata-sāhacaryasya [→ °ritatvābhi°] dṛṣṭasya sambandhināḥ tat-sadṛṣasya vā darśanād adṛṣṭe sambandhini yaj jñānam utpadyate, tenāpratyakṣasyārthasya prasiddhir duravasānā.*

¹⁸ The reference is to situations that are frequently summed up with an expression like ‘Devil quoting the Bible’ in English and kindred languages.

tathā hi. avasthāntareṣu viniścita-bala-sattvādīnām punar avasthāntareṣu puruṣa-gamyeṣv apuruṣa-gamyeṣu vā dṛśyante sva-bhāvā vyabhicāriṇaḥ. bāhyānām api bijāûśadhi-prabhṛtinām avasthā-bhedād upalabhyate śakti-vyabhicāraḥ.

tathā deśa-bhedād api. atiśīto haimavatīnām apām sparśaḥ. sa tu balāhakāgni-kunḍādiṣu tad-rūpānām evātyuṣṇa upalabhyate. tatra rūpa-sāmānyād apahr̥ta-buddhiḥ parokṣa-višeṣo durjñānam bhedam arvāg-darśano darśana-mātreṇāḡgamyam āgamenāiva pratipadyate.

kāla-bhedād api. gr̥īṣma-hemantādiṣu kūpa-jalādīnām atyanta-bhinnāḥ sparśādayo gṛhyante. tatra sūkṣmam avasthāna-višeṣam prākṛtam [?] aprākṛta-gamyam āgama-cakṣur [/āgamika-cakṣur] antareṇāpratyakṣam anumāna-mātreṇāniścitam [/°treṇa niścitya] kaḥ sādhaḡyitum asaṃmūḡhaḥ prayatate [→ prayateta].

These three paragraphs are followed by:

TK 1.33:

*nirjñāta-śakter dravyasya tām tām artha-kriyām prati /
viśiṣṭa-dravya-sambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate //*

‘Even if we come to know for sure that substance S₁ performs action A₁ revealing of its existence, we find that S₁’s capability to perform A₁ is blocked if it comes into contact with certain other substances (and we are thus prevented from making an absolute or universalistic statement about its nature).’

The following provides illustrations in support of the preceding statement:

TKV 1.33: *agny-ādīnām kāṣṭhādi-vikārōtpādane dṛṣṭa-sāmarthyānām abhrapaṭalādiṣu dravyeṣu tathā-bhūtam [/°thā-vidham] sāmarthyam pratibadhyate.¹⁹
tathā mantraûśadhi-rasādibhir yogyeṣv api dravyeṣu dāhādikaṃ pratibadhyate.
tatrākasmin viṣaye dṛṣṭa-sāmarthyānām punar viṣayāntareṣu dravyāṇām dur-
avasānāḥ śaktayaḥ.*

(d) TK 1.34:

*yatnenānumito ’py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhīḥ /
abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathāvôpapādyate //*

‘If a proficient inferer exerts to infer *x*, there comes along an even more proficient knowledge-master who accounts for that very *x* in an altogether different way.’

TKV 1.34 reproduced below shows how reasoning is used to settle a philosophical issue in different ways—how one side picks holes in an argument that seems valid

¹⁹ Compare the use of asbestos as a fire resistant in modern times.

to the other. The issue mentioned as an example has a long history in philosophy: Should we think of substance as distinct from qualities? Is there an essence which is over and above the associated qualities and which, therefore, should be acknowledged in a separate philosophical category called 'substance'? However, while the issue taken up for illustration is clear and while it is natural that the debate about it should result in a discussion about associated linguistic usage, the precise nature of the arguments on the two (or more?) sides is not always clear, partly due to reading problems and partly due to the loss of literature presupposed by Bhartṛhari. UNEBE (2006) is helpful in understanding a part historically.

TKV 1.34: ... *anyad dravyam guṇebhyo, vyapadeśāt* [→ °bhyo 'py apa°?]. [...?] *tad yathā. sati viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhede rājñā rāṣṭram viśeṣyate, na parivrājakena. viśeṣyate* [ca] *candanena gandhaḥ, na rūpādibhiḥ. tasmād, anyad dravyam guṇebhya ity anumānena dravye vyavasthāpīte, nāyam apadeśo yukta ity āhuḥ.* [...?] *viśiṣṭāviśiṣṭābhidheya-nibandhanātvāt. katham candana-śabdena hi viśiṣṭa-rūpādivacanena viśeṣaṇam arthavad gandhādīnām. rūpādi-mātra-vacana tvāt tu rūpādīnām, tāvato 'rthasya nirjñātātvād anarthakam viśeṣaṇam. tathā hi. kasyāyam puruṣa iti praśne, viśeṣāntarāvacchedārtham rājñā iti vyapadiśyate, na tu nirjñātātvāt puruṣasyēti.*

apara āhuḥ. pada-samūhāka-deśa-bhāve 'pi padam ṛcā vyapadiśyate, na padena ṛk. apara āha. ekatvābhūyupagamenāiva candanena vyapadeśo gandhādīnām, rūpādibhir avyapadeśa [...] iti viruddhatvād asiddham [→ asiddhi-dvayam?] *etat. śruti-viśeṣa-samnidhānāsamnidhāna-kṛtas tu pūrva-pakṣōpanyāsaḥ.*

tasmād dṛṣṭād adṛṣṭam anugamyata ity avirodhāt siddham etat.

tathā pākādy-anumānārthāni kriyā-viśeṣeṣu pratīnyatāny aṅgāni vipralambhārthāny [→ °mbhārtham] *api kaiścit kathamcid upādīyante.*

(e) TK 1.35:

*pareṣām asamākhyaḥ abhyāsād eva jāyate /
maṇi-rūpy-ādi-vijñānam [/ °diṣu jñā °] tad-vidām nānumānikam //*

'Those who know jewels, precious metals etc. perceive those objects in their distinctiveness (i.e. with their individual good features and bad features) only through constant practice. (If others ask them, 'How did you figure out the merits or blemishes of this diamond, and so on?') they cannot give expression to their (experience or process of) knowing. (This sort of knowing) is not an outcome of inference (it is like perception in its directness, but it is not ordinary perception either, as it perceives what most others cannot).'

TKV 1.35, while restating the point clarified in the preceding translation, adds the example of persons who have musical ears. Such persons perceive subtle differences of notes that even the persons who dedicate their lives to mastering other branches of learning cannot perceive, no matter how attentive they are, until they have sufficient practice.

TKV 1.35: *na hi rūpa-tarkâdayaḥ sūkṣmān aprasiddha-saṁvijñāna-padān kārṣāpaṇâdīnām kalpayitvâpi samadhigama-hetūn parebhya ākhyātum śaknuvanti. ṣaḍja-ṛṣabha-gāndhāra-dhaivatâdi-bhedam vā pratyakṣa-pramāṇa-viṣayam apy abhyāsam antareṇâbhiyuktāḥ praṇidhānavanto 'pi na pratipadyante.*

TK 1.36:

*pratyakṣam anumānam ca vyatikramya vyavasthitāḥ /
pity-rakṣaḥ-piśacānām [rakṣaḥ-pity-pi°] karmajā eva siddhayaḥ //*²⁰

TKV 1.36: *svapne hi [l°pne 'pi] badhirâdīnām śabdâdi-pratipādanam, ghana-saṁniviṣṭâvayavānām ca kuḍy-âdīnām avayava-vibhāgam antareṇântar-veśmâdiṣu sūkṣmāṇām arthānām darśanam yat sarva-pravâdeṣu siddham [→ °vâda-prasi°?], tatra katham-bhūtāni sādhanānīty adṛṣṭa-śaktim acintyām hitvā nānyāni sādhanāny ākhyātum śakyante //*

The following two verses and the *Vṛtti* thereto touch upon manners of knowing that cannot be subsumed under ordinary perception or inference and yet have the immediacy and power to convince that perception or direct personal experience has in all epistemologies. The first mentions determination of material cause-and-effect relationships even when neither the ‘effect-is-inherent-in-the-cause’ view nor the ‘effect-is-something-newly-produced’ view are free from logical difficulties. The second points out the postulation by philosophers or theoreticians of entities (such as mind or an inner controlling subject, atoms, Brahman, phases of action outcomes or consequences, subtle transmigratory bodies etc.) that ordinary persons cannot see or infer. In short, if one were to summarise the content of the two verses in modern terminology, they refer to genesis of philosophical or theoretical insights—moments in which something probably based on sustained and concentrated thought but

²⁰ The *siddhis* TK 1.36 speaks of belong to ‘persons’ different from ordinary human beings and are a matter of belief, at least for many modern human beings. It may, therefore be argued that the verse should be grouped with the next two. But if justice is to be done to the emphasis in *karmajā eva*, it should form a group with TK 1.35. If we agree to do so then we should understand that the author’s intention was not to argue for the existence of ghosts etc. or the capabilities attributed to them (which he may accept elsewhere) but to state that the capabilities attributed to ghosts etc. make sense only as entities born of something analogous to *abhyāsa*—as arising out of actions they performed, the inclinations they cultivated, as humans.

lacking a definite or demonstrable causal connection to it flashes forth and is found to have considerable explanatory value.

TK 1.37:

*āvir-bhūta-prakāśānām anupapluta-cetasām /
atītānāgata-jñānaṃ pratyakṣān na viśiṣyate //*

TKV 1.37: [...] *tatrôtpatti-pakṣe tāvat katham apadam avastu nirātmakam adṛṣṭāpratiniyata-kāraṇa-śakti-parigraham adhigantuṃ śakyate. pakṣāntare [/'re 'pī] ca viśiṣṭa-vyakti-rūpa-tiro-bhāvād vyavahāraṃ prati tad avijñeyaṃ vastu nirupākhyair eva tulyam. atha ca tapasā nirdagdha-doṣā nirāvaraṇa-khyātayaḥ śiṣṭāḥ pratibimbakalpena pratyakṣam iva svāsu khyātiṣu saṃkrāntākāra-parigraham avyabhicaritam sarvaṃ paśyanti.*

TK 1.38:

*atīndriyān asaṃvedyān paśyanty ārṣeṇa cakṣuṣā /
ye bhāvān vacanaṃ teṣāṃ nānumānena bādhyate //*

TKV 1.38: *antaryāmiṇam, aṇu-grāmam, abhijāti-nimitta-nibandhanam, anabhivyaktaṃ śabda-brahma, śakty-adhiṣṭhānaṃ [-> ?] devatāḥ, karmaṇām anubandha-pariṇāma-śakti-vaikalyāni, sūkṣmam ātivāhikam śarīraṃ, pṛthag anyāṃś ca tīrtha-pravādeṣu prasiddhān arthān, rūpādivad indriyair agrāhyān, sukhādivac ca pratyātmam asaṃvedyān, ye śiṣṭā vyāvahārikād anyenāiva cakṣuṣā mukta-saṃśayam upalabhante, teṣāṃ anumāna-viśayatātītam vacanaṃ vyabhicāribhir anumānair apākartum aśakyam. jāty-andhādīnāṃ hi “rūpādi-grahaṇam evam utpadyata” iti [yā]sā[v a]vasthā nāivānubhūta-pūrvā kadācit, tasyāṃ katham anumānaṃ pravarteta.*

The persons who have faith in the insights or statements of persons with extraordinary capabilities, that is, of persons spoken of in the preceding two verses, are not swayed by rationalistic criticisms. For them, what the *śiṣṭas* say is as unquestionably valid as something they themselves witnessed:

TK 1.39:

*yo yasya svam iva jñānaṃ darśanaṃ nābhiśaṅkate /
sthitam pratyakṣa-pakṣe taṃ katham anyo nivartayet //*

TKV 1.39: *santi prati-caraṇam prati-puruṣam cāptāḥ, yeṣāṃ vacanam avicāritam svam iva darśanam atyantam anabhiśaṅkanīyam, yeṣāṃ cādṛṣṭam api śilā-plāvanādi pratyayena śakyam śrad-dhātum. tathā hi. karmaṇām iha kṛtānām, ūrdhvaṃ dehād, iṣṭāniṣṭa-phala-prāptir āpta-vacana-parigraheṇāiva loke prasiddhā, vināpi sāstrôpadeṣena, prāyeṇa manuṣyair anugamyate. [...]*

“*idaṃ puṇyam idaṃ pāpam ity etasmin pada-dvaye /
ācaṇḍālaṃ [/ācāṇḍā°] manuṣyaṇām alpam śāstra-prayojanam //*”²¹

[...?] *tasmāt pratyakṣam ārṣaṃ ca jñānaṃ, saty api virodhe, bādhakam anumānasya.*

The same observation applies to *āgama*, or received traditional wisdom. It is as ingrained in the being of most persons as their very sentience or life force. Accepted by the spiritual learned, it not given up by the majority simply because philosophers or intellectuals disagree among themselves. In fact, those who do not give it up, usually escape social censure:

TK 1.41:

*caitanyam iva yaś cāyam avicchēdena vartate /
āgamas tam upāsīno hetu-vādair na bādhyate //*

TKV 1.41: *yathā hy aham asmīty evam-ādi-pratyayānugataṃ sahajam anādi yac
caitanyam tan nāsmi, na mamēty-evam āptōpadeśe saty api, loke rūḍhatvān
muktātmanām api vyavahāraṃ prati na vyavacchidyate [→ vicchi°], tathāvāyam
śruti-smṛti-lakṣaṇaḥ sarvaiḥ śiṣṭaiḥ pariḡrḥita āgamaḥ kāryākārya-bhakṣyābhakṣya-
gamyāgamyādiṣu [/bhakṣyā°] yo bhinnānām api pravādinām prāyeṇānātīlaṅghanīyaḥ.
tam itthaṃ-bhūtam anādim upasevitam vṛddhaiḥ samyag upāsīno na tārḱika-pravādaiḥ
kaīscin [→ kaīscin] nyāyāyād apanīyate vartmanāḥ. tatrasthaś cānindyo loke bhavati.*

(f) TK 1.42:

*hasta-sparśād ivāndhena viṣame pathi dhāvatā /
anumāna-pradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ //*

‘It is not difficult to find that a person who puts store by guessing and deducing falls like a blind person running on an uneven path merely on the basis of what the touch of his hand revealed earlier.’

TKV 1.42 restates the preceding more precisely:

*yasya hi sthāli-pāka-pulāka-nyāyenāika-deśam [/°lī-pu°] dṛṣṭvā śiṣṭe ’rthe pratipattiḥ,
so ’ndha iva, viṣame giri-mārge, cakṣuṣmantam nētāram antareṇa, tvarayā
[→ tarasā] paripatan kaṃcid eva mārgāika-deśam hasta-sparśenāvagamya
samatikrāntas tat-pratyayād aparam api tathāiva pratipadyamāno, yathā vināśam
labhate, tadvad āgama-cakṣuṣā vinā tarkānupātī, kevalenānumānena kvacid āhita-
pratyayo dṛṣṭādrṣṭa-phaleṣu karmasv āgamam utkrāmya pravartamāno niyataṃ
mahatā pratyavāyena samīyujyate.*

²¹ The preceding verse is found in the TK *kārikā* manuscripts and hence has been included and numbered as *kārikā* 40 in Rau’s edition. In my judgement, it was originally a quotation in the *Vṛtti* of verse 39.

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Bhartrhari on Unnameable Things*

HIDEYO OGAWA

0. In his *Mahā-bhāṣya* Patañjali declares that for grammarians what words express is their authority¹. Later Pāṇinīyas from Bhartrhari onwards illustrate this principle by stating that grammarians are not concerned with things as they are (*vastv-artha*) but as they are spoken of (*śabdārtha*). It is interesting that they recognise that there are things which are unnameable, beyond verbalisation. In his *Vṛtti* on the *Vākya-padīya* Bhartrhari calls them *asaṁvijñāna-padas*—‘those which have not words to convey themselves’. In this paper I shall show how Bhartrhari accounts for the existence of a thing defined as *asaṁvijñāna-pada* and what philosophical significance he attaches to the issue of whether a certain thing has a word defined as *saṁvijñāna-pada*.

1. To begin with, let us consider how the term *saṁvijñāna-pada* is to be interpreted. HOUBEN (1995: 340, n. 564), who translates this term as ‘specific designation’, gives the following explanation:

‘*saṁvijñānapada*, literally “word of thorough understanding”. The translation “specific designation” was suggested to me by Professor Aklujkar. The word is also used in the *Vṛtti* on 1.94 (Biardeau: “mot qui donne une connaissance complète”; Iyer: “special name”) in the context of the stages of a continuous process, of which some have a *saṁvijñāna-pada*, and others don’t.’

Bhartrhari and his commentators do not give an etymological explanation of this term. But Vṛṣabha’s comments on VP 1.94 furnish useful hints.

In his *Vṛtti* on VP 1.94 Bhartrhari, who mentions the transformation of milk into clarified butter and its specific stages (*avasthā-viśeṣa*), describes specific stages

* I gratefully acknowledge helpful discussions with Professor Brendan S. Gillon and my student Jaehyung Yi on several points in the paper.

¹ MBhā 1.11.1–2; 1.366.12–13: *śabda-pramāṇakā vayam. yac chabda āha tad asmākaṁ pramāṇam.*

such as curds as *saṁvijñāna-pada-nibandhana*, i.e. ‘those which depend on *saṁvijñāna-pada*’, and transformation stages within them as *asaṁvijñāna-pada*, i.e. ‘those for which there are no *saṁvijñāna-padas*’.² According to Vṛṣabha, specific stages such as curds have words (*pada*) like *maṇḍaka*, while the specific stages within them have no words to signify them (*vācaka*).³ Thus, it becomes clear that the term *saṁvijñāna-pada* means: (as a *karma-dhāraya* compound) ‘a word which consists in being that from which a certain thing is understood’, that is, a word to convey something.

It may be worth pointing out, in passing, that, to my knowledge, the term *saṁvijñāna-pada* and its derivatives are not so commonly used by Indian theorists. I could only find the use of the negative compound *asaṁvijñāna-pada* in the *Bhāvanā-viveka* of Maṇḍanamīśra.⁴ This might suggest that Bhartṛhari’s use of the term in question manifests the characteristics of his own philosophy of language.

2. Bhartṛhari does not use the term *saṁvijñāna-pada* in the *kārikā* text but in the *Vṛtti*. Moreover, in the *Vṛtti* he uses it only in two contexts: (1) in connection with the determination of the distinction among things (*bheda*, *viśeṣa*) and (2) in connection with the denotation of something essentially dependent (*paratantra*) as something independent (*svatantra*).⁵

² VPV 1.94: *yathā kṣīram utpatti-pakṣe ’bhīvyakti-pakṣe vā sarpir-ādi-vikāra-prayuktam niyata-krama-rūpair maṇḍakādibhir avasthā-viśeṣair viśiṣṭa-saṁvijñāna-pada-nibandhanair asaṁvijñāna-padais ca yujyamānam ...*

³ PDh ad VPV 1.94: *saṁvijñāna-pada-nibandhanaiḥ iti. etāny eva maṇḍakādīni teṣāṁ avasthā-viśeṣānām padāni. eteṣāṁ eva ca ye ’ntar-āla-vibhāgāḥ sūksmā avasthā-viśeṣāḥ, na teṣāṁ vācako ’stīty asaṁvijñāna-padāḥ.*

⁴ BhViṬ 45.7–46.2: *yukta evōttare sāmānya-nirdeśaḥ; anyathā praśna-gataṁ tad-apekṣaṇīyaṁ syāt, viśeṣatas tu bhāvanāyā asaṁvijñāna-pada-bhedatvāt parōpadhāna-vyajyamāna-sphuṭa-viśeṣāyāḥ.*

⁵ It is interesting that Maṇḍanamīśra describes *bhāvanā*, or the act of bringing about as having the property of being *asaṁvijñāna-pada-bheda*. This description gives the idea that *bhāvanā* has no word to convey its own distinction, which closely reflects the idea Bhartṛhari advances in the former context.

For the sake of reference, here I mention the interpretations of the word *asaṁvijñāna-pada-bheda* given by Umbeka and Nārāyaṇa:

BhViṬ 46.14–16: *bhāvanāyās tu pacaty-ādi-pade viśeṣeṇa sāmānya-nirdeśa eva kartavyaḥ, na hi tatra bhāvanā-viśeṣa-pratipādatakaḥ kaścic chabdo ’sti.*

BhViṬ 88.8–11: *samyak viśeṣākāreṇa jñāyate ’rtho yena padena tat saṁvijñāna-padam, tasya bhedo viśeṣaḥ saṁvijñāna-pada-bhedāḥ, na sa vidyate yasyā bhāvanāyās séyam asaṁvijñāna-pada-bhedā, tad-bhāvo ’saṁvijñāna-pada-bhedatvam. na kaścic api śabdo bhāvanā-viśeṣeṇa grhīta-sambandho ’stīty arthaḥ.*

3. Let us first consider the former context (§ 2.1).

3.1. In his *Vṛtti* on VP 1.35 Bhartṛhari says the following:

(a) Connoisseurs of things such as coins can determine for some reasons that the things examined by them are a *kārṣāpaṇa* and the like in weight. But, even conceiving of the reasons, they cannot communicate those reasons to others.⁶

(b) For, the reasons are subtle (*sūkṣma*) and hence imperceptible, so that they have no well-established words to convey them.⁷

(c) Without repeated practice, even experts, extremely attentive, do not understand the distinction (*bheda*) among musical notes such as *ṣaḍja*, *ṛṣabha*, *gāndhāra*, *dhaivata*, even if such distinction comes within the range of perception.⁸

The musical notes mentioned in (c) and the distinction among them will also be characterised as ‘those which have no fixed and well-established words to convey them’ (VPV 1.123: *anavasthitâprasiddha-saṁvijñāna-pada*).

The points made in (b) is this: the reasons connoisseurs of coins find for determining the weight of the coins (*samadhigama-hetu*) are, as Vṛṣabha explains, imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*), non-inferable (*anānumānika*) and incommunicable (*anāgamika*; in Bhartṛhari’s words, *asamākhyeya*).⁹

According to Umbeka, when *bhāvanā* is spoken of as *saṁvijñāna-pada-bhedā*, it is implied that there is no word to convey a specific *bhāvanā* (*bhāvanā-viśeṣa-pratipādaka*). According to Nārāyaṇa, the term *saṁvijñāna-pada-bheda* means ‘a specific word to properly convey its meaning in a specific form’, so that, when *bhāvanā* is spoken of as *saṁvijñāna-pada-bhedā*, it is implied that *bhāvanā* has no specific word by which it is conveyed in a specific form, namely that there is no word which has signification relation with a specific *bhāvanā*.

⁶ VPV 1.35: *na hi rūpa-tarkādayaḥ sūkṣmān aprasiddha-saṁvijñāna-padān kārṣāpaṇādīnām kalpayitvāpi samadhigama-hetūn parebhya ākhyātum śaknuvanti.*

⁷ See n. 6 above.

⁸ VPV 1.35: *ṣaḍja-ṛṣabha-gāndhāra-dhaivatādi-bhedam vā pratyakṣa-pramāṇa-viśayam apy abhyāsam antareṇābhīyuktāḥ prañidhānavanto 'pi na pratipadyante.*

⁹ VP 1.35:

*pareṣām asamākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate /
maṇi-rūpyādi-vijñānaṁ tad-vidān nānumānikam //*

PDh ad VPV 1.35: *sūkṣmān iti viśeṣaṇaṁ, samadhigama-hetūnām, duravadhānatvād [read: duravadhāraṇatvād] apratyakṣatvam. ata evānumānābhāvaḥ. aprasiddha iti. prasiddham saṁvijñāna-padaṁ nāsti teṣām samadhigama-hetūnām ity ākhyānasyāśakyatayānāgamikatvaṁ samam.*

The point made in (c) is that the distinction among musical notes, which is imperceptible since it exists in a subtle form, comes to be perceived and determined through repeated practice.

It is important to note here the following two points. First, even if a thing has no corresponding word to convey it (*asamvijñāna-pada*), nonetheless the thing exists, that is, it comes within the range of perception. Repeated practice, therefore, can make it possible to perceive and determine the thing. Secondly, it is simply because such a thing has no well-established word to convey it that it cannot be communicated to others.

However, a question arises: How does a subtle thing come to be perceived and determined through repeated practice? In order to answer this question, we have to consider what Bhartṛhari states in VP 1.123 and the *Vṛtti* thereupon.

3.2. VP 1.123 is very important in this regards, for Bhartṛhari declares there that the denotative power of the word (*śabda-mātrā*, *śabda-śakti*) is the cause for understanding the distinction among things:

‘The distinction among things such as *ṣaḍja* is determined when conveyed through words; therefore, all kinds of entities depend upon the powers of words (*śabda-mātrā*).’¹⁰

Bhartṛhari elaborates the point here as follows:

(a) Indeed, any entity depends on a word to convey it, so that it enters into discourse when determined through recollection-determination, muttering-determination and form-determination.¹¹

(b) But, the distinction among the musical notes, *ṣaḍja*, *ṛṣabha*, *gāndhāra*, *dhaivata*, *niṣāda*, *pañcama*, and *madhyama*, which have no fixed and well-established words to convey them, is not determined without understanding the words on which the determination of the distinction depends.¹²

¹⁰ VP 1.123:

*ṣaḍjādi-bhedaḥ śabdena vyākhyāto rūpyate yataḥ /
tasmād artha-vidhāḥ sarvāḥ śabda-mātrāsu niśritāḥ //*

RAU (1977: 48) reads *pāda* a as *śabdādibhedaḥ śabdena*. I follow IYER’s (1966: 182) reading. The term *śabda-mātrā* is glossed by Vṛṣabha by the term *śabda-śakti*.

¹¹ VPV 1.123: *saṁvijñāna-pada-nibandhano hi sarvo ’rthaḥ smṛti-nirūpaṇayābhijalpa-nirūpaṇayākāra-nirūpaṇayā ca nirūpyamāṇo vyavahāram avatarati*.

¹² VPV 1.123: *ṣaḍja-rṣabha-gāndhāra-dhaivata-niṣāda-pañcama-madhyamānām cānavasthitāprasiddha-saṁvijñāna-padānām viśeṣo ’vadhāraṇa-nibandhana-pada-pratyayam antareṇa nāvadhāryate*.

(c) For, cowherds, shepherds, and others also, who have invented (*prakalpya*) the words which serve as the cause for the determination of distinction, undertake to make a discourse with reference to the distinction among cows and others.¹³

(d) Therefore, a distinct entity, when imposed on words,¹⁴ is manifested, picked out, and received by the cognition which is united with the denotative power of the word, which is impregnated with the word, and which is identical with the word (*śabdātmikā*).¹⁵

(e) Words whose meanings are incommunicable are called ‘incommunicable’; terms such as *śadja* are among such words; they are defined as ‘general term’. On the other hand, words whose meanings are communicable are called ‘communicable’; terms such as ‘cow’ are among such words; they are defined as ‘specific term’.¹⁶

There are several points to note. Let us first note (b) and (c). There exists the distinction among musical notes and musicians can grasp the distinction. Similarly, there exists the distinction among cows and cowherds can grasp the distinction. It is highly important to note the point that since a word is the basis for the determination of the distinction among things, it is not until the word is understood that the distinction is determined. This clearly implies that the determination of the distinction among things, as Vṛṣabha says, presupposes the application of specific words to them.¹⁷ To explain. When a certain musical note is known as ‘This is *śadja*’ or ‘This is named *śadja*’ and another as ‘This is *ṛṣabha*’ or ‘This is named *ṛṣabha*’, the distinction between these two musical notes is determined. Similarly, when, by inventing the names A and B, a certain cow is named A and known as ‘This is A’ and

¹³ VPV 1.123: *gopālāvīpālādayo 'pi hi nibandhana-padāni prakalpya gavādiṣu viśeṣa-viṣayam vyavahāram ārabhante.*

¹⁴ According to Vṛṣabha, this amounts to saying that a specific word appears as if engraved on a specific meaning. PDh ad VPV 1.123: *tasmīn arthe sa śabda utkīrṇa ivēti.*

¹⁵ VPV 1.123: *tasmāt samākhyaeyṣv asamākhyaeyṣu ca sāmānya-viśeṣa-śabdeṣv adhyārūḍho bhedaṅ arthaḥ śabda-śakti-saṃsṛṣṭaya śabdānuviddhaya śabdātmikayā buddhyā prakāśyate, upagrhyate, svikriyate.*

¹⁶ See n. 15 and PDh ad VPV 1.123: *samākhyaeyṣu iti. samākhyaeyārthāḥ gavādi-piṇḍeṣu ye śabdāḥ pratyasyante te samākhyaeyā ity uktam. asamākhyaeyārthatvād asamākhyaeyāḥ śadjādayaḥ. samākhyaeyā iti śakyārthe kṛtyaḥ, samākhyaeyātum śakyā iti. gavādinām arthānām sphuṭataram paricchedyatayā śakyatvam. śadjādīnām tu durākhyānā arthā iti. sāmānya-viśeṣa-śabdeṣu iti. sāmānya-viśeṣa-śabdāḥ [read: sāmānya-śabdāḥ] śadjādayaḥ. viśeṣa-śabdāḥ sanniveśitā ye gopālakaiḥ piṇḍeṣu.*

¹⁷ PDh ad VPV 1.123: *viśeṣāvadhāraṇāya śabda-viśeṣa-niveśam āśrayante.*

another cow is named B and known as ‘This is B’, the distinction between these two cows is determined.

Let us next note (a) and (d). Bhartṛhari has stated that any entity depends on a word to convey it. Words such as *ṛṣabha* are the words to convey specific musical notes and names such as A are also the words to convey specific cows. As shown above, an entity (*artha*) is known as a specific one (*bhedavān arthaḥ*) when, depending on a word to convey it (word *x*), it is known as ‘This is *x*’ or ‘This is named *x*’. This is precisely what is meant by statement (d). What is more, according to Bhartṛhari, the cognition ‘This is *x*’ is the cognition (1) in which the entity referred to by ‘this’ is identified with the word *x*,¹⁸ (2) which is united with the denotative power of *x*, (3) which is impregnated with *x*, and (4) which is identical with *x*. It is to be noted in passing that, according to Vṛṣabha, *smṛti-nirūpaṇā* is the recollection of the cognition ‘This is *x*’, or the determination of the cognition; *abhijalpa-nirūpaṇā* is the awareness of the word *x* and its meaning as identical with each other, or the determination of the word; *ākāra-nirūpaṇā* is the determination of the *x*’s meaning as *sādhana* (*kāraṇa*) or as *sādhyā* (*kriyā*, act) to have a sentence meaning, or the determination of the meaning.¹⁹

Let us finally note (e). Bhartṛhari characterises words such as *ṣaḍja* and words such as *go* are respectively as *asamākhyeya* ‘incommunicable’ and as *samākhyeya* ‘communicable’, according to whether they are fixed and well-established words. In addition, he describes the former type of word as *sāmānya-śabda* ‘general term’ and the latter type of word as *viśeṣa-śabda* ‘specific term’. The underlying idea is this. When the word *ṣaḍja* is uttered by a speaker, the hearer to whom this word is unfamiliar can only understand that something is meant by the speaker but cannot specify what it is. On the other hand, when the word *go* is uttered, the hearer to whom this word is familiar can understand that an entity as excluded from non-cows is meant by the speaker.²⁰

¹⁸ The identity between a word and its meaning is established when they are imposed on each other. See (d) and n. 14.

¹⁹ PDh ad VPV 1.123: *tat tu tathā paricchidyōttaram śabdānuviddhayā buddhyā smaryate idam evam ca iti smṛti-rūpeṇa. śabdārthayor abheda-darśanam abhijalpa-nirūpaṇā. idam asyāḥ sādhanam, iyaṃ eṣāṃ sādhyā ity ākāra-nirūpaṇā. ... athavā smṛti-nirūpaṇayā iti jñānasya nirūpaṇam āha. abhijalpa-nirūpaṇayā iti śabdasya. ākāra-nirūpaṇayā ity arthasyāha.*

²⁰ It is to be noted that the word called *viśeṣa-śabda* denotes an entity excluded from others (*vyāvṛttārthābhīdhāyin*), referring to the exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*), see VP 3.5.4cd:

viśeṣa-śabdair ucyante vyāvṛttārthābhīdhāyibhiḥ /

Cf. VPP 3.5.4: *ekāika-vyāvṛtti-ṇiṣṭhā hi bahavaḥ śabdā vastuni pravartante. tathā ca te tatra viśeṣa-śabdā ity ucyante...*

Such is an outline of what Bhartṛhari states in his *Vṛtti* on VP 1.1.23. All of this amounts to saying that, as said above, one cannot cognise distinct things without resorting to the words which are capable of conveying them. The question has arisen how a subtle thing comes to be perceived and determined through repeated practice. Now the answer to this question is: By means of coming to be cognised as ‘This is *x*’ by the cognition which is impregnated with the word *x* capable of conveying the thing referred to by ‘this’.

3.3. As shown, in Bhartṛhari’s view, verbalisation is an essential factor of cognition. We have to note, however, that he has said that the musical note *ṣaḍja*, even if it comes within the range of perception, cannot be determined without being cognised as ‘This is *ṣaḍja*’. The next question to consider is how verbalisation is associated with cognising existent things. To this question, the *Vṛtti* on VP 1.131 will give an answer.

- (a) Things are to be known by a person according to the person’s *śabda-bhāvanā*, or the residual traces of linguistic ability, which consist in being such in which things to be verbalised are merged.²¹
- (b) Even if a non-conceptual cognition (*avikalpakam jñānam*) arises of such things, no effect is brought about by it.²²
- (c) For instance, when one walks quickly and touches things such as grass and pebbles, a cognition arises.
- (d) But even if such a cognition arises, the state of the cognition is a specific one.
- (e) For, in this state of cognition which contains an about-to-sprout seed of the residual traces of linguistic ability (*abhimukhī-bhūta-śabda-bhāvanā-bījā*), when denotative powers of words manifest themselves, the cognition gets impregnated with words (*śabdānuviddha*) and follows the denotative powers of the words to determine its object (*śabda-śakty-anupātin*).
- (f) The entity itself (*vastv-ātman*) which is the object of such a cognition is said to be cognised (*jñāyata ity abhidhīyate*) when it is obtained through its cognitive image (*ākriyamāṇa*)²³ and picked out by that cognition.

²¹ VPV 1.131: *yathāśya saṁhṛta-rūpā śabda-bhāvanā tathā jñeyeṣv arthesūtpannenāpy avikalpakena jñānena kāryam na kriyate.*

²² For (b)–(h), see note 25 below.

²³ PDh ad VPV 1.131: *ākriyamāṇaḥ iti. viśiṣṭenākāreṇa śabdānuviddhena spaṣṭena labhyamānaḥ.* When an entity is definitely cognised by the cognition impregnated with a word to which a specific image of the entity appears, it is spoken of as *ākriyamāṇa* ‘being obtained through its cognitive image’.

- (g) Under this condition, the entity is understood by the cognition (*jñānānugata*) and appears clearly in it (*vyakta-rūpa-pratyavabhāsa*).
- (h) Words that pick out meanings (*arthōpagrāhin*)²⁴ are of two types: ‘communicable’ words such as *go* and ‘incommunicable’ words such as *ṣaḍja*.²⁵ The denotative power of words is fixed for each of their meanings.²⁶

Statement (a) is made under Bhartṛhari’s well-known thesis that verbalisability is immanent in our cognitive faculty.²⁷ A part of (e), (f), and (g) say the same thing as (d) in the previous section. What is stated in (h) overlaps with what is stated in (e) in the previous section. We have to note here (b)–(e). What Bhartṛhari argue there is this.

When one walks quickly and touches grass, a cognition, i.e. a tactile sensation, arises of it. This cognition is a non-conceptual cognition. Even if the grass is cognised, practically nothing is cognised. For, in that state of cognition, the function of the seed of the residual traces of linguistic ability has not been activated. The grass is said to be cognised when it is cognised by the cognition which is impregnated with the word for it. It is not until the function of the seed is activated that the denotative power of the word manifests itself.²⁸

It is important to note two points. One is that an entity is said to be cognised when it is cognised through a cognition which is impregnated with the word for it; if it is not cognised through such a cognition, practically nothing is cognised. The other is

²⁴ That is, words which convey meanings, see PDh ad VPV 1.131: *arthōpagrāhiṇām iti. artha-pratipādakānām.*

²⁵ PDh ad VPV 1.131: *ākhyeya-rūpāṇām iti. ākhyātum śakyate rūpaṁ yeṣāṁ gavādi-śabdavat. anākhyeya-rūpāṇām iti. ṣaḍjādivat. yato na teṣāṁ arthaḥ paryāyāntareṇākhyātum śakyate.*

²⁶ VPV 1.131: *tad yathā. tvaritam gacchataḥ tṛṇa-loṣṭādi-saṁsparśāt saty api jñāne kācid eva sā jñānāvasthā yasyām abhimukhī-bhūta-śabda-bhāvanā-bijāyām āvir-bhūtāsv arthōpagrāhiṇām ākhyeya-rūpāṇām anākhyeya-rūpāṇām ca śabdānām praty-artha-niyatāsu śaktiṣu śabdānuviddhena śabda-śakty-anupātīnā jñānenākriyamāṇa upagrhyamāṇo vastv-ātmā jñānānugato vyakta-rūpa-pratyavabhāso jñāyata ity abhidhiyate.*

²⁷ VPV 1.130: *anādiś cāiṣā śabda-bhāvanā prati-puruṣam avasthita-jñāna-bija-parigrahā. na hy etasyaḥ kathañcit pauruṣeyatvam sambhavati.* According to Bhartṛhari, the residual traces of linguistic ability contain the seed of cognition, which is established in each human being; and, such residual traces of linguistic ability are beginningless, for they can never be artificial.

²⁸ Saying that a word has the power to convey its meaning amounts to saying that the word is capable of determining an entity. Note Vṛṣabha’s following comments in PDh ad VPV 1.131: (1) *śabdasya śaktir artha-pratipādanam, tad-upadarśane ’rtha-rūpa-pratipatteḥ, gaur ayam aśvo ’yam iti;* (2) *pratiniyatārtha-paricchedōpayoginyo hi tāḥ. artha-nirūpaṇa-yogata* [read: *artha-nirūpaṇa-yogyatā*] *śabdasya śaktir ity uktā. tasyām hi prabuddhāyām taj-jñānam tayārtham nirūpayati.*

that there is a case in which the seed of the residual traces of linguistic ability does not come up.

The first point will remind us of what Bhartṛhari says in his *Vṛtti* on VP 1.129:

‘Even if it exists as a thing to be cognised, an entity is as good as non-existent as long as it is not picked out by a verbal expression.’²⁹

According to Bhartṛhari, even an existent thing is regarded as non-existent, for what is said to exist is just what enters into discourse (*vyavahārāṅga*). As shown, what enters into discourse is only an entity which is cognised by a cognition impregnated with the word for it.

The second point is explained by Bhartṛhari in his *Vṛtti* on VP 1.132 as follows:

(a) Speech-element (*vāg-rūpa-mātrā*) inheres in all cognitions, just as the essential property of being an illuminator inheres in fire and that of being consciousness in the mind (*antar-yāmin*). The subtle penetration of speech (*vāg-rūpa*) recurs even in the state which lacks ostensible mental activity.³⁰

(b) The illumination (*prakāśa*) which first comes into relation with external objects makes the bare essence of an entity shine forth, since the causes for the use of the word cannot be apprehended because of the function, which cannot be designated as this or that, of the seed of the residual traces of linguistic ability (*śabda-bhāvanā-bīja*).³¹

According to Vṛṣabha, it is said that the function of the seed of the residual traces of linguistic ability cannot be designated as this or that as long as this function is not activated.³² In the light of Bhartṛhari’s denotation theory, the cause for applying a word to an entity must be the delimiting factor (*upādhi*) of the entity.³³ Conse-

²⁹ VPV 1.129: *sad api vāg-vyavahāreṇānupagrhitam artha-rūpam asatā tulyam.*

³⁰ VPV 1.132: *yathā prakāśakatvam agneḥ sva-rūpaṃ caitanyaṃ vāntar-yāmiṇas tathā jñānam api sarvaṃ vāg-rūpa-mātrānugatam. yāpy asaṅcetitāvasthā tasyām api sūkṣmo vāg-rūpānugamo ’bhyāvartate.*

³¹ VPV 1.132: *yo ’pi prathamōpanipātī bāhyeṣv artheṣu prakāśaḥ sa nimitānām aparigraheṇa vastu-svarūpa-mātram idaṃ tad ity avyapadeśyayā vṛtyā pratyavabhāsayati.*

³² PDh ad VP 1.132: *vyapadeśyayā iti. śabda-bhāvanā vidyamānāpi sā kāryābhāvān na tatra vṛttim labheta.* Bhartṛhari says that when an entity is cognised by the cognition which is impregnated with a word, it appears clearly in that cognition (*vyakta-rūpa-pratyavabhāsa*); see (g). Vṛṣabha remarks that in this situation the entity is what can be designated as this or that. PDh ad VP 1.131: *vyakta-rūpa iti. vyakta-rūpaḥ pratyavabhāso ’smin. idaṃ tad iti vyapadeśa-rūpatvāt.*

³³ VP 3.5.2abc: *dravyasyāvvyapadeśasya ya upādīyate guṇaḥ. bhedako vyapadeśāya...* According to Vṛṣabha, what Bhartṛhari means by the term *nimitta* (‘cause’) here is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) connected with an entity; see PDh ad VPV 1.132: *teṣāṃ vastu-sambandhinām gotvādīnām*

quently, when such a cause is not apprehended, it is natural that the entity is beyond verbalisation. In this situation, it has to be said that such a cognition manifests the entity as a bare entity, in an unqualified form,³⁴ and hence that it is not distinctly perceived.

All these things make it clear that in Bhartṛhari's view what is beyond verbalisation, namely what is beyond conceptualisation, is beyond the reach of ordinary cognitive states and thoughts, practically a non-existent thing. This is the underlying view on which Bhartṛhari argues that the musical note *ṣadja*, even if it comes within the range of perception, cannot be determined without being cognised as 'This is *ṣadja*'.

3.4. In view of what has been said, let us then consider another case in which it is argued that the determination of the distinction among things depends upon the word. The instance is an expression of excellence (*prakṛṣṭa-vyapadeśa*), such as *śuklataraṁ rūpam asya*—'The colour of this is whiter'.

3.4.1. Let us first of all keep in mind a basic framework for the expression of excellence. Bhartṛhari says:

'A quality is the cause to convey excellence [in respect of a substance (*dravya*)]. If the quality is presented as an independent thing (i.e. as a substance), the excellence in respect of it is understood only on the basis of its quality which resides in it.'³⁵

The point here is this. In order to convey excellence in respect of a substance, one has to resort to a quality which resides in the substance. The quality is susceptible to substantialisation. When one wishes to convey excellence in respect of a quality, which one has substantialised, one has to resort to the quality which resides in the substantialised quality.

Now Bhartṛhari says the following in regard to the utterance *śuklataraṁ rūpam asya*:

viśeṣāṇām. In Bhartṛhari's denotation theory, the terms *guṇa*, *viśeṣaṇa*, and *upādhi* are synonymous with one another.

³⁴ PDh ad VPV 1.132: *tato viśeṣaṇa-rahitam eva vastu pratyāyati*.

³⁵ VP1.65:

*guṇaḥ prakarṣa-hetur yaḥ svāntaryeṇopadiśyate /
tasyāśritād guṇād eva prakṛṣṭatvaṁ pratīyate //*

- (a) In the utterance in question there does not occur any word to convey the distinction among white colours (*saṁvijñāna-padāntarābhāva*) other than the word *śukla*.³⁶
- (b) Therefore, what are understood to be the causes of the expression of excellence (*prakṛṣṭa-vyapadeśa-hetu*) are the differentiators (*viśeṣa*) characterised as follows:³⁷
- (c) They are other than what is denoted by an affix which signifies the cause for the occurrence of the word (*bhāva-pratyaya*).
- (d) They are understood from the word *śukla* which denotes a white colour in general (*tulya-śruty-upagrhitā*).
- (e) They reside in the colour white which is spoken of as a substance, just as the colour white resides in a substance such as a cloth (*śaukalyavad eva rūpāśritāḥ*).
- (f) Insofar as the expression of excellence is made in respect of a quality which resides in a substance and which can be referred to by ‘this’ or ‘that’ and hence can be denoted as something principal, there is no end to the resulting of the abstraction of a property, which takes place when another cause for the expression of excellence is assumed.³⁸

Let us first note (c). Concerning the question of what the cause for excellence in the utterance *śuklataraṁ rūpam asya* is, Bhartṛhari, first of all, points out that the generic property whiteness (*śaukalya, śvaitya*), which is denoted by the affix *śyañ*, cannot serve as the cause for excellence in being white because the generic property ‘whiteness’ resides in all white colours and cannot serve to distinguish among white colours. Then he submits the alternative solution presented here.³⁹

It is important to note (a). Bhartṛhari states that, in the given utterance, there is no word to convey the distinction among white colours. His idea here is this. One can have different shades of white. If one wishes to specify the colour white more pre-

³⁶ VPV 1.65: *saṁvijñāna-padāntarābhāvād vā bhāva-pratyayair anirdeśyās tulya-śruty-upagrhitāḥ śauklyavad eva rūpāśritā viśeṣāḥ prakṛṣṭa-vyapadeśa-hetavo vijñāyante*.

Suppose that there are white and non-white substances. The quality white serves to differentiate the white substance from the non-white one. In this respect the item *śukla* which conveys the distinction among colours is considered to be a *saṁvijñāna-pada* with respect to that distinction.

³⁷ For (b)–(e), see note 36.

³⁸ VPV 1.65: *yāvac cēdam tad iti vyapadeśyasya prādhānyenāśritasya prakṛṣṭa-vyapadeśaḥ kriyate tāvad avicchinnō 'yam nimittāntara-parikalpanā-dharma-prasaṅga iti*.

³⁹ VPV 1.65: *śuklataraṁ rūpam asyētra [read: asyēty atra] tu rūpasya dravyatvenōpādāne kriyamāṇe rūpāśrita-nimittāt prakṛṣṭa-vyapadeśaḥ prakalpate. na ca guṇa-sāmānyam śveta-samavāyi śvaitryam ekatvād bheda-hetuḥ sambhavaṭīti saṁsargi-dharmāntarāśrayo 'vāntarasvāikasyāpi bhedaḥ parikalpyate*.

cisely, one can use a modifier, such as ‘bright’. One can seek differentiating properties such as *bhāsvaratva* or brightness to have this kind of utterance. In the utterance in question, obviously, a term such as *bhāsvara*, which denotes the property brightness, is not used. The term *bhāsvara* is properly described as *saṁvijñāna-pada* with respect to brightness, since it signifies ‘brightness’.⁴⁰ It goes without saying that this property is considered to reside in the white colour functioning as a substance (c).

As (d) states, the meaning ‘brightness’ in question lies within the domain of the word *śukla*. This is because this word denotes different white colours with different shades. It can denote a bright white colour.

Let us note (f). Bhartṛhari maintains that a quality is the cause for denoting excellence in respect of a substance; when excellence in respect of the quality is to be denoted, the quality of that quality is sought. Even if, theoretically, there would be no end to this process of abstracting some quality or other, it is natural that when one has no knowledge of the word to convey the differentiating property, one cannot have any further utterance. It is significant that in the given context Bhartṛhari considers the word *bhāsvara* as *saṁvijñāna-pada*. For, this shows that he holds that one who uses the utterance in question must have obtained the knowledge of the word which serves as the cause for determining the distinction among white colours in respect of brightness and must have determined the distinction. We have to recall that Bhartṛhari regards *saṁvijñāna-pada* as *avadhāraṇa-nibandhana-pada*.⁴¹ Therefore, if, with a certain word, one can determine the distinction among bright white colours, one can have the utterance *rūpam asya bhāsvarataram*—‘This is of a brighter white.’ But this implies that if one cannot determine the distinction in question due to the lack of the knowledge of *saṁvijñāna-pada* for it, one cannot have such an utterance.⁴²

4. Let us turn now to the context in which Bhartṛhari uses the term *saṁvijñāna-pada* to deal with the denotation of something essentially dependent as something independent (§ 2. (2)). The context is the one in which he discusses the unsignifiability of the relation (*sambandha*). What I mean by ‘the unsignifiability of the relation’ is what Bhartṛhari asserts in VP 3.3.3–4.

‘[3] When the utterance “This is the signifier of that” or “That is the significand of this” is used, the relation between word and meaning is

⁴⁰ PDh ad VPV 1.65: *na hi teṣāṁ kiñcit saṁvijñāna-padaṁ bhāsvarādi-śabdavad ihāsti*.

⁴¹ See § 3.2.

⁴² Helārāja explains as follows in VPP 3.5.3: *tatrāpi dharmāntarasya prādhānye tad-aparāśrita-dharma-nimitta eva prakarṣa iti yāvat sambhavati śabda-vyāpāras tāvad aparyavasānam eva dharmāṅgam iti ... yadā tu śabda-vyāpārōparamas tadā dharmāntara-paryeṣaṇā paryavasyati*.

understood from the genitive ending. On the basis of this [relation] the identity (*tattva*) of word and meaning is also expressed. [4] There is no word to denote a relation in terms of its own property. Because it is absolutely dependent, its form cannot be referred to by its own word.⁴³

There are two points to note here. First, a relation (*yoga*, *sambandha*) between word and its meaning enters into our consciousness through the use of genitive endings. Secondly, there is no nominal term which signifies a relation qua relation: a relation is absolutely dependent (*atyanta-paratantratva*); its characteristic form is not referred to by any particular nominal term.

Now, on this assumption, Bhartrhari describes a relation using the term *saṁvijñāna-pada* in his *Vṛtti* on VP 2.439.⁴⁴

(a) In the utterance ‘There is a contact of two fingers’ (*aṅgulyoḥ saṁyogaḥ*), the contact (*saṁyoga*), even if it is a relation, is denoted as something independent (*svatantra*) by a *saṁvijñāna-pada* such as *saṁyoga* (‘contact’).

(b) The contact is understood here as what has the property of being a relatum (*sambandhin*), just like the servant in the utterance ‘the king’s servant’ (*rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*), even if it is a relation.

(c) In the utterance ‘There is inherence between the contact and its holder’ (*saṁyoga-saṁyoginoḥ samavāyaḥ*), on the other hand, the relation with the contact, understood to be a relatum, becomes the cause for the occurrence of the genitive ending.

The point made in (a) is that with reference to the relation contact (*saṁyoga*), the term *saṁyoga*, a nominal term, is a *saṁvijñāna-pada*. Besides, the point made in (b) is that the term *saṁyoga* denotes this relation as being independent (*svatantra*) and hence as being a relatum with respect to its property (*sambandhin*), but not in its own property.

⁴³ VP 3.3.3–4:

... vācya itī ṣaṣṭhyā praṭīyate /
yogaḥ śabdārthayos tattvam apy ato vyapadiśyate //
nābhīdhānaṁ sva-dharmeṇa sambandhasyāsti vācakam /
atyanta-paratantratvād rūpaṁ nāsyāpadiśyate //

⁴⁴ VPV 2.439: *aṅgulyoḥ saṁyoga itī sambandho 'pi saṁyoga[h] saṁvijñāna-padena svatanthro 'bhīdhīyamānaḥ puruṣādīvat sambandhidharmābhīdhīyate / sambandhi-sambandhas tu ṣaṣṭhyā nīmītatvāya kalpate /* My special thanks are due to Professor Ashok Aklujkar for permission to use his unpublished edition of the *Vṛtti* to read this passage. See Ogawa (forthcoming).

What all this implies is the following: contact qua relation cannot be denoted by the term *saṃyoga* and, with reference to contact qua relation, this term is not a *saṃvijñāna-pada*. These points are stressed by Helārāja in his *Prakāśa* on VP 3.3.4.⁴⁵ According to him, when, extracting a relation from its relatum, one speaks of the relation using the term *sambandha*, one cannot refer directly to the relation qua relation with that term, since in this case one can only speak of the relation in question as something dependent (*sva-pradhāna*). Helārāja clearly states that a relation qua relation is *asaṃvijñāna-pada*, or what has no word by which it can be conveyed; and that it is to be understood from the effect of the occurrence of the genitive ending (*kāryāika-gamyā*). It is to be noted that when Helārāja says that a relation qua relation is *asaṃvijñāna-pada*, he implies that it has no term which, entering into its own essence, conveys it (*tat-svarūpa-niveśi-saṃvijñāna-pada*).⁴⁶

As shown above, one cannot have a discourse on a relation without resorting to a *saṃvijñāna-pada*, such as ‘*sambandha*’. But ‘relation’ has no *saṃvijñāna-pada* of its own by which one could capture its essence. ‘Relation’ as a substantialised entity has its *saṃvijñāna-pada*, while ‘relation’ per se has no corresponding *saṃvijñāna-pada*. That is characteristic of what is in essence of a dependent nature, such as relation.⁴⁷ And that is why in (c) Bhartṛhari has to say *śaṣṭhyā pratīyate*, namely that the relation is understood from the use of the genitive ending. The point is that there does exist a relation and it is determined as a distinct entity, but it has to be indicated with the genitive ending.

5. A close look at what is called *asaṃvijñāna-pada* has revealed the following points: First, a thing characterised as *asaṃvijñāna-pada* exists in an indistinct way. Secondly, the word called *saṃvijñāna-pada* denotes a distinct entity; but, in some cases, not in its own form.

⁴⁵ VPP 3.3.4: *tato niṣkṛṣya sambandha-śabdena sva-pradhānaḥ sambandhi-rūpatayābhidhīyamāno na sākṣāt spraṣṭum śakyata ity asaṃvijñāna-padaḥ kāryāika-gamyāḥ*.

⁴⁶ Regarding the term *samavāya* (‘inherence’), the following idea is expressed by Helārāja in VPP 3.3.19: *nitya-paratantra-rūpaś cāsau samavāya-śabdād api nāvadhāryate prayokṭr-pratipatṭybhyaṃ iti na tat-svarūpa-niveśi-saṃvijñāna-padam kimcanāsti ity avācya eva bhāvato ’yam. sambandhi-rūpatayā tu svatantraḥ samavāyaḥ śabdād avagamyate*.

⁴⁷ According to Bhartṛhari, the nominal terms *diś* (‘direction’), *sādhana* (‘accomplisher’), *kriyā* (‘action’) and *kāla* (‘time’) signify their meanings as substances, so that they do not refer to the essence of being a power (*śakti*) the direction and others have; see VP 3.6.1:

*dik sādhanam kriyā kāla iti vastv-abhidhāyinaḥ /
śakti-rūpe padārthānām atyantam anavasthitāḥ /*

In Bhartṛhari’s view, power consists in being what renders service (*upakārin*) and hence in being something dependent. See OGAWA (forthcoming).


As shown above, the word called *saṁvijñāna-pada* is the word called *avadhāraṇa-nibandhana-pada* which, denoting a distinct entity differentiated from others, serves to determine the distinction among things. This clearly shows that Bhartṛhari argues that the world we experience is segmented into distinct things by virtue of our language. The word characterised as *saṁvijñāna-pada* is involved in such segmentation, and what is signified by such a word is precisely what enters into discourse. This means that we have to depend on *saṁvijñāna-pada* for a thing so that we may speak of the thing. To speak of a relation, for example, we have to use the nominal term *sambandha* which is a *saṁvijñāna-pada* with respect to a relation as a substantialised entity. It is noteworthy that verbalisation presupposes substantialisation in Bhartṛhari's denotation theory. But we also have to note that how it is spoke of is different from how it is. The most important point to keep in mind with respect to Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language is that only the world as we speak of it is existent, namely that an entity is said to be existent only when it becomes a meaning of a word.

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**Logic and Belief
in
Interpretation
and Translation**



Major Points of Vācaspati's Disagreement with Maṇḍana*

DIWAKAR ACHARYA

The first two works of Vacaspatimiśra I, the *Nyāya-kaṇikā* and *Tattva-samīkṣā*¹, are commentaries on Maṇḍanamiśra's works. This indicates that Vācaspati initially studied Mīmāṃsā, focusing especially on Maṇḍana. His study of Maṇḍana's Mīmāṃsā works made him gradually develop his interest further in the latter's Vedānta work, the *Brahma-siddhi* (BSi), before he found his way to Nyāya. As a result, Vācaspati's tenets are influenced by Maṇḍana's thought, particularly insofar as they reflect Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta². The *Bhāmatī*, which establishes a distinct school of interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya* (BSŚBh), is mainly based on the foundation of the *Brahma-siddhi* and Vācaspatimiśra's commentary thereon, the *Tattva-samīkṣā* (TSam). It is not unknown to the scholars of Indian philosophy that most of distinctive features of the *Bhāmatī*-school have their roots in Maṇḍana's views as set forth in the *Brahma-siddhi*. In the *Bhāmatī*, Vācaspatimiśra resorts to the *Brahma-siddhi* whenever he faces unclear points in the *Śāṅkara-bhāṣya*, and so invariably explains the text convincingly. Therefore, Vācaspatimiśra is blamed by some traditional authors for following Maṇḍanamiśra blindly.

My impression, however, is that this is not always true, at least in the final stage of his writing career. It is true that Vācaspatimiśra appears to have been heavily

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¹ On chronological order of Vācaspati's works, see ACHARYA (2006: xxxi–xxxiii).

² Following the line of Maṇḍanamiśra and further developing it, Vācaspatimiśra brings together the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya theories of error as two dimensions of a combined theory of error in Vedānta, which, if observed from two different angles, is equally acceptable to all these three schools (see ACHARYA (2006: lxvii–lxviii)). I intend to compare concerned passages at some other occasion in near future.

influenced by Maṇḍanamīśra's ideas but, at the same time, we find him reconsidering the latter's positions and refining them in the *Bhāmatī*. There it appears that he developed further arguments or even new ideas from simple points made by Maṇḍana and blended them with the ideas of Śaṅkara. Not only that, Vācaspatimīśra in the *Bhāmatī* seems to differ from Maṇḍanamīśra on a number of crucial points. I shall reflect upon them here briefly.

1. Levels of Brahman Realisation

Firstly, Vācaspati does not agree with Maṇḍana on the levels of realisation of Brahman. At the beginning of the *Niyoga-kāṇḍa*, Maṇḍana mentions three possible levels of Brahman realisation: verbal knowledge, meditative knowledge and the final intuitive knowledge. In the *Tattva-samīkṣā*, Vācaspati briefly comments on the passage, saying nothing specific from his side, but in the *Bhāmatī* he delimits the third as the profound meditation (*nididhyāsana*) in the form of continuity of the mind (*citta-santati-maya*) and identifies the intuitive knowledge as a fourth form at the top, and proceeds to justify its necessity. This fourth level of realisation is an original idea on the part of Vācaspati; however, his speculation is grounded in Maṇḍana's discourse. Let us compare the following passages from the *Brahma-siddhi* and *Bhāmatī*:

‘There are three [levels of] realisation with regard to Brahman. The first comes from verbal knowledge (lit. word). Another is the realisation variously known as meditation, contemplation and cultivation, which is a continuation of the first realisation from the verbal knowledge, and the other takes the form of intuitive perception, when the state of completion occurs and all mental fabrications have ceased.’³

‘There are four [levels of] realisation with regard to Brahman. The first is reached by merely studying sentences from the Upaniṣads; this is known as the “act of hearing”. The second is reached by studying of the same Upaniṣadic sentences but at the same time reflecting on them; this is known as the “act of reflection”. The third is the profound

³ BSi 1.74: *tisraś ca pratipattayo brahmaṇi. prathamā tāvac chabdāt, anyā śabdāt pratipadya tat-santānavatī dhyāna-bhāvanōpāsānādi-śabda-vācyā, anyā tato labdha-niṣpattir vikalpita-nikhila-vikalpā sāṅgāt-karaṇa-rūpā*, see ACHARYA (2006: 156).

Vācaspatimīśra's commentary on this passage runs as follows (ACHARYA (2006: 156–157)): “*ātmā jñātavyaḥ*” *iti hi kila brahmaṇi pra[ti](pattir vidhīyate, ti)sraś ca tāḥ sambhavantīty āha—tisraś cēti. anyā tataḥ santānavatyāḥ pratīter ādara-nairantarya-ḍīrgha-kālāsevāna-labdha-paripākāyā (labdha-niṣpattir viga)lita-nikhila-vikalpā, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-nirbhāso 'vacchinna-viśaya-pratyayo vikalpaḥ, tad-rahītēty arthaḥ.*

meditation in the form of a continuation of the mind, and the fourth is the state of the intuitive perception in the form of a particular mode of the mind. Absolute unity is an inherent property of this fourth state.⁴

In the above passage from the *Bhāmāṭī*, Vācaspati clearly states that verbal knowledge continues up to the second level, and on the third level merely continuity of thought prevails, while on the fourth level intuitive realisation occurs from a particular operation of mind.⁵

Thus, according to him, a particular operation of the mind following upon impressions of 'hearing' (*śravaṇa*), 'reflection' or 'spiritual cultivation' (*manana*) and 'meditation' (*nididhyāsana*) causes the final and direct realisation of Brahman. For the followers of the *Vivaraṇa*-school of Śāṅkara Vedānta, the latter is caused by the hearing of the Upaniṣadic sentences being perfected by spiritual cultivation and meditation. This is one of the major points of difference between the two schools of interpretation among the followers of Śāṅkara Vedānta.

This question is of great importance because it involves another controversial point of debate concerning the capacity of the Upaniṣadic sentences. In Vācaspati's scheme, spiritual cultivation is fundamental and necessary; the Upaniṣadic sentences can produce only indirect knowledge of Brahman, and without spiritual cultivation direct realisation of Brahman is not possible. This is not acceptable to the followers of the *Vivaraṇa*-school, since it limits the capacity of the Upaniṣadic sentences.

In Maṅḍana's three-level scheme, the third level is already the final stage of intuitive perception and is said to be a culmination of the second level and free of all fabrications and diversities.⁶ This level is already the level of final culmination, and there is no scope for the fourth in this scheme.

In the *Brahma-sūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya* there is not the slightest allusion to a fourth level or a passage that would admit such a stage. In the *Pañca-pādikā* (PP) and *Vivaraṇa*, there is no mention of the fourth level either. Therefore, we must say that

⁴ *Bhāmāṭī* ad BSSBh 3.4.26: *catasraḥ pratipattayo brahmaṇi. prathamā tāvad upaniṣad-vākya-śravaṇa-mātrād bhavati yām kila ācakṣate śravaṇam iti. dvitīyā mīmāṃsā-sahitā tasmād eva upaniṣad-vākyaād yām ācakṣate mananam iti. tṛtīyā citta-santati-mayī, yām ācakṣate nididhyāsanam iti. caturthī sākṣāt-kāravatī vṛtti-rūpā, nāntaryam hi tasyāḥ kaivalyam iti.*

⁵ This operation of the mind in later Vedānta texts is identified as being in a pure and undifferentiated state.

⁶ It is not clear from Maṅḍana's passage, however, whether or not the verbal knowledge which is continued in the second level continues till the third, where it is culminated. This can be interpreted either way: Ānandapūrṇa in BhŚu thinks that this final culmination takes place by means of hearing (*śravaṇa-dvārā*); and if he is right, Prakāśātman is closer to Mandana. In any case, Maṅḍana's stance is less disputable than that of Vācaspati's.

this is an original idea on the part of Vācaspati which is not in agreement with Maṇḍana's thought.

2. Liberation in life

Once Brahman is realised, what happens to the realised person? Does his body immediately collapse, that is, does he die, due to the total annihilation of ignorance (*avidyā*) and *karman* brought about by the realisation of Brahman? If not, how does his body remain functional after such an annihilation?

Maṇḍana says that it all depends either upon leftover traces of the cause of the body (*avidyā*), which was once in operation (*labdha-vṛtti*), or upon the residual effect of this cause, or upon both of them.⁷ The bodies of those who have no such traces may immediately collapse, but those who have such traces may persevere in a bodily state for some time, this state being termed 'liberation in life' (*jīvan-mukti*). Maṇḍana holds a person in this state to be a man of stable insight (*sthita-prajña*) and explains that he might not be a *siddha*, one who has already attained the goal, but still a *sādhaka*, one who has reached a highly advanced stage in spiritual cultivation and is waiting for the final realisation. He writes:

'We say, first of all, the man of stable insight is not a *siddha* (i.e. one who has accomplished the goal), for whom *avidyā* has entirely disappeared, but a *sādhaka* (i.e. one who is still progressing towards the goal) who has reached a particular state, and we do not say that the body is dropped immediately after the realisation of Brahman. He awaits the extinction of the *karman* whose effects are still in motion. Here the one enjoys immediate liberation, whereas the other suffers some delay.'⁸

On this point, Vācaspati does not follow Maṇḍana, and indeed even refutes him, following Śāṅkara. According to Śāṅkara, a question like whether a realised person dies or continues to live is not a matter of debate, for the realisation of Brahman brings about annihilation of only that portion of *karman* which has not fructified and begun to produce results (*anārabdha*) but not of that which has begun to produce results (*prārabdha*). Śāṅkara writes:

⁷ Maṇḍanamiśra's preference seems to be for the second alternative (see below, p. 437). As commentators think, inasmuch as differences in the mind produce impressions and the body continues to exist.

⁸ BSi₁ 130–131: *ucyate—sthita-prajñas tāvan na vigalita-nikhilāvidyaḥ siddhaḥ, kim tu sādha- evāvasthā-viśeṣaṃ prāptaḥ syāt. na ca brūmaḥ—brahma-vedanānantara eva deha-viyogaḥ. ārabdha-kārya-karma-kṣayaṃ bhogena pratikṣata iti tatra kasya cit tat-kālo 'pavargaḥ, kasya cit kiyāmsi cit kṣepaḥ.*

‘Moreover, one should not debate in this point whether a realised person bears his body for some time or not. How could the realisation of Brahman, a conception of one’s mind, negate endurance of a body affected by some other [conception]? This point is explained in both the *śrutis* and *smṛtis* by describing the characteristics of a man of stable insight. Therefore, it can be concluded that on the strength of realisation there is extinction only of those vices and virtues the effects of which are not yet in motion.’⁹

As already stated, Vācaspatimiśra in the *Bhāmātī* not only accepts the position of Śaṅkara on this issue but also refutes Maṅḍanamiśra’s position by stating that a *sthita-prajñā* or *jīvan-mukta* cannot be a *sādhaka* awaiting the final realisation but must be a *siddha*, and that there is no higher state than this to be accomplished. Here is Vācaspatimiśra’s commentary on the above excerpt from the *Brahma-sūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya*:

‘On the *mūla* expression **one should not debate...**: the man of stable insight is not one who is still progressing towards the goal (*sādhaka*), for there is not any more primal conception that could be based on the supremacy of even further meditation. Rather, the man of stable insight is without a superior and is one who has already accomplished the goal (*siddha*).’¹⁰

It should also be noted that Maṅḍanamiśra does not think that the realised person has to consume the *prārabdha-karman* by experiencing its results; he seems to say that what remains even in the state of *jīvan-mukti* is merely an impression of *prārabdha-karman* but not the residue itself. Thus he mentions the contrary position and refutes it:

⁹ BSŚBh 4.1.15: *api ca nāvātra vivaditavyam—brahma-vidā kaṁ cit kālāṁ śarīraṁ dhriyate na vā dhriyate iti. katham hy ekasya sva-hṛdaya-pratyayaṁ brahma-vedanaṁ deha-dhāraṇaṁ cāpareṇa pratikṣeptuṁ śakyeta? śruti-smṛtiṣu ca sthita-prajñā-lakṣaṇa-nirdeśenāttad eva nirucyate. tasmād anārabdha-kāryayor eva sukrta-duṣkṛtayor vidyā-sāmarthyāt kṣaya iti nirṇayaḥ.*

¹⁰ *Bhāmātī* ad BSŚBh 4.1.15: *api ca nāvātra vivaditavyam iti. sthita-prajñās ca na sādhakāḥ; tasyōttarōttara-dhyānōtkarṣeṇa pūrva-pratyayānavasthitatvāt. niratīśayas tu sthita-prajñāḥ. sa ca siddha eva.*

Interestingly enough, Amalānanda in commenting upon this passage expressly states that Vācaspati has here refuted Maṅḍana, see KT on *Bhāmātī* ad BSŚBh 4.1.15: *bhāṣye sthita-prajñā-lakṣaṇa-nirdeśo jīvan-mukti-sādhaka uktaḥ. tatra sthita-prajñāḥ sādhamo na sākṣāt-kāravān iti maṅḍana-miśrair uktaṁ dūṣaṇam uddharati—sthita-prajñās cēti.*—‘In the *Bhāṣya*, a mention of the characteristics of the man of stable insight [found in the Upaniṣadic and *smṛti* texts] is said to be the proof of “liberation in life”. In this context, Vācaspati takes out the fault Maṅḍana [pointed out] that the man of stable insight is one who is still progressing (*sādhaka*) but not one who has obtained the intuitive perception, and writes “**The man of stable insight...**”.’

‘Some people, however, think that cessation of the *karman* set for fruition is not possible, just as in the case of an arrow impetuous [in its course] or a wheel [in motion], and that for this reason it is necessary to wait for the cessation of such *karman*. That is not true. An arrow can certainly be stopped by setting a wall or the like in its way, and can also be destroyed by cutting it off [in flight] or by other means. In our case, too, there are pacifying rituals which are capable of destroying *karman* bound for consumption, as indicated in a dream or the like. Therefore, it is sure that the endurance of the body is due to impressions (*saṃskāra*).’¹¹

However, both Śaṅkara and Vācaspati are opposed to this view and regard what is destroyed after realisation as only the *karman* which is not yet bound to have repercussions but not the *karman* which is set for fruition.¹² Thus Vācaspati not only differs from Maṇḍana on this issue but even accepts a position refuted by him.

3. The Relationship between *karman* and Realisation

Another controversial view of Maṇḍanamiśra that Vācaspati discards in the *Bhāmatī* concerns the relationship between *karman* and realisation. According to Maṇḍana, *karman* has a vital role to play even in the process of realisation of Brahman, the former being closely associated with the latter. Maṇḍana presents seven possible theories on this issue and affirms two of them. For him, either *karman* by virtue of its bi-functional nature is conducive to the realisation of *ātman* alongside the production of its direct result; or else it exists for the purification of the individual and perfects him so as to prepare him for Brahman realisation. Maṇḍana presents these two views as follows:

‘Others, however, say that all types of *karman* are finally governed by the realisation of *ātman* due to the property of separateness-with-conjunction, for it is stated in the *śruti* that “they desire to know by performing sacrifice” and “by whatever means he makes sacrifice, his mind becomes pure after the concluding *darvī-homa*”. Some others describe the relationship between *karman* and the governing authority of Brahman realisation with the words that “by means of sacrifices and

¹¹ BSi₁ 132–133: *ye tu manyante—pravṛtta-bhogānām karmanām pravṛtta-vegasyeṣor iva cakrasyeva vā na śakyaḥ pratibandhaḥ, ato bhogena kṣaya-pratikṣēti. tad asat. śakyo hiṣuḥ pratibandhuṃ kuḍyādibhiḥ, nāśayitūṃ ca cchedādibhiḥ. svapnādi-sūcitōpasthita-vipāka-varttamāna-deha-bhogya-karma-kṣayārthāni ca śāntikāni karmāni. tasmāt saṃskārād eva sthitiḥ.*

¹² See ACHARYA (2006: cxxi).

great sacrifices this body is made ready for [realisation]” and “to whom the forty rites of purification and the eight virtues [apply]”.¹³

Later, after presenting all possible views, he returns to these two views and affirms them in the following way:

‘It is logical that that *karman* which is not dependent on some other action is subordinate to realisation according to the property of separation-with-conjunction, even as the *śruti* states that “those who contemplate Brahman desire to know it by means of sacrifice”. It is called subordinate, inasmuch as it is instrumental in attaining [realisation] but does not contribute to producing it the way *prayāja* and the like do, for realisation has no other effect to be produced. Alternatively, the other position of purification is acceptable because of the testimony of the *smṛti* and also because of the fact that realisation comes only to a purified person. Thus it is said: “and since it is prescribed, the *karman* of a particular *āśrama*, too, [is helpful in realisation]”.¹⁴

Thus Maṇḍana not only claims usefulness of *karman* in the course of realising Brahman but also says that the accumulation of *karman* accelerates the process of realisation and so should be continued until the final intuitive stage of realisation (*sākṣāt-kāra*)¹⁵.

Vācaspati criticises this view of Maṇḍana and accepts that of Śaṅkara, who believes that *karman* and Brahman realisation are quite opposed to each other and a reconciliation of the two is impossible. Though Vācaspati accepts that *karman* purifies and qualifies a person for the realisation of *ātman*, he says it is effective as long as a desire for such knowledge (*vividiṣā*) is not produced. He writes:

‘For [fear of] entering into a cumbersome assumption, it is not logical to agree upon the position which postulates that the obligatory duties have a direct relation to realisation via separation-with-conjunction,

¹³ BSi₁ 27 = BSi₂ 21–22: *anye tu saṁyoga-pṛthaktvena sarva-karmaṇām evātma-jñānādhikārānupraveśam āhuḥ “vividīṣanti yajñena” iti śruteḥ, “yena kenacana yajetāpi darvī-homenānupahata-manā eva bhavati” iti ca. anye tu puruṣa-saṁskāratayātma-jñānādhikāra-saṁsparsam karmaṇām varṇayanti—“mahā-yajñais ca yajñais ca brāhmīyam kriyate tanuḥ”, “yasyāte catvāriṁśat-saṁskārā aṣṭāv ātma-guṇāḥ” iti ca.*

¹⁴ BSi₁ 36: *idam tu yuktam—kāryāntara-nirākāṅkṣāṇām api karmaṇām saṁyoga-pṛthaktvāt “tam etaṁ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividīṣanti yajñena” iti vidyāṅga-bhāvaḥ. so ’py upapatty-arthatayā, na prayājādivat kāryōpayogena, vidyāyāḥ kāryāntarā-bhāvāt. saṁkāra-pakṣo vā, smṛteḥ; saṁskṛtasya hi vidyōpatteḥ. tad uktam—“vihitatvāc cāśrama-karmāpi” iti.*

¹⁵ See the passage quoted below, p. 441.

whereas these duties can be related easily with realisation [in another way], inasmuch as they purify a person by regularly disposing accumulated vice. Thus virtues are in fact acquired from the performance of the obligatory duties, whence vice goes away. Vice alone pollutes one's mind by casting an antithetic view of eternity, purity and pleasure on this mortal, impure and sorrowful world. So when vice is removed and the doors of perception and reasoning are opened, one understands by perception and reasoning the nature of this world beyond doubt as mortal, impure and sorrowful. Then a disliking for this world known as displeasure is developed, and then rises a desire to abandon it. Then one searches for the means to do so, and in this search, hearing that the knowledge of the self is the means being searched for, one desires to know the self. Thereafter, one comes to know it by following the due course, beginning with "hearing". Because of all this, it is logical to agree that the purification of the mind by *karman* is indirectly contributive to the process of realising the truth.¹⁶

In brief, then, according to Śaṅkara and Vācaspati, once the desire for knowledge is produced and one is minded to listen to the Upaniṣads, *karman* has no further role to play and must be dropped entirely.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Bhāmatī* ad BSSBh 1.1.1: *kḷptenāiva ca nityānām karmaṇām nityēhitenōpātta-duritanibarhaṇena puruṣa-saṃskāreṇa jñānōtpattāv aṅga-bhāvōpapattau na saṃyoga-pṛthaktvena sāksād aṅga-bhāvō yuktah, kalpanā-gauravāpatteḥ. tathā hi nitya-karmānuṣṭhānād dharmōtpādah, tato pāpmā nivartate, sa hy anityāśuci-duḥkha-rūpe saṃsāre nitya-śuci-sukha-khyāti-lakṣaṇena viparyāseṇa citta-sattvaṃ malinayati. ataḥ pāpani-vṛttau pratyakṣōpapatti-dvārāpvaraṇe sati pratyakṣōpapattibhyāṃ saṃsārasyānityāśuci-duḥkha-rūpatām apratyūham avabuddhyate, tato 'syāsminn anabhirati-saṃjñam vairāgyam upajāyate, tatas taj-jihāsōpāvartate, tato hānōpāyam paryeṣate, paryeṣamāṇaś cātma-tattva-jñānam asyōpāya ity upaśrutya tat jijñāsate, tataḥ śravaṇādīkrameṇa taj jānātīty ārād upakāratvaṃ tattva-jñānōtpādam prati citta-sattva-śuddhyā karmaṇām yuktam.*

¹⁷ In commenting on Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Upaniṣadic sentence *kurvann evēha karmāṇi...* ('one should aspire to live a full life by performing *karman*'), Vācaspatimiśra follows Śaṅkara in admitting the point that a realised person can continue accumulating *karman* but states that even so he is not afflicted by it. However, his inclination is to take the above statement as a recommendation to an unrealised person, and so for him it is a secondary solution, *Bhāmatī* ad BSSBh 3.4.13–14: "*kurvann evēha karmāṇi jijīviṣed*" *ity-evam-ādiṣu niyama-śravaṇeṣu na viduṣa iti viśeṣo 'sti, aviśeṣeṇa niyama-vidhānāt. "kurvann evēha karmāṇi" ity-atrāparo viśeṣa ākhyāyate. yady apy atra prakaraṇa-sāmarthyād vidvān eva kurvann iti sambandhyeta, tathāpi vidyā-stutaye karmānuṣṭhānam etad draṣṭavyam. "na karma lipyate nare" iti hi vakṣyati. etad uktam bhavati—yāvaj-jīvaṃ karma kurvaty api viduṣi puruṣe na karma lepāya bhavati vidyā-sāmarthyād iti tad evam vidyā stūyate.*—'In the case of the statement of rules like "One should aspire to live in this world by performing *karman*", there underlies the special point that such a

Contrary to this, Maṅḍana thinks that the process of Brahman realisation is accelerated if it is accompanied by *karman*, even though plodding on towards realisation without accumulating *karman* is also possible. In support of his view, he quotes *Brahma-sūtra* 3.4.26 (*sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādi-śruter aśvavat*) and elaborates the idea that, even as it is possible to reach a destination without a horse, although one is desirable for reaching there quickly or for the sake of convenience, in the same way *karman* is desirable in the process of Brahman realisation for the same reason. He writes:

‘In the case of ascetics living in chastity, the rise of pure knowledge could be expected even without [the performance of] those duties; still, there is difference in terms of time. Thanks to these particular means, pure knowledge is revealed quickly, [much] more quickly, while in the absence of these means it is revealed slowly, [much] more slowly. It is said: “the requirement of all types of *karman* is admitted, for the *śruti* teaches sacrifice and so on [as a means of attaining Brahman], but [these duties are] like a horse”. This is the meaning of this *sūtra*: the performance of duties is required for realisation, which is to be attained through repeated practice, as the *śruti* teaches through sacrifice and charity, just as a horse is required in order to reach a village swiftly and conveniently, even though it is possible to reach there without a horse.’¹⁸

Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the same *sūtra* is quite different, and seemingly a bit distorted. He says that as a horse is employed to draw a chariot but not to plough fields, so too *karman* is required in order to produce a desire for knowledge (*vividīṣā*), not to accomplish the final goal of Brahman realisation (*brahma-jñāna*):

prescription is not for a realised person. For this statement is made without any specification, [so that a clarification is needed]. However, in the case of this particular statement, “One should aspire...”, it is further necessary to make another point, that though depending on the context a realised person may be an agent who accumulates *karman*, the accumulation of *karman* should be viewed as something for the sake of praising the realisation of [Brahman]. Later it is said that “*karman* does not defile a [realised] person”. This amounts to saying the following: even though a realised person accumulates *karman* for his whole life, his *karman* will not cause any defilement in him, given his realisation, and thus [Brahman] realisation is praised.’

¹⁸ BS₁ 36–37: *ūrdhva-retasām cāśramiṇām vināpi tair viśuddha-vidyodaya iṣyate. kiṃ tu kāla-kṛto viśeṣaḥ. sādhana-viśeṣād dhi sā kṣipram kṣiprataram ca vyajyate, tad-abhāve cireṇa cīratareṇa ca. tad uktam—sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādi-śruter aśvavat. eṣo ’rthaḥ—“yajñena dānena” iti śravaṇāt karmāṇy apekṣante vidyāyām abhyāsa-labhyāyām api, yathāntareṇāśvaṃ grāma-prāptaṃ siddhyantyaṃ saighryāyākleśāya vāśvo ’pekṣyate.*

‘The right knowledge, once attained, requires nothing towards accomplishing the goal, but it requires means towards its [own] rise. How so? Because the *śruti* teaches sacrifice and so on as the means thereto. ... Given their connection with the desire to know [the self], they are regarded as the means whereby [the right knowledge] arises. The expression “like a horse” in the *sūtra* points at ability. Even as a horse, because of its ability, is employed to pull a chariot but not to plough, similarly the ritual duties of [the earlier] *āśramas* are not required by the right knowledge towards accomplishing the goal, but only towards its [own] rise.’¹⁹

Maṇḍana strongly criticises this position. He postulates that *karman* and Brahman realisation are hardly opposed to each other, and repeatedly states that the former is conducive not only to a desire for knowledge (*vividiṣā*) but also to the final intuitive realisation of Brahman.²⁰

For his part, Vācaspati rejects any positive relation between the two:

‘In this way, for a person who has not performed *karman* in this life but whose mind has been purified by his actions in the previous life and an aversion to this world has arisen in him through an apprehension of its worthlessness, there is no use performing *karman*, that is fit and favourable for the rise of aversion. For its purpose has already been served by his having performed *karman* in his previous life.’²¹

Thus neither of the two views concerning the relation between *karman* and realisation affirmed by Maṇḍanamiśra is acceptable to Vācaspatimiśra in this matter.

4. The Significance of Renunciation (*saṁnyāsa*)

The above view of Maṇḍanamiśra regarding the relationship between *karman* and Brahman realisation has a direct impact on the question of the significance of

¹⁹ BSŚBh 3.4.26: *utpannā hi vidyā phala-siddhiṁ prati na kiṁ cid apekṣate, utpattiṁ prati tv apekṣate. kutaḥ? yajñādi-śruteḥ. ... vividiṣā-saṁyogāc cāṣāṁ utpatti-sādhana-bhāvo ’vasīyate. ... aśvavad iti yogyatā-nidarśanam. yathā ca yogyatā-vaśenāśvo na lāṅgalākaraṇe yujyate, rathacaryāyām tu yujyate. evam āśrama-karmāṇi vidyayā phala-siddhau nāpekṣyante, utpattau cāpekṣyanta iti.*

²⁰ See BSi₁ 32–36.

²¹ *Bhāmāṭī* ad BSŚBh 1.1.1: *evaṁ cānanuṣṭhita-karmāpi prāg-bhaviya-karma-vaśād yo viśuddha-sattvaḥ saṁsārāsārātā-darśanena niṣpanna-vairāgyaḥ, kṛtāṁ tasya karmānuṣṭhānena vairāgyōt-pādōpayoginā, prāg-bhaviya-karmānuṣṭhānād eva tat-siddheḥ.*

saṁnyāsa. Since *karman* is conducive to the final realisation and is effective till the end of one's life, *saṁnyāsa* should not really be necessary. A householder who continues with the performance of *karman*, specifically the obligatory duties (*nitya-karman*), should reach the goal rather earlier than an ascetic who renounces everything. Indeed, according to Maṇḍana, a householder gallops towards the goal while an ascetic is still plodding on.²² This idea would in no way have been acceptable to Śaṅkara and his followers, who champion *saṁnyāsa* with almost propagandist fervour.

According to Śaṅkara, *saṁnyāsa* is a necessary condition for Brahman realisation. For him, abiding in Brahman (*brahma-saṁsthatā*), in complete surrender to Brahman, is possible only for a renunciant, not for others in any of the other three stages of life. These have to perform their specific duties; if they stop performing the recommended duties, they will be committing sin. A renunciant, however, is different; he does not acquire sin by not performing *karman*, inasmuch as he has renounced all *karman*.²³

Śaṅkara states that renunciation is part and parcel of the maturity leading to Brahman realisation and is recommended for a qualified person. One is called upon to renounce all *karman* after listening to the Upaniṣads:

‘As renunciation is part of the maturity leading to Brahman realisation, it is not for people other than allotted ones. And the *śruti* teaches this: “Now a mendicant with his head shaved, pale-dressed, without possessions, clean, free from malice and living on alms is [ready] for Brahmanhood”.’²⁴

Here too, Vācaspati follows Śaṅkara, not Maṇḍanamiśra, as his commentary on the above *Brahma-sūtra-śaṅkara-bhāṣya* passage makes clear:

‘This is what is taught: Brahman[hood] is renunciation characterised by the abandonment of all types of longing through devotion to Brahman. Therefore, such a special [way of life] characterised by renunciation and abiding in Brahman is only for the mendicant, not for people in the

²² See ACHARYA (2006: cxv).

²³ BSŚBh 3.4.20: *atrôcyate—brahma-saṁstha iti hi brahmaṇi parisamāptir ananya-vyāpārātā-rūpaṁ tan-niṣṭhatvam abhidhīyate. tac ca trayāṇām āśramāṇām na sambhavati, svāśrama-vihita-karmānauṣṭhāne pratyavāya-śravaṇāt. parivrājakaśya tu sarva-karma-saṁnyāsāt pratyavāyo na sambhavaty anauṣṭhāna-nimittaḥ. śama-damādis tu tadīyo dharmo brahma-saṁsthatāyā upodbalako na virodhī. brahma-niṣṭhatvam eva hi tasya śama-damādy-upabṛñhitam svāśrama-vihitam karma.*

²⁴ BSŚBh 3.4.20: *brahma-jñāna-paripākāṅgatvāc ca pārvirājyasya nānadhikṛta-viṣayatvam. tac ca darśayati—“atha parivrāḍ vivarṇa-vāsā muṇḍo ’parigrahaḥ śucir adrohī bhaiḥṣāṇo brahma-bhūyāya bhavati” iti.*

other stages of life. Intuitive perception, the maturity of Brahman realisation arising from verbal knowledge, is the only means of emancipation. Renunciation is prescribed as part of this maturity, and is not for people to whom it has not been allotted.²⁵

According to Vācaspati, one should renounce as soon as desires have fallen away;²⁶ and thus he appears to assume that *saṁnyāsa* is a prerequisite for Brahman realisation.

Vācaspati generally takes the liberty to introduce new ideas and add extra remarks. Thus, though he appears to follow Śāṅkara in the last three instances above, it is important to note that he does so while refuting or discarding Maṇḍana's views. As to the first instance, it is a revised presentation of an idea found in the *Brahmasiddhi*; still, it is perfect and effective in its own way, and even leads to new avenues of philosophic pursuit.

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²⁵ *Bhāmatī* ad BSŚBh 3.4.20: *etad uktam bhavati—brahma-paratayā sarvêṣaṇā-parityāga-lakṣaṇo nyāso brahmēti. tathā cēdṛśam nyāsa-lakṣaṇam brahma-saṁsthatva-lakṣaṇam bhikṣor evāsādhāraṇam nētareṣām āśramiṇām. brahma-jñānasya śabda-janitasya yaḥ paripākaḥ sāksāt-kāro 'pavarga-sādhanaṁ tad-aṅgatayā pārvirājyam vihitam, na tv anadhikṛtam pratīty arthaḥ.*

²⁶ *Bhāmatī* ad BSŚBh 1.1.1: “yadi vetarathā brahmacaryād eva pravrajed grhād vā vanād vā” ity etāvataḥ hi vairāgyam upalakṣayati. ata eva “yadahar eva virajet tadahar eva pravrajed” iti śrutiḥ.

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**From the *Tattva-cintā-maṇi* by Gaṅgeśa
The *Kevala-vyatireki-prakaraṇam***

NEGATIVE-ONLY INFERENCE

Annotated Translation and Commentary

STEPHEN H. PHILLIPS

Introduction

Much of the outstanding work in epistemology and logic of the Navya-nyāya school remains inaccessible except to traditional scholars in India. N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya, a traditional scholar of great accomplishment, read with me this section of the masterwork of Gaṅgeśa (c. 1300) in February of 2000. This translation and commentary have benefited much from his guidance and an occasional correction of the text. Unlike with some of our previous work, however, we are not this time co-authors and mistakes of interpretation belong only to me. Before attempting to translate the section, which concerns a thorny area of logic, I did much work in Western sources (including a graduate course in philosophical logic) and my reading and comments are informed, hopefully, as much by contemporary understandings as by Gaṅgeśa's Nyāya inheritance. Gaṅgeśa is a first-rate philosopher and tools of contemporary logic help enormously in tracing his thought.

The text is taken from the Tirupati Vidyapeetha edition of the inference chapter of the *Tattva-cintā-maṇi*, part one (TCM_T).¹ In the present edition, compounds are indicated by hyphens and *sandhi* is broken but letters dropped or changed are not restored. A circumflex indicates a vowel *sandhi* at the word junction of a compound, overriding the usual hyphen. Beyond indicating *sandhi* breaks, no effort has been made to improve the representation of *sandhi*. The Tirupati edition is here practically mirrored and violations of *sandhi* are left as they appear. Some punctua-

¹ RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (1982: 441–487). The edition includes the *Prakāśa* commentary by Rucidatta Miśra and a subcommentary by Dharmarājādhvarin, both of which have proved helpful.

tion has been simplified and there are no paragraph indentations or designations other than the big breaks for translation and comment. In this way my transliterated text is an edition distinct from the Tirupati edition, representing how I read Gaṅgeśa. All non-punctuation emendations are indicated in notes. References (e.g. TCM_T 442) are to pages of the editions.

For the convenience of Sanskritists who possess only the older Calcutta Asiatic Society edition (1991 reprint), page references to it too are given (TCM_C).² No attempt has been made to edit the text critically or systematically to compare the two published editions. But in a few places I have followed a clearly preferable phrase of the Calcutta edition, marking the emendation in a note. The commentary, moreover, by Mathurānātha, published there, sometimes proved helpful.

Let us review a minimal set of logical terms, ones that are standard across Nyāya and most of the other classical schools:

<i>pakṣa</i>	(a)	the inferential subject, e.g. ‘the mountain’ in the stock example;
<i>sādhana</i>	(H)	the prover (<i>hetu</i> is a synonym), e.g. ‘smokiness’;
<i>sādhya</i>	(S)	the probandum, the property to be proved, e.g. ‘fieriness’;
<i>vyāpti</i>	(x)(Hx → Sx)	the inference-grounding pervasion, e.g. ‘Wherever smoke, there fire’.

Inductive support is presumed, a basis for the proper formation of the inference-informing *saṃskāra* or ‘mental disposition’, which is called the ‘example’.

<i>dṛṣṭānta</i>		a pervasion-supportive example, a locus known to exhibit both the prover and the probandum, e.g. ‘a kitchen hearth’; and with respect to the negative method, e.g. ‘a lake’, known as a locus of both the absence of the probandum and absence of the prover.
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A stock five-step proof formula runs as follows:

1. [The ‘proposition’ to be proved:] That mountain is fiery.
2. [The ‘reason’:] That mountain is smoky.
3. [The ‘example’ generating the general rule:] Like a kitchen hearth. [Or, in the case of the negative method:] Unlike a lake.

² TARKAVAGISH (1991: 582–625).

4. [The ‘application’:] And this is likewise.
5. [The ‘conclusion’:] Therefore, that mountain is fiery.

The five steps are to be construed as a single statement governed by grammatical and semantic rules, a formal presentation of an ‘inference for others’ (*parârthânumāna*).

‘Inference for oneself’ (*svârthânumāna*) may be represented:

$$(K)(S^pHa) \rightarrow (K)Sa$$

If a person comes to know that H-as-qualified-by-being-pervaded-by-S (*sādhyavyāpaka-pakṣa-dharmatā-viśiṣṭa-hetu*) qualifies *a*, then that person comes to know that *Sa*.

In wide overview, negative-only inference was highly controversial among the classical schools.³ Two co-extensional terms (e.g. ‘being earthen’ and ‘having smell’) present an epistemological puzzle when the one is used to pick out the inferential subject (*pakṣa*) and the other the prover (*hetu*): inference as a knowledge source normally requires a positive inductive basis from which extrapolation proceeds to inference-warranting knowledge of pervasion. An objector will say as much in the very first passage of our text (see below, p. 452). And since the inferential subject cannot be used itself as such support—otherwise, inference would be pointless—a putative prover’s extensional equivalence to the subject would mean that there could be no positive support, no correlations of a positive variety of the S and the H. Correlations of absences, the objector will suggest (in line with many of like philosophical prejudice), are problematic.

Clearly, the form seems invalid without restriction, since it would prove too much: given merely that ‘*a* is H’, with no known H outside the *pakṣa* (*a*), it would appear from the correlation of $\sim S$ and $\sim H$, then, that we could prove of *a* any S known not to reside outside the *pakṣa*. For example, ‘Martian-made’ (S) could be proved of every cow (*a*) by the prover cowhood (H). Everywhere we find something that is not a cow, there we find something that is not Martian-made, e.g. a rock. Thus, since every cow has cowhood, it is Martian-made. (See below p. 501, TCM_T 500, for a similar point concerning the name ‘Ḍittha’.) It is true that Gaṅgeśa would rule this inference out as having an ‘unfamiliar’ probandum (*aprasiddha*). And other Nyāya logicians would reject it as falling to the counter-inference, *sat-pratipakṣa*, ‘Every cow is non-Martian-made, since it is a cow, unlike a rock.’ Nev-

³ Excellent discussion of Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician (c. 650), who dismisses the form, and Uddyotakara and company, who defend it, is: MATILAL (1998: 108–26). Another excellent introduction concentrating on Pracīna (‘Old’) Nyāya is: CHAKRABARTI (1999: 79–91).

ertheless, if the form is to have validity *prima facie*—an epistemological interpretation consonant with Gaṅgeśa’s overall view⁴—it appears we’ll have to be especially good at countering in this way pseudo-inferences. Better would appear to be the way of the Buddhists to reject the form entirely.

Furthermore, negative correlations would not seem strictly relevant, as is brought out by the ‘ravens paradox’ well-known to students of inductive logic.⁵ An evidence basis supporting the generalisation, ‘All ravens are black’, benefits from the sight of an additional black raven. But to flip the pages of a book, noting that one after another is neither a raven nor black, seems irrelevant. In Nyāya terms, a pervasion of being-black (H) by being-a-raven (S) would seem to require positive evidence. Negative correlations, being practically everywhere, shouldn’t count. Of course, Gaṅgeśa would view the pervasion of being-a-raven by being-black as known by both the positive and negative methods. The problem is nevertheless plain.

On the other hand, if the absence of the probandum (\sim S) is grasped as having the same or an inclusive extension with the absence of the prover (\sim H), the presence of the prover (H), which is an absence of the absence of itself ($\sim\sim$ H), proves the absence of the absence of the probandum ($\sim\sim$ S), which is the probandum itself (S). This seems to be how Gaṅgeśa understands the logic of the ‘negative-only’ inference, (*kevala-*)*vyatirekin*. He will point to the logical rule of transposition as underpinning his position on the negative-only (below, TCM_T 442). A pervasion expressed negatively is equivalent to one expressed positively.

Furthermore, all things H being things S may be evident only from the ramification that everything that is not an S is not an H. Positive correlations may be hidden. A double absence is equivalent to a positive presence, that is, with respect to two ‘mutual absences’ or ‘distinctnesses’ (*a*’s distinctness from being-distinct-from-*a* is equivalent to *a*’s identity), as opposed to ‘relational absences’. All these points surface in the section.

Finally concerning the content of the knowledge generated. In consideration of the knowledge that would be the result of negative-only inferences, the deepest worry concerns definitions of fundamental categories. The fundamental truths of things (*tattva*), which are captured by philosophical definitions, seem accessible only through knowledge of fundamental distinctions. For example, a standard inference to self (*ātman*) as a fundamental category of substance is negative-only:

<i>a</i> (<i>pakṣa</i>)	=	every-living-body
S (<i>sādhya</i>)	=	has-a-self
H (<i>sādhana</i>)	=	has-breath

⁴ PHILLIPS–RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (2004: 7–12 and 20).

⁵ Cf. HEMPEL (1965: 12–25).

Thus, ‘Every living body has a self, *since* every living body has breath, unlike a pot (a pot being qualified by both absence-of-self and absence-of-breath).’ The inferential subject includes all living bodies and so there is no *sapaḥṣa*, no examples of the probandum known outside the set of things that are living bodies. Thus, the inference has to be *kevala-vyatirekin*, based solely on correlations of absences, ‘unlike a pot’, a pot having neither breath nor a self.

This inference, analysis of which is probably the most interesting portion of the section (beginning below, TCM_T 488), was in part presented by me at the International Seminar, ‘Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy’, May 2006, organised by the Institute of Oriental Studies, Warsaw University. I wish to thank all the participants for helpful feedback and in particular the conference organisers, Piotr Balcerowicz, Marek Mejer and Monika Nowakowska.

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kevala-vyatireky-anumāna
atha kevala-vyatireki-prakaraṇam

Now examination of the exclusively negative inference.

Text (TCM_T 441 and TCM_C 582) and Translation

kevala-vyatirekī tv asat sapaḥṣaḥ. yatra vyatireka-sahacāreṇa vyāpti-grahaḥ. nanu vyatirekī na anumānam, vyāpti-pakṣa-dharmatā-jñānasya tad-dhetutvāt. atra vyatireka-sahacārāt tatra vyāptir anvayasya pakṣa-dharmatā⁶.

Gaṅgeśa: [Of the three types of inference, (a) that having a prover whose pervasion by the probandum is known by both positive and negative correlations, (b) that where the prover’s being pervaded is known only by positive correlations and (c) that where the pervasion is known only by negative correlations, this last], the prover’s being known as pervaded [by the probandum] only through negative correlations works without a *sapaḥṣa* [known instances of the probandum property other than the inferential subject]. The pervasion is grasped by the method of negative correlation [where the probandum S is not, there the prover H is not, too].

⁶ Deleting the *na* in line with the correct reading of TCM_C.

Objection: The ‘exclusively negative’ pattern [as you have it] is not inference, (i.e. the ‘prover’ whose relation to a probandum is grasped in such a manner of negative correlation is not a *pramāṇa*). For, inferential awareness is caused by cognition (*parāmarśa*) of a prover’s being a property of an inferential subject as qualified by an awareness of pervasion [by a probandum]. Here [in your pseudo-inferential pattern] where the correlation is with an absence [absence of the prover], the pervasion is also so (i.e. a correlation with an absence). But the inferential subject’s exhibiting a [genuine] prover is an exhibiting [not of absence but] of a positive presence.

Comments

Gaṅgeśa’s division of inferences into three types—according to the inference-warranting pervasion being known (a) by both positive and negative correlations, (b) only by positive correlations and (c) only by negative correlations—is not found in the *Nyāya-sūtra* (NS, c. 150) or Vātsyāyana’s commentary, the NBh (c. 400). Uddyotakara (c. 600) introduces it in his ‘elaboration’ (*vārttika*) of Vātsyāyana’s *bhāṣya*. However, near the end of Vātsyāyana’s comments on the so-called inference *sūtra* (NS 1.1.5), there occurs the ‘negative-only’ inference—to the existence of self, *ātman*—that will become the centre of discussion in the second half of our text (TCM_T 488 ff.). There Vātsyāyana also disparages any final or natural system of inference types. Nevertheless, in Uddyotakara’s subcommentary, Gaṅgeśa’s issues are raised in connection with the *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* type of inference mentioned in NS 1.1.5 and illustrated by Vātsyāyana’s proof of a self, including the objection here.⁷

This objection, which is not definitively answered until several other arguments are out on the table, targets the negative form of the inference rule, absences of the probandum correlating with absences of the prover. A good inference not only requires knowledge of pervasion (*vyāpti*) along with knowledge of the prover as qualifying the inferential subject (*pakṣa-dharmatā*). A good inference also requires, the objector alleges, a match between, so to say, the quality of the variables in the general and singular requirements (where H, there S; *a* is H). Such a singular qualifying (*Ha*) is always positive, the objector claims, and thus could not match the negative variable ($\sim H$) of the ‘negative-only’. Furthermore, the conclusion is positive (*Sa*).

Text (TCM_T 441 and TCM_C 585) and Translation

na ca vyāpta-pakṣa-dharmatvaṃ sādhyābhāva-vyāpakābhāva-pratīyogisattvam ubhayam apy anumiti-prayojakam iti vācyam. ananugamāt. na

⁷ NYAYA-TARKATIRTHA–TARKATIRTHA–TARKATIRTHA (1985: 156–57).

*ca anyataratvaṃ tathā, eka-pramāṇa-pariśeṣāpatteḥ. na ca tṛṇāraṇi-
maṇi-nyāyena anumiti-viśeṣe tad-kāraṇatvaṃ iti vācyam. vyatireki-
sādhye 'numititvāsiddheḥ, ubhaya-siddha-klpta-tat-kāraṇasya abhāvāt.
na ca sādhyābhāva-vyāpakābhāva-pratīyogitvam eva anumiti-
prayojakam iti vācyam. gauravāt. kevalānvayiny abhāvāc ca.*

Objection 2 (to the original objector 1): Both the two initiate the process resulting in inferential awareness, both, that is, the prover's being a property of the inferential subject that is pervaded (by the probandum) and the prover's being the counter-correlate (or absentee) of the absence that pervades the probandum's absence.

Answer (by objector 1): That should not be said. For in that case inference would not be uniform (i.e. would divide into two distinct *pramāṇa*). And being-the-one-or-the-other [as you describe the dual or alternative types of prover] is not the uniformity required, since if it were only one type of *pramāṇa* would remain.

Objector 2: [But the sort of uniformity required is not what you presume.] By the maxim of '[Fire can be produced] from straw, tinder sticks, or a jewel', we should think of the causes of an inferential awareness as varying with the instance.

Objector 1: That also should not be said. It is not accepted [by us] that any inferential awareness is the result of such a prover establishing its probandum negatively, since there is no agreement between our two sides that there is such a negative cause of inference beyond the factors that we both do accept and work with [namely, the prover's qualifying the inferential subject and its being pervaded by the probandum].

Objector 2: [Then] 'the prover's being the counter-correlate [or absentee] of the absence that pervades the probandum's absence [indirectly]' alone initiates the process resulting in inferential awareness (i.e. the alternative characterisation is not necessary).

Objector 1: You can't say that. For, it is a cumbersome conception [in its trying to turn a relation between positive presences into a relation between absences] and it leaves out inferences based exclusively on positive correlations [such as, 'This is nameable, *since* it is knowable'].

Comments

Inference is a process with more unity than the proposal by Objector 2 would entail. By the quirky logic of alternation we could reduce all *pramāṇa* to one. Given that we are concerned with pertinent factors in the generation of veridical awareness, if a veridical inferential awareness is said to result from inference specified as such-and-

such *or* whatever (generator of veridical awareness), then perception, analogy and testimony will all be the same as inference.

The cumbersomeness of the final proposal is shown simply by its being a few words that are used in the standard expression, '[cognition of] the prover on the inferential subject etc.', *vyāpti-pakṣa-dharmatā*, compared to the long expression, '[cognition of] the prover's being the counter-correlate of the absence that pervades the probandum's absence'. But the latter expression is of course awkward as well, with its mention of the word 'absence' (*abhāva*) twice.

A second fault of the proposal is that some of its terms would fail to refer when the type of inference is plugged in that is 'based exclusively on positive correlations', *kevalānvayin*. This is the fault that eliminates, Gaṅgeśa has shown in the first section of his *anumāna* chapter, several well-known contenders for a definition of pervasion itself, *vyāpti*.

Text (TCM_T 442 and TCM_C 588) and Translation

atha sādhyābhāva-vyāpakābhāva-pratīyogitvena sādhyā-vyāpyatvam anumīyate. evaṃ vyatireka-vyāptyānvaya-vyāptim anumāya yatra anumitiḥ sa eva vyatirekī ity ucyata iti. tan na. anvaya-vyāpter gamakatve vyatireka-vyāpty-upanyāsasya arthāntaratāpatteḥ. anvaya-vyāpty-anukūlatayā ca tad-upanyāse 'nvaya-vyāptim anupanyasya tad-upanyāsasya aprāpta-kālatvād iti.

Objection (by Objector 2): By means of a prover that is the counter-correlate of an absence that pervades an absence of the probandum ($\sim S \rightarrow \sim H$), it is inferred that it is pervaded by the probandum ($H \rightarrow S$). In this way, having inferred by means of a pervasion between absences (*vyatireka-vyāpti*) that there is a pervasion between presences, one goes on to arrive at the [standard] inferential awareness [of the inferential subject as possessing the probandum]—where this occurs there alone is there a case of '[exclusively] negative inference' (not where there is no prior step involving the relation of absences, though all inferences involve a relation of presences).

Answer (by Objector 1): That's wrong. For, this faces the objection that the mention of the negative pervasion becomes pointless (a kind of 'switching meaning', *arthāntara*) since a positive pervasion is what makes an inference.

Furthermore, if the mention of the negative pervasion is because it conforms to the positive pervasion, then one not mentioning the positive pervasion commits the 'mismatched' fallacy in mentioning the negative pervasion.

Comments

Objector 2 now points out that the ‘negative-only’ inference (*vyatirekin*) is really two inferences: it is concluded, first, from the relation between the absences that the probandum pervades the prover (which qualifies the inferential subject); from this it is concluded, second, that the inferential subject possesses the probandum. In response, Gaṅgeśa’s original objector claims that this view has two faults against it, both of which amount to equivocation. Only the positive form is meant.

Text (TCM_T 442 and TCM_C 591) and Translation

*ucyate. nirupādhi-vyatireka-sahacāreṇa anvaya-vyāptir eva grhyate
pratīyogy-anuyogi-bhāvasya niyāmakatvāt anvaya-vyatireka-vat.*

Gaṅgeśa: We answer. By means of the method of negative correlation (no S and no H) insofar as there is no inferential undercutting condition, a pervasion between positives [H and S] is grasped. For, there is an invariable rule regulating the relation between the two terms, as in the case of an inference based on both positive and negative correlations.

Comments

Let us put in mind again, here at the beginning of a *siddhānta* statement, the standard inference to self (*ātman*). As mentioned, this comes to be centre stage only much later, after a long discussion of an inference to earth as a fundamental substance. But we can appreciate Gaṅgeśa’s present points in its terms.

<i>a</i>	(<i>pakṣa</i>)	every-living-body
S	(<i>sādhya</i>)	has-a-self
H	(<i>sādhana</i>)	has-breath
<i>b</i>	(<i>dr̥ṣṭānta</i>)	a pot ($\sim Sb$ and $\sim Hb$)

Thus,

Every living body has a self (*Sa*), *since* a living body has breath (*Ha*),
unlike a pot ($(x)(\sim Sx \rightarrow \sim Hx)$).

Gaṅgeśa endorses a version of the law of contraposition (or transposition):

$$(x)(\sim Sx \rightarrow \sim Hx) \equiv (x)(Hx \rightarrow Sx)$$

Therefore, *Sa*, since *Ha* and $(x)(Hx \rightarrow Sx)$.

The inferential subject includes all living bodies, and so there is no *sapakṣa*, no examples of the probandum known outside the set of things that are living bodies. It

is based solely on negative correlations, ‘unlike a pot’, a pot having neither breath nor a self. Of course, it is also true that a pot is not clever. Does this mean that every living body is? To repeat some of our opening remarks, the inference form seems by itself too powerful, generating false inferential awarenesses.

Thus one is tempted to interpret the qualification included here, ‘so long as there is no inferential undercutting condition’ (*nirupādhi*), as terrifically significant, in restricting appropriately (it might be hoped) the negative-only method. An *upādhi* is an ‘inferential undercutter’ because it entails a counter-example, to wit, that there is something or other that is both an H and a \sim S.

An *upādhi* is (according to a standard definition which although refined by Gaṅgeśa suits our purposes here) a property U such that

- (1) U pervades the probandum S (*sādhya*, i.e. anything that is an S is a U, *sādhya-vyāpaka*): ‘Everything clever is human’, and
- (2) U does not pervade the prover H (*sādhana* or *hetu*, i.e. there is something that is an H but not a U, *sādhanāvyāpaka*): ‘e.g. my cat’.

- (1) $(x) (Sx \rightarrow Ux)$
- (2) $(\exists x) (Hx \cdot \sim Ux)$


It follows then that

- (3) $(\exists x) (Hx \cdot \sim Sx)$.
(There is something that exhibits the prover without exhibiting the probandum: ‘e.g. my cat’.)

Thus, there is ‘deviation’ and no relation of pervasion:

- (4) $\sim(x) (Hx \rightarrow Sx)$

Thus in the present passage, Gaṅgeśa would seem to state a relevance condition, a requirement that we consider the possibility of a counter-example in extrapolating from correlations of absences in particular, that we be duly diligent in checking for an undercutter—the ramifications of something’s being an S—to make sure that any such thing would also pervade the H, the prover. If we would prove that ‘every living body is clever’ from the prover, ‘having-breath’, the undercutter (*upādhi*), ‘being-human’, would show the error of our ways. Being-human pervades cleverness, but some things that have breath are not clever.



H = having breath
 S = being clever
 U = being human
 C = my cat

(1) $(x) (Sx \rightarrow Ux)$

Everything clever is human

(2) $(\exists x) (Hx \cdot \sim Ux)$

e.g. my cat, which has breath but is not human

However, undercutting is not Gaṅgeśā's focus in this section, which is, rather, the epistemic requirement that the probandum property be understood or 'familiar' (*prasiddha*) in some way. There may seem, then, to be an interpretative issue in the question of how much work is supposed to be done by the *nirupādhi* requirement over and above the requirement of familiarity, but my view is that it does none in particular. One may ask whether Gaṅgeśā needs the *nirupādhi* requirement given his restrictions on term introduction that he will emphasise until the very end. Note that this is the only place where he mentions *upādhis* in the entire section. How diligently would we have to search to make sure that an inference is *upādhi-frei*?

The *upādhi* makes a distinction, showing that while there may be some Hs that are Ss not all of them are. Unfortunately, there is no prophylactic to protect us from actual *upādhi*-infection of what we quite rightly take to be good inferences. But though imitated by cognitive patterns that turn out to be wrong, some negative-only inferences remain *bona fide*. Indeed, we have every right to assert the conclusion of such an inference so long as we are unaware of *upādhis*. In other words, I take sensitivity to *upādhis* to be a general epistemic requirement. I may well infer the cleverness of living beings from their having-breath—until you remind me that non-human animals have breath but are not commonly clever. To think of living beings as clever may be absent-minded but nevertheless not simply wrong. Inference is prolific and looking for *upādhis* is a general epistemic duty that is more or less pressing depending on circumstances.⁸

Note finally that the special domains of philosophy, the general topics of metaphysics and epistemology, all involve controversy and thus call for argument and due consideration of opposing views. Thus the epistemological requirements are much higher than those of everyday life, *laukika* knowledge being automatically acquired without special preparations. With philosophy, in contrast, we bring to the table mastery of fallacies and other common flaws of reasoning and would have the

⁸ This epistemological incorporation is argued in PHILLIPS–RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (2002). Helping us to appreciate the epistemic nature of *upādhi* consideration by way of arguing that the concluding of *Sa* is monotonic is: SIDERITS (2004: 302–21). An excellent paper showing that the issue of the nature of the logic (as opposed to the epistemology) is not clear-cut, however, is: OETKE (2004: 23–38).

responsibility to prove, for instance, that an alleged undercutter (*upādhi*) is only pseudo (*ābhāsa*). This is the reason that we study, Gaṅgeśa says, *upādhy-ābhāsa* and *hetv-ābhāsa*, in advance of philosophical engagement (*kathā*).⁹

Text (TCM_T 447 and TCM_C 592) and Translation

*nanv*¹⁰ *evaṃ vyāpti-graha eva pṛthivī itara-bhinnā iti bhāsitaṃ niyata-sāmānādhikaraṇya-rūpatvāt vyāpter iti cet, satyam. gandha-vattvāvacchedena itara-bhedasya sādhyatvāt. ata eva ācāryaḥ pakṣatāvachedake na hetutvam anumene. pṛthivītvam itara-bhedavyāpyam iti pratīṭāv api sarvā pṛthivī itara-bhinnā iti pṛthivī-viśeṣyaka-buddher vyatireki-sādhyatvāc ca.*

Objection: Only if the pervasion has already been grasped will there appear to cognition [the conclusion of your standard ‘negative-only inference’, namely] that earth is distinct from the other things (i.e. the other substances, water and the rest, along with things belonging to non-substance categories, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology and so you would commit the fallacy of trying to prove what is already established, *siddha-sādhana*). For, a pervasion takes the form of a rule-bound presence [of the prover and probandum] in the same loci.

Gaṅgeśa: That’s true [to an extent, but there is no fallacy of *siddha-sādhana* for two reasons]. (1) The probandum is ‘distinctness from the other things’ as specified by the having of smell. This is why our teacher [Udayana] has not accepted inferences whose provers are the specifiers of the subjecthood. And (2) although a person already has the notion that being-earth (earthhood, the universal resting in all earthen things) is pervaded by distinctness-from-the-other-things, [to make the inference is nevertheless useful in that] the cognition that *everything* earthen is distinct from the other things [in our ontology], which is a cognition that has as its qualificandum [not earthhood or earth in general but] earth [in particular], is proved [only] by a inference based on negative correlations.

⁹ RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (1999: 1). This is not a new position. Vātsyāyana, in explaining why the word *samsaya* (‘doubt’) appears in *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.1, reminds us that it is neither certainty nor ignorance but rather doubt that provokes the employment of *nyāya* (‘philosophical method’). This latter, *nyāya*, amounts to inferential demonstration of a thesis and refutation of a counter-thesis: *pakṣa-pratipakṣau nyāya-pravṛtti; arthāvadadhāraṇam nirṇayas tattva-jñānam iti*. In the translation by JHA (1984: 44): ‘...“considering of the two sides” constitutes the process of reasoning [*nyāya*]; and “ascertainment of the reality of things”, which is “Demonstrated Truth” [*nirṇaya*], a word that also appears in *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.1]; forms the knowledge of the real nature of things.’

¹⁰ Reading *nanv* instead of *na ca*, with TCM_C.

Comments

The fault of *siddha-sādhana* hovers above all the discussion of the inference based on negative correlations, the *vyatirekīn*. If the inferential subject is known as qualified by the probandum, there would be no point in inferring that proposition from a sign, a prover property. One would not take the trouble for oneself. But if the predicate to be proved, i.e. the probandum property, is not familiar, then there can be no inferring that the subject has the property. Proper ‘consideration’, *parāmarśa*, requires that the probandum be available.

Here is the first mention of the inference about earth as category:

S	(<i>sādhya</i>)	has-distinctness-as-a-substance
H	(<i>sādhana</i>)	has-smell
a	(<i>pakṣa</i>)	earth

Thus,

Earth is a distinct substance, *since* it has smell, unlike water.

If the specifier of the inferential subject—the property or concept through which the inferential subject is nailed down, in Sanskrit, the *pakṣatāvachedaka*—is the same as the prover property, then the fault of *siddha-sādhana* would occur, according to Udayana as reported by Gaṅgeśa here. Inference would be pointless, as with ‘Earth is distinct etc., *since* it has *earthhood*.’ But if the ‘specifier of subjecthood’ is distinct from the prover—as it is with earth’s being distinct etc. where the prover is *having-smell*—then this fault is not committed and the inference proceeds ‘based on negative correlations’. Similarly for the inference, ‘Things having smell are distinct from the things that are substances other than earth along with everything in the non-substance categories, *since* they have earthhood.’

Gaṅgeśa implicitly disagrees with Udayana, however, in pointing out the difference between a predicate being known in general and being known, so to say, distributively. Thus, the inference, ‘Earth is distinct from the other things [etc.], *since* it has earthhood’, is not, according to Gaṅgeśa, a faulty inference, although it commits the *siddha-sādhana* fallacy in the view of his ‘teacher’.

Text (TCM_T 448 and TCM_C 593) and Translation

*yad vā vyatireka-vyāpṭer eva anvayena gamya-gamaka-bhāvaḥ.
sādhyaḥbhāva-vyāpaka-sāadhanābhāvābhāvena sādhanena pakṣe*

*sādhyâbhāvâbhāvasya sādhyasya sādhanāt. vyāpakâbhāvena
vyāpyâbhāvâvāśyam-bhāvāt.*

(Gaṅgeśa continues:) Alternatively, a pervasion between absences is itself inferential by reason of a pervasion between presences. For, an absence (A) of a prover that is the pervader of an absence of a probandum, well, by its absence (i.e. by A's absence, e.g. the absence of the absence of smoke), which absence is the prover, there is proved the probandum (fire) as an absence of an absence of itself. By reason of an absence which is a pervader, there has to be an absence of that which it pervades.

Comments

For example, as fieriness pervades smokiness ('wherever smoke, there fire'), so an absence of smokiness pervades an absence of fieriness ('wherever no fire, there no smoke'). Here the logic of the absences is that of double negation, which holds of absences of the 'mutual' (*anyonya*) variety, not necessarily of relational absences.

Problems about absences occupied a large place in the earlier section on the nature of inference-grounding pervasion (*vyāpti*) and further discussion follows a bit below (p. 461). Note that mutual absences and the other types—absolute absence, prior absence and posterior absence, which are called 'relational absences' (*samsargâbhāva*)—are differentiated according to knowability conditions by later Navya-Naiyāyika philosophers, for example, by Viśvanātha in his *Muktāvalī*. The mainstream position is that with the relational absences the perceptibility of the counter-correlate is a causal factor. The perceptibility of the substratum is a cause, a necessary condition, only with mutual absences. Gaṅgeśa will endorse the point about mutual absence a bit below.

Text (TCM_T 453 and TCM_C 594) and Translation

*atha evaṁ sānumitiḥ kṛpta-tad-dhetu-liṅga-parāmarśâbhāvāt,
anyathānanugama iti cen, na. anumiti-mātre vyāpti-jñānasya
prayojakatvāt. na ca evam atiprasaṅgaḥ, anumiti-sāmānya-sāmagryām
satyām apy anumiti-viśeṣa-sāmagrī-virahād¹¹ anumiti-anutpatteḥ,
viśeṣa-sāmagrī-sāpekṣāyā eva sāmānya-sāmagryā janakatvāt. anvayi-
vyatireki-viśeṣa-dvaya-sāmagrī ca na asty eva.*

Objection: If your view were correct, the 'negative-only' inference would not result in inferential awareness, since there would be no correct appreciation of the inferential mark (i.e. no 'correct reflection', *parāmarśa*) which as an established

¹¹ Adding *viśeṣa-sāmagrī-°*, with TCM_C.

explanatory category [in the form of a positive prover or mark, not as an absence] is a cause of any inferential awareness. Or, if there were that result, then there would be no unitary conception of ‘inferential awareness’.

Gaṅgeśa: Wrong. With respect to inferential awareness in general, [simply] awareness of a pervasion is the instigator. And this view does not have too wide an application. For, although all the general factors necessary for an inferential awareness to arise are in place, there would be no inferential awareness if the collection of particular causal factors is missing anything. General factors (e.g. time, space, God, *karman*) are causal only as members of a collection of causal factors including some that are unique. And there simply is no collection of causal factors that includes the particular factors necessary for both the ‘positive-only’ and ‘negative-only’ inferences.

Comments

To produce a pot, time, space and a few other, quite universal conditions stand as necessary factors. If they did not hold, the pot would not be produced. But they are not causal factors independently of other factors that are not so general but particular to the production of the pot, to wit, the potter, the clay and so forth.

Similarly, cognition of an inferential subject as possessing a prover that one is also aware of as pervaded by a probandum *produces* an inferential awareness—so long as one is speaking in general terms. More specifically, the awareness of a pervasion takes one of three specific forms, ‘positive-only’, ‘negative-only’, and ‘based on both positive and negative correlations’. And no inferential awareness would be produced if there were not one of these three types of particular awareness of pervasion.

Gaṅgeśa’s last statement is not to be taken as denying that there can be awareness of a pervasion based on both positive and negative correlations, but as denying that the conditions sparking the positive-only variety of inference are anything but mutually exclusive of those that spark the negative-only variety.

Text (TCM_T 455 and TCM_C 596) and Translation

*nanu pṛthivī itarebhyo bhidyate pṛthivītvād iti vyatirekiṇi
sādhyāsiddham, tathā ca na vyatireki-nirūpaṇam na vā pakṣatvam na
vā liṅga-janya-sādhyā-viśiṣṭa-taj-jñānam teṣāṃ sādhyā-jñāna-janyatvāt.
atha sādhyam prasiddham tadā yatra prasiddham tatra hetor avagame
'nvayitvam anavagame asādhāraṇyam.*

Pūrva-pakṣin (objecting to Gaṅgeśa’s position): The probandum in the ‘negative-only’ inference (*vyatirekin*), ‘Earth is distinct from the other things [accepted in the

ontology], *since* it has earthhood', is not known [outside the inferential context]. And so (1) it cannot be determined [to belong to the inferential subject] by a negative inference. Nor (2) would there be a proper inferential subject (*pakṣatva*, which requires doubt whether the probandum is its qualifier, whereas here that is already known). Nor (3) would there be generated by means of the prover a cognition of the inferential subject as qualified by the probandum. For, these three are generated by (i.e. require) cognition of the probandum [prior to and outside the inferential context].

Alternatively, let us say the probandum is so known. This being the case, we would have a positive inference [based on positive correlations] if the prover is known to occur there where the probandum is known to occur. If the prover is not known to occur there, we would have the 'no similar instance' fallacy (i.e. 'no prover in the *sapakṣa*', *asādhāraṇya*).

Comments

The *Pūrva-pakṣin* adversary challenges the form's validity by claiming that its advocate faces a trilemma, three bad options, three apparently exhaustive alternatives, none of which appears unobjectionable. (1) If there are other known instances of the probandum, the inference would be (a) based on positive correlations (and not be 'negative-only'), (b) fallacious if a counter-example were known, or (c) fallacious as based on knowledge of the *sapakṣa* without an example of the prover (*asādhāraṇya*). This fallacy (the 'not common to the *sapakṣa*') is committed when there is no known example of the prover in the *sapakṣa*, i.e. the set of things where the probandum is known to occur. Given a *sapakṣa*, we expect to find at least a single instance of positive correlation. 'Sound is eternal, since it has soundhood' commits the fallacy since the prover, soundhood, is not found in the *sapakṣa*, ether, atoms and other things known to be eternal. (2) If there are no known instances of the probandum at all, the probandum term cannot be available for inference, period. One cannot make an inference where one does not understand the terms it trades on. (3) If the probandum is known to occur on the subject or *pakṣa* itself, there would be no point to the inference (*siddha-sādhana*).

Concerning good inferences that seem to be 'negative-only', the best option, the *Pūrva-pakṣin* insinuates, is (1a): these genuine inferences that seem to be based only on negative correlations are really informed by positive knowledge. There is no 'negative-only' type of inference.

To avoid the unwanted options, Gaṅgeśa will concentrate on (2), the familiarity requirement. He accepts (3) and appears to accept (1) as well. He will concede with respect to (1) that in some cases a negative-only inference need not have been *only* negative, there being available positive correlations that were, for some reason or

other, not relied on, while the negative inference remains correct. In other circumstances, one might have made an inference based on both types of evidence. Nevertheless, it is Gaṅgeśa's qualifying of (2)—the requirement that the probandum be exemplified—that is his core response.

To consider the earth inference with respect to the trilemma: (1) there is no example of *is-distinct-from-the-other-things* outside of earth, the inferential subject and so the inference is 'negative only'. (2) This probandum *is* known prior to the inference *in particular*—for instance, a pot, something earthen, is so known—and so the term is available. (3) The probandum is not known *in general* to apply to all earth prior to the negative-only inference and so the *siddha-sādhana* fallacy is not committed. The inference makes something new known through a generalisation that proceeds on the basis of negative evidence ('This pond is both not-distinct-etc. and not smelly').

Gaṅgeśa holds, as we shall see, that prior to inference the probandum ('Earth is distinct from the other things') is known only distributively, only with respect to particular instances. Post inference, it is known also in general; that is to say, one knows that *everything* earthen is distinct from the other substances and non-substance entities. Perception introduces the term. By negative-only inference, we can learn about very general truths and the deep categorial joints of the universe.

Text (TCM_T 455 and TCM_C 597) and Translation

kiṃ ca itara-bhedo na sva-rūpam adhikaraṇa-pratīyoginoḥ pṛthivī-jalādyor anumānāt prāg eva siddheḥ. na api vaidharmyam jalādi-niṣṭhātāntā bhāva-pratīyogimattvam, tad dhi pṛthivītvādikam tac ca siddham eva. na ca jalādi-niṣṭhātāntābhāva-pratīyogitvena pṛthivītvam na siddham iti vācyam. jalādau pṛthivītvāntābhāva-graha-daśāyām pṛthivītve 'pi tat-pratīyogitva-grahāt.

(The *Pūrva-pakṣin* continues:) Furthermore, the probandum 'distinct from the other things' [which is a kind of absence, a mutual absence or distinctness], is not by its very nature [as some hold] the locus—earth—or [as others say] the loci where it is absent—water and the rest. For, in that case it would be known even before any inference [and inference would be pointless].

Nor is it 'difference of property' (*vaidharmya*) understood as the having of a property that is absolutely absent in water and so on, (i.e. exhibiting the counter-correlate of an absolute absence that rests in water and so on, as, say, earthhood is the counter-correlate of the absolute absence of earthhood that rests in water and so on). For, in that case the things that have earthhood and so on and this (i.e. difference of

property) would be indeed known [and again there would be no prompting of inference].

Objection: Earthhood, [although known with respect to earthen things,] is not known *as* the counter-correlate of an absolute absence resting in water and so on, [and so there is a point to the inference that would establish that it is distinct from the other things, with ‘other’ being understood as ‘difference in property’].

Pūrvapakṣin: That move should not be tried. For [earthhood would be known in that way, in that with the inference, ‘Earth is distinct from the other things, *since* it has earthhood’, there would be required—by the lights of those who advocate the ‘negative-only’ as a type of inference—cognition of the places where both the distinctness and earthhood do not occur, in water and so on, namely], concerning water and so on, at the time any absolute absence of earthhood were grasped (an absence that would be grasped as in water and so on which have no earthhood), earthhood would also be grasped as being the counter-correlate of the absence.

Comments

The commentators (Rucidatta, TCM_T 456 in particular) along with my teacher N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya are responsible for restoring the elided ideas. The point is that one has to be familiar with the predicate, being-earth.

We may add that being-odorous (*gandhavattva*) is commonly identified within Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a distinctive property of earth, in that all earthen things have odour but nothing else does. Thus having-earthhood can be established for anything that smells, by inference of the usual sort, based on both positive and negative correlations. Of course, that does not mean that the negative-only is useless, as will be further explained.

Text (TCM_T 456 and TCM_C 598) and Translation

*anyonyābhāvas tu bhedo yady api sādhyam sambhavati vaidharma-
jñāna-sādhyatvād anyonyābhāva-grahasya, tathā api jalādi-
pratiyogikānyonyābhāvasya aprasiddhiḥ. na ca jalādi-pratyekānyo-
nyābhāvah sādhyah, asādhāranya-prasaṅgāt.*

(The **Pūrvapakṣin** continues:) But even if the distinctness understood as ‘mutual distinctness’ (or, ‘mutual absence’, *anyonyābhāva*) is the probandum of the inference [‘is *distinct* from the others’], inasmuch as a mutual absence is grasped as the probandum in the [required] cognition of a difference of property [such that the probandum would be known in general as such an absence], still [it would not be

known in particular, i.e.] the mutual absence whose counter-correlate is water and so on would be unknown [and so for this reason inference could not proceed].

And it is not the case that the probandum is the mutual absence of each of the set of water and so on. For, if so, the unfortunate consequence would be that we would have a case of the fallacy of ‘no similar instance’, [since there would be a *sapakṣa*].

Comments

Why would the probandum be unknown? The knowledge is not precluded by the inferential context, since such an absence exists only in earth which is the inferential subject (though this seems a problem as well). Rather, the difficulty is that the probandum is so all-inclusive, ‘distinctness from all those other things’. Thus the objector to the *Pūrva-pakṣin* tries to understand the probandum distributively. But in that case the inference would not be ‘negative-only’ in that there would be a *sapakṣa*: to wit, all the instances of the ‘being-other’ except the one in focus, e.g. the fiery element and the rest, given that water is mentioned in the statement of the probandum.

Text (TCM_T 456 and TCM_C 599) and Translation

atha pṛthivī tejo-bhinnā na vā iti saṁśayena tejo-bhinnatve 'vagame pṛthivī tejo-bhinnā satī jalâdi-dvâ-daśa-bhinnā na vā iti saṁśaye tejo-bhinnatve sati jalâdi-dvâ-daśa-bhinnatvaṁ prasiddhaṁ tad eva sādhyam, eka-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭe viśeṣaṇântara-buddher eva viśiṣṭya-jñānatvāt, evaṁ ca saṁśaya-prasiddhaṁ sādhyam ādāya vyatirekādi-nirūpaṇam. yad vā pṛthivī jalâdi-bhinnā na vā iti pratyekaṁ trayo-daśa-saṁśaya-viśayāṇāṁ trayo-daśānyonyâbhāvānām samudāyaḥ pṛthivyām avagato vyatirekādi-nirūpakaḥ. na ca evaṁ pṛthivyām eva sādhyā-prasiddher vyatireki-vaiyarthyaṁ, sādhyā-niścayârtham vyatireki-pravṛtteḥ. na ca asādhāraṇyam, samuditānyonyâbhāvānām sādhyatve sapakṣâbhāvād iti cen. na.

Objection: By means of a *question* [or doubt whose object or content is the probandum as known well enough to be proved to belong to the *pakṣa* by means of inference, e.g.], ‘Is earth distinct from the fiery or not?’, a distinctness from the fiery is understood; [and then] in [other] questions, ‘Given that earth is distinct from the fiery, is it distinct or not from water and the rest, the twelve other things (i.e. the other substances and things belonging to non-substance categories)?’ a distinctness from the twelve other things is known well [enough for inference to proceed (*prasiddha*)]. That alone (i.e. the collective object of the questioning) is the probandum [in the inference at issue]. For, a cognition of a qualified entity as [again] quali-

fied (e.g. ‘The staff-bearing person’, where a qualificandum qualified by personhood is also qualified by staff-bearingness) is generated just from a cognition of another qualifier with respect to something qualified by a single qualifier. And in this way, taking the probandum to be that which is well-known from the questioning, one proceeds with negative-only correlation and the rest of the inference.

Alternatively, ‘Is earth distinct from water or not’ and a series of like questions each contribute to a collection of thirteen mutual absences that are the objects of thirteen questions. The collection is understood just with respect to earth and determines the negative-only correlation and the rest of the inference.

And it is not the case that the probandum being known in this way just with respect to earth makes the negative-only inference pointless. For, one proceeds with it in order to be certain about the probandum [as belonging to the subject, whereas prior to the inference the probandum was known only through being the object of a doubt or question].

Nor [on this analysis] would the inference commit the ‘no similar instance’ fallacy, since there would be no *sapakṣa* (i.e. no places where the probandum is known definitely to occur) given that the collected mutual absences stand as its probandum.

Pūrva-pakṣin: Wrong.

Comments

The non-substance categories are six in number: quality, motion, universal, ultimate individuator, inherence and absence. There are eight substances in addition to earth (nine in all): water, the fiery element, air, ether, time, space, *manas* and self. Not counting the fiery element since it is mentioned in the *sādhyā* statement, thirteen instead of twelve should be said. N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya suggested to me that the category absence is not counted because it is already included in the mention of distinctness, which is a kind of absence, a mutual absence.

The ‘no similar instance’ fallacy requires that (1) there be a *sapakṣa* as well as (2) the prover be unknown as occurring anywhere there, that is, that there be no things known to be both S and H outside the inferential context while there are things known to be S. No negative-only inference could commit this fallacy since the *sapakṣa* is empty. So again the more serious problem would seem to be how the probandum can be available, given that the inferential context requires that it not be known to occur on the *pakṣa*.

Text (TCM_T 459 and TCM_C 601) and Translation

sādhyā-niścaye hi sādhyā-vyatireka-niścayo bhavaty eva sādhyā-sandehe tad-vyatireka-samśayasya vajra-lepāt, tathā ca samśaya-rūpā

sādhyā-siddhir iti śiṣya-bandhanam, etena pṛthivī jalādibhyo bhinnā iti vipratipatti-rūpa-vādi-vākyād ākāṅkṣādimate 'pūrvārtha-pratipādakāt sādhyā-prasiddhir iti parāstam. vākyād eva pṛthivyām sādhyā-siddher vyatireki-vaikyārthāt. na ca tad-buddhau vādi-vākya-janyatvena aprāmānya-saṁśayāt niścaye 'pi saṁśaya iti tan-niścayārtham vyatireki iti vācyam. tarhi saṁśaya-prasiddham sādhyam, tasya ca na vyatireka-niścayakatvam uktavāt, svārthānumāne tad-abhāvāc ca.

Pūrvā-pakṣin: [You are wrong.] For if the probandum is known with certainty [in correlations elsewhere], there will indeed be certainty about its absence [in negative correlations]. If the probandum is cognised with doubt [as in your questions], then it is cemented in diamond that there will be doubt about its absence [in negative correlations, whereas inference requires that a pervasion be cognised with certainty]. And, therefore, the ‘proving’ of the probandum in the form of something dubious, well, it’s to torture and imprison students.

Objection: The probandum is [‘introduced’ (*prasiddhi*) or] made well-known from the statement of a debater taking the form of a [doubt-provoking] counter-contention meeting the conditions of syntactic expectancy etc., which would make understood something not previously understood, [e.g.] ‘Earth is distinct from water and the rest.’

Pūrvā-pakṣin: By the reasoning just given, this is rejected, too. For, the establishment of the probandum as in earth just from a statement would make the negative-only inference pointless.

Objection: Given that the idea of that is generated from the debater’s statement, because of a [contrary] doubt about its non-veridicality [given a context of debate], there would be doubt even with respect to something [initially] certain. Thus, the negative-only inference would proceed for the purpose of [maintaining] its certainty.

Pūrvā-pakṣin: That also should not be said. For in that case the probandum would be introduced (*prasiddhi*) by the doubt and [so] it could not be made certain by a negative-only inference, as has been stated already. And with respect to inference for oneself, such would not occur.

Comments

Doubt or questioning is no way to introduce a probandum such that it could be proved by a negative-only inference. For, inference requires certainty concerning all of its terms and relations.

*kevala-vyatireki-siddhântaḥ***The right view of the exclusively negative inference.**

Text (TCM_T 463 and TCM_C 604) and Translation

*ucyate. ghaṭādāv eva itara-sakala-bhedasya pratyakṣataḥ prasiddhiḥ
ghaṭo na jalādir iti pratīteḥ.*

Gaṅgeśa: We answer. An entire distinctness from the other things is made well-known (i.e. introduced and made known sufficiently well for inference to proceed) by perception with respect to just a pot and the like, that is to say, from such a [perceptual] cognition as, ‘The pot is not water and the rest’ [the probandum is ‘well-known’].

Comments

Gaṅgeśa’s position is that prior to inference the probandum mentioned in the inference being discussed (‘Earth is distinct from the other things’) is known only distributively, only with respect to particular instances. Posterior to inference, it is known also in general, that is to say, one knows that *everything* earthen is distinct from the other substances and non-substance entities. Perception introduces the term. As explained, by negative-only inference we can learn about very general truths and the deep categorial joints of the universe.

Towards the end of the section, Gaṅgeśa reminds us of the negative-only inference that figured crucially in the section of the previous chapter on knowing veridicality (*jñapti*). Let us rehearse that discussion with an eye to this one. The inference explained how one could know for the very first time that a cognition with such-and-such objecthood (e.g. ‘That line in the distance is a river’) is veridical.¹² The success of drinking from the stream as guided by the sighting is the prover in the negative-only inference (wherever I have had non-veridical cognition, there no such success as this drinking water from the stream at first only distantly perceived). The prover correlates negatively with non-veridicality (every cognition known to be non-veridical is also known not to have sparked such success). Although the veridicality of the first-time cognition has no *sapakṣa*—there has been no cognition with such objecthood before, the objecthood of which it is meaningful to talk of veridicality—the successful subject infers, thirst quenched, ‘That cognition is (was) a veridical river-water cognition, *since* it produced successful effort [what is not so, is not so, for example, a non-veridical cognition of water].’

¹² PHILLIPS–RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (2004: 102–19).

Perhaps the most interesting point about this in the current context is that there the probandum—veridicality—is understood as known in general prior to the inference and not known in particular. This is just the opposite of the order of knowing here where earth is the inferential subject. The veridicality of the type of cognition that has not been had before (*anabhyāsa-daśāyām*) has no *sapakṣa*. This is because veridicality is not a true universal, but a makeshift to serve our purposes.¹³ The veridicality known prior to inference (the probandum as *prasiddha* ('well-known') in the technical sense that permits inference) is said to be what non-veridical cognitions, which are revealed as non-veridical through frustration of effort, are opposed to, namely, the common way they all fall short. But let us not be distracted by the ontological wriggling; my point is that the reasoning proceeds from the general to the particular.

Here the order of knowing begins with the particular and moves to the universal. Earth in general is known to be distinct from the other things in the ontology. Gaṅgeśa takes the negative-only inference to be of an interestingly ontological variety, the sort of inference whose conclusion reveals a very general fact, here, that earth is a distinct type of substance, different not only from all the things that are not substances (colours etc.) but also from all other types of substance. Earthhood is a true universal (*jāti*) and this seems to be the way we learn that fact.

Furthermore, there seems a certain plausibility to the argument voiced in the current passage. Perception does seem to tell us that the pot is not water or any of the other non-earthen types of thing. But perception does not tell us that everything earthen is distinct from the other fundamental types. We have to be prompted to the appropriate reflection (*parāmarśa*) and infer this. We have to wonder whether earth in general is distinct in this way and we infer that it is by a method of negative correlation.

Gaṅgeśa should not be misunderstood as saying that we actually know about everything we encounter perceptually whether it is distinct or not from non-earthen things. Being-earthen or not is not something that he thinks can invariably be read off of perceptual experience. But presumably we do have a wide enough negative sample of things not-S (the *vipakṣa*, places where the probandum is known not to be) and things not-H (here, absence of the specific quality, 'having-smell', or, in an alternative inference, absence of the universal, 'earthenhood') to cognise a pervasion. We reflect on numerous individuals where we know the probandum is not and we find that none of them has smell (or is earthen). And so we arrive at the veridical cognition of everything earthen—or earth in general—as distinct from the other things.

¹³ PHILLIPS–RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (2004: 210–16).

Text (TCM_T 463 and TCM_C 604) and Translation

nanv ayam anyonyābhāvo na pratyakṣaḥ atīndriya-pratīyogikābhāvāt vāt paramāṇu-saṃsargābhāva-vat yogyānupalabdher abhāva-grāhakatvāt nayanōnmīlanānantaram stambhaḥ piśāco na bhavati iti pratīter bādha-balena vāyur vāti iti-val liṅga-grahōpakṣiṇatvāt cet. na. yo hy anupalambho 'dhikaraṇe pratīyogi-sattva-virodhī'¹⁴ so 'bhāvam grāhayati na tu yogyānupalabdhi-mātram, anyathā vāyau rūpābhāva-pratīti-vat jala-paramāṇau pṛthivītvābhāva-graha-prasaṅgāt. adhikaraṇe pratīyogi-sattvam ca tarkitam yadi hi stambhaḥ piśācaḥ syāt stambha-vad upalabhyeta na piśācānupalambhaḥ syāt.

Objection: This 'mutual absence' (mutual distinctness) is not perceptual. For [in the midst of the list of things that are other than earth] things that are beyond the reach of the senses would be the counter-correlate to that absence (that mutual absence mentioned in the probandum expression). Like the absence of contact with an ultimate atom [of earth in a mass of water, an absence that clearly is not perceptual], the condition of 'non-perception of something perceptible' governs the grasping of the absence (i.e. if the counter-correlate is not perceptible, its absence is not perceptible).

[This view about the perceptibility of absences is correct despite certain evidence:] immediately after opening one's eyes, one has the cognition, 'The stump is not a demon' [where it seems that the absence of the demon is perceptual even though the demon is not]. This evidence is countered by the force of a defeater [and the cognition is inferential in fact]. As with 'The wind is blowing', the senses exhaust themselves in the grasping of the inferential mark (the touch of the air, not the air itself, which is imperceptible and similarly in cases of being-other-than-earth).

Gaṅgeśa: No. For, [the rule is] that a non-perception [of *x*] that is *opposed* to [a perception of] the entity [*x*], the counter-correlate, at a particular spot [as, for instance, a non-perception of a pot is blocked by the perception of a pot at a particular spot] makes the absence grasped, not simply the non-perception of something capable of being perceived. Otherwise, there would be the unfortunate consequence that, like a cognition of the absence of colour in air, there would be a [perceptual] grasping of the absence of earthhood in ultimate atoms of water. Furthermore, the [possible] existence [and perception] of the counter-correlate in the locus is arrived at through counterfactual reasoning (*tarka*): 'If the stump were a demon, then like the stump it would be perceived. It is not the case that the demon would not be perceived' [for instance].

¹⁴ Here I follow the suggestion of N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya to emend to *pratīyogi-sattva-virodhī* from *pratīyogimattva-virodhī*. Both editions have the latter.

Comments

Presumably, no demon has previously been seen. But one sees immediately the distinctness (the mutual absence) that rests in the stump. (One sees the stump as in this way distinct.) Gaṅgeśa's objector views this as an illusion, asserting that the phenomenological evidence is overridden by the principle that the only absences that are perceptible are those whose absentees are perceptible (thus an absence of a horn on a rabbit is perceptible, but not an absence of a rabbit's horn wherever). Gaṅgeśa contends that there is an additional requirement concerning the *locus* of the absence. This principle asserts that an absence is perceptible or not according to whether or not the presence of the absentee at the particular spot would normally force its perception and thus block perception of its absence. This is shown by a little reflection on cases where the substrata are imperceptible, as revealed by 'counterfactual reasoning' (*tarka*).

For example, colour is perceptible. So its absence should be perceptible, according to the principle that an absence is perceptible if its counter-correlate is perceptible. But we do not perceive an absence of red in watery atoms. Since the substratum is imperceptible, there is no opposition between the non-perception of colour there and the perception. It's not true that given the right circumstances including its actual presence we would perceive it (in fact watery atoms do house an absence of red). So this new principle explains why the absence of colour in atoms is not perceptually grasped: the locus is imperceptible.

The new principle—the perceptibility of the absence's locus—handles the stump-demon case, as shown by *tarka*. Reflecting, 'If that were a demon instead of a stump, the demon would be perceived', we see that the absence in this case is perceptible since the demon in the counterfactual worlds would also be perceived. This accords both with the appearance and how people speak, 'That's not a demon!' for instance.

If air were coloured, the colour would be perceived. Therefore, according to Gaṅgeśa, its absence is directly grasped. But the more common opinion among his philosophic contemporaries—both within Nyāya and outside—was that air is imperceptible and known by inference from its touch (the touch alone being perceived and not also its locus or substratum). So, by the light of this new principle, an absence of air would be imperceptible.¹⁵

In the current context, the thrust of the objector's position is to challenge the introduction of a probandum in a negative-only inference. Gaṅgeśa is trying to escape from the impossible options laid out by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* by having the probandum

¹⁵ PHILLIPS–RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (2004: 491 ff.).

perceptually introduced but not in such a way as to make inference pointless (and committing the error of *siddha-sādhana*, ‘trying to prove what is already granted’). So, how can the probandum be perceptually introduced—and indeed introduced only, it seems (though this may be where the trick lies), in cases included within the *pakṣa*, the inferential subject, which are illicit as bracketed in the inferential context—in such a manner that the question is not begged? Finally, it bears repeating, if one manages to introduce a probandum properly referring to places where it occurs *outside* the inferential context, then any inference, it would seem, would be positive in character and not ‘only-negative’.

Text (TCM_T 464 and TCM_C 609) and Translation

na ca pṛthivī jalād bhidyate jalāvṛttir dharmavattvāt tejo-vat evam anyebhyo 'pi bheda-siddhau dvā-daśa-bhinnā iti viśeṣaṇam dattvā samavāya-bheda-sādhanaḍ anvayina eva pṛthivyām trayo-daśa-bheda-siddhir iti kiṁ vyatirekiṇā iti vācyam. jalādi-bhinnā satī samavāya-bhinnā iti buddhāv api trayo-daśa-bhinnā iti buddher vyatireki-sādhyatvāt.

Objection: The inference, ‘Earth is distinct from water, *since* it has a property that does not occur in water, like *tejas*, the fiery element’, is the way that its distinctness is established with respect to the others [on the list, *tejas*, ether etc.], too: ‘distinct from twelve [in the series, water, *tejas*, air, ether and so on through the first four non-substance categories]’ is then a qualifier kept in mind as one establishes inferentially earth’s distinctness from inherence [the thirteenth member of the set of ‘the other things’]. Thus by an inference based on positive correlations distinctness from the thirteen [other types of thing] is proved. How, then, is there any use for the ‘negative-only?’

Gaṅgeśa: This too should not be said. For, even though the cognition that earth is distinct from inherence given its being distinct from water and so on [could be established by positive correlations], the cognition that it is distinct from the thirteen is established veridically by a negative-only inference.

Comments

We can prove that earth is distinct from water straightforwardly by positive and negative correlations making the pervasion known: ‘Whatever is distinct from earth does not have smell, like fire and unlike sandalwood.’ So we can prove serially that earth is distinct from each substance (and everything composed of those substances) and from the things in the non-substance-categories, too, without resorting to a negative-only inference. But, Gaṅgeśa contends, what about the final inference,

where the probandum is not some one or another non-earthen thing but rather everything non-earthen, all entities other than those that are earthen? In that case, the probandum would not be known outside the inferential subject and so the only cases to be considered would be places where the probandum is not. And in none of those places do we find the prover. Thus we conclude—on the basis of a *vyatirekin* inference—that earth is distinct from the other things, where we understand ‘the other things’ to be everything mentionable other than earth.

Other fundamental categories could be revealed in similar fashion, as we shall see, in the second half of the section, in particular concerning the self (*ātman*), which is another fundamental category.

Text (TCM_T 465 and TCM_C 612) and Translation

na ca ghaṭasya api pakṣatvād aṁśataḥ siddha-sāadhanam, sarvā pṛthivī itara-bhinnā ity uddeśya-pratīter abhāvāt. pakṣatāvachedakānānātve hi tat, ata eva anitye vān-manasi¹⁶ ity atra anityā vāg iti buddheḥ uddeśyāyāḥ siddhatvād aṁśataḥ siddha-sāadhanam, anyathā anumāna-mātrōchedāt pakṣasya siddhasya sādhyatvāt.

(Gaṅgeśa continues:) And it is not the case that the pot [pointed to show that the predicate ‘is distinct from the others’ is known well enough to be available as probandum in the negative-only inference] belongs to the inferential subject, such that, bit by bit, there would be the error of trying to prove what is already known. There is no such idea in what we want to prove, namely, ‘All earth is distinct from the other things.’

For [there occur cases of bit by bit trying to prove what is already known but] they are cases where the [final] inferential subject is specified by variety (i.e. where it is conceived distributively, in contrast to universally, as our subject is specified by the universal, being-earth). Just for this reason, the inference, ‘Non-eternal are speech and mind [*since* they are products]’ is an example of this kind of ‘proving what is already known’: bit by bit the designated cognition [of the *pakṣa*] is known [prior to the inference, e.g.] ‘Speech [is non-eternal]’ (i.e. is known to be non-eternal prior to the inference). If this were not how the inferential error should be understood, then the whole system of inference would break down, since an inferential subject [so understood] may well be previously known as the probandum [with respect to some one or more of its ‘parts’].

¹⁶ Again I follow the suggestion of N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya, changing *manase* to *manasi*.

Comments

The probandum is introduced by such perceptions as ‘This pot, which is earthen, is *distinct from water and so on.*’ But apart from the *vyatirekin* inference, the probandum is not known to be true of everything earthen. Therefore, this is not a case of ‘trying to prove what is already known.’

The specifiers of the inferential subject in a case where it is ‘various’ (*nānā*) will be multiple, more than one in number. For example, in the inference about speech and mind as non-eternal, speechhood and mindhood (*manastva*) are the specifiers (*avacchekas*) of being-the-inferential-subject (*pakṣatā*). In Gaṅgeśa’s negative-only inference, in contrast, the specifier of the *pakṣatā* is singular: earthhood. Thus, such a speech-mind inference could commit the error of ‘bit-by-bit trying to establish what is already known’, but not Gaṅgeśa’s in that the inferential subject is understood as non-composite.

Text (TCM_T 470 and TCM_C 614) and Translation

*na ca ghaṭaḥ katham pakṣaḥ sādhyā-niścayena samśaya-siṣādhayaṣayoḥ
abhāvād iti vācyam. sarvā pṛthivī itara-bhinnā na vā iti samśayasya
tat-prakāra-siṣādhayaṣāyāś ca sāmānyato ghaṭa-viśayatvāt ghaṭatvena
viśeṣa-darśanam siddhir vā, atas tena rūpeṇa samśaya-siṣādhayaṣe na
sthaḥ, pṛthivītvena tu bhavata eva dhūmavān vahnimān iti
dhūmavattvena vahni-niścaye ’pi parvate vahni-samśaya-vat.*

Objection: How is it that the pot [which is something earthen] can be [part of] the inferential subject, since as known with certainty to possess the probandum there is no doubt about its possessing it nor a desire to infer that it possesses it?

Gaṅgeśa: That, too, should not be asked. The question, ‘Is all earth distinct from the other things or not?’ and a desire to infer whose predication content is the pot as object as a generality [not as a particular, i.e. as something earthen, not as a pot]. As a pot, it is either perceived as a particular or it is established as that [but as a pot is not the way it is included in the *pakṣa* of the current inference nor is it the way it is the object of the desire to infer]. Thus, not in that way (i.e. taking it as a pot) do the question and/or the desire to infer occur but as earth as their object alone do they occur. This is similar to the case of ‘That having smoke is that having fire’ where [*in general*, prior to the inference that would prove that yonder mountain has fire], it is known with certainty that there is fire on whatever has smoke but there is doubt [prior to the inference] whether there is fire on the particular mountain.

Comments

The objector claims that the conditions for being a proper *pakṣa* are not met by Gaṅgeśa's example of a negative-only inference since a pot, for example, which is supposed to be included in the *pakṣa* (it is something earthen), is not something about which there would be either a question or a desire to infer of the appropriate sort. Gaṅgeśa responds by making clear that in the case of any known pervasion by things S of things H anything known as H would be in general known as S in advance of the inference that would infer of some particular thing, e.g. a mountain, that it is S because it is H. The doubt that prompts the inference is about a particular as S, not about the relation between things S and H in general. Thus, the mountain of the stock example is a proper *pakṣa*, as is, too, the *pakṣa* of Gaṅgeśa's negative-only inference.

Text (TCM_T 474 and TCM_C 615) and Translation

*yad vā sarvatvena rūpeṇa na pakṣatā sarvatra avipratipatteḥ. ghaṭādy-
eka-deśe itara-bhedasya pratyakṣa-siddhatvāt. tathā ca eka-deśe
vipratipattau sāmānye pṛthivītvena yāvad eva vipratipatti-viśayas
tāvatām eva pakṣatā viśeṣyānanugamāt.*

(Gaṅgeśa continues:) Alternatively, [in this case] being-the-inferential-subject is not specified by 'all' or 'everything' [but rather by 'being-earth'] in that everything is not the object of the doubt [that prompts the inference]. For, the several parts [of the inferential subject], the pot and the rest, are established by perception as 'being distinct from the other things' [prior to the final inference and so there would be no doubt about it being true of them].

And so if the doubt were about one or another part [of that which is the inferential subject] and the inference proceeded to prove distinctness from the other things *in general*, the fault of 'switching meaning' (*arthântara*) would be committed. However, my inference [is free from that fault in that] just in that the object of the inference-prompting doubt [which becomes the inferential subject] is understood in general as being-earth. If one takes those parts of it to be [the object of the doubt and] the inferential subject, one would indeed fail to think uniformly of the qualificandum (and thus to make the *arthântara* error).

Comments

Under whatever concept or 'predicate' (*prakāra*) a doubt is borne concerning something, that something becomes an inferential subject (*pakṣa*) under that *prakāra*—it is this rule that Gaṅgeśa invokes to make his point. If there were a

doubt: ‘Is everything distinct from the other things’, then there would be an inferential subject determined by a notion of everything. However, the inference at issue has its *pakṣa* specified by earthhood.

If we change what we are referring to in a proof, our inferences are *eo ipso* vitiated, as in the Aristotelian fallacy of equivocation or ‘four terms’. Vātsyāyana, however, explains *arthântara* as a kind of irrelevance, the additional meaning being beside the point.

Text (TCM_T 474 and TCM_C 616) and Translation

tarhi pṛthivī itara-bhinnā pṛthivīvāt ghaṭa-vad ity anvayinā eva itara-bhedasya siddhatvāt kiṃ vyatirekiṇā, ghaṭa-sādhāraṇa-pakṣatve 'py abhedānumāna-vat pakṣasya api dṛṣṭāntatva-virodhāt pakṣānyatvaṃ hi tatra atantram. kiṃ tu sādhyavattayā niścitatvaṃ prayojakam. na ca pṛthivīvāgrāhe pūrvam gṛhītaṃ yatra sādhyam paścāt smaryate tatra hetu-sādhyā-sāmānādhikaraṇyāgrahād vyatireky-avatāra iti vācyam. hetor eva pakṣatāvachchedakatvena ghaṭe pṛthivīva-graha-daśāyām itara-bheda-sāmānādhikaraṇya-grahāvaśyam-bhāvād iti cet. satyam. anvayi-tulyatayā vyatirekiṇo 'pi sāmārthyāt. anvayāpratisandhāna-daśāyām vyatireky-upanyāsasya aparyanūjyativāt. tad uktam, “āstām tāvad ayam suhṛd-upadeśaḥ, kevala-vyatireki lakṣaṇam tāvan nirvyūḍham”.

Objection 1: In that case, the inference, ‘Earth is distinct from the other things, *since* it has earthhood, like a pot, proceeds based simply on positive examples [such as the pot that you have excluded from the *pakṣa*], in proving the distinctness from the others. So what’s the point of your negative-only inference?

Even if the pot [cited as an example] is [in a sense] common to the *pakṣa*, like a ‘non-distinctness’ inference [such as, ‘This is the pot that I experienced yesterday, *since* it has the shape and so on of the pot that I experienced yesterday’, where the supporting example can be nothing other than the pot itself], there is no contradiction in the inferential subject itself being offered as a supporting example. For, the principle [governing the citing of an example] does not apply there. Rather, the criterion is that the example helps make the having of the probandum certain.

Objection 2 (against Objector 1): At first, when the probandum is grasped [in a pot and so on which are known by perception to be ‘distinct from the others’], earthhood is not grasped [since the pot and so on are grasped through their pothood, for example, not as examples of earth]. In cases where the probandum has been grasped later, it is remembered as being there. But there is no grasping of [pervasion defined as] the prover’s having the same loci as the probandum [in that the examples not

being grasped as earthen are not grasped as exhibiting the prover, earthhood]. From this, there is room for the entry of the negative-only inference.

Answer (by Objector 1): That should not be alleged. For, it is just the prover that specifies how the inferential subject is understood in the case of the pot: at the time that it is understood as being-earth [in the context of the inference under discussion] necessarily is there grasped [a pervasion in] the prover's having the same loci as [the probandum] distinctness-from-the-other-things. [Therefore, positive correlations can be had and the inference need not be 'only negative'.]

Gaṅgeśa (responding to Objector 1): What you say is true [to an extent]. For the capability of the negative-only is, though negative, the equivalent of positive inference. On an occasion when positive correlations are not brought to mind, that negative correlations are mentioned is not to be worried about. So it has been said [by Vācaspatimiśra]: "Away with it" (i.e. with the negative-only, given an accomplished positive inference)—such is the teaching of a friend. [But without a positive inference] an inference whose nature is negative-only is itself indeed an accomplished method.'

Comments

The objector complains that Gaṅgeśa can't have it both ways. He can't exclude such earthen things as a pot from the inferential subject and then pretend that he has an inference based on negative correlations alone. For, the pot is an example of *sapakṣa*, a place known to exhibit the probandum, and the method of positive correlation checks such places for the presence of the prover. One might also check the *vipakṣa*, places known to be bereft of the probandum, to make sure that the prover is not there. But relying on both positive and negative correlations is not to make an inference that is 'negative-only', as Gaṅgeśa seems to pretend.

The objector then weakens his case with a comparison to 'non-distinctness' inferences, opening the possibility that something can be both an inferential subject and a supporting example in the same inference. But the inference on the table is different. Here the example is *sapakṣa*. It helps 'make the probandum certain'. Note that the standard convention is to cite an instance of *sapakṣa* where the prover is also known to occur. A negative example is an instance of *vipakṣa* (where the probandum is known definitely not to occur) where the prover, too, is known to be absent. According to the paradigm, then, an example has to be something outside the *pakṣa* (the inferential subject). But some good inferences break the rule, for example, so-called 'non-distinctness' inferences, an example of which is given in parentheses here.

Gaṅgeśa admits that his example could be reconstructed such that the same inferential awareness would be produced by a positive inference, with positive examples, in the fashion of Objector 1, whose point about the example in a ‘non-distinctness’ inference Gaṅgeśa does not contend. His current point seems to be, then, that negative-only inference may be used if we like or if we do not see positive correlation. But it need not be defended as indispensable.

Text (TCM_T 475 and TCM_C 618) and Translation

*athavā jalādīnām trayo-daśānyonyābhāvāḥ trayo-daśasu prasiddhāḥ
pṛthivyām sādhyante. ata eva ākāśe vyatirekiṇā jalādi-milita-
pratiyogikānyonyābhāvāpratītāv api trayo-daśānyonyābhāvāḥ sādhyā
iti na anvayitvāsādhāraṇye.*

(**Gaṅgeśa** continues:) Alternatively, thirteen mutual absences of water and the rest (or thirteen ‘mutual distinctnesses’, *anyonyābhāva*), which are well-known in thirteen types of entity (each one of a total of fourteen types of entity would appear to be mutually distinct from the others), are established in earth (i.e. earth is proved mutually distinct from the thirteen other types of entity). Just for this reason, in ether [which has no parts] thirteen mutual absences are established by a negative-only inference, although there is no notion of a mutual absence whose counter-correlate is the collection of water and the rest [prior to the inference]. Therefore, [the inference] is not [based] on positive correlations and there is no [fallacy of] ‘no similar instance’.

Comments

To this point Gaṅgeśa has claimed his sample negative-only inference meets the requirement of having a probandum that has been properly introduced (*prasiddha*, ‘well-known’) by being known in a part (*eka-deśa*, ‘one spot’) of the inferential subject, for example, a pot which as something earthen is included in the inferential subject earth in general but not as a pot. This analysis, we have seen, has resulted in an admission that the inferential awareness (‘Earth is distinct from the other things’) that is the result could be generated by a positive inference just as well (or better, it would seem) as by the method at issue. So the objector’s complaint about usefulness stings a bit still. So now Gaṅgeśa tries a different tact, switching our focus from earth to ether and other potential inferential subjects for which ‘being distinct from the others’ is surely known. These entities, or categories (*padārtha*, ‘types of thing to which words refer’), have no parts or instances. Ether is non-atomic, unlike earth, water and air. Similarly, a self is a partless unit as are other fundamental entities such as inherence.

In the case of ether, which is the inferential subject in the current passage ('Ether is distinct from the other things, *since* it is the substratum of sound'), each of thirteen mutual absences are known prior to the inference. But unlike the case of the earthen pot where the probandum, a summational mutual absence ('being distinct from the other things'), is introduced through the pot, which is an earthen thing, here with ether the probandum is not well-known, since ether has no parts. How, then, is the probandum available? Gaṅgeśa does not answer here and the question drives much of the subsequent discussion.

Let us take stock. Putting aside the availability issue, we see that with a previously unknown probandum, there cannot be inference based on positive correlations (as Gaṅgeśa will point out at the end). Nor can there be the 'no common instance' fallacy, which requires that there be a *sapakṣa*. The defence so far of the usefulness of negative-only inference has been pretty minimal. In other words, Gaṅgeśa is now occupied with knowledge that has no source other than inference of the negative-only variety. In some cases, it *is* indispensable.

Finally, it seems pretty plausible in itself that the mind make a leap to a new term in the conclusion or result of a negative inferential process, at least as Gaṅgeśa has us picture it in his example. All that is unknown prior to the inference is the combined absence, the mutual distinctness that is a composite of other mutual distinctnesses already known. The leap is from the particular not so much to the general but to the collection, the very general collection of all things other than earth.

Text (TCM_T 477 and TCM_C 619) and Translation

*yad vā jalam tejah-prabhṛti-dvā-daśa-bhinna-pratīyogikānyonyābhāva-
vat dravyatvāt tejo-vat ity anumānāt trayo-daśa-bhinnasya sāmānyataḥ
siddhau pṛthivyām trayo-daśa-bhinnatvaṁ sādhyam. na ca anvayitvam
asādhāranyam vā, pakṣād anyatra sādhyāprasiddhiḥ. vastu-gatyā
pṛthivyām eva sādhyā-siddheḥ kiṁ vyatirekiṇā iti cet, na. pṛthivī trayo-
daśa-bhinnā iti vyatirekiṇam vinā apratīteḥ.*

(Gaṅgeśa continues:) Alternatively, one could say that the inference, 'Water possesses the mutual distinctness whose counter-correlate is [itself not only distinct from water but also] distinct from the twelve sorts of entities beginning [on the standard list] with *tejas* (the fiery element), *since* it is a substance, like *tejas*', establishes its probandum in general as belonging to something distinct from the thirteen (i.e. the twelve distinct from water's distinctness from X plus water's distinctness from X). This being-distinct-from-the-thirteen is the probandum with respect to earth [as inferential subject].

And here there is neither an inference based on positive correlations nor the fallacy of ‘no similar instance’, because the probandum is unknown outside the inferential subject (i.e. there is no *sapakṣa*).

But in reality the answer to the ‘It’s *already established* for earth’ challenge to the usefulness of negative-only inference is to say: no, without the negative-only inference there would be no knowledge, ‘Earth is distinct from the thirteen.’

Comments

Once we have X, we have also the absence of X available to be inferred. All inference extends the scope, so to say, of a probandum. So it is no objection that the absential term gets new meaning through the negative-only inference.

Text (TCM_T 478 and TCM_C 619) and Translation

nanv evaṃ pṛthivī jalâdi-trayo-daśa-bhinna-pratīyogikânyonyâbhāvavati dravyatvād iti pṛthivī-bhinna-tad-bhinnâdi-siddhiḥ syād iti cet, na aprayojakatvāt. prakṛte ca anubhūyamāna-jalâdi-vaidharmyasya pṛthivīva-śabdâśrayatvâder atiriktam vinā anupapatteḥ.

Objection: In this way, ‘Earth possesses the mutual distinctness whose counter-correlate is [itself not only distinct from earth but also] distinct from the *thirteen* sorts of entities beginning [on the standard list] with water, *since* it is a substance’ is an inference that would prove not only something to be distinct from earth but also as distinct from that and on on [*ad infinitum*].

Gaṅgeśa: Wrong. For that inference [unlike mine] would be unmotivated [by favourable counterfactual reasoning (*tarka*)]. And in the case of my inference, such entities as earth in general or the substratum of sound [ether], which are experienced as having different properties from water and so on, would not be known without something in addition [to the experience, to wit, my negative-only inference].

Comments

The favourable counterfactual reasoning is that if there were not something distinct from, say, water, then things that have properties that water does not have would not be experienced. And of course we do experience earth and the rest.

Text (TCM_T 479 and TCM_C 620) and Translation

nanv itara-bhedo yady anyonyābhāvas tadābhāvād¹⁷ na sidhyet. abhāvasya abhāvāntarābhāvāt. yadi ca tena samam sva-rūpa-bheda eva sādhyah, tadānanugamād anumānāpravṛttiḥ. bhāvo 'bhāvo¹⁸ na bhavati ity abādhita-pratīti-balād abhāvasya api anyonyābhāvo 'sti iti kecit. tan na. apasiddhāntāt. anatiprasaktādhikarāṇa-sva-rūpa-mātreṇa eva abhāva-pratīty-upapattau ca adhikābhāve mānābhāvāc ca iti cet, na. itara-bhāvānyonyābhāvasya sādhyatvāt. na ca evam abhāvād aviveka-tādavasthyam. tena samam sva-rūpa-bhedasya anvayinā vyatirekiṇā vā sādhyatvāt.

Objection: If ‘distinctness from the others’ [as employed in your inference] were [as you say] a mutual absence, then distinctness from [the seventh category on the traditional list of things] absence would not be proved [by it]. For there is no other type of absence that would be an ‘absence of absence’. [Rather, that is a presence, but your inference requires an absence of absence to make sense of earth’s distinctness from absence as a category.]

And if along with that [distinctness that is the probandum in your inference] there is the distinctness that is something’s ‘very nature’ (*sva-rūpa*, i.e. absence reduced to the substratum), then, because there would not be the uniformity necessary, inference could not proceed.

Answer (by a Naiyāyika faction): A presence is not an absence (i.e. absence is a separate category)—a thesis that holds by force of being undefeated. So absence [as a fundamental category], too, is a mutual absence.

Gaṅgeśa: So say some. But they’re wrong. For, the position is inconsistent with our overall view.

Objection: The notion of absence is explained just by the ‘very nature’ of the locus or substratum, which is a view that faces no [such] untoward consequence. Furthermore, there is no argument that there is any other type of absence.

Gaṅgeśa: No. For, the probandum [with the current inference], the *being* other [which is a presence], is proved [by a separate inference] to be mutually distinct [from absence].

And it is not the case that in this way earth’s being the way it is would be indistinguishable from absence. [My sample inference does not purport to prove earth’s dis-

¹⁷ Emending to *abhāvād* (i.e. *tadābhāvād*) from *bhāvād* (i.e. *tadā bhāvād*).

¹⁸ Deleting *vā*.

tinctness from absence.] Equally for absence, earth's distinctness is by its very nature to be proved by either a positive or a negative inference.

Comments

If earth were not different from absence, then its very nature would be an absence. But this is ridiculous. On the other hand, it seems that we have to have a new type of absence.

Text (TCM_T 482 and TCM_C 621) and Translation

anye tu pṛthivīva-bhinna-dharmātyantābhāva eva sādhyah jalādi-pratīyogikās tāvanto 'tyantābhāvā vā tat-tad-asādhāraṇa-tat-tad-dharmātyantābhāva-yogo vā. ete ca abhāvā jalatvaṃ na ghaṭādu ghaṭādi jalatvātyantābhāva-vad iti pratyakṣādeḥ kvacit tat-tad-vaidharmyād eva prasiddhā iti na aprasiddhiḥ. tāvatām abhāvānām vaiśiṣṭyam na prasiddham iti cet, kim etāvātā. na hi tāvad-vaiśiṣṭyam atra sādhyate. kiṃ tu jalatvādinām yāvanto 'bhāvā iha sādhyās te ca tatra tatra prasiddhā eva. tāvad-vaiśiṣṭya-dhīs tu phalam. anyathā siddha-sāadhanāt. nimilitānām api sādhyatve na aprasiddhiḥ. kiñcid eka-dharmāvacchedako hi balādi-van melakārthaḥ, sa ca na asiddhiḥ. na ca hetor asādhāraṇyam. tāvad abhāva-yogī hy atra sapakṣo bhavati, na tu tad-eka-deśa-katipayābhāvavān. sādhyatāyās tāvaty aparyāpteḥ.

(Gaṅgeśa continues:) But others hold the following.

Naiyāyika faction: What's to be proved [by the sample inference is not a *mutual absence* from earth, it] is simply an *absolute absence* of a property distinct from earthhood [in earth]. Or [to frame the inference more specifically], what's to be proved is [in earth] the absolute absences whose counter-correlates are waterhood and company. Or, it is the relation [in earth] to absolute absences of this and that 'specific property', i.e. a property not the same as just this or that property [of earth].

And these absences are well-known such that there is no issue concerning introduction (*prasiddhi*). 'Waterhood does not exist in a pot and so on' [and] 'A having of an absolute absence of [e.g.] waterhood in a pot and so on' are produced by perception and the rest, (i.e. by inference and testimony). Thus, with respect to some things these absences are well-known just from this or that difference of property.

Objection: The relationality of those absences [to earth] is not well-known.

Naiyāyika faction: What would be the use of that being known [prior to the inference]? For, it is not the case that such relationality is to be proved here first. Rather, such absences as of waterhood and so on are to be proved and then these absences

being here and there well-known indeed inform such a cognition of relationality [that takes them all, so to say, in summation], which is the [final] fruit [of the inference as a knowledge source]. Otherwise, there would be the fault of ‘trying to prove what is already established’.

Even though [in the final inference] the probandum consists of them taken together, there is no issue of introduction (*prasiddhi*). For, there is specification by some single property or other for the purpose of a combining, like power [in combining men into an army] and the like. And this is not unfamiliar. Nor is there the ‘no similar instance’ fallacy of the prover. For, here the *sapakṣa* (places where the probandum is known definitely to occur) is: being-related-to-such-a-[collective]-absence, not possessing-the-absence-of-a-few-properties-in-some-one-or-another-part, [the former not occurring other than in the inferential subject, whereas the latter is well-known to occur in various things made of the element earth]. No formulation of the probandum would be sufficient [for what we want to prove] that was in such a way limited (i.e. limited in the manner of the second formulation in its mention of a ‘few’).

Comments

‘Earth has an absolute absence of a property distinct from earthhood, *since* it has earthhood’ is how the sample inference would be reconstructed by the Naiyāyika faction in the first formulation. The second formulation of the probandum, which is in terms of the absences’ counter-correlates, waterhood and company, suggests the solution to the problem of the availability of the probandum. And the third switches from the universals proper to the elements to ‘specific properties’ such as viscosity (*sneha*) for water. These properties, which are themselves not universals (*jāti*) but tropes (*guṇa*) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, are, like universals, exhibited by the one type of thing and nothing else, as being-smelly by all things earthen and nothing else. A further, more minor change in the third formulation is the mention of the qualificative relation, the being-qualified by such absences to the probandum: ‘Earth is qualified by the absolute absence of this and that specific property etc.’.

As before, the probandum is known prior to the inference in a portion of the inferential subject, for example, a pot.

The solution to the availability problem is, then, like counting, which, according to Nyāya, can create a new property in the things counted (*apekṣā-buddhi*, which is a kind of mental perception, not an inference, brought about by the *manas*, the internal organ). Putting all the absences together would be an act of the *manas* making the collectivity known prior to the inference that would establish it as qualifying earth. It is the collective absence, as opposed to an absence of a few properties, that makes the probandum provable only by a negative-only inference.

Text (TCM_T 485 and TCM_C 623) and Translation

yad vā jalatvātyantābhāvas tejastvātyantābhāvādhikaraṇa-vṛtīḥ atyantābhāvavāt ghaṭatvātyantābhāva-vat. evam atyantābhāvāntara-sāmānādhikaraṇyam api tatra sādhyam iti kva aprasiddhiḥ. kiṃ ca itare tāvat prasiddhā eva. te ca bheda-pratīyogino meyatvāt iti itara-bhedo 'pi sugraha eva.

(The **Naiyāyika faction** continues:) Alternatively, in the manner of the following inference it is shown that the probandum becomes for other absolute absences, [e.g. of airhood,] the having of the same substratum: ‘An absolute absence of waterhood rests in the substratum of the absolute absence of *tejas*-hood [or, being-the-fiery-element], *since* it is an absolute absence, like the absolute absence of pothood [in e.g. a cloth].’ So where is the not being familiar?

Furthermore, ‘the others’ are, in the first place, familiar indeed. And they are the counter-correlates of the distinctness, [that is, earth’s from the other things], *since* they are knowable. So ‘distinctness from the others’, too, is easy to grasp, quite easy.

Comments

Bit by bit the probandum is aggregated, in each case being ‘familiar’ (*prasiddha*, ‘well-known’) in a particular instance.

Text (TCM_T 486 and TCM_C 624) and Translation

nanu pṛthivī na itara-bhedavatī gurutvādibhyo jala-vad iti pratirodha iti cet, na. itara-bheda-niṣedho hi itarābhedaḥ na tu tejaḥ-prabhṛty-abhedo jala iti dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyā-vaikalyāt. catur-daśābhedānām ca ekatra virodhena asambhavāt. catur-daśa-bhedānām ca ekatra vṛttau na virodhaḥ.

Objection: [Your inference is defeated because it faces a counter-inference (*sat-pratīpakṣa*):] ‘Earth is *not* distinct from the others, *since* it is heavy and the like, like water’ contradicts your inference [and is equally well-supported].

Naiyāyika faction: No. For, a denial of distinctness from the others amounts to [an assertion of] non-distinctness with the others, but not to non-distinctness [in some respect] with members of the list beginning with the fiery element. So the example given, ‘water’, commits the fault called ‘probandum infirmity’, (i.e. an instance of the probandum’s absence since water though possessing some properties in common with other types of thing is clearly not non-distinct with the others as a group). And there is no possibility of fourteen *non*-distinctnesses at a single spot because they

would be mutually opposed, whereas fourteen *distinctnesses* occurring at a single spot would not be mutually opposed.

Comments

The fault of the example required in a presentation of an inference for others called ‘infirmity of the probandum’ (*sādhyā-vaikalya*) applies to an example that does not exhibit the probandum: ‘There is smoke on yonder mountain, *since* there is fire, like a lake.’ Water does not exhibit the probandum, ‘non-distinctness from the others’.

Furthermore, a thing has a single identity. It is non-distinct only with itself. There is only the single entity. But a single thing, a pot, for instance, is distinct from many other things, such that the idea that there be fourteen distinctnesses resting in it is quite plausible. ‘Fourteen’, of course, is the number in the text because it is the number of earth’s distinctnesses from the other fundamental types of thing, substances and non-substances (counted by fundamental category of non-substances and fundamental sub-category of substance), all the things that are not earth.

Text (TCM_T 487 and TCM_C 625) and Translation

yat tu sādhyā-prasiddhau pṛthivī itara-bhinnā tat-sādhyādhikaraṇa-tad-anadhikaraṇa-pṛthivy-anyataratvāt¹⁹ tad-adhikaraṇavat pṛthivyām tat-sādhyam anvayina eva setsyati iti. tan na. anyataratvasya aliṅgatvād ity uktatvāt. liṅgatve vā jalādāv api tat-siddhi-prasaṅgāt. evaṁ tarhi pṛthivī jalam pṛthivītvāt yan na jalam tan na pṛthivī yathā teja iti sat-pratipakṣo ’stv iti cet, na. ajalasya ghaṭādeḥ pratyakṣata eva pṛthivītvāniścaye vyatireka-vyabhicārād asya nyūnatvāt. tad-anavadhāraṇe tu sat-pratipakṣatvam iṣṭam eva.

Objection: Given that the probandum is introduced as you have explained (i.e. bit by bit), the inference, ‘Earth is distinct from the others, *since* earth is either (a) the probandum’s substratum (i.e. earthen things such as a pot where distinct-from-the-others has been already determined to occur) or (b) the substratum of its absence (i.e. where it has not been determined to occur), like the probandum’s substratum’, that probandum will be proved just by a positive inference. [So your example of a negative-only inference disintegrates.]

Gaṅgeśa: That’s wrong. It has already been explained that being-one-or-the-other [of a property and its absence] cannot be a true inferential mark. Or if it can be, then

¹⁹ N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya suggests the addition, *tad-anadhikaraṇa-°*, although both editions leave the string out.

the predicament is that being-distinct-from-non-earthen-things could be established for water and so on, too.

Objection: Let there be in this way, then, the counter-inference [showing your inference to be fallacious], ‘Earth is water, since it has earthhood—what is not water, that is not earth—like *tejas*, the fiery element.’

Gaṅgeśa: No. It is just by perception that a pot and the like, which are not water, are known to be earthen [to possess earthhood]. This being so, your so-called counter-inference falls to the fallacy of deviation in negative correlations, [that is to say, there is a counter-example, a place that exhibits the prover but not the probandum]. It [also] commits the debate error known as ‘leaving something out’ (*nyūna*, failing to mention or formulate correctly one or another of the five steps required in a proper ‘inference for others’, *parārthānumāna*). But if such is not determined [by perception], then your [crazy] counter-inference would be welcome indeed!

Comments

Here we move from the availability problem back to the usefulness of the negative form of inference. Granting that the probandum is available for inference in the way that has been sketched, we see that the inference proceeds by generalising over cases where it is known to occur. Thus, the inference looks pretty normal, that is to say, based on positive correlations as well as negative ones.

But the attempt to formulate a positive inference involves a trick prover, ‘*since it is one or the other of...*’, which invokes the logic of alternation in a way that could prove anything if such a prover were legitimate. However, something being’s either F or not-F cannot be used as a significant prover, Gaṅgeśa points out.

What counts as a genuine inference is in part determined by what we know is true. If an apparent inference form could be used to prove something false, then it is in reality non-genuine. ‘This four-headed creature is from Mars, since it has four heads—what is not from Mars, that does not have four heads—like a pot.’ Of course, the counter-inference proposed by the objector is defective in its example, i.e. in the third of the five specified steps, which is supposed to show the pervasion between the prover and probandum but does not. But Gaṅgeśa’s final counterfactual reasoning shows just what we would have to swallow were a pot’s being earthen, for instance, not known perceptually.

We turn now to a negative-only inference with a rather momentous conclusion, to judge by the classical controversy, a proof of self, *ātman*, an enduring substratum of psychological properties. That there is such a thing is hotly disputed by Buddhists and Cārvāka materialists and is a primary issue for all the schools.

Text (TCM_T 488 and TCM_C 626) and Translation

*nanu jīvac-charīram sātmakam prāñādimattvāt icchādi-kāryavattvād
vā iti vyatirekiṇi sādhyāprasiddhau katham vyatirekādi-nirūpaṇam.
nairātmyam ca na ghaṭasya pratyakṣa-vedyam, tasya tatra asāmarthyāt.
na anumāna-gamyam, nairātmyāpratītāv anvayino 'bhāvāt. sātmakatva-
pratītiṃ vinā vyatirekiṇo ' nupapatteḥ.*

Objection (by a new *Pūrva-pakṣin*): Consider another so-called negative-only inference: ‘A living body has a self, *since* it has breath and the like, or *since* it has as effects [inhering in itself] desire and the like.’ Given that the probandum is not known, how can there be such an inference as that which you understand to be ‘negative-only?’ (i.e. How is it that having-a-self is something known and thus available for inference?)

And not-having-a-self is not to be known perceptually for [e.g.] a pot, because perception is not capable there of making that known. Nor is it arrived at through inference [because the required pervasion cannot be established]. Given that there is no cognition of not-having-a-self, there can be no positive correlations; without cognition of having-a-self, negative correlations are impossible.

Comments

Like his Nyāya predecessors, Gaṅgeśa views a self as knowable both by perception and by inference. But for present purposes, we must bracket the perceptual position in order to explore the method of negative-only inference.

As mentioned at the beginning, this stretch of text seems practically a subcommentary on the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana (c. 400) on *Nyāya-sūtra* (NS) 1.1.5, where he proves the existence of the self as the locus of psychological properties by way of an inference type called *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. He says: ‘The self is known inferentially by means of [the marks of] desire and the like. Desire and the like are qualities and qualities have as their foundations substances. That which is the foundation of desires and the like is the self.’²⁰ Note that the NS has a long stretch of *sūtras* at the beginning of chapter three on the self, its character and how it is known (NS 3.1.1–25).

Despite the elucidations of the subcommentaries (and of Udayana’s independent treatise on the self²¹), one might wonder how precisely to reconstruct Vātsyāyana’s

²⁰ NYAYA-TARKATIRTHA–TARKATIRTHA–TARKATIRTHA (1985: 156–57): *icchādibhir ātmā, guṇāḥ, guṇās ca dravya-samsthānāḥ, tad yad eṣāṃ sthānam sa ātmā.*

²¹ The richness within the commentarial tradition notwithstanding, it is Udayana’s *Ātma-tattva-viveka* (‘Discrimination of Truth (from Falsehood) concerning the Self’), with its mind-boggling array of arguments, that is the outstanding Nyāya treatise on the self and self-knowledge. Never-

reasoning. For instance, if an inference is proffered, what is the *pakṣa*? More than one argument, moreover, seems to be implicit. A primary issue for Gaṅgeśa is the nature of our knowledge of the inferential subject prior to the inferential process or act. In the current passage, the *pakṣa* is the collection of living bodies (*śarīra*—a word used primarily for the human body but which here includes animals and presumably plants, which have their own type of *prāṇa* or breath).

Now although liberated selves are not embodied, clearly a dead body does not exhibit the prover here, breath, as also do not all other non-living things. Then presupposing that having-a-self is not revealed to the senses (otherwise inference would not be required), how could the absence of having-a-self, to wit, not-having-a-self, be known? Is it known perceptually? No. We do not directly observe that a pot, for instance, has no self. Nor is the probandum known by inference. If not-having-a-self is not made available by perception, it could not be grasped by an inference based on positive correlations, since perceptual evidence would be required. And with ‘not-having-a-self’ as probandum, the *vipakṣa* would be things that ‘have a self’. Of course, that predicate is unavailable.

Text (TCM_T 488 and TCM_C 626) and Translation

*atha icchā samavāyi-kāraṇa-janyā kāryatvāt. tac ca samavāyi-kāraṇam
prthivy-ādy-aṣṭa-dravya-bhinnaṃ prthivy-āditye bādhaka-sattvād iti
prthivy-ādi-bhinnātma-siddhau tadvattvaṃ jīvac-charīre sādhyata iti
cet, yadi sātmakatvaṃ ātma-saṃyogavattvaṃ, tadā ghaṭādaṃ tad asti
iti tato hetu-vyāvṛttāv asādhāraṇyam. jñāna-samānādhikaraṇa-jñāna-
kāraṇī-bhūta-saṃyogāśraya-kāryatvaṃ sātmakatvaṃ, śarīrātma-
saṃyogasya jñāna-kāraṇatvāt, ātma-manasos tathātve 'py akāryatvād iti
cet, na. śarīrād anyatra asiddheḥ. tatra prasiddhau siddha-sādhanam.*

Objection (to the *Pūrva-pakṣin*, by a Naiyāyika defender of the separate utility of *kevala-vyatirekin* inference): [First there is established an inherent cause of psychological qualities:] Desire has origins in an inherent cause, *since* it is an effect [like a pot]. And [then it is established that] the inherent cause is distinct from the eight substances [on the traditional list] beginning with earth, because there are de-

theless, Gaṅgeśa most directly follows Vātsyāyana and the NS commentaries, not his ‘teacher’s’ *Ātma-tattva-viveka*. The latter is, by the way, a long work. The edition DVIVEDIIN–DRAVIḌA (1986), with a commentary by Saṅkara Mīśra that takes up about half, runs almost a thousand pages. And despite his focus, it is safe to assume that overall Gaṅgeśa takes a position that is pretty much the same as Udayana’s. (The *Ātma-tattva-viveka* is organised around refutation of rival views, and wanders to inferences to God and to the authority of scripture, departing dramatically from the order of the NS discussion.)

featers that rule out earth and the rest. Given that self has been established as distinct from earth and the rest, the having of that [a self] is proved [by negative correlations] for a living body.

Pūrvā-pakṣin: If ‘having a self’ amounts to ‘being conjoined with a self’, then that occurs in the case of a pot and so on (too, since, according to Nyāya, a self is ubiquitous in size, i.e. all-pervasive, such that everything would be in a sense ‘conjoined’ with it). Therefore, the prover being excluded (from the *sapakṣa*), the fallacy of ‘no common instance’ is committed.

Objection: [The probandum predicate] ‘having a self’ amounts to something’s (i.e. a living body’s) ‘being an effect and a substratum that supports the conjunction (i.e. body-self conjunction or connection) that is a cause of cognition and that has the same substratum [namely, a self] as cognition.’ For, body-self conjunction is a cause of cognition. Although self-*manas* conjunction is such a cause, too, *manas* (‘mind’ or the ‘internal organ’) is not an effect [and so the predicate does not overapply to *manas*].

Pūrvā-pakṣin: Wrong. For it is unknown elsewhere than with respect to the body (i.e. the *pakṣa*). [And] if it is known there, then [you’ve got a case of] ‘trying to prove what is already known’.

Comments

Following Vātsyāyana under *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.5 (the so-called inference *sūtra*), Gaṅgeśa puts forth a two-step argument. First, desires are proved to have a locus, a substance in which to inhere, like all qualities. In step two, self is proved to be that locus, a distinct substance, different from earth, water, *tejas* and so on down the traditional list, by eliminative argument. Note that all that we know about the self hereby is that it is the locus of certain properties, on analogy to the way, say, the lotus is a locus of blue.

The defeaters for the proposition that desire and the like belong to earth or the rest consists of counterfactual reasoning such as the following. If desire were a property of earth (or water and so on down the list), then like the colour that exists in earthen things, it too would be perceived. Surveying pots and so on, we find that nothing material has desire, cognition etc., outside of living bodies, bodies conjoined, on the Nyāya theory, with selves.

Next, instead of advancing inquiry about the main concern of how the probandum is available, the new *Pūrvā-pakṣin* tries to exploit bits of incoherence within the overall Nyāya picture of mind-body relation. By a separate eliminative argument concerning substances and size, a self is proved to be ubiquitous: all substances are supposed to be of ubiquitous, intermediate, or atomic size (with examples in ether, a pot and an earthen atom, respectively). Thus, the *Pūrvā-pakṣin* points out, a pot is

conjoined with a self as ubiquitous on the Nyāya view, and so such a non-living thing too would be qualified by the probandum. But the prover, having-breath, does not qualify a pot. So there is no evidence for the required pervasion and the ‘no common instance’ fallacy is committed. There should be evidence, but there isn’t any.

Two conjunctions, or connections, are viewed in Nyāya as necessary for cognitive occurrences: body-self conjunction and *manas*-self conjunction. The *manas*, or ‘internal organ’, is of course itself a controversial posit—both within Nyāya, we should note, as well as outside. (There is a section on *manas* in Gaṅgeśa’s perception chapter.²²) By separate arguments, *manas* (along with the self) is properly excluded as qualified by the property, having-a-self, by its ‘being an effect’ (neither self nor *manas* is an effect). So Gaṅgeśa qualifies the probandum term of his inference, specifying that conjunction of self and body is an *avacchedaka* or condition for the self’s being the locus of desires, cognitions and so on, as effects.

Thus the objection is met (our having been reminded of the many problems attaching to the conception of *manas* notwithstanding). Unfortunately, there remains the main problem, the *Pūrva-pakṣin* points out: where have we encountered this now, on the objector’s analysis, highly complex property, having-a-self? The probandum cannot be both unknown and available for inference, nor both known and needing to be proved.

Text (TCM_T 490 and TCM_C 627) and Translation

icchāyā asamavāyi-kāraṇa-samyogāvacchedakatvasya abhāvo ghaṭādau dṛṣṭaḥ, tad-vyatirekaḥ śarīre sādhyata iti cet, na. icchāyā asamavāyi-kāraṇa-samyogāvacchedakatvasya śarīra eva prasiddheḥ siddha-sādhanam. anyathā asiddhi-vyatirekādya-anirūpaṇāt. aprasiddha-sādhyā-saṃsargam iva sādhyam aprasiddham sādhyati vyatirekī iti cet, na. vyatirekādya-anirūpaṇād asādhāraṇa-dharmaṇa apratīta-padārthānumāne ghaṭatvādinā api svēcchā-kalpita-dīthādya-anumāna-prasaṅga iti.

Objection: In a pot and so forth there is experienced no specifier of the emergent cause, which is conjunction [of self and body], with respect to desire [as effect, i.e. it is only living bodies that have desires, not things like pots]. Its absence (i.e. the absence of the absence) is [thereby] proved with respect to the living body. (That is to say, the property, living-body-as-specifying-the-conjunction-etc., which is what having-a-self amounts to, is proved to belong to a living body.)

²² PHILLIPS–RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (2004: 537–74).

Pūrvā-pakṣin: No. [Your absence's counter-correlate, namely] the specifier of the emergent cause, which is conjunction [of self and body], with respect to desire, is well-known just with the living body and so this is a case of 'trying to prove what is already known'. Otherwise, the problem is that its not being present could not be determined by a negative method or the like (i.e. by another method of knowledge: it would be unavailable to all knowledge-generative processes).

Objection: The way that the probandum that the negative inference proves is unknown is like the relation to the probandum that is unknown [with respect to the *pakṣa*, prior to inference].

Pūrvā-pakṣin: No. For, it could not be determined by a negative method or the like (as has been said).

If inference could prove an uncognised something by way of the thing's uncommon property, [as 'having-breath' is a property possessed only by living bodies], then a pot too could be inferred to have, by its [uncommon property] pothood or the like, such arbitrarily imagined properties as 'Ḍittha' (a name normally used only for persons)—this is the difficulty.

Comments

The suggestion is that, since no difficulty attaches the probandum's being unknown with respect to the *pakṣa* prior to inference, the unknownness or unfamiliarity of the probandum is nothing to be concerned with. No matter what the method of correlation establishing *vyāpti*, the probandum is unknown as qualifying the *pakṣa* prior to inference, and so with negative-only inference we have a similar unknownness in the case of the probandum itself prior to inference.

'This distinctive-in-this-way creature is from Mars, *since* it is distinctive-in-this-way.' Imagining invariable concomitance between (a) whatever marks something as of a certain type of thing and (b) any far-flung predicate we like, we can prove the far-flung predicate to occur in that sort of thing. Thus, 'Pots have ghosts, *since* they have pothood', and 'Earthen things are from Mars, *since* they have smell.' Such 'negative-only' inference would be way too powerful an engine. The problem is supposed to be solved by limitations on probandum availability. The suggestion in the objection would undermine the solution and we could prove way too much, says the *Pūrvā-pakṣin* in response.

Text (TCM_T 490 and TCM_C 629) and Translation

ucyate. icchā-samavāyi-kāraṇa-siddhāv icchātvaṁ saṁyogāsamavāyi-kāraṇaka-vṛtti, nityēndriya-grāhya-viśeṣa-guṇa-vṛtti-guṇatva-sākṣād-vyāpya-jātitvāt śabdatva-vat. sa ca asamavāyi-kāraṇaṁ saṁyogaḥ

*kiñcid-avacchinnah saṃyogatvāt ātma-saṃyoga-mātrasya icchā-janakatve atiprasaṅgād iti icchāsamavāyi-kāraṇa-saṃyogāvachedakatvaṃ*²³ *sātmakatvaṃ śarīre sādhyate.*

Gaṅgeśa: We answer. Given that desire has been proved to have an inherent cause [by the inference previously stated, ‘Desire has origins in an inherent cause, *since* it is an effect’, we formulate a second inference], being-a-desire occurs in that [namely, desire] which has as emergent cause a conjunction, *since* being-a-desire is a universal directly pervaded by, [i.e. whose instances are all instances of the wider universal of,] being-a-quality-occurring-in-specific-qualities-grasped-by-an-eternal-organ (i.e. *manas* or the organ of hearing), like being-a-sound (i.e. soundhood, the universal of sound). And this emergent cause, which is a conjunction, is specified by something, *since* it is a conjunction. (That ‘something’, of course, is the living body.) If merely conjunction with a self were the origins of desire [without requiring something else, something delimiting it], then ramifications would overextend. Therefore, having-a-self, which is the specifier of the conjunction that gives rise to desire, is proved with respect to the living body. (That is, every living body is ‘enselved’, *sātmaka*.)

Comments

Conjunction is a two-term relation. It does not occur on its own but simultaneously in two loci. The point here, however, is that as a property of each of its terms it is not a locus-pervading property, like, say, cowhood, which pervades every part of the cow. Thus it has to be specified or delimited in order to make inference predicating it possible. That is, since a conjunction between, for instance, a monkey and a tree occurs in the tree’s branches but not at its roots, the tree both has and does not have monkey-conjunction. That a single thing is qualified by both a property and its absence presents an obvious problem for logic, to be resolved by specification of precisely where in the tree the property occurs. Similarly, the conjunction necessary for desire makes us ask, ‘Where, precisely, does it occur?’ The answer is not everywhere in the self but only where there is conjunction with the living body. A self, we must keep in mind, is ubiquitous in size and so a ‘conjunction’ (of sorts) of self with a pot does occur. But a pot does not have desire. Desire occurs only in a self as connected to a living body. Indeed, desire is itself a non-locus-pervading property—given that the self is ubiquitous. So, the specifier—or delimiter (*avachedaka*)—of the conjunction that makes desire possible is the living body.

²³ Adding *atiprasaṅgād iti icchā-samavāyi-kāraṇa-saṃyogāvachedakatvaṃ*, with TCM_C.

The conjunction is proved by Gaṅgeśa at the beginning of the passage by some complicated reasoning centring on second-order properties, or symmetries, within the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories, specifically, a desire's being an effect like a colour. Thus desire and the like not only demand posit of an inherent cause whereof they would be 'specific properties' (exhibited only by that type of thing), but also posit of a conjunction as their 'emergent cause', as conjunctions among threads are emergent causes of the colour of a piece of cloth. More on this after the next passage.

Gaṅgeśa apparently shares the view of his Nyāya predecessors that between incarnations a self does not have desire, cognition and other psychological properties had by living persons. Although it is disputable whether he sees a self as in every way unconscious between birth and death, clearly without a body a self has no cognition (*jñāna*). At several places it is evident that this is Vātsyāyana's position.²⁴ 'Awareness' (*anubhava*, which is the experiential subset of 'cognition', *jñāna*, which divides into awareness and memory) is dependent on embodiment. Though normally reborn after death, a self has no cognition etc., between incarnations, that is, not until it is reconjoined with a body—this is the mainstream position.

Uddyotakara is, notably, one who occasionally suggests otherwise. Vātsyāyana's 'elucidator' seems to see detached cognition of self as possible without embodiment.²⁵ Furthermore, God is thought of as having cognition without having a body.²⁶

Theology aside, the thesis that the body is required for cognition and other psychological properties feeds Gaṅgeśa's analysis of 'having-a-self'. Thus the conclusion of his negative-only inference to self as locus of desire and the like is restricted to self as conjoined with a living body.

Like the current argument, which we see draws deep on Nyāya psychology, next we have a formally constructed negative-only inference couched in what are really technical terms that also have everyday meanings.

Text (TCM_T 493 and TCM_C 629) and Translation

*yad vā, ātmani icchādhāratā mahat-saṃyogāvacchedyā janya-vibhu-
viśeṣa-guṇādhāratātīvāt vāyv-ādi-saṃyogāvacchedya-śabdādhāratva-*

²⁴ For example, NBh 1.1.2, 1.1.22 and 4.2.38: see NYAYA-TARKATIRTHA-TARKATIRTHA-TARKATIRTHA (1985: 76.227 ff. and 1090–91).

²⁵ Otherwise, we would not have the authoritative teaching, which of course we do have, of the 'living liberated', see NV 1.1.2 in NYAYA-TARKATIRTHA-TARKATIRTHA-TARKATIRTHA (1985: 67–8).

²⁶ There are, on the other hand, contrary positions on this; see, e.g. Udayana's *Ātma-tattva-viveka* in DVIVEDIN-DRAVIḌA (1986: 808–09).

*vad iti sāmānyataḥ siddham icchādhāratā-ghaṭakēcchāsamavāyī-
kāraṇa-dravya-saṃyogavattvaṃ sātmakatvam. ata eva jñāna-
samānādhikaraṇa-jñāna-kāraṇī-bhūta-saṃyogāśraya-kāryatvaṃ
vā sātmakatvam. sva-śarīre prāṇādīmatvāsya icchādīmatvāsya
ca ceṣṭāvayavōpacayādi-vyāpyatva-grahāt. ghaṭātau ceṣṭādi-virahēṇa
prāṇādīmatvēchādīmatva-virahānumānam, icchādi-virahāt icchādi-
prayojakēcchādy-ādīdhāratā-ghaṭakēcchādy-asamavāyī-kāraṇa-
saṃyoga-virahānumānam kāryābhāvavati kāraṇābhāva-niyamāt.*

(**Gaṅgeśa** continues:) Alternatively, ‘The abstract property of a desire’s locus being a self [is only half right, i.e. it] requires specification by a conjunction with something of intermediate size [neither ubiquitous like a self nor atomic like an earthen atom, i.e. a living body], *since* it is an abstract property of the ‘specific qualities’ (i.e. desire, cognition, pleasure, pain and so on) that are both generated and belong to something ubiquitous [namely, a self], like the abstract property of sound’s locus [ether, which, like a self, is ubiquitous] requiring specification by the likes of a conjunction with air or something of the sort [having intermediate size].’ This inference proves *in general* that ‘having-a-self’ amounts to the ‘having of a conjunction with another substance, this conjunction being an emergent cause of desire that specifies its locus.’

Just for this reason, an alternative analysis of ‘having-a-self’ [is all right for such a proof in general]: ‘having-a-self’ is [as I have said above] something’s (i.e. a living body’s) ‘being an effect and a substratum that supports the conjunction (i.e. body-self conjunction) that is a cause of cognition and that has the same substratum [namely, a self,] as cognition.’

A pervasion is grasped between (a) having-breath and so on in the case of a person’s own body [and others] along with having-desire and so on and (b) voluntary bodily movement along with becoming fat or thin on the part of various [bodily] parts (i.e. one’s waist and so on). From this grasping, an inference proceeds [targeting a *vipakṣa* (places where the probandum is known definitely to be absent), namely] with respect to a pot and the like, which do not have voluntary movement and so on, establishing the absence there of both having-breath and having-desire-and-the-like. From the absence of desire etc., an inference proceeds to establish [in that same *vipakṣa*, viz., a pot and the like,] the absence of the conjunction that is the emergent cause of desire and the like, a conjunction that specifies their locus and counts among their causes. For, [with emergent causality] the rule is that without showing the effect no such cause is to be supposed.

Comments

An ‘emergent cause’, *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*, is a causal condition only with respect to certain effects; e.g. the colour of a piece of cloth has an emergent cause in the colour of the threads. Considering the cloth as effect, the conjunction of the threads is an emergent cause.²⁷ Similarly here with a desire, there is an emergent cause in the connection between a self and a living body.

Text (TCM_T 494 and TCM_C 631) and Translation

*na ca sātmatvaṁ śarīra-vṛtti śarīra-vṛttitve*²⁸ *bādhakābhāvāt śarīratva-vad iti anvayinā eva sādhya-siddheḥ kiṁ vyatirekiṇā iti vācyam. śarīraṁ sātmakam iti śarīra-viśeṣyaka-buddher vyatirekiṇaṁ vinā anupapatteḥ. upāyāntarasya upāyāntarādūṣakatvāc ca.*

Objection: The inference, ‘Having-a-self has its occurrence in the body, *since* with respect to its occurring there that there is no defeater [or counter-consideration], like being-a-body’, establishes the probandum simply by positive correlations. Hence, what’s the use of your negative-only inference?

Gaṅgeśa: And that should not be asked. For, ‘A [living] body has a self’—a cognition whose qualificandum is the body—would not be possible without the negative method. Furthermore, one means [of knowledge] does not vitiate another.

Comments

In the objector’s inference, having-a-self is the inferential subject, whereas in Gaṅgeśa’s it is the living body. Gaṅgeśa apparently accepts the objector’s inference and accepts that it is based on positive correlations. But one valid means of knowing does not cancel out another, he says. What’s the loss in accepting both as reliable sources? ‘Those delighting in reasoning’ (e.g. TCM_C 977, *tarka-rasika*) sometimes prove things even though they are already known by perception. And if one takes the living body as inferential subject, one has no *sapakṣa* for one’s inference (no instance of ‘having-a-self’ outside the set of living bodies) and thus no possibility to prove that ‘A living body has a self’ except by a negative-only inference.

²⁷ See PHILLIPS–RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (2004: 540 ff.) for further explanation of emergent causality, as well as the causality section in the introduction (23–25).

²⁸ Emending *śarīre* to *śarīra-vṛttitve*.

Text (TCM_T 494 and TCM_C 632) and Translation

yad vā ceṣṭā saṃyogāsamavāyi-kāraṇikā saṃskārājanya-kriyātvād iti ceṣṭāyā asamavāyi-kāraṇa-saṃyoga-siddhau prayatnavad ātma-saṃyoga eva paryavasyati prayatnānvaya-vyatirekânūvidhāyivāt. evaṃ ca ceṣṭāyāḥ asamavāyi-kāraṇa-saṃyogāśrayatve sati śarīratvaṃ sātmakatvaṃ jīvac-charīre sādhyam, ceṣṭāvattvād iti hetuḥ. ceṣṭā-virahaś ca ghaṭāḍau pratyakṣa-siddhiḥ. ceṣṭā-virahāt tad-asamavāyi-kāraṇa-saṃyoga-virahe 'pi sugrahaḥ.

(**Gaṅgeśa** continues:) Alternatively, voluntary bodily movement has an emergent cause in a conjunction [of something with the body], *since* it is action not generated by a disposition. Given that this conjunction is established—the conjunction, that is, that is an emergent cause of voluntary bodily movement—it is concluded that it is a conjunction [of the body] with a self, i.e. something capable of effort, by positive and negative correlations with effort.

And in this way, given that there is a [dual] substratum of the conjunction that is an emergent cause of voluntary bodily movement [which amounts to a general understanding of ‘having a self’], that to be a [living] body is to be ‘enselved’ (*sātmaka*) is to be proved (i.e. it is the probandum in an inference) targeting living bodies, and it is proved, *since* a living body exhibits voluntary bodily movement—the prover.

Moreover, absence of voluntary bodily movement is known in a pot and the like by perception. From this absence of voluntary bodily movement, it is easy to grasp that there is also an absence of the conjunction [we have been talking about] that is an emergent cause of it. [Thus, we prove that living bodies are enselved by a negative-only inference.]

Comments

Here ‘disposition’ (*saṃskāra*) includes the impetus of a moving object and the like.

A standard example of action born of a conjunction is striking a tree branch with a stick such that a piece of fruit falls. The conjunction of stick with branch is an emergent cause of the falling of the fruit. This example contrasts with disposition-impelled action that does not require conjunction or disjunction.

The main idea behind the argument is that action that is not *saṃskāra*-impelled, not something dropping because of weight or inherently active such as wind or air (according to the traditional physics), is generated by conjunction or disjunction, which are themselves qualities with substrata, two substrata, to be precise. One substratum of the conjunction that is an emergent cause of voluntary bodily movement

is the body; the other has to be capable of initiating effort and action, to wit, a self ‘capable of effort’.

Text (TCM_T 495 and TCM_C 633) and Translation

yad vā jīvac-charīraṃ tad-avayavo vā ātma-bhinnatve saty ātma-viśeṣa-guṇa-kāraṇa-bhogānadhikaraṇāvṛtti-saṃyogavat prāṇānyatve sati jñāna-kāraṇī-bhūta-prāṇa-saṃyogavattvāt yan na evaṃ tan na evaṃ yathā ghaṭaḥ. ātma-prāṇa-saṃyogaḥ prāṇa-manas-saṃyogo vā śarīra-prāṇa-saṃyogena eva anyathā-siddhaṃ na kāraṇam. bhogādhāratvaṃ bhoga-samavāyi-kāraṇātirikta-vṛtti sakala-bhogādhikaraṇa-vṛttivāt prameyatvādi-vad iti tārkiṅkī rītiḥ.

(Gaṅgeśā continues:) Alternatively, the living body or one of its parts exhibits a conjunction that is a cause of the ‘specific qualities’ (i.e. desire, cognition, pleasure and so on) of a self, given that the living body and its parts are distinct from selves. They exhibit a conjunction, [furthermore,] that does not occur in what is not the substratum of pleasure, *since* the living body or the part exhibits a conjunction with breath that is a cause of cognition, given that it is other than breath. What is not so, is not so, like a pot.

The conjunction between self and breath and the conjunction between breath and *manas* (the ‘internal organ’) are not such causes in that they are rendered irrelevant (*anyathā-siddha*) just by [the emergent cause we have targeted as the prover, namely] conjunction between body and breath.

To be a pleasure’s substratum is to be something over and above [the other term of self-body conjunction] an inherent cause of a pleasure, *since* it is to be a substratum of every pleasure [but not the only one], like such pervasive properties as being-knowable—to use the logical style [of those who like formally formulated inferences].

Comments

This new inference contains an expression that qualifies the probandum, ‘given that a living body and its parts are distinct from selves’, which is required because otherwise a self would be proved to ‘have a self’, too, since both self and body exhibit the conjunction—i.e. the connection between these two—that is a cause of desire and the like. A second qualifier, ‘a conjunction, [furthermore,] that does not occur in what is not a substratum of pleasure’, eliminates *manas* as a candidate for being ‘enselved’, since the internal organ is not a locus of pleasure, although its connection with a self is a causal factor in the appearance of psychological qualities. Thus, of the two emergent causes, body-self conjunction and *manas*-self conjunction, only the former is key to the inference (and indeed to the meaning of ‘being enselved’).

The qualification to the prover, ‘given...’, is added because the second term of the conjunction of body and breath is of course breath. The inference proceeds based on negative correlations only: ‘What is not so, is not so, like a pot.’ The example, which is negative, exhibits both the absence of the probandum, in effect, ‘not having a self’, and the absence of the prover, ‘not having breath’.

In the second paragraph, Gaṅgeśa addresses the worry that there might be deviation in the case of breath inasmuch as the first two conjunctions with breath mentioned would also be emergent causes of psychological qualities. However, they are not to be regarded as such, because they are ‘rendered irrelevant’ by the connection between breath and the body. In brief, without the body-breath connection that marks a living body, there would not be the connections with the other two substances.

According to both Mathurānātha and Rucidatta, the final paragraph concerns the question of how the probandum is known. The living body is known to be both a locus of psychological qualities and something distinct from the other term of the required ‘mind-body’ connection. Psychological qualities occur in a self only as conjoined with a body, and in a body only through causal processes involving *manas* and self. A body as so known allows us to avoid the dilemma of (a) an unavailable probandum or (b) an unnecessary inference. We know what a substratum of a pleasure is in knowing the living body as such a substratum and we know it as something over and above a second inherent cause. We know that it is not the only causal factor. But prior to the inference we do not know the self as either such a substratum or as something over and above the body. Unfortunately, just how we know the body is not the only causal factor is not explained here. The inference is framed formally, presupposing knowledge of the entire Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

Text (TCM_T 499 and TCM_C 633) and Translation

*atha icchā aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyâsritā aṣṭa-dravyânâsritatve sati
guṇatvât yan na evaṃ tan na evaṃ yathā anâsritam aṣṭa-dravyâsritam
vâ katham vyatirekî. aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyasya tad-vṛttitvasya ca
apratîter vyatirekâdy-anirûpaṇât. syâd etat. icchâyâḥ dravyâsritatve
'numite pṛthivyâdau bâdhânavatâra-dasâyâm vipratipatti-vâkyâd
âsritatvâdi-sâdhâraṇa-dharma-darśanâd vâ tad-dravyam aṣṭa-
dravyâtiriktam na vâ iti sandehena aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyôpasthitih.*

(New) **Pūrva-pakṣin:** [Reconsider your inference:] ‘Desire rests in a substance over and above the eight substances [mentioned on the traditional list, earth and the rest], *since*, given that it does not rest in any of the eight, it is a quality [and all qualities rest in, or qualify, substances]; what is not so, is not so, like something that does not

reside anywhere [for example, ether, which does not have a substratum] or like something that resides in one or another of the eight substances [for example, a smell].’

How is it that this is [a *bona fide* inference, as you say] a negative-only inference? A substance that is over and above the eight substances [mentioned on the traditional list] is unknown, as is something that would occur in something like that [as opposed to one of the eight or a combination of them], unless they are determined by your negative inference or the like [which is precisely what is in question].

A **Naiyāyika faction**: That may be. [What you say is right in part.] Desire may have been inferred to reside in a substance [on the grounds that it is a quality], but until the realisation of the patent falsehood of its resting in earth or the rest [of the eight], a question is provoked by a statement of a debater or questioner or by an experience of a common property such as of [qualities all] resting in something or other: ‘Such a substance, is it over and above the eight or is it not?’ The question (or ‘doubt’, *saṁdeha*) puts the probandum into awareness [that is to say, makes it available for inference, the probandum, to wit], a substratum that is over and above the eight substances.

Comments

The probandum ‘rests in a substance over and above the eight substances (mentioned on the traditional list, earth and the rest)’ is asserted of desire. Desire may well be known, but it is not to be assumed that self as a ninth substance is known. The inference is one of a set that target psychological qualities and infer a self as their bearer. Thus selves are not to be assumed in the context and the inference has to be ‘negative-only’. A smell, for example, does *not* rest in a substance over and above the eight, since smells rest in things earthen. It is not an example of the probandum nor of the prover as precisely specified, ‘given that it does not rest in any of the eight.’

The Naiyāyika faction argues that the ways that a probandum can be introduced and made available for inference are not as narrow as some apparently think. Under certain conditions, a debater’s statement or a mere question can make a term known well enough to be used in inference. And there are several alternative formulations of doubts or questions—or more precisely an ordered series of questions—that make the probandum in the negative-only inference about the self ‘well-known’ (*prasiddha*).

Text (TCM_T 499 and TCM_C 634) and Translation

yad vā icchā aṣṭa-dravyâtiriktâśritā na vā iti saṁśayāt icchāyāḥ aṣṭa-dravyâtiriktâśrayôpasthitau paścād icchâśrayo ’ṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyam na vā iti saṁśayād aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyôpasthitih. atha

vā dravyâsritâ icchâ aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravya-vṛttir na vā pūrva-vat saṁśayât aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravya-vṛttitvaṁ prasiddham icchâyāḥ sādhyate. saṁśaya-prasiddham api sādhyam vyatirekâdi-nirūpakam, sādhya-jñāna-mātrasya kāraṇatvāt. na ca evaṁ saṁśayād eva pakṣe sādhya-siddher vyatireki-vaiyarthyam. niścayârtham tat-pravṛtter.

(The **Naiyāyika faction** continues:) Alternatively, from the question [or doubt]: ‘Does desire reside in *something* over and above the eight or not?’ [the fact] that desire rests in such a substance over and above the eight is set in awareness. Later [having concluded that it does], one questions, ‘Is the substratum of desire a *substance* over and above the eight or not?’ Thereby, that there is substance over and above the eight gets set in awareness.

Alternatively, ‘Does desire, which resides in a substance, reside in a substance that is over and above the eight or not?’ is a question, as explained above, that makes an occurrence in a substance over and above the eight known [well enough for inference (*prasiddha*)]—a probandum that is [then] proved of desire. Although the probandum is introduced (*prasiddha*) by a question, it is determined to hold [for the inferential subject] by a process involving its absence and so on, since simply cognition of the probandum [not veridical awareness of it] is the relevant causal factor [for inference].

And it is not the case that just from the doubt there would be, on this view, knowledge of the probandum as qualifying the inferential subject such that negative-only [or any] inference would be pointless. For, the inference is carried out to gain certainty.

Comments

Understanding a debater’s statement, asking a question, or entertaining a doubt do not require previous knowledge of the precise terms employed. Furthermore, prior cognition—understanding of an opponent’s statement etc.—of a probandum term, not knowledge, is required. Gaṅgeśa does not appear himself to accept this position.

Text (TCM_T 499 and TCM_C 635) and Translation

mā evam. saṁśayena sādhya-prasiddhāv api tad-vyatireka-niścayâ-sambhavāt sādhya-vyatireka-tad-vyāpti-niścayasya sādhya-niścaya-sādhyatvāt sādhya-sandehe tad-vyatirekâdi-saṁśayâvâśyambhāvāt.

[New] **Pūrva-pakṣin**: Don’t think like that. For, were a probandum indeed ‘well-known’ by means of a doubt [or a question], there would be no possibility of the certainty about its absence. For, certainty about the absence of the probandum along with certainty about its pervasion [by the absence of the prover] is [or becomes] the

certainty about the probandum [qualifying the inferential subject that is the result of inference]. If doubt about the probandum is what we have, necessarily will there be doubt about the absence of the probandum et cetera (i.e. doubt about the pervasion, doubt that blocks inference).

Comments

Gaṅgeśa or any advocate of negative-only inference would concede that the absence of the probandum has to be known with certainty to occur in at least one instance of correlation with the absence of the prover and normally with many. And if there is doubt about the pervasion from any (reasonable) quarter, then inference does not proceed. If all we know about some probandum term is that it dubiously applies to the subject, then we do not know enough about it to infer anything. And the very nature of the proposed negative-only method requires that it not be known to hold of anything; otherwise, inference could proceed based on positive correlations. Again, the old bind.

Text (TCM_T 500 and TCM_C 635) and Translation

kim ca saṁśayōpasthita-sādhyasya vyatireki-nirūpaṇam na yogyānupalambhāt, sādhyā-niścayaṁ vinā yogyānupalambhāsambhavāt. na api vyāpakābhāvāt, sādhyā-niścayaṁ vinā tad-vyāpakatva-niścayābhāvāt. na ca yadi icchā aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyâsritā na syād aṣṭānâsritā satī dravyâsritā na syāt rūpa-vad iti sādhyā-viparyaya-koṭau pratikūla-tarka-saha-kṛtaḥ sādhyā-saṁśaya eva niścaya-kāryam karoti. ata eva etādṛśa-saṁśayōpasthita-kalpita-ḍiṭhādi-sādhanam apy apāstam. tad-viparyaye pratikūla-tarkābhāvād iti vācyam. sādhyā-niścayaṁ vinā sādhyā-vyatireka-niścaya-tan-mūla-tarkānavatārāt. anyathā aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravya-vṛttitva-nirūpaṇe tarkodayas tarkodaye ca tat-saha-kṛta-sādhyā-saṁśayasya sādhyā-vyatireka-niścāyakatvam iti.

(The new *Pūrva-pakṣin* continues:) Furthermore, determination by a negative inference of a probandum [to qualify an inferential subject, i.e. a probandum] set in awareness through a doubt [or question] cannot derive from the probandum's not being experienced while being capable of being perceived. For, without certainty about the probandum, there could be no 'non-perception of something as capable of being perceived' (i.e. where that 'something' would be the probandum).

Nor could it derive from an absence of something that pervades it [from your negative prover, that is], because without certainty about the probandum there would be no certainty about its having something as its pervader.

Objection: ‘If desire did not reside in a substance that is over and above the eight substances, then, not residing in any of the eight, it would not reside in a substance, like colour’—this is unfavourable counterfactual reasoning on the assumption of the probandum’s opposite. So it is the doubt about the probandum accompanied by such reasoning that renders the effect of certainty.

Just for this reason, an earlier objection is also thrown out, the objection, namely, that such arbitrarily imagined properties as ‘*Ḍittha*’ (a name normally used for persons) could also be established [for a pot, say] through the probandum being set in awareness by a doubt [or question]. For, there would be no such unfavourable counterfactual reasoning on the assumption of the probandum’s opposite.

New *Pūrva-pakṣin*: That should not be said. For, without certainty about the probandum, there could be no entry either for certainty about the absence of the probandum [as would be required by your negative-only inference] or for counterfactual reasoning which is based in that [certainty, too]. Otherwise, [there would be the fault of ‘mutual dependence’ (*anyonyāśraya*):] given knowledge that there is an occurrence in a substance over and above the eight substances, counterfactual reasoning would be employed, on the one hand, and, on the other, given the use of the counterfactual reasoning, the absence of this probandum would be made certain by a doubt about it ‘accompanied’ by such counterfactual reasoning!

Comments

A pot whose absence is known by perception to occur on the floor (‘The pot is not on the floor’) has been encountered previously or at least learned about through a trustworthy statement. The pot’s being capable of being perceived is a requirement for its absence to be known perceptually, but so too must it as absentee be previously known. Otherwise, the memory of it could not inform the sort of perception that some call ‘non-perception of something capable of being perceived’. Simply put, nothing not known perceptually could be known to be ‘capable of being perceived’.

Counterfactual reasoning can distinguish proper and improper conclusions drawn using a term introduced solely through a doubt or a question—says the objector to the new *Pūrva-pakṣin*—and thus eliminate fallacious inferences. It is not true that if the pot were not named ‘*Ḍittha*’ any untoward consequence would ensue.

The rebuttal by the new *Pūrva-pakṣin* of the view that questioning and so forth can make a probandum available for inference leaves us with the unresolved bind of how the probandum of a negative inference would be known well enough for the inference to proceed, given that it is not known outside the inferential subject and that the inference would not prove something that is already known.

Text (TCM_T 501 and TCM_C 636) and Translation

ucyate. icchâśraya-dravya-siddhau pṛthivy-ādāv icchâdhāratâbhāve tad-dravyam pṛthiyâdy-aṣṭa-dravya-bhinnam aṣṭa-dravyâvṛtti-dharmavattvāt pṛthiyâditve bādhaka-sattvād vā ity aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravya-siddhau icchâyām aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyavattvam aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravya-vṛttitvam vā sādhyate. sādhyā-prasiddhir dravyatve. icchā-viśeṣyakâṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravya-vṛttitva-pratīter vyatireki-sādhyatvāt.

Gaṅgeśa: We answer. With it established that desire resides in a substance, that substance—in the absence of a locus for it in earth and the rest [of the eight]—is *distinct* from the eight substances [on the list] beginning with earth, *since* it possesses a property that does not occur in the eight or *since* there are counter-considerations (‘defeaters’) that rule out earth and the rest [of the eight]—thus is there established a substance over and above the eight. Given that establishment, there is proved—with respect to desire [as inferential subject]—a having of (i.e. a resting in) a substance that is over and above the eight, or, an occurring in a substance that is over and above the eight. Either probandum [such a having or such an occurring] is ‘well-known’ (*prasiddha*) in the case of substancehood (the universal of substances). The cognition of an occurrence in a substance that is over and above the eight substances has as its qualificandum desire. That is proved true by an inference based on negative correlations.

Comments

Gaṅgeśa here appears to defend—and to emend slightly as well as to unpack with a stepwise analysis of how the probandum is introduced—the negative-only inference stated by the new *Pūrva-pakṣin* at the beginning of this stretch of text: ‘Desire rests in a substance over and above the eight substances (mentioned on the traditional list, earth and the rest), *since*, given that it does not rest in any of the eight, it is a quality (and all qualities rest in, or qualify, substances); what is not so, is not so, like something that does not reside anywhere (for example, ether, which does not have a substratum) or like something that resides in one or another of the eight substances (for example, a smell).’

First an inference establishes that desire resides in a substance, e.g. ‘Desire and the like rest in a substance, *since* they are qualities, like colour.’ Next it is proved that that substance is not earth or another on the list of eight (earth, water, *tejas*, air, ether, time, space and *manas*) since various counter-considerations rule each of them out (e.g. ‘If earth possessed desire as a property, then it would be experienced there, like colour’). Finally, it is concluded that desire (and the like) rest in a ninth

substance. The extrapolation is from things that do not reside in a ninth substance, all of which are not qualities or are items that rest in one or more of the eight substances or their combinations, universals of substances, for example. Everything we encounter outside the inferential subject, which consists of all psychological qualities, is not something that rests in a ninth substance. For, everything is either something that does not, by nature, rest in a substance (e.g. ether, an earthen atom), or does rest in one or more of the eight (e.g. the universal of substances).

Since the second inference establishes that there is a substance over and above the eight, we also know that as a substance it is a locus of substancehood, the common character running through earth and the rest. Thus, there is an example of the second-order property (which will presently serve as probandum) ‘occurring in a substance that is over and above the eight.’ It qualifies substancehood, since substancehood ‘occurs in a substance etc.’ as was just proved.

The reason I add a parenthetical ‘and the rest’ to the first inference is that if desire alone is the inferential subject, it does not seem as though we could prove this of it by an inference based only on negative correlations as Gaṅgeśa asserts. Rather obviously there would be a *sapakṣa*, places other than the inferential subject where the probandum is known to occur, namely, pleasure, pain, cognition and other psychological qualities. This objection is addressed next, though instead of pain or the like an abstract property is used as an example of *sapakṣa*.

Text (TCM_T 502 and TCM_C 637) and Translation

tathā api icchā aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyâsritā aṣṭa-dravyânâsritatve sati dravyâsritatvât aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyatva-vad iti sādhyā-prasiddhyā eva dṛṣṭānta-prasiddher anvayī hetuḥ syād iti cet, na. anvaya-vyāpty-apratisandhāne vyatireka-vyāpti-pratisandhāna-daśāyām vyatireki-sambhavāt.

Objection: So, too, then, would the prover be positive, [i.e. based on positive as well as negative correlations], inasmuch as the probandum would be indeed ‘well-known’ through knowledge of an example: ‘Desire resides in a substance that is over and above the eight substances, *since*, given that it does not reside in any of the eight, it rests in a substance, *like* the property, being-a-substance-over-and-above-the-eight.’

Gaṅgeśa: Wrong. [Even if the inference could be based on positive correlations as well as negative ones] insofar as one has not seen the pervasion as based on positive correlations, there is the possibility that one make a negative inference on an occasion where one sees a pervasion among absences.

Comments

Gaṅgeśa is talking about *svārthānumāna* ('inference for oneself'). A cogent 'inference for others' (*parārthānumāna*) would group desire with all psychological properties, with the inferential subject as 'desire and the rest', as explained just above.

Text (TCM_T 503 and TCM_C 637) and Translation

na ca dravyatvādeḥ sapakṣāt vyāvṛttāv asādhāranyam. tad dhi sādhyatad-abhāvōbhaya-sādhakatvena sat-pratipakṣōthāpakatayā doṣāvaham. prakṛte ca na hetoḥ sādhyābhāva-sādhakam, vipakṣe bādhakābhāvāt sādhyasādhakatve tat-sattvāc ca. ata eva yāvad ekatra anukūla-tarko na avatarati tāvad eva daśā-viśeṣe 'sādhāranyam doṣa ity uktam suvarṇa-taijasatva-sādhaka-vyatirekiṇi śabdo 'nityaḥ śabdatvāt ity-ādāv api tathā.

(Gaṅgeśa continues:) And it is not the case that since there is a *sapakṣa* (places where the probandum is known to occur), for example, substancehood and the like [which, like desire, would rest in a substance over and above the eight], the fallacy 'no similar instance' would be committed [by our negative inference] in the exclusion of the prover there. For, the criterion of that fallacy is that an inference at fault would establish both the probandum and its absence in the manner of the working of the fallacy of 'counter-inference'. And in the current case, the prover does not establish the absence of the probandum [but rather its presence, in desire, by an inference where only negative correlations are found], since there is no counter-consideration (i.e. counterfactual reasoning) placing it in the *vipakṣa* (loci known to be lacking the probandum), whereas there is a counter-consideration (i.e. favourable counterfactual reasoning) for its establishment [by being pervaded by] the probandum.

Just for this reason is it said that 'no similar instance' is the fallacy that occurs insofar as no favourable counterfactual reasoning presents itself with respect to the one side [favouring it over the other, given no *sapakṣa* (counterfactual reasoning could suggest that the prover is either present or absent in the *vipakṣa*, but without it there is the fallacy)]—just as such is 'no similar instance' a fault (an epistemic defect pertinent to inference, *doṣa*) sometimes [only]. The inference that would prove by negative correlations that gold is made out of the fiery element succumbs to this fault, as does 'Sound is non-eternal, *since* it has soundhood [the universal of sound]', and the like.

Comments

The difference between ‘no similar instance’ and ‘counter-inference’ as fallacies is that in the first case there is a single prover whereas in the second there are two. The problem with both is nevertheless the same in that with equal force both a probandum and its opposite would be proved.

The ‘no similar instance’ fallacy occurs when there is a *sapakṣa* and we are unable to find an instance of the prover there. It is classified as a ‘person-relative’ fallacy, one that is ‘non-eternal’ or ‘non-constant’ (*anitya-doṣa*), in contrast with a fallacy such as ‘deviation’ (the prover’s being known to occur where the probandum does not). Depending on whether there is in a given epistemic context reasonable doubt (including whether or not there are pertinent counterfactual considerations that favour a proposition or its opposite), lack of a *sapakṣa* may be a reason why this fallacy occurs or a mark of a cogent negative-only inference.

For example, ‘Sound is non-eternal, *since* it has soundhood’, is a pseudo-inference whose prover has as much force for the eternity of sounds as it does for their non-eternality as asserted. There is no supporting co-locatedness of non-eternality and soundhood since there is no locus of soundhood anywhere outside of the inferential subject, which is to be construed as all sounds. The wider context of doubt required to motivate inference means that we are supposing that the non-eternality is in question. But favourable or unfavourable *tarka* could change the epistemic default.

The translation of the second paragraph’s final sentence follows Mathurānātha. Another possible rendering of the ‘whereas’ clause at the very end: ‘whereas [to consider the counter-inference] there would be a counter-consideration (i.e. unfavourable counterfactual reasoning) to its establishing [by being pervaded by] the [counter]probandum.’ The upshot would remain the same.

Text (TCM_T 503 and TCM_C 638) and Translation

atha aṣṭa-dravya-bādhānantaram icchātau guṇatvād eva aṣṭa-dravyātirikta-dravya-vṛttitvaṃ sidhyati pakṣa-dharmatā-balāt. prasiddha-viśeṣa-bādhē sāmānya-jñānasya tad-itara-viśeṣa-viśayatva-niyamāt. ata eva asarva-viśayānitya-jñāna-bādhānantaram kṣityātau kāryatvena jñāna-janyatvaṃ siddhyat nitya-sarva-viśayatvaṃ jñānasya ādāya eva sidhyati iti cet, na. bādhānantaram aṣṭa-dravyātirikta-dravya-viśayā apy anumitir dravyāśritatva-prakārikā syāt. anumiter vyāpakatāvacchedaka-mātra-prakāratva-niyamāt. na tv aṣṭa-dravyātirikta-dravya-vṛttitva-prakārikā, tasya pūrvam apratītatvena prakāratvāsambhavād iti tat-prakārikānumitir vyatirekiṇā eva. anādy-ananta-dvy-aṅukādi-yāvat-pakṣikaraṇe ’nādy-

*ananta-tāvad-upādāna-gocarâparokṣa-jñānatvam eva nitya-sarva-
viṣayakatvam, etad-anya-nitya-sarva-viṣayatvaṃ vyatirekiṇa eva
sidhyati. pakṣa-dharmatā-balena api vyāpakatâvacchedaka-prakāreṇa
sādhyā-siddhir bhavati na tu sādhyā-gata-viśeṣa-prakārikā,
atiprasaṅgāt.*

Objection: Right after realising that counter-considerations rule out the eight substances, one proves that desire and the like occur in a substance that is over and above the eight, just by their being qualities—by force of the inferential subject possessing the prover property. For, well-known particulars being eliminated [such as a pot as an earthen thing and so on], the cognition of the generality (namely, that there is some sort of substance over and above the eight, its precise nature not being known) has by rule as its object only that the particular (i.e. the self) is distinct from those others [that have been ruled out].

Just for this reason, [in the case of the inference to God] right after realising that counter-considerations rule out cognition that has as its object less than everything—non-eternal cognition, namely—proving that this world and the like as effects are generated by cognition proves it *understanding* the [generating] cognition to be precisely a cognition that is eternal and whose object is everything. (Thus there is no need for a negative-only inference in that the first inference that you sketch out, the inference to the probandum in general, is embedded, so to say, with the desired conclusion.)

Gaṅgeśa: Incorrect. Right after realising the ruling out, one would make an inference that—albeit its object would be a substance over and above the eight—would have as its predication content [or probandum] residence in a substance [and nothing else]. For, the rule with veridical inferential awareness is that its predication content is restricted to that which specifies the pervading [of the prover by the probandum, as fieriness specifies the pervading of smoke by fire, not, e.g. fire’s being-a-substance]. It is not an inferential awareness whose predication content is the occurrence [of particular properties] in the substance that is over and above the eight, since, as not having been previously cognised, that cannot serve as predication content (i.e. as a probandum). Thus the inferential awareness that has that as its predication content comes about by means of a negative-only inference alone.

[To consider the inference to God:] Insofar as the beginningless and endless series of things right up from the dyads [though not ether, for example, or the ultimate atoms, which are eternal and uncreated] are taken as the inferential subject, what is proved [on the basis of these things being effects] is only [God’s] immediate cognition as restricted to the substrata of the beginningless and endless list of things. Beyond this, cognition that is [truly] eternal and having [truly] everything as its object is proved by [another inference, namely] a negative-only inference alone. Though

[of course] it is by force of the inferential subject possessing the prover property, the probandum is proved through the predication content that specifies the pervading [of the prover by the probandum]. What is proved (i.e. the inferential awareness brought about) does not have as its predication content particularities included in the probandum, because that would have consequences that are too wide.

Comments

Perception—or more precisely, non-perception—is one of the defeaters that rule out earth and so on as candidates for the locus of desire and similar properties. In a pot, for example, which is an earthen thing, no desire is evident.

Agency requires cognition, desire to do and action, in that order. Everything produced, from dyads (ultimate atoms are not produced) to planets and stars, implies agency. From all those things that are produced by the limited cognition and desire of the likes of women and men we know, it follows that things that are produced but do not fall within the limitedly-created set (such as dyads and planets) are produced by God whose cognition is not limited, at least not in the ways with which we are familiar. The inference is negative-only because the inferential subject is taken to be everything produced but not by the likes of humans. There is no *sapakṣa* but no matter. The *vipakṣa*, which consists of all those things brought about by limited humans etc., do not exhibit the property-to-be-proved, ‘brought about by one whose cognition is unlimited.’

The inference does not have implications that are too wide, since God’s cognition is to be supposed unlimited only in the sense that is required for the production of things not produced by humans etc. We have little idea about what this involves. Similarly, a locus of fire as known by inference from smoke seen is not known in its utter particularity but rather only in general, as an instance of fieriness.

Text (TCM_T 503 and TCM_C 639) and Translation

nanv aṣṭa-dravyânāśritā icchā dravyâśritā iti yadi sādhyate tadā-aṣṭa-dravyâtirikta-dravyâśritatvam antareṇa pratijñârtha eva na upapadyate. satyam. evam apy aṣṭa-dravyânāśritā icchâyām dravyâśritatvam sidhyatu, tasya aṣṭa-dravyâtirekyam kutaḥ sidhyet.

Objection: If desire, which does not reside in the eight substances, is proved to reside in a substance (‘since it is a quality’), then, without its residing in a substance over and above the eight, there would be no meaning to the proposition to be proved.

Gaṅgeśa: That's true. So, too, let it be proved that residing-in-a-substance applies to desire, which does not reside in any of the eight substances. Why should that substance's being over and above the eight [need to] be proved [too]?

Comments

Gaṅgeśa apparently sees the two expressions as extensionally equivalent and practically as intensionally equivalent, too, varying only in which part of the two assertions is in the foreground, so to say, and which immediately behind.

Text (TCM_T 504 and TCM_C 640) and Translation

*atha sāmānyavyabhicāram ādāya mānāntarōpanītam tat-tad-anyatvam
upajīvyā aṣṭa-dravyānya-dravya-vṛttitā eva icchādeḥ paricchidyate.
jñānāntarōpasthāpita-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa-jñānasya surabhi candanam ity-
ādau darśanād iti cet, na. mānāntarān niyamena anupasthiteḥ. ye ca
icchāśraye pṛthivy-ādi-bhinnatvam na jānanti icchāyās ca pṛthivy-
ādy-anāśritam na jānanti teṣām apy anumānād ity apy āhuḥ.*

Objection: [With regard to the inference, 'Desire, which does not reside in the eight substances, resides in a substance, *since* it is a quality, like colour',] we take [let us grant] the prover not to deviate from the probandum considered *in general*. [How then do we get the particular content that you say is provided by a separate negative-only inference?] That non-deviating prover is informed by other means of knowledge that reflect the substance's being other than this or that. This (such a 'laden' prover) makes it known that desire and the like occur in a substance other than the eight. For, we do find such experiences as 'Fragrant is the sandalwood' [where the information carried by the visual organ gets fused with, or informed by, a memory of sandalwood's fragrance, such that there is a perception of smell without the operation of the olfactory organ], which is a cognition of an entity as qualified by a qualifier set in awareness by another cognition (i.e. by the cognition that formed the memory-impression of the fragrance which has been revived).

Gaṅgeśa: No. For, it does not become set in awareness from another source by rule.

And so too they (i.e. our teachers) say: for those who do not know desire as residing in something distinct from earth and the rest (e.g. Cārvākas who say the self is the living body or Buddhists who deny a self altogether or a student who is confused by the rival teachings) and who do not know that desire does not reside in earth and the rest, for them the inference generates the knowledge.

Comments

The objector is opposed to the utility of negative-only inference and the two-step proof that Gaṅgeśa has laid out. We could look at it instead as a variety of ‘impregnated’ perception. In rejecting the proposal, Gaṅgeśa invokes what he sees as the default, namely, that this kind of knowledge is generated by inference, not perception. Such ‘impregnated’ perception is itself controversial, especially in a debate about the self, and we had better make all of our sources clear, we might read between the lines.

At the very end of the section, Gaṅgeśa differentiates his position from the one voiced here, which is that of his teachers, especially Udayana, who do of course try to prove the existence of the self against opposition. The disagreement provides drama for the section’s close.

Text (TCM_T 505 and TCM_C 641) and Translation

atha vyatirekī na anumānam, sarvatra prameyatvādinā sat-pratipakṣa-grastatvād iti cet, na. vipakṣa-bādhakena vyatirekiṇo balavattvāt.

Objection: The negative-only is not a valid form of inference, since in every case it is eaten up by the ‘counter-inference’ fallacy by means of [a ‘counter-prover’, e.g.] knowability and the like.

Gaṅgeśa: Wrong. For, the negative-only has force [and would have greater cogency than such a counter-inference] because of considerations excluding the prover from the *vipakṣa* (places where the probandum is known definitely not to occur).

Comments

For example, the inference to the self would face a counter-inference that ran as follows: ‘Desire does not reside in a substance over and above the eight, *since* it is knowable, like a colour.’

Gaṅgeśa implies that when a negative-only inference is cogent, exclusion of a counter-prover from the *vipakṣa* would not face cogent counter-considerations (*tarka*).

Text (TCM_T 505 and TCM_C 641) and Translation

anye tu vyatirekiṇy abhāva eva sādhyah, sa ca aprasiddha eva sidhyati. yasya abhāvasya vyāpako hetv-abhāvo grhītaḥ tasya abhāvaḥ pakṣe vyāpakābhāvābhāva-rūpeṇa hetunā sidhyati. vyāpakābhāvavattayā jñāte vyāpyābhāva-jñānāvaśyam-bhāvāt. tathā hi pṛthivī itarebhyo bhidyate pṛthivītvād ity atra itarasya jalāder vyāpakah pṛthivītvābhāvo

*grhīta iti pṛthivītvābhāvābhāva-rūpeṇa pṛthivītvena pṛthivyām
itarānyonyābhāvo 'prasiddha eva sidhyati, pratiyogi-jñānasya vṛttivāt,
pratyakṣeṇa bhūtale ghaṭābhāva-vat.*

(Gaṅgeśa continues:) But others hold the following.

Naiyāyika faction: In the case of a negative-only inference, the probandum is nothing but an absence and this, which is indeed not known [prior to the inference], is what is proved [on the following principle]. An absence of a prover ($\sim H$) is grasped as pervading the absence of just that x ($\sim S$) whose absence is proved to qualify the inferential subject by that prover (H), which [as itself qualifying the inferential subject] is an absence ($\sim\sim H$) of the pervading absence ($\sim H$) (i.e. $H \equiv \sim\sim H$)—if something is cognised as having an absence of a pervader (e.g. an absence of a pervading absence), necessarily is it cognised as lacking the pervaded [too].

For example, there are ‘Earth is distinct from the other things [on the traditional list], *since* it has earthhood’ and other such inferences. Here an absence of earthhood ($\sim H$) is grasped as pervading the absence of the others ($\sim S$) beginning with water [and so on down the list]. By that earthhood (H), which is an absence ($\sim\sim H$) of the absence of earthhood ($H \equiv \sim\sim H$), a *mutual* absence of the others is proved to qualify [the inferential subject, namely] earth. That is to say, a mutual absence (‘mutual distinctness’, here, a mutual absence from the others beginning with water) that is itself unknown (i.e. prior to the inference) is proved. This is like an absence of a pot on the floor known by perception because a cognition of the absentee (the pot) has previously occurred [forming a memory-impression that in turn supplies the absentee in the absential perception].

Comments

This principle about the pervasion of absences explains why even though a probandum has not been known before, so long as its absentee, or counter-positive, *pratiyogin*, has been known before, it can be proved by a negative-only inference. This means the probandum would have to be an absence. And presumably insofar as $\sim H$'s pervading $\sim S$ is grasped, S 's pervading H would be grasped.

Do not be misled by the example of the absential perception involving an absolute absence, not a mutual absence. (‘The pot is not on the floor’ would express a locative or ‘absolute’ absence, whereas ‘The pot is not the floor’ would express a ‘mutual’ absence.) The point is that the cognition of the absentee would be a causal factor responsible, along with other factors, for generating the absential cognition.

Text (TCM_T 507 and TCM_C 642) and Translation

*evam anyatra apy avyāpya-vṛtticchāyāḥ sāsrayatve*²⁹ *siddhe svāśraye yo 'tyantābhāvas tad-avacchedakam ghaṭādi sarvam, tad-avacchedena icchānupalambhāt. tathā ca icchātyantābhāvāśrayatāvacchedakatva-rūpasya nairātmyasya ghaṭādau prāṇādimmattvābhāvo vyāpako grhīta iti jīvac-charīre prāṇādimmattvena icchātyantābhāvāśrayatvāvacchedakatvasya abhāvaḥ sātmmkatvam sādhyate. evam prāmānya-sādhakavyatirekiṇy api vyadhikaraṇa-prakārāvaccinnatvasya vyāpakaḥ samartha-pravṛtti-janakatvābhāvo apramāyām grhīto 'to vivādāsītānubhave samartha-pravṛtti-janakatvena vyadhikaraṇa-prakārāvaccinnasya abhāvaḥ siddhyati vyadhikaraṇa-prakārānavaccinnatvam*³⁰ *eva pramātvam.*

(The **Naiyāyika faction** continues:) Elsewhere, too, it is this way. Given the proof that desire has a substratum (i.e. that it is located in a substance, ‘since it is a quality’)—desire, that is, that as a property does not pervade its locus (a self being omnipresent, a desire occurs in a self only as delimited by the living body)—the absolute absence [of desire] has as its specifier a pot and so on, everything namely [except the living body which specifies instead desire’s occurrence in a self]. For, there is no experience of desire by means of specification by any of those things (a pot and so on). But the living body is not like that. For, there is experience of desire by means of that specification of its locus (i.e. a delimitation of a self’s being a locus by the specifier, being-a-living-body).

And so, not-being-a-self (or ‘not-enselved’ (*nairātmya*) contrasting with ‘enselved’ (*sātmya*)), which is to be (~S) a specifier of the locus of an absolute absence of desire, is grasped as absent in things where having-breath and the like are absent (~H), namely, in a pot and the like. That is to say, it is grasped as having that absence as its pervader (~S → ~H: the absence of the prover is grasped as pervading the absence of the probandum). Therefore, with respect to the living body [as inferential subject], an *absence* of [what we just said, i.e. *not being*] a specifier of the substratum of an absolute absence of desire (~S)—which is what it is to be ‘enselved’ (or, having-a-self, *sātmya* or *sātmakatva*)—is proved by [the negative-only prover] having-breath or the like.

In this way, there is also the negative-only inference that establishes veridicality [to wit, the veridicality of a cognition arising in unfamiliar circumstances]. [~H, an

²⁹ Emending *svāśrayatve* to *sāsrayatve*.

³⁰ Reading *vyadhikaraṇa-prakārānavaccinnatvam* instead of *vyadhikaraṇa-prakārāvaccinnatvam*, with TCM_C.

absence of H, i.e.] an absence of a generating of successful effort, which is an absence that pervades [\sim S, non-veridicality, i.e.] that which is specified by predication content whose locus or substratum is not the thing cognised—such an absence having been grasped in the case of a non-veridical cognition—there is, then, proved with respect to an awareness whose veridicality has been drawn into question [which is the inferential subject] an absence of the cognition’s being specified by predication content whose locus is not the thing cognised, by [the prover in the form of an absence of an absence of itself, \sim H, to wit] being a generator of successful effort. [And so it is an *absence* that is proved. This is the same as veridicality, the positive property, in that] veridicality is just an awareness’ not being specified by predication content that belongs to a different locus than the thing cognised (\sim S).

Comments

The inference is: ‘This cognition is veridical, *since* it is a generator of successful effort; what is not so, is not so (\sim S \rightarrow \sim H), like a non-veridical cognition [of silver, say, as mother-of-pearl].’³¹

Text (TCM_T 514 and TCM_C 643) and Translation

nanu sādhyāprasiddhau katham sādhyā-viśiṣṭa-jñānam, viśeṣaṇa-jñāna-janyatvād viśiṣṭa-jñānasya iti cet, na. pakṣe sādhyānumiti-sāmagrī-sattvāt pakṣa-viśeṣaṇakah sādhyā-viśeṣyaka eva pratyayo jāyate, bhū-tale ghaṭo nāsti ity abhāva-viśeṣyaka-pratyaya-vat.

Objection: Given that the probandum is not known, [that is, prior to the inference, as you apparently hold], how can a cognition of an entity as qualified by the probandum come to be, since [there is the rule that] a cognition of an entity as qualified is generated [in part] by a [prior] cognition of the qualifier.

Gaṅgeśa: No. Because of the collection of causal conditions coming together that are sufficient to produce a [veridical] inferential awareness with respect to the inferential subject, a cognition arises that has the [eventual] inferential subject as the qualifier (i.e. predication content) and the [eventual] probandum just as its qualificandum, [there being no rule that a cognition of an entity as qualified is generated even in part by a prior cognition of the qualificandum]. This is like the [absent] cognition, ‘On the floor the pot is not’, which has the absence as the qualificandum.

³¹ See PHILLIPS–RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (2004: 99–105), where the inference is first put forth in Gaṅgeśa’s book, in the section on ‘knowing veridicality’ (*jñapti-vāda*). It figures crucially in Gaṅgeśa’s account of knowledge and is discussed there at length.

Comments

For example, ‘Fire is on the mountain’ is a cognition with the probandum fire as qualificandum and ‘on the mountain’ as qualifier. Similarly, since a given absence of a pot on the floor would not have been experienced before, properly speaking an absential cognition has, first of all, the absence itself as qualificandum and ‘on the floor’ as qualifier. The qualifier-qualificandum relation can be converted by inference.³²

Thus does Gaṅgeśa appear to hold that with the negative-only inference about earth being other than those other things (on the traditional list) the probandum is first cognised as the qualificandum of an awareness and ‘from earth’ or ‘in earth’ as first the qualifier. ‘Difference from those other things is in earth’ converts to ‘Earth is different from those other things.’

Text (TCM_T 515 and TCM_C 643) and Translation

tathā api sādhyābhāva-vyāpakābhāvābhāva-rūpa-hetumattayā pakṣa-jñānaṃ vyatirekiṇi gamakatāūpāyikam. na ca sādhyā-prasiddhaṃ vinā etādṛśa-pratisandhānaṃ sambhavati. na ca vastu-gatyā yaḥ sādhyābhāvaḥ tad-vyāpakābhāva-pratīyogimattayā jñānaṃ mṛgyata iti vācyam. vyatireky-ābhāsānupapatter iti cet, na. yo 'bhāvo yasya bhāvasya vyāpakatvena grhītaḥ tad-abhāvābhāvena tasya vyāpyasya abhāvaḥ pakṣe sādhyata ity anugatānatīprasaktasya gamakatāūpāyikatvāt. ayam ca vyatireki-prakāraḥ svārtha eva. param prati sādhyāprasiddhyā pratijñādy-asambhavād iti sarvaṃ samañjasam.

Objection (by Objector 1): So, too, in the case of the negative-only inference there has to be [as you have urged, ‘consideration’ or ‘correct reflection’ (*parāmarśa*) which is] cognition of the inferential subject as possessing the prover in the form of an absence of the pervading absence ($\sim\sim H$ along with the rule $\sim S \rightarrow \sim H$), the absence that pervades the absence of the probandum: such is the method of inference. [So you must still tell us how the probandum is available to such *parāmarśa*, as you say.] And it is false that somehow without knowledge of the probandum [prior to the inference], such correct reflection or putting it all together is possible.

Objection (by Objector 2 against Objector 1): [But] in reality, the cognition [we have been talking about] is not only looked for but found: a having of the counter-correlate (or absentee, i.e. the prover) to an absence (i.e. $\sim H$) that pervades ($\sim S$) that

³² The analogy to absential cognition is discussed in the perception chapter, PHILLIPS–RAMANUJA TATACHARYA (2004: 113).

which will be [with every negative-only inference] an *absence* of the probandum [as we have explained].

Objector 1 (responding to Objector 2): That should not be said. For, it would not be possible in that case that an inference look like a negative-only inference but be an error. [And so the problem of the unknown probandum has not been solved.]

Gaṅgeśa: No. That absence ($\sim H$) grasped as pervasive of its presences (i.e. as uniform throughout a set, as earthhood is absent in water in so on) is such that by its absence ($\sim\sim H$) the absence ($\sim\sim S$) of that which it ($\sim H$) pervades ($\sim S \rightarrow \sim H$) is proved (by *modus tollens*) for the inferential subject. For, [in this way] the negative inference as uniform (all such inferences that are correct take this form) and as free of untoward consequences is a method of inference.

And this way [of correct reflection in a negative inference making a probandum well-known for the first-time] works only in ‘inference for oneself’. For, in inference presented for another, since the probandum would not be known, presenting the ‘proposition to be proved’ [as the first member of a formal five-membered demonstration] would not be possible.

Comments

The outstanding problem is to account for the cognition of pervasion without which no veridical inferential awareness could occur. Objector 2 used the expression, ‘an absence of the probandum’, in explaining how there is a cognition of pervasion in the case of a negative inference. Gaṅgeśa’s formulation, in contrast, does not mention the probandum and would thereby avoid the problem of an unavailable term. The probandum is a generalisation made in the very process of making the inference. For example, prior to inference, the probandum, ‘distinct from the others’, is not known in its full generality, but its counter-correlate—the distinctness is an absence—namely, the others (water and so on) are known prior to the inference. Indeed, they form the stock of negative examples that the proof draws upon. In other words, water and so on are not specified through the property having-an-absence-of-the-*probandum* but rather as presences specified by waterhood and so on. The negative inference requires a correct consideration that generalises for the first time, i.e. introduces, a new property made apparent by the prover, both of which are absences.

What a concession to the Buddhists to admit that in ‘inference for others’ the negative-only fails because the probandum is not understood! It’s a concession because this is the nature of several key ‘religious’ inferences, concerning a self and God. In other words, by pointing out that his discussion has been restricted to ‘inference for oneself’ (*svārthānumāna*) Gaṅgeśa signals a sense of need for some kind of perceptual knowledge of self in the way that a pot known as earthen is cru-

cial to the inference that renders definitional knowledge of earth. Otherwise, we might as well call the ninth substance proved as the locus of psychological properties something else, not ‘self’ (*ātman*).


Gaṅgeśa does not say this explicitly, but he uses the *svārtha/parārtha* distinction to differentiate his position from that of his teachers, especially Udayana, who do of course try to prove the existence of the self against opposition. Indeed, Udayana takes as his principal interlocutor the Buddhist stream-theorist who denies Nyāya’s whole approach to ontology as a matter of properties, some of which are short-lived and property-bearers enduring through some types of change. For the Buddhist opponent, ‘self’ is a ‘convenient fiction’, bundling momentary *dharma* or properties that have no property-bearers but are causally ordered in sequences. Gaṅgeśa holds that the inferences we have been discussing are *bona fide* only as ‘inference for oneself’ (*svārthānumāna*) not ‘inference for others’ (*parārthānumāna*) and thus would have no force against the Buddhist for whom the probandum would make no sense. This is a sharp departure from tradition. The engine of the negative-only inference seems quite severely restricted by Gaṅgeśa if it is to be applied only to non-controversial predicates.

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**Logic,
Reality and Belief
in
Buddhist Tradition**



A Hot Dispute About Lukewarm Air Dignāga on *Āpta-vāda*¹

HORST LASIC

Buddhism has often been associated with a strong leaning towards rationality, as well as a high esteem for and strong belief in the words of the Buddha. These two features might be regarded as indicating incompatible attitudes, and therefore one may feel the need for justification.

Within the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition, the relation between empirically gained knowledge and knowledge based on the words of the Buddha is a recurrent theme. The passage constantly referred to in this connection is Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika-sva-vṛtti* 108 ff., where the statements of a trustworthy person (*āpta-vāda*) are given the status of a source of correct knowledge. An interesting point is that the statements of a trustworthy person have been classified as inference, although the status of inference has been accepted only because there is no other way to enable Buddhist practice.

The discussion in the PVSV takes a line of verse from Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* as its starting point:

PS 2.5ab: *āpta-vādāvisaṃvāda-sāmānyād anumānatvam /*

There are several variants of this line. The one presented here is attested in Jinendra-buddhi's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya-ṭīkā*.

Modern scholars have interpreted this line of verse in various ways. I refer here in particular to Richard Hayes, Tom Tillemans, Hideomi Yaita, Vittorio van Bijlert and John Dunne. These scholars agree that the main proposition is that something is (or, respectively: is to be subsumed under; is to be regarded as; is classified as; is a sort of) *anumāna*. The question of what the word *anumāna* means in this passage is closely related to the question of what is intended to be identified as being a sort of *anumāna* here. At this point the different contexts in which this line of verse occurs have to be taken into account. HAYES (1980: 252), (1987: 238), TILLEMANS (1986: 32), (1990: 20 and 24) and VAN BIJLERT (1989: 122), who treat this passage in its

¹ I would like to express my thanks to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek, who kindly improved my English.

own right as part of Dignāga's work, hold that it is *āpta-vāda* which is said to be *anumāna*.

In PVSV this line of verse occurs twice. First, in PVSV 108.1–2, it is cited by an opponent in order to point out a contradiction in Dignāga's as well as in Dharmakīrti's statements:²

*yat tarhīdam āpta-vādāvisaṃvāda-sāmānyād anumānatēty
āgamasyānumānatvam uktam, tat katham.*

The line has its second entry as part of verse PV 1.216:

*āpta-vādāvisaṃvāda-sāmānyād anumānatā /
buddher agatyābhihitā parokṣe 'py asya gocare //*

In the first passage, the opponent's rendering of that part of the verse line he considers important to his argument, namely *āgamasyānumānatvam*, seems to say that in PS 2.5ab, it is *āgama* that is identified as *anumāna*. If it is admissible to equate *āgama* with *āpta-vāda*, this understanding fits well with the above-mentioned interpretation. The second passage however takes 'cognition' (*buddhi*) to be that which is *anumāna*.

Concerning this question, namely, what precisely does *anumāna* mean here, Professor YAITA (1987: 4) cautions in his article 'Dharmakīrti on the Authority of Buddhist Scriptures (*āgama*)', that

'in this context we have to be careful with the word *anumāna*. "Anumāna" in PS 2.5ab and PV 1.216b etc. seem to mean an inferential cognition as a result, so to speak, *anumānaphala*. On the other hand, "anumāna" in sentences as "*āgamasya anumānatvam*" (108.1–2 etc.) seems to mean an inferential source, like *liṅga*.'

In a footnote he then points to the fact that Jinendrabuddhi explains *anumāna* in the sense of *liṅga*. To be sure, Jinendrabuddhi's explanation³ refers to the '*anumānatvam*' of PS 2.5b, or to be more precise, to its restatement in PSV, and not to the opponent's rendering in PVSV 108.1–2. In the same footnote, Professor YAITA says that

'H. Kitagawa (op. cit., p. 92) following J[inendrabuddhi], properly translates the word "anumānatā" in PS 2.5b into "its being the producer [of the inferential cognition]".'

² For the context, see the synopsis in YAITA (1987: 2–3).

³ PST 64a5.

Combining all this information, I understand that according to Professor Yaita, *anumāna* means ‘inferential source’ in PS 2.5ab, but that—in an attempt, as I see it, to harmonise this passage with PV 1.216—he opts to understand it in the sense of an inferential cognition when the same line of verse is cited by the opponent in PVSV 108.1. Concerning its paraphrase by the opponent, however, YAITA keeps, so to speak, to the original meaning.

Facing the same problem, Prof. John DUNNE (2004) seems cautiously indecisive in his translation of the verse line. On p. 239, introducing his readers to Dharmakīrti’s treatment of scriptural inference, he translates PS 2.5ab as it occurs in PVSV 108.1 in the following way:

‘Since the statements of a credible person are generally trustworthy, a cognition arising from them is an instrumental inference.’

In a footnote thereon, he explains his motivation for adding the phrase ‘a cognition arising from them’ with a reference to PV 1.216, which shows, so he says, that ‘Dharmakīrti clearly understand(s) this statement in that fashion.’ In the appendix of the same book (2004: 361), however, DUNNE restrains from harmonising this passage with verse 216 and translates,

‘The testimony of a credible person is the source for an inference because it is generally trustworthy.’

In his translation of Śākyabuddhi’s commentary, he renders this sentence in the same manner. His rendering of *luṅ*⁴/*āgama*, which corresponds to *āgama* of PVSV 108.2, with ‘[knowledge derived from] scripture’, however, again takes account of Dharmakīrti’s understanding as expressed in PV 1.216.

The interpretations of *āpta-vādāvisamvāda-sāmānyāt* diverge even more than those related to the expression *anumānatvam/°tā*. Of greatest interest are the interpretations of *sāmānyāt*. With the exception of Prof. HAYES (1980: 252), (1987: 238) and VAN BIJLERT (1989: 122), both of whom render the ablative with ‘insofar / in so far’,⁵ modern scholars interpret it as expressing cause or reason, rendering it by ‘since’, ‘as’ and ‘because’. We will later encounter still another possibility for interpreting this ablative.

A major interpretative difference concerns the expression *sāmānyā*. One interpretation, offered by HAYES, TILLEMANS (1986) and VAN BIJLERT, understands *āpta-*

⁴ PVṬ Je 242b4.

⁵ For a criticism of this translation and especially of HAYES’ portrayal of Dignāga as a sceptic, with which it is connected, see TILLEMANS (1990: 18–22).

vāda to have something in common with inference or to be similar⁶ to it, the common character or, respectively, the *tertium comparationis* being *avisamvāda*. Later, TILLEMANS (1990) modified his translation, rendering it more ambiguous. This new translation also allows it to be understood in line with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary.⁷ According to this understanding, the similarity is not between *āpta-vāda* and common *anumāna*, but between different *āpta-vādas*. As for Dignāga's intended meaning, however, TILLEMANS sticks to his interpretation of 1986.⁸

YAITA (1987: 6, 8), (2005: 443, 447) and DUNNE (2004: 239, 361, 363), on the other hand, translate '*sāmānya*' with 'generally'. DUNNE (2004) refers to this interpretation twice, once in his description of Dharmakīrti's treatment of scriptural inference (p. 239) in connection with the PVSV 108.1 quotation. His reason for preferring this interpretation over the 'interpretation of *sāmānya* as "the same as" or "similar to"' is that this reading renders 'the comments by Jinendrabuddhi, Karṇakagomin and Śākyabuddhi more intelligible.'⁹ In his translation in the Appendix, DUNNE (2004: 363–4, n. 10) returns anew to the question of how to understand *sāmānya*, here in connection with PV 1.216. He rejects a possible understanding of *sāmānya* in the sense of 'sameness', which would imply 'that the trustworthiness (*avisamvāda*) of a credible person's statements about observable objects is *the same* as the trustworthiness of those statements with regard to unobservable objects', with the argument that only two verses later Dharmakīrti would then contradict himself. He informs us, however, that the rejected reading 'appears to be the interpretation taken by Śākyabuddhi.' Discussing his preferred understanding of *sāmānya* in the sense of 'generally', DUNNE explains that on this interpretation, Dharmakīrti's 'argument is that, since the statements of a particular author have been observed to be trustworthy in terms of observable objects, this general trustworthiness may be extended to unobservable objects.' As the obvious problem with this second interpretation, he points out 'that it uses a type of reasoning that Dharmakīrti explicitly rejects, namely, *śeṣavad* evidence.' 'However', he continues, 'since Dharmakīrti is not concerned with rendering scriptural inferences fully instrumental, this tentative reasoning may be adequate for his purposes.' Indeed, when Dharmakīrti criticises the Mīmāṃsaka's proof of validity of the *Veda* on account of being a *śeṣavad*-

⁶ To support the interpretation of *sāmānya* as 'similarity', TILLEMANS refers to *mtshungs pa'i phyir* (*tulyatvāt*) in PSV as Dignāga's paraphrase of *sāmānya*.

⁷ TILLEMANS (1986: 32): 'Because authoritative speech (*āpta-vāda*) is similar [to an inference] in being infallible ...', and TILLEMANS (1990: 20): 'Because authoritative words are similar in not belying ...'

⁸ TILLEMANS (1990: 22): '[Authoritative statements] are similar to normal inference because they too are non-belying with regard to the real particular.'

⁹ DUNNE (2004: 239, n. 25).

anumāna, he is confronted with the accusation that he uses the same kind of reasoning in his own treatment of *āgama*. Dharmakīrti seems to accept this claim, and in accordance with PV 1.216 to 217 and his commentary thereon he points out that his approach is nevertheless the best option.¹⁰

From DUNNE's remarks we learn that Śākyabuddhi provides two different explanations of *āpta-vādāvisamvāda-sāmānyāt*: one that is rendered 'more intelligible', as DUNNE says, when *sāmānya* is understood as 'generally', and one that evidently relies on an interpretation that implies *sāmānya* being understood in the sense of 'sameness'.

According to Śākyabuddhi's first explanation, the relation expressed in *āpta-vādāvisamvāda-sāmānyāt* implies that whatever is an *āpta-vāda* is trustworthy.¹¹ According to the second explanation, the relation is such that as an *āpta-vāda* has trustworthiness with regard to empirically verifiable things, it also, in the same way, has trustworthiness with regard to empirically non-verifiable things.¹² The ideas expressed in these two explanations do not explicitly contradict one another, but they are certainly different. Śākyabuddhi's second explanation is in the context of PV 1.216, and as we would expect, it is influenced by Dharmakīrti's treatment. The first explanation, however, is in the context of PVSV 108.1–2. Here Dignāga's line of verse stands in its own right and is explicitly marked as a quotation. Would it be absurd to suspect that here, in the context of the opponent's reproach, Śākyabuddhi has deliberately chosen to explain this line of verse differently in order not to anticipate Dharmakīrti's interpretation? And could it be conceivable that this non-Dharmakīrtian interpretation is not just something invented by the commentator for dramaturgical purposes, but that it renders a pre-Dharmakīrtian understanding?

I would like to refer here to yet another reading of PS 2.5ab, which displays an understanding similar to Śākyabuddhi's first explanation regarding the relation of *āpta-vāda* and *avisamvāda*. In the MŚV *śabda-pariccheda*, Kumārila makes use of the expression *āpta-vādāvisamvāda-sāmānyāt*. In Sucaritamiśra's commentary, ŚVT 111.20–23, we read:

*ayam arthaḥ—yathā dhūmādiṣu bheda-hānena sāmānya-dharmayor
vyāptir avadhāryate, evaṃ śābde 'py āpta-vādāvisamvāda-sāmānayor*

¹⁰ PVSV 173.16–174.2.

¹¹ PVṬ Je 242b3: *gang dang gang nyes pa zad pa'i tshig de dang de ni mi slu ba yin te*; cf. PVSVṬ 390.16: *yo ya āpta-vādaḥ so 'visamvādī*.

¹² PVṬ Je 245a7: *ci ltar mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pas mi slu ba'i don* yongs su gcod par nus pa la nyes pa zad pa'i tshig mi slu ba de ltar shin tu lkog tu gyur pa yang yin te* (* read *don* instead of *mi slu ba'i don*); cf. PVSVṬ 393.25–26: *yathā śākya-paricchede 'rtha āpta-vādasyāvisamvādas tathātyanta-parokṣe 'pi*.

vyāptir avagatā. (āpta-vādāvisamvādēti?). evam ca viditvā vede 'pīśvarāpta-vādatvād avisamvādo 'numīyate, ato 'numānam evēdam.

‘The meaning [of this argument] is as follows: Just as one, leaving aside the differences, ascertains the pervasion of two universal properties in the case of smoke and so on, in the same way the pervasion of the two universals of “a credible person’s statement” and of “trustworthiness” is cognised. Knowing it thus, one infers trustworthiness also in the case of the *Veda* on account of its being a statement of the credible *Īśvara*. Therefore it is precisely *anumāna*.’

Sucaritamīśra continues¹³ by emphasising that a statement is not an instrument of knowledge as long as its trustworthiness has not been inferred, and then gives a grammatical explanation of ‘*āpta-vādāvisamvāda-sāmānyāt*’. Of particular interest is his understanding of the ablative. He says that the word *sāmānya* has to be construed twice: once with *āpta-vāda*, once with *avisamvāda* (*sāmānya-śabdaḥ pratyekam abhisambadhyate*). The ablative case is explained in such a way that *āpta-vādāvisamvāda-sāmānya* is to be understood as the object of a verb in its gerund-form, the gerund-form being elided (*lyab-lope pañcamī*). He then restates PS 2.5ab: ‘Even if one cannot recognise a connection between particular instances of statements by credible persons and particular instances of trustworthiness, one can nevertheless call [a credible person’s statement] an *anumāna*, after one has cognised the universal [of each] of those two, since pervasion is possible between two universals.’

These various readings of PS 2.5ab display a variety of ideas associated with this line of verse and thereby may suggest possibilities for our own understanding of it. It is noteworthy, however, that none of the Sanskrit authors gives the slightest hint that *āpta-vāda* is to be classified as *anumāna* on account of trustworthiness being a common character of both, or on account of their similarity in being trustworthy.

In the following, I will attempt to clarify the structural position of PS 2.5ab in Dignāga’s text and will reflect on how this might influence our understanding of this line of verse.

There will probably not be much disagreement that the understanding of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* poses some extraordinary difficulties. A large disadvantage is that we do not have access to the Sanskrit original. Another cause for our difficulties

¹³ ŚVT 111.24–112.10: *yāvat tv avisamvādo nānumīyate tāvad artha-gocaram jñānam utpannam apy anīścāyakatvād apramāṇam eva. sāmānya-śabdaḥ pratyekam abhisambadhyate. lyab-lope pañcamī. tad ayam anvayo bhavati—yady apy āpta-vādāvisamvāda-viśeṣānām bhedān na sambandho 'vagantum śakyate, tathāpi tayoḥ sāmānya-<n> pratītyānumānatā śakyate vaktum, sāmānyayor vyāpti-sambhavād iti.*

is that there is evidently no reliable commentarial tradition. Generally speaking, many of the śāstric texts can only be interpreted and evaluated with the help of the commentarial literature, which, if carefully used, often provides information about the background of an argument, thereby helping us to better understand the problems addressed in the text. The closer the commentator is to the author, both in terms of time and of personal acquaintance, the better it is for our purposes. And, of course, the commentator should not be endowed with too much innovative energy.

The only available commentary on the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, i.e. Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā*—long known only in its Tibetan translation—has fortunately finally surfaced in the Sanskrit original.¹⁴ However, it was composed considerably later than Dignāga's lifetime. As is clear on almost every page of the *Ṭīkā*, Jinendrabuddhi's understanding of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* has been influenced by concepts developed or adopted by the highly creative philosopher Dharmakīrti and by his commentators. Therefore, I would not place too much weight in Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of Dignāga, at least with regard to those teachings of Dignāga that Dharmakīrti has dealt with.

Nevertheless, the value of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary must not be underestimated. When dealing with opponents' views, Jinendrabuddhi evidently had access to and at times quotes verbatim some of the very texts referred to by Dignāga. To a certain extent, this fact compensates for our otherwise meagre knowledge of Dignāga's philosophical environment. And, of course, Jinendrabuddhi's commentary provides us with words and phrases of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, which together with the hitherto known fragments permit us to gain a much clearer picture of what the original Sanskrit text looked like.

Aside from the lack of a complete text in the original language and the missing background information, both made up for only partially by Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, there might still be another point that makes an understanding of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* difficult. I hesitate, but nevertheless suggest that perhaps the work was not well composed. One explanation for the text of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* seeming sometimes less clear and less coherent than one would hope for might be based on the fact that Dignāga produced his *samuccaya* by recycling some of his earlier works. And my impression is that he often did not bother to reformulate passages in order to embed them smoothly into the new context, but rather favoured the method of copy-and-paste.

As far as the section under consideration is concerned, the work that has been recycled might well be the *Vāyu-prakaraṇa*. Śākyabuddhi, Karṇakagomin, Vibhūti-candra and Jinendrabuddhi mention the title *Vāyu-prakaraṇa* in connection with

¹⁴ Chapter 1 has already been published, see STEINKELLNER–KRASSER–LASIC (2005). The remaining five chapters are under preparation.

passages and ideas found in the said section. To my knowledge, modern scholars consider it simply to be the title of the section of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* we are dealing with. Tibetan sources, however, speak of the *Vāyu-prakaraṇa* as an independent work of Dignāga's.¹⁵ These Tibetan sources also suggest that the *Vāyu-prakaraṇa* consisted of verses with commentary. This information fits well into the picture. In the section of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* in question, there are at least two passages that are possibly identifiable as parts of verses; however they do not belong to the verses of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*.

This said we may turn to the analysis. The discussion starts¹⁶ with a criticism of Dignāga's opinion that each and every inference has a universal (*sāmānya*) for its object. One can, so the argument runs, indeed observe inferences that have non-universals for their object. To exemplify this, the inference of air (*vāyu*) from temperature (*sparsā*) is cited, an inference that is used in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. Dignāga does not say exactly what distinguishes the inference of air from the inferences of fire etc., making the object of the first an *asāmānya* and the objects of the others *sāmānya*. Nevertheless, one difference that comes to my mind is that, at least according to the Vaiśeṣika's opinion, air is not perceptible. Therefore, if one were to infer air, this would be the first time one cognises air. Since in this case one would not be able to relate the object of this cognition to something one has previously perceived (**pūrva-dṛṣṭānusandhāna*), it may not be classified as a *sāmānya*. At least PS 2.2ab and the *Vṛtti* thereon seem to point in this direction.¹⁷

Thanks to Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭikā* we know that Dignāga, when discussing *Vaiśeṣika* tenets, often makes use of direct and indirect commentaries on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* and even includes verbatim passages from these texts. It is also clear that at least one of these commentaries is somehow genetically related to Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*. It is plausible that Candrānanda knew this *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* commentary either directly or via intermediate works, or that his *Vṛtti* and the commentary used by Dignāga had a common source, again either direct or indirect.

Although there is no hint that Dignāga is quoting verbatim from one of these commentaries in the present discussion, I think it is methodologically justifiable to

¹⁵ In his commentary on Sa skya paṇḍita's *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter*, Go rams pa (b. 1429, d. 1489) mentions the *Vāyu-prakaraṇa* together with its *Vṛtti* among a list of the works by Dignāga that had been translated into Tibetan (RTZM 3a2–3). He mentions the title for the second time in a list of the works that Sa kya paṇḍita had learned from Śākyaśrībhadrā (RTZM 5b2).

¹⁶ PSV 450.9.

¹⁷ In PS(V) 2.2ab, Dignāga argues that 'touch' (*sparsā*), otherwise a particular and a typical object of perception, is a *sāmānya* when inferred, on account of its being associated with a previously perceived 'touch'. Cf. also PST 58a1–2: *tat-prathamataḥ sparsā-viśeṣeṇa grahaṇād ity asāmānya-viśayam anumānam*.

use the passage of the commentary that we can access via Jinendrabuddhi to get an idea of that understanding of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* Dignāga refers to, taking recourse in Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* if required. In the following, I will try to lay out the structure and the content of the *vāyu*-discussion as I understand it, as based on these materials.

To recapitulate, an opponent holds the opinion that an inference can also have a non-universal as its object, as seen in the inference of air from temperature—more precisely, the inference of the existence of air from a specific temperature,¹⁸ namely one that is neither hot nor cold.

Dignāga's first response¹⁹ is that the opponent has misunderstood the object of the cited inference. It does not refer to air, but rather what it indicates is that temperature, being a quality, is supported by something. Since 'being supported' (*āśritatva*) is a general property, there is no chance of the object being a non-universal. As an alternative, Dignāga proposes that this inference indicates that temperature is supported by a substance. Since the state of being supported by a substance is also a general property, there is again no chance for this inference to have a non-universal as its object. This second reply gives the opponent an opportunity to begin a new line of argumentation.²⁰ Starting from the understanding that temperature must be supported by a substance, and moreover, that according to *Vaiśeṣika* ontology there are only nine substances, it would be possible to infer air by eliminating (*pariśeṣa*) the other eight substances as possible substrata of the temperature in question.

Dignāga replies²¹ that the procedure of elimination is generally not applicable in such cases. If we suppose that air is known to exist and that one can successfully eliminate the other substances as substrata of the specific temperature in question, it would be possible to establish air as its substratum. However, it is exactly the existence of air that one is attempting to prove by this inference. Therefore the necessary conditions for this procedure have not been fulfilled.

On top of this, Dignāga shows that it would not even be possible to exclude the eight other substances as substrata of the temperature in question. These eight substances fall in two groups: perceptible substances²² and imperceptible substances.²³ As far as the first group is concerned, the opponent supposedly uses mere non-per-

¹⁸ According to the commentary quoted in PST 57b6, this temperature is particular insofar as it is *sītōṣṇatva-viśeṣa-rahita*; according to Kaṇṇakagomin (PVSVT 66.23) it is *apākajānuṣṇāśīta*, cf. PBh 8.8–9.

¹⁹ PSV 450.17–451.5.

²⁰ PSV 451.5–9.

²¹ PSV 451.9–452.6.

²² Namely *pṛthivī*, *āp*, *tejas*.

²³ Apart from *vāyu*, these are *ākāṣa*, *kāla*, *diś*, *ātman* and *manas*.

ception to establish the absence of the temperature in question in them, a procedure that is not acceptable to Dignāga. Nor does he accept the opponent's manner of excluding the imperceptible substances as possible substrata.

The opponent's argument may somehow be outlined as follows: Only substances that are corporeal (*mūrtiman*) can offer physical resistance (*abhighāta*) and can therefore serve as substrata of temperature.²⁴ Other than air, of the group of imperceptible substances only the internal organ (*manas*) fulfils this requirement. Since the qualities of the internal organ must all be inferred, that is, since they are not perceptible,²⁵ temperature, being perceptible, cannot be a quality of the internal organ and therefore, one can exclude it as a possible candidate. Dignāga counters that temperature, in general, is observed in perceptible substances. Merely because one cannot decide which of those substances the temperature in question belongs to, it is not possible to eliminate them as its possible substrata. Therefore one cannot infer the existence of air by means of elimination. Lacking any other means, the opponent must rely on *āgama*.²⁶ Having first inferred a substance in general, he establishes the existence of air by eliminating the other substances. This last process is possible, since the authorities correctly gave names to things (*āpta-sañjñā-prāmāṇyāt*), and therefore there are exactly nine substances and air is one of them.

If we now look at the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, we discover a skeleton form of this discussion:

VS 2.1.9 (*vāyoh sparśas ca*) says that temperature is an indicator of air. The commentary explains the *ca* as implying that temperature is only one of several indicators.²⁷

VS 2.1.10 (*na ca dr̥ṣṭānām sparśa ity adr̥ṣṭa-liṅgo vāyuh*) states that the temperature in question does not belong to the other perceptible substances. Therefore, air has as its indicator a temperature which is not observed in the perceptible substances.²⁸ The commentary explains

²⁴ Cf. VSV 13.17: *vibhūnām sparśavattve bhāvānām pratighāta(h)*, and NKan 129.2–5: *nāpy amūrteṣv ākāśa-kāla-dīg-ātmasu varttate, sparśasya mūrtīvyabhicārōpalambhāt. manasāñ ca sparśavattve paramānūnām iva teṣāṃ sajātīya-dravyārambhakatvaṃ syāt, na cāvam, tasmāt teṣāṃ api na bhavati, ato yatrāyam āsritaḥ sa vāyur iti pariśeṣaḥ.*

²⁵ See VS 2.1.25: *paratra samavāyāt pratyakṣatvāc ca nātma-guṇo na mano-guṇaḥ.*

²⁶ PSV 452.6–14.

²⁷ The other indicators are *śabda*, *dhṛti* and *kampa*, see PṢṬ 57b6–7 and PBh 9.1.

²⁸ The commentary (PṢṬ 58b1) explains: *na cāyam dr̥ṣṭānām kṣity-ādīnām. ca-śabdān na cādr̥ṣṭānām ākāśādīnām. ato dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭeṣv adr̥ṣṭatvāt sparśa-viśeṣo 'dr̥ṣṭaḥ. so 'sya liṅgam ity adr̥ṣṭa-liṅgo vāyuh.* The understanding of the compound *adr̥ṣṭa-liṅgaḥ*, that is indicated, here may be rendered in a more conventional form as *dr̥ṣṭeṣv [adr̥ṣṭeṣu ca] dravyeṣv adr̥ṣṭaḥ sparśo liṅgam yasya sa tathōktaḥ* ('that which has for its mark a temperature that has not been perceived in per-

the *ca* as indicating that the temperature in question also does not belong to the imperceptible substances.²⁹

VS 2.1.16 (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭāc cāviśeṣaḥ*) and 2.1.17 (*tasmād āgamikam*) object that since temperature, in general, is seen in various substances, a specific temperature cannot be an indicator of air. Therefore, so says the opponent, air is known by tradition, by ‘mere telling’ as paraphrased by Candrānanda.

To this point it is clear that Dignāga has based his discussion very closely on a discussion from the Vaiśeṣika tradition. Dignāga’s ostensible reason for presenting this discussion, the alleged inference of a non-*sāmānya*, however, is not addressed in VS. Whether the Vaiśeṣika commentary used by Dignāga referred to this problem is unclear. When Jinendrabuddhi presents the assumption that this is an inference of a non-*sāmānya*, one cannot decide, based on formal reasons, whether he is stating an opinion actually expressed in the commentary or whether he is just showing a possible consequence—as expressed by Dignāga—of what the commentary says. Since I see no hints elsewhere that this topic was treated in the Vaiśeṣika tradition, I prefer the second possibility.³⁰

Next,³¹ the opponent tries to save his argument that the cognition of air is an inference by saying that there is no difference between inference and verbal testimony (*āgama*). Dignāga responds by arguing that there is a difference between inference and *śābda*. Jinendrabuddhi, of course, emphasises that this is not Dignāga’s real opinion. This discussion, which is quite long, ends with the statement that inference and *śābda* are said to be different from each other merely because of a tiny difference.

At this point, the reader of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* might ask: What should this mean? Is the difference so small that verbal testimony might be treated as inference? Then the Vaiśeṣika would have made his point and would be ready to fight another round. Or is the difference small, but nonetheless decisive? Then the alleged infer-

ceptible [nor in imperceptible] substances’). This solution seems to me more convincing than WEZLER’s (1983: 53) proposal, *adrṣṭe* or *adrṣṭasya liṅgaṃ yasya saḥ*, which to his mind is ‘the only one that really makes sense in the narrower and wider context.’

²⁹ Interestingly, Kanakavarman’s translation renders this *sūtra* as if it explicitly were to say that the temperature in question does not belong to the imperceptible substances either (PSV 451.8–10: *ji skad du mthong ba rnams la reg bya yod pa ma yin la / ma mthong ba rnams la yang ma yin no zhes bya ba la sogs pa lta bu yin no*).

³⁰ In fact, it is extremely implausible that the question whether the inference of air has a non-*sāmānya* for its object could have been discussed prior to Dignāga. But theoretically, of course, the Vaiśeṣika commentary may have referred to this topic. In that case its author must have been a contemporary of Dignāga and must have already been acquainted with some of his teachings.

³¹ PSV 452.15–454.5/8.

ence of air would not be an inference and should therefore not be cited as an example of an inference with a non-*sāmānya* for its object, and Dignāga's position that each and every inference has a *sāmānya* for its object would not be endangered, at least not by the quoted example. Of course, this position would contradict PS 5.1, in which Dignāga says that *śabda* is not a different instrument of knowledge than *anumāna*.

In the first case, this means that if verbal testimony were to be accepted as inference,³² we would expect Dignāga to show in the remaining discussion why verbal testimony, as a sort of inference, also can only have a *sāmānya* for its object. One way to do so would be to reject that statements which assert the existence of air and so on are in fact verbal testimonies.

Professor TILLEMANS' (1990: 22) interpretation of the next paragraph³³ of Dignāga's discussion might be understood as hinting in this direction. I will try to summarise his explanation: 'The general underlying principle in Dignāga' is, according to TILLEMANS, 'that the object of inference is not a real particular, or *sva-lakṣaṇa*, but that, nonetheless, via these mentally created objects we do gain knowledge about *svalakṣaṇa*.' Dignāga distinguishes 'two types of inference', one having an empirical object, the other a non-empirical. 'In the latter case we only have a concept (*rnam par rtog pa = vikalpa*) and do not cognize the *svalakṣaṇa* object.' Against the reproach 'that in that case authoritative statements about imperceptible objects would just express the conceptually invented object and not the real particular at all', Dignāga would reply 'that authoritative statements about heaven and the like do not express *just* the conceptually invented object: they are similar to normal inference because they too are non-belying with regard to the real particular. For, although the heavens and so forth are beyond our sense range, authoritative people have directly seen them and hence were able to apply the words "heaven", etc.' Explaining the final part of the discussion TILLEMANS states: 'Dignāga then says, "This position refutes inferences with regard to natures such as *pradhāna* and so forth." In other words, the word "*pradhāna*" has never been applied by an authoritative person to a real particular. His conclusion from all this is to restate his general view, now safe from attack: "therefore, the object of inference is not a *svalakṣaṇa*."'

In addition to many other interesting points in this explanation, we learn that Dignāga denies the status of an inference to statements that have been made by credible persons, as held by other schools, simply by saying that these allegedly credible persons have never directly seen what they are talking about. The primordial nature, so TILLEMANS tells us, 'is an example of something which does not exist, and where the scriptures describing it are bogus.'

³² This position seems more likely and so I will treat only this option.

³³ PSV 454.5/8–455.7.

Admittedly it might be possible that this conforms to Dignāga's private opinion. However, could he really have bluntly said that only those statements that refer to things he himself believes to exist are trustworthy? And how could this contribute to the question of whether there are inferences that have a *sva-lakṣaṇa* for their object or not? Besides, at this point of the discussion Dignāga does not yet speak of the primordial nature. He is still talking about the inference of air. Only at the end of the discussion does he add that one should refute inferences with regard to the primordial nature and other *sva-bhāvas* in the same manner as he has refuted the inference of air.³⁴ I doubt whether Dignāga would have impressed his contemporary Vaiśeṣika opponents just by saying: 'Your Great Lord has not seen a thing he could justifiably call air.'

I also hesitate to believe that Dignāga aims here at openly discrediting the scriptures adhered to by his opponents. This is because of the fact that the passage Professor TILLEMANS understands as an argument against them—namely that an acceptable verbal testimony must refer to something the speaker has perceived—is actually a *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, namely

VS 2.1.19: *pratyakṣa-pūrvakatvāt sañjñā-karmaṇaḥ.*

Let us look at the context: With VS 2.1.18 (*sañjñā-karma tv asmad-viśiṣṭānām liṅgam*), the proponent of the Vaiśeṣika opinion counters the reproach expressed in VS 2.1.17. According to Candrānanda, VS 2.1.18 states that the assignment of names by those who are distinct from ourselves—this meaning the Great Lord (*mahēśvara*)—is a reason for knowing that there are exactly nine substances, and consequently, that the temperature in question definitely belongs to the air. VS 2.1.19, still according to Candrānanda's explanation, answers the question of how the Lord is known: He must exist, because the assignment of names is preceded by perception.

Of course, we do not know how far Candrānanda's interpretation of these two *sūtras* agrees with the interpretation of the commentary used by Dignāga, but I think there is no risk in saying that in his opinion, too, the one who assigned the name 'vāyu' to the air had really had a perception of it. Dignāga would not gain much in a discussion by just denying this.

What I would like to emphasise here is that Dignāga's discussion at this point still seems to follow the one he met in the Vaiśeṣika literature of his time, possibly enriching it with related ideas from the same tradition.

³⁴ PSV 455.4–6/5.

This presumption may be supported by another source. If we look at a passage from the *Yukti-dīpikā* that refers to PS 2.5ab,³⁵ the explanation given there seems to associate PS 2.5ab with the Vaiśeṣikas rather than with the Buddhists, who would not state that the *mahēśvara* and the *ṛṣis* are trustworthy. As the *Yukti-dīpikā* suggests, the question answered by PS 2.5ab is how verbal testimony that refers to things imperceptible by common people can be related to a *sāmānya* and, therefore, be classified as *anumāna*. The answer is that a credible person's statement is an inference since it can be thought of as having a universal for its object. This is because it has the universal feature of trustworthiness (*avisamvāda-sāmānya*).

The argument's representation in the *Yukti-dīpikā* may be oversimplified so that it can be easily refuted. And sure enough, the argument is rejected by pointing to the fact that the universal is shared by the *pramāṇa*, but not by the *prameya*.³⁶ Nonetheless, the *Yukti-dīpikā*'s discussion might well hint to a certain view that existed at the time. Relying on the presented material and its interpretation that I have used so far, I am tempted to identify this view with Dignāga's reading of the Vaiśeṣikas' advocacy of verbal testimony as a kind of inference, a reading that includes their discussion on *vāyu* and expands upon it with arguments prompted by his own contributions in the field of *pramāṇa*. At a certain point, the hypothetical proponent of the Vaiśeṣika tenet would have to admit that even if the *sābda* type of inference of air were acceptable (which of course is not the case), its object could not be an *asāmānya*.³⁷ And this is, I would like to suggest, the main conclusion of Dignāga's discussion. To prove that scriptures referring to air as a substance or claiming the existence of a primordial nature and so on are bogus, other arguments would be needed, arguments that would most likely question their qualification for *āpta-vāda*. In this discussion, however, Dignāga seems not to have been concerned with the question of which criteria a statement has to fulfil to be acceptable as an *āpta-vāda*. The question was going to receive more attention from Dharmakīrti and from the tradition that followed him.

³⁵ YDi 100.21–101.3: *ucyate—svargādīnām tarhi katham anumānatvam iti. āha—āpta-vādāvisamvāda-sāmānyāt. yathā hairaṇyaka-prabhṛtīnām āptānām vākyam avyabhicāry evam, īśvara-maha-rṣayo 'pi cāptāḥ. tasmād eṣām api vākyam avyabhicārīti śakyam atrāpi sāmānya-viśayatvaṃ kalpayitum. evam anumānam evāgama iti.*

³⁶ YDi 103.15–104.4.

³⁷ The statement that a credible person has perceived air, for instance, before having given a name to it could somehow be used to show that a word like 'air' or 'heaven' refers to a *sāmānya*, even if the listener has never cognised such a thing before and is therefore not able to connect the present mental image in a generalising way to a previously perceived *sva-lakṣaṇa*.

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On (Non-semantically) Remembering Conventions: Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara on *Samketa-kāla**

DAN ARNOLD

‘... a theory of meaning for a particular language should be conceived by a philosopher as describing the practice of linguistic interchange by speakers of the language without taking it as already understood what it is to have a language at all: that is what, by imagining such a theory, we are trying to make explicit.’

Michael DUMMETT (2004: 31)

1. Introduction

In the subtitle of a recent article, Mark SIDERITS (2001) asked: ‘Is the Eightfold Path a Program?’ What SIDERITS thus wants to know is whether persons, on the Buddhist analysis thereof, can be understood as analogous to computers. More precisely, Siderits wonders whether Indian Buddhist philosophy might finally be reconcilable with the sort of physicalism currently exemplified by the contemporary research programs of ‘cognitive science’. This is a large and flourishing field of inquiry comprising various approaches, and Siderits does not specify any particular instance of it; he simply wonders whether or not the strong dualist tendencies of Indian Buddhist philosophy are really integral to the Buddhist project—or whether, instead, the basic Buddhist commitment to selflessness might be compatible with *physicalism*, of which cognitive science is widely thought to advance a uniquely cogent version. Siderits argues that the basic Buddhist project is, in fact, thus compatible.

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The constitutively Buddhist concern to advance a basically causal-reductionist account of the person surely makes it natural to ask whether Buddhist thought might be compatible with contemporary cognitive science. But despite this, it seems to me that SIDERITS is wrong to argue that the characteristically Buddhist form of dualism is not really integral to the Buddhist project. It seems, in particular, that the role and significance of rebirth in the Buddhist project commit Buddhists to refuting physicalism.¹ Paul GRIFFITHS (1986: 112) is right, I think, to stress ‘just how radical a dualism’ was advanced particularly by the Abhidharma and Yogācāra trajectories of Buddhist thought. ‘Physicalism’, GRIFFITHS argues, ‘in any form (identity theory, epiphenomenalism and so forth) is not an option’ for this tradition of Buddhist thought.

But that is not the point I want to defend here. What I want to suggest here is, I hope, finally a more interesting point: that while Indian Buddhist thought is not (contra SIDERITS) reconcilable with physicalism, central strands of Buddhist philosophy nevertheless turn out to be vulnerable to precisely the same kinds of critiques that can be brought to bear against physicalism. Attention to this can help us appreciate the extent to which the category of *intentionality* is problematic for Buddhist philosophers.² Chief among the questions faced by contemporary philosophers of mind is whether it is possible to give an exhaustively *causal* account of *intentionally* describable states or events.³ It is, then, to the extent that theirs is an exhaustively causal account that many Buddhists share what is arguably the most im-

¹ A well-known elaboration of such an argument (developed precisely in the context of arguing for rebirth) comes in the *Pramāṇa-siddhi* chapter of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇa-vārttika*; for useful analyses of that argument, see FRANCO (1997: 95–132), HAYES (1993), and TABER (2003).

² It should be said at the outset that in using variations on the word ‘intentionality’ here, I have in mind a usage (common among Anglo-American philosophers) according to which intentionality is a constitutively semantic phenomenon. This usage follows Wilfrid Sellars in taking it that mental events should be understood on the model of a thought’s *meaning* something. In other words, the kind of *aboutness* that is typically taken to define ‘intentionality’ is here taken to be inextricably related to the sense in which linguistic items are *about* what they mean. SELLARS’s ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ can, in this regard, be read as chiefly meant to advance the conclusion that ‘the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantic categories pertaining to overt verbal performances’ (1963: 180). Cf., as well, CHISHOLM–SELLARS (1957); and SEARLE (1982: 260), who similarly urges that ‘[i]ntentional states represent objects and states of affairs in exactly the same sense that speech acts represent objects and states of affairs.’ SEARLE (1982: 260) emphasises, however, that ‘Language is derived from Intentionality, and not conversely. The direction of pedagogy is to explain Intentionality in terms of language. The direction of analysis is to explain language in terms of Intentionality.’

³ Proponents of such causal accounts are often characterised as undertaking a project in ‘naturalising’ mental content, and the question is whether such a project can succeed; for a cogent argument to the effect that such a project cannot, in principle, succeed, see BAKER (1987).

portant presupposition of contemporary cognitive science—and that Buddhists are, like cognitive scientists, therefore at pains to account particularly for the ‘intentional’ phenomena that are propositional attitudes.

I want to suggest some ways in which this point plays out particularly in the trajectory of thought stemming from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. In hopes of being brief, I would here like simply to suggest two issues—central to that philosophical trajectory—that are usefully characterised vis-à-vis the category of intentionality, and in ways that show this Buddhist program to be vulnerable to critiques that have identified intentional phenomena as what are most intractable for contemporary physicalists.

First, I want to suggest that the doctrine of *apoha* can be understood not only in terms of familiar debates regarding the status of universals, but more generally as an attempt at a *non-intentional, non-semantic*—a purely *formal* or *syntactic*—account of mental content.⁴ Here, however, I want to approach this point indirectly. In particular, I want to suggest what I mean simply by considering an interesting problem case that is briefly addressed by Dharmakīrti’s commentator Dharmottara: that of the *perceptual* experience of any (necessarily unique) *utterance* of a word. Consideration of an utterance under this description—that is (as Dharmottara says), as a perceptible *śabda-sva-lakṣaṇa*—then raises the question of how we get from this perceptual experience of a *noise*, to the discursive awareness of a *sentence*. The question then becomes: can the transition from one level of description to the other *itself* be described in non-intentional terms?

The problem that Dharmottara thus addresses represents a special case of what is a more general problem for Buddhist philosophers of this trajectory of thought: that of how to go from (causally describable) sense perceptions to (semantically evaluable) propositional awareness.⁵ I will suggest that in this form, we can appreciate this case as a point of access to what the contemporary cognitive scientist Jerry FODOR identifies as the ‘disjunction problem’—and despite Dharmottara’s relatively brief treat-

⁴ In my use of the terms ‘semantic’ and ‘syntactic’, I particularly have in mind the usage exemplified by Jerry FODOR. In his early formulations of a computational theory of mind, FODOR proposes the computer model as most basically meant to advance our understanding of how a process can be (like the workings of a computer) exhaustively describable in physical (causal, ‘formal’) terms, and yet yield semantically ‘meaningful’ outputs: ‘Computers are a solution to the problem of mediating between the causal properties of symbols and their semantic properties’ (1985: 94). And ‘[w]hat makes syntactic operations a species of formal operations is that being syntactic is a way of *not* being semantic. Formal operations are the ones that are specified without reference to such semantic properties of representations as, for example, truth, reference, and meaning ... formal operations apply in terms of the, as it were, shapes of the objects in their domains’ (1982: 279).

⁵ For a development of this point with reference to Dharmottara’s revisions of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, see ARNOLD (2005) 42–48. Something precisely like the problem characterised there is usefully stated in BRANDON (1997: 126–28).

ment of the problem, I will suggest, as well, that this way of framing the issue can help us to appreciate what is, in point of fact, a very significant problem for Buddhist Apoha-vādins. This can be appreciated by briefly considering the extent to which a line of argument associated with the Mīmāṃsakas (but one not ordinarily brought to bear on discussions of *apoha*) turns out to have some purchase here.

Second, I want to suggest that another doctrine important to these thinkers—that of *sva-saṁvitti*, reflexive cognition or ‘apperception’—is important to understanding why these Buddhists may not, in principle, be able to address the issues raised by consideration of the first point. It is, I suggest, the characteristically Buddhist emphasis on *sva-saṁvitti* that makes this trajectory of Buddhist thought an instance of what Vincent DESCOMBES (2001) characterises as *cognitivism*—that is, of those philosophies of mind that take the locus of the ‘mental’ to be exhaustively internal to the subject, in the way, for example, that Jerry FODOR (1982) does in commending ‘methodological solipsism’ as a necessary ‘research strategy in cognitive psychology’. It is, according to a line of argument that I will sketch sympathetically, chiefly the ‘cognitivism’ or ‘methodological solipsism’ of contemporary projects in physicalism that makes it finally impossible for physicalists to account for the semantic content of intentional states—and I will suggest that arguments to this effect may have considerable purchase, as well, with regard to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s *sva-saṁvitti*.

Before turning to these Buddhist thinkers, then, let us consider briefly what motivates and characterises at least some of the influential examples of cognitive-scientific physicalism, and some of the lines of critique that have been developed against them.

2. The Problem of Semantics in Cognitive-scientific Physicalism

Cognitive science is heralded by its proponents as a revolutionary breakthrough, capable of solving the historically intractable ‘mind-body’ problem. It is particularly the characteristically cognitive-scientific appeal to the analogy of computers—to the idea, as proponents of this project often say, that thought is *computational*—that promises this.

The basic problem is familiar: human bodies are manifestly material objects, and so subject to whatever laws of physics we take to govern the behaviours of other such objects. But despite the possibility of seemingly exhaustive descriptions of bodily actions in physical terms, we *experience* at least a great many such actions as governed by our *intentional states*—by our beliefs, reasons, fears, intentions, and so forth. The question arises: How can we understand the content of such mental events to be causally efficacious with respect to the physically described actions

of our bodies, so that intentional states (like *having a belief*) can be thought to play some explanatory role in our behaviour?

The ‘cognitive-scientific’ approach to this problem involves an appeal to the model of computers to argue that *thought is computational*. There are reasons to think this characterisation can achieve what had eluded all previous versions of physicalism: namely, an intelligible characterisation of intentional states at the same time in *syntactic* and *semantic* terms. To accomplish this would be to answer the question, put by Vincent DESCOMBES (2001: viii–ix): ‘How can a mechanical sequence of mental states also be a chain of reasoning?’

Consider, in this regard, the operation of a simple calculator. The calculator’s execution of an algorithm can be described entirely in causal terms: the completion of each instruction causes the machine to pass into a consequent electrical state, with the series determined entirely by the algorithm. What is remarkable is that the end result of this physically describable process—in the form of a numeric display on a screen—is at the same time also a meaningful *sign*. With the example of a calculator, then, we seem to find an instance of a ‘sign’ that can also be completely described as the effect of certain causal transactions. So what is really advanced by the computer analogy is a way to imagine describing a semantically meaningful occurrence (like *having an idea*) as simply the effect of a series of causally efficacious, physical events.

This basic picture is expressed by Jerry FODOR’s (1982: 279) representative claim that ‘computational processes are both *symbolic* and *formal*. They are symbolic because they are defined over representations, and they are formal because they apply to representations, in virtue of (roughly) the syntax of the representations.’ For FODOR, then, cognitive science is defined by its attempt to elaborate this idea that states of mind simultaneously have semantically meaningful *content*, and yet are *formal* in the sense that ‘they apply to representations by virtue of their non-semantic (e.g. syntactic, computational, functional, physical) properties.’

But it is, on this view, finally only under a causal-syntactic description that mental representations can really be thought to play any explanatory role. This is because FODOR thinks that a properly ‘scientific’ psychology can involve reference only to causally efficacious particulars with specifiable identity criteria—in this case, individual tokens of what FODOR figuratively calls a ‘language of thought’: representations or neurologically ‘inscribed’ correlates to the propositions that we experience as ‘contentful’.⁶ And it is only to these that we can refer if we are to explain

⁶ Chief among the upshots of this is that this ‘language of thought’ would consist *only* in unique particulars; this is the point of GARFIELD’s (1988: 51) characterisation of FODOR as treating not *propositional* attitudes (which is Russell’s term for referring, basically, to intentional states), but *sentential* attitudes; that is, on FODOR’s account, the propositional attitudes, ‘like overt utterances, are biologically instantiated relations of *individuals* to concrete inscriptions of sentence

how intentional attitudes relate to our physically described actions; for a rigorously causal account requires reference only to processes that are (like the neuro-electrical and -muscular transactions that figure in the description of bodily actions) internal to the body.

Thus, the passages here quoted from FODOR all come from his influential article ‘Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology’ (1982). FODOR (1982: 283) argues that the cognitive-scientific hypothesis is ‘tantamount to a sort of methodological solipsism. If mental processes are formal, they have access only to the formal properties of such representations of the environment as the senses provide. Hence, they have no access to the *semantic* properties of such representations, including the property of being true, of having referents, or, indeed, the property of being representations *of the environment*.’

It is chiefly this commitment that is attacked by critics who argue that intentional phenomena cannot finally be explained in entirely non-semantic terms. Lynne Rudder BAKER (1987: 27), for example, has argued that ‘description of states in terms of content at all is incompatible with the presupposition that nothing exists other than the subject.’ There are several lines of argument behind this point, many of them finally supporting a basically Wittgensteinian point against the coherence of a ‘private language’—though it is something like Hilary Putnam’s ‘semantic externalism’ (advanced with reference to numerous thought experiments that basically resemble Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth’ case) that BAKER explicitly invokes. BAKER’s (1987: 41) argument, then, is one to the effect that, among other things, ‘[t]he identity of ... beliefs depends in part upon the language-using community of the believer; so even considered apart from semantic properties of truth and reference, such beliefs are not wholly “in the head.” Therefore, if behavior is to be explained only by what is in the head, it is not to be explained by belief.’

The physicalist’s case only becomes more problematic if we then factor in the additional ‘semantic properties of truth and reference’—as we must if his own analysis is to be taken as possibly true.⁷ The argument here is that intentional descriptions

tokens’ (my emphasis). The ‘objects’ of intentional states, then, are on this account nothing like, say, Fregean ‘thoughts’ or Husserlian ‘*noemata*’ (which are both fundamentally *abstract* ideas, akin to ‘propositions’); rather, the objects of intentional states are invariably *particular*. Dharmakīrti, as we will see, is after the same thing, and emphasises, in his account of the cognitive ‘representations’ (*pratibhāsa*) that are produced by perception, that they, like their putatively object referents, are *sva-lakṣaṇas*. More on this in due course.

⁷ The argument that the intentionality of mental content thus necessarily involves the idea of *reference* is one that is made by SELLARS in the section of his ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ devoted to considering ‘The logic of “looks”.’ Against characteristically representationalist attempts to show that knowledge is built on the foundations of what incorrigibly *seems* to a subject to be the case, SELLARS (1963: 142) argues that ‘*being red* is logically prior, is a logically simpler

are presupposed *even by those accounts that aim to explain away intentionality*. Thus, it is not a trivial point to ask what analysis we are to give, on the cognitivist's own account, of the phenomenon of giving reasons in support of a belief. Suppose, for example, that we want to give reasons to justify the belief that *beliefs are reducible to brain states*. If the claim itself is true, what difference can it be thought to make to adduce reasons for it? What could it mean, in other words, for someone to *understand the meaning* of a cognitive scientist's argument, given that intentional states like 'understanding' are said by this program to consist in the kinds of physical events that, *ex hypothesi*, do not *mean* anything at all? To press this question is basically to make a transcendental argument—one to the effect that intentional descriptions are necessarily presupposed even by the very arguments that claim to explain them away.⁸

While it may yet be—as SIDERITS (2001: 307) says—that contemporary cognitive-scientific iterations of physicalism are 'more difficult to resist' than earlier versions, these lines of critique make clear, at least, the kinds of problems that it is in principle difficult for physicalist accounts of mental content to accommodate. Thus, intentionally described situations—like *being persuaded by an argument* or *believing in physicalism*—may be intractable even for those physicalists who have suggestively exploited computer analogies. Physicalists can here be said to face a dilemma: it is arguably the case that the semantic content of mental events (the description of what it is that intentional states are *about*) necessarily involves factors external to the subject, such as truth conditions and the norms of a linguistic community; but to the extent that FODOR rightly takes a purely formal (causal, syntactic, computational) description of mental tokens to compel 'methodological solipsism', such physicalists cannot consider all of the factors that thus constitute mental content as being *about* what it's about. The failure thus to vindicate intentionally described mental content cannot, however, coherently be taken to show that such semantic content is superfluous; for the very attempt to *argue* this necessarily turns out to presuppose intentional descriptions. And if that is right, then it is not intentional descriptions that are dispensable; rather, it is putatively exhaustive causal explanations thereof that we can coherently do without.

notion, than *looking red*'—given which, 'it just won't do to say that *x is red* is analysable in terms of *x looks red to y*.' FODOR (1982: 279) can be understood to refuse just this notion with his contention that what is required is an account of the mental that involves only terms 'that are specified without reference to such semantic properties of representations as, for example, truth, reference, and meaning.'

⁸ This is the basic argument in Part II of BAKER (1987); see also GARFIELD (1988), whose sixth chapter comprises a similar approach.

3. Buddhist Epistemology and the Disjunction Problem

Let us now consider whether these lines of arguments against the program of cognitive-scientific physicalism have any purchase against the Buddhist tradition of thought stemming from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—and thus, whether this Buddhist program might, despite its clear rejection of physicalism, share something of the deep structure of physicalist arguments. Let me begin by briefly characterising the epistemological and ontological commitments that create the conceptual problems to be addressed by the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha*—which, I have said, I propose we understand not simply as an account of the referents of words, but more generally as a non-intentional, non-semantic account of mental content.

As is well known to students of Indian philosophy, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti admit only two reliable epistemic warrants, i.e. two *pramāṇas*: perception and inference.⁹ These have as their respective objects the only two kinds of things that are held by these Buddhists to exist: ‘unique particulars’ (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) and ‘abstractions’ (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*). Only the former, though, are to be admitted into a final ontology—in characteristically Buddhist terms, only these are ‘ultimately existent’ (*paramārtha-sat*), whereas abstractions are merely ‘conventionally existent’ (*saṃvṛti-sat*). And what qualifies unique particulars as thus ‘real’, on Dharmakīrti’s view, is that they alone possess causal efficacy.¹⁰

To the ontological claim that only causally efficacious particulars are ‘real’, there is the epistemological corollary that only cognitions that bear on (that are *caused by*) such particulars are finally warranted. More precisely, only cognitions that are themselves the *effects* of causally efficacious particulars¹¹ can be said to be (in Dharmakīrti’s term) ‘inerrant’ (*abhṛānta*). This is the point advanced by the claim—made alike by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—that perception is constitutively ‘free

⁹ For a fuller development of my understanding of the epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (and of its problems), see ARNOLD (2005: Part I).

¹⁰ So, for example, PV₁ 3.3, p. 112:

*artha-kriyā-samarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārtha-sat /
anyat saṃvṛti-sat proktaṃ te sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇe //*

¹¹ See, for example, PV₁ 3.224ab, p. 186:

hetu-bhāvād ṛtte nānyā grāhyatā nāma kācana /

‘Other than being a *cause*, there is nothing at all that can be called being *apprehendable*.’

As we will see, it is finally only subjectively occurrent cognitions that are the relevant ‘effects’ thus produced—a point of great significance for understanding Dharmakīrti’s project.

of conceptual elaboration' (*kalpanâpodha*). The 'conceptual elaboration' that perceptual cognitions thus lack consists, we might say, in *propositional attitudes*—in 'association with name and genus and so forth' (as Dignāga defined it), or (with Dharmakīrti) in thought whose phenomenological content is suitable for association with such linguistic items.¹²

Dignāga and Dharmakīrti thus maintain that discursive thought constitutively involves reference to things that are *not actually present*. A genuine 'perception' of, say, a book will consist only in a sensory impingement caused by some particular object, yielding a cognition whose appearance is itself *caused* by the object. But if one then entertains the propositional belief that 'this is a book', one's thought now includes reference to something not actually present—for example, the generic image of a book, knowledge of the conventions for the use of the word 'book', and so forth. What distinguishes perceptual encounters as uniquely warranted, then, is that only these cognitions are *causally constrained by actually present objects*. Inferential cognitions are not so constrained, and therefore 'add' something to the uninterpreted data of perception. This amounts to a radical critique of naive realism; for insofar as perceptual cognitions are really thus constrained only by fleeting sense data, it turns out that whenever we think we experience a more or less enduring token *of some type*, we are deeply mistaken about what is really present.¹³

I do not think it too much of a stretch to understand this program as roughly analogous to cognitive science at least in the minimal sense that we have here a systematic *redescription* of our common-sense intuitions about our epistemic situation. Thus, while we typically experience ourselves as confronted with a world of intentionally described objects—which is to say, a world of things *under familiar descriptions*—the claim here being made is that objects *as thus described* do not really exist; rather, we are only really warranted in believing there to be uniquely particular and fleeting sensations, such as will, by definition, not admit of any predication.¹⁴

Moreover, this Buddhist approach thus admits of comparison with cognitive-scientific physicalism insofar as the privileged level of description involves only *causal* transactions; just as on FODOR's account it is finally only under a formal or

¹² So, for example, NB 1.5, p. 47: *abhilāpa-sāmsarga-yogya-pratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā*.—'Conception is a thought whose phenomenological content is suitable for association with discourse.'

¹³ Here, it is helpful to recall the basically Buddhist point that is ultimately advanced by this epistemology: all that is finally warranted by the kind of cognition that is uniquely in contact with really existent phenomena is the conclusion that *there are sensations*—which does not also warrant the inferential belief that these must be the states of a 'self.'

¹⁴ This is what Dignāga meant in saying of *sva-lakṣaṇas* only that they are 'inexpressible' (*avyapadeśya*); see HATTORI (1968: 24, and p. 81, n. 1.19).

‘syntactic’ description that mental representations can be thought to have any explanatory role, so, too, it is affirmed by Dharmakīrti that only the world of causally efficacious sensibilia consists in ‘ultimately existent’ (*paramārtha-sat*) things. And the problem for Dharmakīrti, just as for FODOR, is whether and how the non-privileged level of description—the level consisting in those ‘conventionally’ described things (*saṃvṛti-sat*) that involve the kinds of ‘abstractions’ (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*) that alone are *semantically* evaluable—can be brought into contact with this.

But here is the problem: if perceptual cognition is defined by its independence from conceptual thought, and if the latter is held to be the point of ingress for cognitive error, then how could one ever be certain *that* the (propositional) judgement that follows a perception is in fact properly related to the perception in question? More precisely, if perception’s privileged status is a function of its having been caused by its object, and if discursive cognitions are defined by their adding something, then how can one ever be sure that what one is thinking *about*, when entertaining some proposition, is in any sense the same thing that was *perceived*? How can perceptual data—which is exhaustively explicable in non-intentional (causal, formal, or syntactic) terms—be made available as the content of thought? In the terms suggested by FODOR, then, we have here a process that meets the *formality* condition, but it is not clear how it can also meet the *content* condition.

One way to address this problem is to redescribe thought and its contents in the same kind of non-intentional (causal, formal, or syntactic) terms here used to explain perception. And this is, I suggest, precisely the kind of answer that is elaborated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and their followers in the form of the doctrine of *apoha*. While space will not permit me here to give a full account of this as an attempt at an entirely non-intentional re-description of intentional phenomena,¹⁵ I want to suggest an oblique but revealing angle of approach to the issue. If the doctrine of *apoha* is to succeed at what I thus take to be its aims, it must provide an account that explains the conceptual construction of (semantic) mental content without any reference to semantic descriptions (since these are what this account proposes to explain)—it must, instead, finally make reference only to *subjectively appearing particulars*¹⁶ in explaining how it is that the abstractions or universals that are the objects of thought are constructed.

One problem for such an account is that it turns out to be very difficult at once to provide a non-semantic description of the comprehension of a linguistic utterance, *and* to distinguish that from a perception. We can see this if we consider that any

¹⁵ See ARNOLD (2006) for a fuller development of many of the relevant points.

¹⁶ The significance of its finally being *subjectively appearing* particulars that are in play here will be considered in due course.

particular utterance of a word or sentence is—considered as a unique, perceptible acoustic event—in a sense precisely the kind of thing of which we can (these Buddhists have urged) have a wholly non-conceptual *perception*. Given, then, that the utterance of a sentence can be appropriately described as a perceptible acoustic event that, as such, is no different from the sound of, say, thunder, the task is to explain how in one such case (but not the other) the sound also *means* something—which involves the further question of how (or whether) the transition from one level of description to the other can *itself* be described in non-intentional terms. That is, the case of a speaker's uttering a sentence presents us with an event that is describable in two very different kinds of terms: what is 'conventionally' (*saṃvṛtitas*) taken as the expression of a meaningful proposition is, 'ultimately' (*paramârthatas*), nothing but the causation of particular noises that in turn have among their effects the production of certain cognitions. But insofar as it is only terms from the latter level of description that have a place in the final ontology (which is just what it means to characterise them as *paramârtha-sat*), the *relation between* these two descriptions must itself be explicable in terms that are *paramârtha-sat*—which is just to say that the process of understanding *sāmānya-lakṣaṇas* must, as Apoha-vādins want to argue, finally be explicable with reference only to *sva-lakṣaṇas*.

The problem I thus pose is closely related to what Jerry FODOR (1990: 89) has identified as the 'disjunction problem', which arises from the fact that 'it's just not true that Normally [sic] caused intentional states ipso facto mean whatever causes them.' That this is a problem is clear from attempts to give thoroughly causal accounts even of perception; when, for example, one has a visual perception of a tree, all manner of brain events are surely among the *causes* of the resultant cognition—but these are not among the things that we say are thus *seen*. A tenable causal theory of perception requires, then, that there be some principled way to explain which of the relevant causes of any perception is at the same time *what is perceived*.

If (as I think is the case) it turns out to be a not entirely straightforward matter to provide such an account, the problem is even more difficult in the case of the specifically semantic version of the disjunction problem: 'What the disjunction problem is really about deep down is the difference between *meaning* and *information* ... Information is tied to aetiology in a way that meaning isn't ... By contrast, *the meaning of a symbol is one of the things that all of its tokens have in common, however they may happen to be caused. All 'cow' tokens mean cow; if they didn't, they wouldn't be 'cow' tokens*' (FODOR (1990: 90); emphasis original). In this way, FODOR distinguishes between, as it were, artefacts that are efficiently precipitated by their causes ('information'), and those that somehow manage to 'refer' to something other (or something *more*) than the particulars that cause them; the latter he

calls conveyors of ‘meaning’, and he characterises the relatively unconstrained nature of these in terms of the ‘robustness’ of signifying tokens.

The problem that FODOR thus identifies is the same as the problem of how innumerable uniquely particular acoustic events—such as those that occur when countless speakers of English make the sound conventionally represented by the letters *c-o-w*—can commonly be taken as utterances *of the same word*. Insofar as the uniqueness (the contingency, temporality) of any such event can (as with anything capable of being represented in space and time) be understood to consist in its being causally describable, the problem is invariably that of how to relate the causal level of description to the intentionally describable abstraction.¹⁷

Something like the same question is anticipated by Dharmakīrti’s commentator Dharmottara in his commentary to verse 5 of the first chapter of Dharmakīrti’s *Nyāya-bindu*. It is in this verse that Dharmakīrti stipulates that the ‘conceptual thought’ (*kalpanā*) of which perception is constitutively devoid consists in ‘a thought whose phenomenological content is suitable for association with discourse.’¹⁸ This definition significantly revises Dignāga’s earlier characterisation of conceptual thought as simply ‘association with name and genus and so forth’, making it possible to infer conceptual thought even in pre- or non-linguistic creatures—even, that is, in the absence of any *actual* use of language.

But it raises various questions to argue, in this way, that constitutively discursive thought can be inferred even in the absence of any overt use of discourse. Dharmottara elaborates on the situation:

¹⁷ The problem here characterised is one of the most prominently recurrent issues addressed in HUSSERL’s *Logical Investigations*. ‘What in general’, HUSSERL (1970: 567 [Investigation V, §13]) asks, ‘is the surplus element distinguishing the understanding of a symbolically functioning expression from the uncomprehended verbal sound?’ And his answer is: ‘...we do not, *qua* expressing it, live in the acts constituting the expression as a physical object—we are not interested in this object—but we live in the acts which give it sense: we are exclusively *turned* to the object that appears in such acts, we *aim* at it, we *mean* it in the special, *pregnant* sense’ (1970: 584 [Investigation V, §19]). Again, ‘The ideality of the relationship between expression and meaning is at once plain in regard to both its sides, inasmuch as, when we ask for the meaning of an expression, e.g. “quadratic remainder”, we are naturally not referring to the sound-pattern uttered here and now, the vanishing noise that can never recur identically: we mean the expression *in specie*. “Quadratic remainder” is the same expression by whomsoever uttered. The same holds of talk about the expression’s meaning, which naturally does not refer to some meaning-conferring experience.’ (1970: 284 [Investigation I, §11]). HUSSERL’s point here (which is an expression of his ongoing critique of psychologism in logic) could, I think, serve just as well as a critique of Dharmakīrti’s account of meaning, according to which utterances *are*, in the final analysis, to be understood as referring to ‘some meaning-conferring experience’; more on this shortly.

¹⁸ See n. L.

‘There are some thoughts whose phenomenological appearance (*ābhāsa*) is [actually] associated with discourse, such as the conception of a jar on the part of someone by whom the [relevant linguistic] convention has been learned—[such a thought is one] whose phenomenological content [specifically] involves the word “jar”. But some [thoughts] have phenomenological content that is [simply] *suitable* for association with discourse, even though [they are in fact] un-associated with discourse—like the conception of a child by whom the [relevant linguistic conception] has not been learned.’¹⁹

While this passage raises various questions, I am most interested in Dharmottara’s references to those who have learned the conventional usage of a word whose utterance is being heard (those who are, as Dharmottara says, *vyutpanna-samketa*), and those who have not. Dharmottara recurs to this idea when he gets around to considering the following objection:

‘An auditory cognition [that is, a *sensory perception* of the auditory sort] apprehends a unique particular which is a sound. And since some audible particulars are *referents* and some are *signifiers*,²⁰ [it therefore follows that cognition of an audible particular] would be one whose phenomenological content is suitable for association with discourse—and thus, it would be *conceptual*.’²¹

The objection, then, is that insofar as it is a unique, perceptible acoustic event, any particular utterance of a word would seem to count as a *sva-lakṣaṇa*—that is, as the kind of unique particular that can be the object of a constitutively non-conceptual perception; and yet, insofar as the thing that is thus uttered is a *word*, it seems that we must allow that we here have a cognition that, though describable as a perception, is *conceptual*.²² In order to avoid this unwanted consequence, Dharmottara must find

¹⁹ NBT, p. 48: *tatra kācīṭ pratītir abhilāpa-saṃsṛṣṭābhāsā bhavati, yathā vyutpanna-samketasya ghaṭārtha-kalpanā ghaṭa-śabda-saṃsṛṣṭārthāvabhāsā bhavati. kācīṭ tv abhilāpenāsaṃsṛṣṭāpy abhilāpa-saṃsarga-yogyābhāsā bhavati, yathā bālakasyāvyutpanna-samketasya kalpanā.*

²⁰ I find Dharmottara’s use of the pair *vācya* and *vācaka* a bit counterintuitive here, since, in fact, *both* of these would seem to denote abstractions (precisely parallel to Saussure’s ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’, respectively). But it seems clear that what is wanted here is a dichotomy one of whose terms is a *particular*; hence, I render *vācya* here as ‘referent’, rather than as ‘signified’.

²¹ NBT, p. 52: *śrotra-jñānaṃ tarhi śabda-sva-lakṣaṇa-grāhi; śabda-sva-lakṣaṇaṃ ca kiñcid vācyaṃ kiñcid vācakam ity abhilāpa-saṃsarga-yogyā-pratibhāsam syāt; tathā ca savikalapakam syāt.*

²² Dharmottara’s commentator Durvekamiśra introduces this whole discussion by noting the following assertion ‘by previous commentators’ (*pūrva-vyākhyātrbhiḥ*; I do not know whom he is quoting), which makes explicit the contradiction that Dharmottara is trying to avoid: DhPr, p. 52: *iha pūrva-vyākhyātrbhiḥ “asāmarthya-vaiyarthābhyaṃ sva-lakṣaṇasya samketayitum aśakyatvād*

some way to keep these two descriptions of the same event distinct from one another (so that the true ‘perception’ of the utterance can, as Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception requires, still count as non-conceptual); but he must do so in a way that allows us to understand how we can, as users of language, effortlessly go from the perceptual to the semantic (i.e. the *conceptual*) description.²³ This is, then, another case of the same problem that recurrently bedevils the philosophical program of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti: how to bring these two sharply distinct levels of description together.

4. Recollection of Conventions as Culminating in *Sva-saṃvitti*

In response to the foregoing problem, Dharmottara elaborates the following account:

‘This is not a problem. Even if a unique particular can be a referent or a signifier, the unique particular can be apprehended as referent or signifier [only insofar as it is] being apprehended as having been experienced at the time [when one learned the relevant linguistic] convention. And a thing’s being an object of experience does not now exist as occurring at the time [when one learned the relevant linguistic] convention. And just as the perception that existed at the time [one learned the relevant linguistic] convention has now ceased, in the same way a thing’s also being an object of that [experience] does not now exist. Thus, a [purely perceptual] auditory cognition, not registering the fact of having been previously seen, does not [itself] apprehend a signifier-signified relation.’²⁴

avācya-vācakatvam; avācya-vācaka-sva-lakṣaṇa-grāhitvāc cēndriya-jñānam avikalpakam iti”
vyākhyātam.—‘Since, as lacking both [intrinsic] significance and *in*-significance, it cannot be involved in a linguistic convention (*saṃketayati*), a unique particular is not a signifier or a signified; and a sensory cognition, because of [its] being the apprehender of a unique particular that is neither signifier nor signified, is non-conceptual.’

²³ Dharmottara’s task here would be further complicated by consideration of the phenomenology of such a situation; for in fact, we do not experience ourselves as *moving* from one level of description to the other, but simply as *understanding the sentence*. Cf. HUSSERL (1970: I: 282–84, §10)—a discussion that DUMMETT (2004: 11) summarises as attending to the fact that ‘we hear or read the words *as* saying whatever it is that they say; only by a heroic effort can we hear them as mere sounds or see them as mere shapes.’

²⁴ NBT, pp. 52–53: *nāṣa doṣaḥ; saty api sva-lakṣaṇasya vācya-vācaka-bhāve, saṃketa-kāla-dṛṣṭatvena grhyamānaṃ sva-lakṣaṇaṃ vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ca grhītaṃ syāt. na ca saṃketa-kāla-bhāvi darśana-viśayatvaṃ vastunaḥ sampraty asti; yathā hi saṃketa-kāla-bhāvi-darśanam adya niruddham, tadvat tadviśayatvaṃ apy arthasvādya nāsti. tataḥ pūrva-kāla-dṛṣṭatvam apaśyac chrotra-jñānaṃ na vācya-vācaka-bhāvi-grāhi.*

Let us first develop the idea that what Dharmottara is here addressing is something like FODOR's 'disjunction problem'—and in so doing, gain a more complete picture of the account that Dharmottara's references to *saṃketa-kāla* here presuppose. Recall that the disjunction in question is between what FODOR referred to as 'information' and 'meaning'. 'Information', on FODOR's usage, is carried by the kinds of events that are only 'about' what *causes* them; and his account is one according to which all instances of *meaning* must in the final analysis be explicable with reference to some particular occasion on which the use of a signifying convention was in some sense *caused* by an interaction with some ostensible particular. *Meaning*, then, is for FODOR explicable in terms of *information*—in terms of particular cognitions that are 'about' their causes.²⁵ And FODOR needs thus to bring the processes of signification to rest in some causally describable transaction with unique particulars since his account of semantics, like that of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, just is an account of how it is that semantically meaningful states are constructed out of the causally efficacious particulars that alone are really existent.²⁶

Now, what thus causes foundational utterances on Dharmakīrti's view is ultimately that kind of *sva-lakṣaṇa* (if it makes sense to talk of *kinds* of *sva-lakṣaṇas*!) that is some particular, subjectively occurrent 'intention' (*abhiprāya* or *vivakṣā*). Here it is important, then, to attend briefly to Dharmakīrti's elaboration of another view commonly held by Buddhist philosophers in this trajectory of thought: specifically, the claim that cognitions engendered by testimony (*śābda-jñāna*) are not themselves *pramāṇas* just insofar as such cognitions are reducible to some other *pramāṇa*—namely, inference. On Dharmakīrti's account, the inference involved here is specifically one to the fact *that* the speaker has some 'intention' (*abhiprāya*). As Dharmakīrti says at PV 1.213,

'Since words have no inherent connection with things, there is no proof of objects based on them; for they [merely] express a speaker's intention.'²⁷

²⁵ See ARNOLD (2006) for a fuller elaboration of FODOR's arguments here.

²⁶ It should be said, in this regard, that FODOR claims to be a realist about propositional attitudes, which suggests that he might not endorse this characterisation of his project; but I am persuaded by such critiques as that of BAKER (1987) that, notwithstanding FODOR's avowed realism, his reductionist position reduces, in the end, to an *eliminativist* one, insofar as the only real explanatory work is done at the 'syntactic' level of description. To that extent, the semantic level of description basically becomes epiphenomenal, which makes it hard to retain the claim that one is a 'realist' about things at this level.

²⁷ PV₂, p. 107:

*nāntarīyakatābhāvāc chabdānām vastubhiḥ saha /
nārtha-siddhis tatas te hi vaktr-abhiprāya-sūcakāḥ //*

Note, however, that Dharmakīrti thus credits only the inference to the fact *that* a speaker has some intention, but cannot get at *what* that intention is; for the ‘intentions’ Dharmakīrti thus imagines must be understood not as anything like ‘propositions’ (not, that is, as concerning objective states of affairs), but only as *subjectively occurrent representations*. This is the salient point of Dharmakīrti’s saying (as he does at PV 2.2) that ‘language is a reliable warrant²⁸ [only] in regard to *that object which appears in thought, which is the speaker’s object of engagement*; it is not grounded in the reality of the object [itself].’²⁹ And again, in the auto-commentary on PV 1.227, Dharmakīrti explains:

‘An utterance is impelled by an intention regarding a particular point; for one who knows that this [utterance thus] comes from that [intention,] *the point expressed [by the utterance] is the phenomenal appearance which is its proper cause*. Hence, there is a cause-effect relation between [an intention] *whose form is mental*, and its expression in speech.’³⁰

The inference to a speaker’s intention, then, is an inference based on a *kārya-hetu* (that is, an inference from an effect to its cause).³¹ And the cause in question is a subjectively occurrent representation (*ābhāsa*) appearing to the speaker. For Dharmakīrti, to say that such a representation is thus the *cause* of the utterance is in effect to say that the ‘intention’ in question must be a unique particular, since only *sva-lakṣaṇas*, on his view, are causally efficacious.³² Indeed, Dharmakīrti has it that the ‘intention’ in question—a mental representation that is itself causally produced by what it is ‘about’—is, like any such representation, itself a *sva-lakṣaṇa*.³³

But *that* means that this ‘intention’ must in some sense be *perceptible*, since *sva-lakṣaṇas* are the objects only of perception—although as a subjectively occurrent representation, it would of course be ‘perceptible’ only to the subject to whom it was appearing. This is not, however, a problem for Dharmakīrti, and the attractive-

²⁸ More literally, ‘language has reliability’ (*śabdasya prāmāṇyaṃ*).

²⁹ PV₁ 1.4:

*vaktṛ-vyāpāra-viśayo yo ’rtho buddhau prakāśate /
prāmāṇyaṃ tatra śabdasya nārtha-tattva-nibandhanam //*

³⁰ PV₂, p. 113–114: *artha-viśeṣa-samihā-preritā vāg ata idam iti viduṣaḥ sva-nidānābhāsinam artham sūcayatiṭi buddhi-rūpa-vāg-vijñaptiyor janya-janaka-bhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ*. Cf. DUNNE (2004: 146).

³¹ As Kamalaśīla says in expressing this point, ‘the intention is understood from the utterance because of [the utterance’s] being the effect of that [intention], but not as being [directly] expressible’ (TSaP, p. 376: *sā ca vivakṣā tat-kāryatvād vacanāt pratiyate, na tu vācyatayā*).

³² Cf. n. J.

³³ On this point, DUNNE (2004: 116) says, ‘Since each image is an effect, it as much a particular’ as the *sva-lakṣaṇas* which they represent; cf. DUNNE (2004: 121).

ness of this picture becomes clear when we then factor in one of the other central commitments of Dharmakīrti and his philosophical fellow-travellers: the commitment to the view that *sva-saṃvedana* or *sva-saṃvitti* (reflexive cognition or ‘apperception’) is not only to be reckoned as a type of immediate, preconceptual awareness—which is to say, as a kind of *pratyakṣa*—but in the final analysis, as the *only* such cognition.³⁴ That is, the only truly non-conceptual, non-discursive cognition—the only kind whose status as ‘inerrant’ (*abhrānta*) is such as to make it *indubitable*—is the awareness we have of the contents of our own mental events. This, then, is the account that is in play when Tom TILLEMANS (2000: 163), explicating PV 4.109, thus summarises what he calls Dharmakīrti’s ‘fundamental position’ with regard to the role of a speaker’s intentions: ‘words are used according to the speaker’s wishes and designate anything whatsoever which he might intend. The speaker is thus an authority as to what he is referring to in that he can ascertain his own intention by means of a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), viz., reflexive awareness (*sva-saṃvedana*).’

Now, however, we are in a position to see all the more clearly how problematic is this account of inferences to a speaker’s intention; for precisely insofar as our inference is thus to a particular, subjectively occurrent representation, there remains the question of how the speaker’s ‘intention’ itself relates to what that intention is *about*. That is, if the only inference involved here is one to the bare fact of ‘some speaker’s having an intention’, we are no closer to understanding *what* that intention is.³⁵ Indeed, the account we have just surveyed would seem to undermine whatever claim Dharmakīrti has on giving an account of the *reference* of words; for insofar as the ‘reference’ thus becomes a subjectively occurrent representation, what we are ‘explaining’ seems no longer to be the constitutively intersubjective phenomenon of language, but rather, something eminently subjective and psychological.³⁶ Against such a view, understanding what a speaker’s intention is *about* arguably requires reference to a universal such as a *proposition*—something with Husserlian ‘ideality’,³⁷ or what the grammarian Bhartṛhari called *upacāra-sattā* (‘figurative reality’).³⁸ Whatever it is we can thus be thought to require, the salient point is that it must, if it is to explain how it is that thoughts and utterances can be about objective states of affairs, be something other than the efficient causes of any particular mental event.³⁹

³⁴ Dignāga first made this point in elaborating on *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* 1.8; see ARNOLD (2005: 34–36).

³⁵ For a highly illuminating development of this and related points, see NANCE (2004: 42–67).

³⁶ DUNNE (2004: 139 ff.) has made a similar point.

³⁷ See n. Q, above.

³⁸ Cf. HOUBEN (1995: 257–262).

³⁹ In fact, Dharmottara is arguably striving for precisely such an account of intentionality when he revises Dharmakīrti’s account of perception. Thus, in commenting on the first chapter of the *Nyāya-*

Here, then, we can begin to see how the specifically semantic kind of ‘aboutness’ exemplified by linguistic items can be considered inextricably related to the ‘intentionality’ of mental events;⁴⁰ for giving any account that takes *thoughts or sentences* to be *about* anything at all arguably requires reference to precisely the kinds of abstractions that pointedly do not figure in Dharmakīrti’s account of speakers’ intentions—requires reference, that is, to (what FODOR’s methodological solipsism is precisely meant to exclude) the ‘*semantic* properties of such representations, including the property of being true, of having referents, or, indeed, the property of being representations *of the environment*’ (FODOR (1982: 283)). This nicely discloses, I think, the main reason why Dharmakīrti’s epistemology can move so easily between realist⁴¹ and idealist commitments; for on one reading of the Dharmakīrtian account of *sva-saṃvitti*, the whole point just is to bracket from consideration the question of whether our mental events have the property of ‘being representations *of the environment*.’⁴²

5. Mīmāṃsakas on the Impossibility of a Non-intentional Account of Linguistic Conventions

To the extent that is right, the *sva-saṃvitti* of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti can be understood to play a role precisely analogous to the ‘methodological solipsism’ that underlies FODOR’s project—given which, we can say that the Buddhist commitment to *sva-saṃvitti* figures prominently in the difficulty of their giving a semantic account of mental content; for the view that all of our higher-order awareness has its foundations in indubitably occurrent, uniquely particular episodes of reflexive cognition⁴³ just is the view that an account of the mental cannot finally make reference to the semantic properties of mental representations.

bindu, Dharmottara is concerned to reverse Dharmakīrti’s exhaustively causal account of perception, with an eye towards allowing that perception must, after all, yield something like propositional content; cf. ARNOLD (2005: 42–48). But of course, Dharmottara (as a commentator who claims exegetical adequacy to the texts of Dharmakīrti) tries to do so while yet maintaining that perception is *kalpanāpoḍha*.

⁴⁰ Cf. n. B.

⁴¹ Here, I mean ‘realist’ in the ordinary sense that pertains to a world of external objects.

⁴² Thus, these ideas put Dharmakīrti in a good position to take the further, idealist step of arguing that *there is no* ‘environment’ thus to be ‘represented’; but insofar as this ‘bracketing’ does not by itself commit Dharmakīrti to taking that step, he also remains in a good position to argue (as he usually does) as a ‘Sautrāntika’.

⁴³ Which is just the view SELLARS (1963) attacks when he considers ‘the logic of “looks”’; cf. n. G.

Now, I have been trying to argue that these considerations (to recur, finally, to our passages from Dharmottara) represent the kind of thing that is presupposed by talk of *saṃketa-kāla*. Recall, then, that what makes a cognition ‘conceptual’, for Dharmakīrti and his ilk, is its not being causally constrained by an actually present object—by its involving, that is, reference to (or *recollection of*) something that is not presently there. When we hear (i.e. *perceive*) someone speaking, all that is presently occurring is the causally or ‘syntactically’ describable utterance of noises. The relevant non-present thing that is then recalled is the ‘linguistic convention’ (*saṃketa*) that governs the use of the word. Thus, on this way of describing the ‘computation’ (as it were) of a linguistic expression, the initial perception of the acoustic event that is someone’s utterance can be described as the effect of a causally efficacious, unique particular (namely, the sound emitted by the speaker). The sound’s being taken as *meaningful* (i.e. as ‘*vācaka*’) is then attributed to a stimulated *recollection* of an arbitrary convention—and if we are to avoid question-begging, the initial devising or acquisition⁴⁴ of the relevant convention, as well as the recollection thereof, must itself be causally describable.

But can this picture work? What I want to suggest is that at least this part of the Buddhist proposal cannot, in the end, coherently be given a non-semantic, non-intentional description; for the picture that Dharmottara has sketched here presupposes precisely the intentional level of description that it is meant to explain. To see this, the question to ask is: how are we to explain—in non-semantic, non-intentional terms—the linkage between the sound that is immediately perceived, and the ‘convention’ (*saṃketa*) one is thereby prompted to recall? More compellingly, how are we to describe *the making of this convention itself* in non-intentional terms?

It is here that it becomes relevant to consider a Mīmāṃsaka argument that has not, so far as I am aware, been much considered with regard to the doctrine of *apoha*. Here, I have in mind not the characteristically Mīmāṃsaka arguments that were developed specifically against *apoha*, but rather, one of the arguments deployed to support the quintessentially Mīmāṃsaka claim that—as affirmed at *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 1.5—‘the relation between a word and its referent is primordial’ (MS, p. 28: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ*...). Among the arguments marshalled in support of this claim is the following, which Śabara—in his lengthy commentary on *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 1.5—quotes from the earlier commentary of the unnamed *Vṛtti-kāra* (‘author of the *Vṛtti*’):

⁴⁴ Note that the expression *saṃketa-kāla* is ambiguous in this regard; it could mean ‘the time of [*the devising of*] the convention’—a translation that is recommended by the understanding of *saṃketa* as ‘agreement’ (for we can then simply translate ‘at the time of the agreement [i.e. between the creators of the convention]’)—or ‘the time of [*the learning of*] the convention.’ For further reflections on this ambiguity, see ARNOLD (2006).

‘There is no period whatsoever without a relation [between words and their referents, no period] in which not a single word was related to any referent. How so? Because the very act of making a relation does not [otherwise] stand to reason. Some language must be used by the one who is creating the relation; who created [the relations constitutive] of that [language] by which he would [thus] do so? If [that was done] by someone else, then who created [linguistic relations] for him, and who, [in turn,] for him? There is no end [to the series]. Therefore, someone who is [ostensibly] creating [any linguistic] relation must presuppose some words whose relations are unmade, established according to the usage of elders.’⁴⁵

The Vṛtti-kāra’s argument is straightforward but compelling: the fundamental connection (*sambandha*) of language with non-linguistic fact cannot coherently be imagined without presupposing precisely the intentional, semantic level of description that is supposed to be *explained* by positing the creation of precisely such a connection. This is, the Vṛtti-kāra argues, because we can only imagine an act of meaning-assignment—an act such as that consisting in the utterance ‘this [accompanied by an act of ostension] is to be called a cow’—as *itself* a linguistic act. Hence, the very act of creating such a ‘relation’ does not stand to reason unless we presuppose that both the agent and the audience of this act already have (what we are here trying to understand) the idea of *meaning* something—already find intelligible, that is, the very idea that the utterance that accompanies some act of ostension (‘this is called a cow’) *means* what is ostended.

This argument brings to mind one made by WITTGENSTEIN, who nicely gets at what all is involved in knowing a language by criticising Augustine’s account of language-acquisition by children. Thus, against the view that children require only to learn the names of things by attending to the ‘bodily movements’ of adults—‘as it were the natural language of all peoples’⁴⁶—WITTGENSTEIN says:

‘Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the

⁴⁵ ŚBh 1.5, p. 68: *na hi sambandha-vyatiriktaḥ kaścit-kālo ’sti, yasmin na kaścic api śabdaḥ kenacid arthena sambaddha āsīt. katham? sambandha-kriyāva hi nōpapadyate. avaśyam anena sambandham kurvatā kenacid chabdena kartavyaḥ. yena kriyeta, tasya kena kṛtaḥ? athānyena kenacid kṛtaḥ, tasya kenēti, tasya kenēti, nāvāvatīṣṭhate. tasmād avaśyam anena sambandham kurvatā akṛta-sambandhāḥ kecana śabdā vṛddha-vyavahāra-siddhā abhyupagantavyāḥ.* This line of argument is further elaborated by Kumāri in the *Sambandhākṣepa-parihāra* chapter of the *Śloka-vārttika*; see ARNOLD (2006).

⁴⁶ Augustine, *Confessions*, 1.8; quoted at WITTGENSTEIN (1958: § 1).

country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And “think” would here mean something like “talk to itself.”⁴⁷

Similarly, the Mīmāṃsakas have argued that to presuppose the intelligibility of a proposed convention’s *meaning* what is ostended is to presuppose that the audience for this act of creation ‘already had a language, only not this one.’ The challenge to the would-be nominalist here is a significant one: What must be imagined is how anybody could *explain* to someone—how they could, that is, *tell* them—what it means to *mean* something. This must be imagined, moreover, without presupposing that the parties to this eminently intentional act can already ‘think’, where that means (with Wittgenstein) something like *talk to themselves*.

6. Conclusion

It is this basically Wittgensteinian point that Vincent DESCOMBES (2001) develops in his critique of ‘cognitivism’;⁴⁸ for ultimately the problem with all instances of cognitivism—with all philosophical programs, that is, that take the locus of the ‘mental’ as entirely internal to the subject—is that the *normative, rule-governed, semantic* character of thought requires reference to a constitutively *social* dimension. This fact, DESCOMBES (2001: 58–59) suggests, applies to the explanation and understanding of all constitutively social practices and institutions:

⁴⁷ WITTGENSTEIN (1958: § 32). Interestingly, Jerry FODOR (1975: 63–64) quotes this passage from WITTGENSTEIN at the conclusion to an argument almost precisely like that of the Vṛtti-kāra: ‘Learning a language (including, of course, a first language) involves learning what the predicates of the language mean. Learning what the predicates of a language mean involves learning a determination of the extension of these predicates. Learning a determination of the extension of the predicates involves learning that they fall under certain rules (i.e. truth rules). But one cannot learn that *P* falls under *R* unless one has a language in which *P* and *R* can be represented. So one cannot learn a language unless one has a language. In particular, one cannot learn a first language unless one already has a system capable of representing the predicates in that language *and their extensions*. And, on pain of circularity, that system cannot be the language that is being learned. But first languages *are* learned. Hence, at least some cognitive operations are carried out in languages other than natural languages.’ FODOR thus agrees with the Mīmāṃsakas that trying to imagine a first creation (or acquisition) of linguistic conventions seems to confront us with an infinite regress; it’s just that FODOR, thinking the regress intolerable, takes the argument as a *reductio*, and argues that it is therefore necessary to posit what he figuratively calls a ‘language of thought.’ For a much lengthier development of the role of that argument in FODOR’s project, and of the Mīmāṃsaka argument briefly sketched here, see ARNOLD (2006).

⁴⁸ Of which FODOR’s ‘methodological solipsism’ is a paradigm case—as would be Dharmakīrti’s *sva-samvitti*, to the extent that (as I have suggested) this plays a role comparable to that of FODOR’s guiding principle.

‘... there can be no formal rules where there are no preexisting practices and customs... What we require, then, is an explanation that provides the institution’s intellectual principle, but without seeking it in an individual consciousness...’

But insofar as they take causally describable instances of *sva-saṃvitti* to be foundational—to be, as Dharmakīrti argues, all that is finally expressed by (because they are the *causes of*) any linguistic utterance—Buddhist philosophers in the tradition of Dharmakīrti are unable to look to anything *other* than the mental representations occurring within an individual consciousness.

To be sure, there are characteristically Buddhist commitments that are well served by this account. Chief among these, of course, is (what all Buddhist philosophy is finally concerned to elaborate) the cardinal Buddhist doctrine of selflessness; Dharmakīrti’s account of a speaker’s ‘intention’ is, then, one among the many arguments meant to block any inference from the experience of sensations to the conclusion that these must be the properties or states of an enduring subject (a ‘self’). Dignāga and Dharmakīrti can be understood to have recognised that even to allow that thoughts or utterances could be *about* something other than their proximate causes—that they could be about such enduring realities as ‘objective states of affairs’—is already to clear the way for the view that our experiences could be related to something (a *self*) other than their manifestly episodic causes. Accordingly, these thinkers developed a radically thoroughgoing sort of empiricism, which is concomitant with a broadly nominalist account (such as they elaborated with the doctrine of *apoha*) in which the only existents to be admitted into a final ontology are causally efficacious particulars. The refusal that thoughts or utterances are really *about* anything so abstract as ‘objective states of affairs’ thus serves the goal of taking the only properly indubitable belief to be that *there are sensations*.

But the price to be paid for this is that the locus of *truth* becomes just subjectively appearing representations; and this is precisely the view that Husserl, in his ongoing struggle against psychologism, criticised by saying that an expression’s *meaning* ‘naturally does not refer to some meaning-conferring experience.’ For these Buddhists, in contrast, utterances *are* finally to be understood as referring simply to some ‘meaning-conferring experience’—specifically, to the reflexive cognitions (*sva-saṃvitti*) of some particular speaker. Husserl’s argument against such a route, however, is compelling, and has ultimately to do with the very idea of *truth*; for it is only by taking expressions (and thoughts) to be, in general, *about* something other than their proximate causes that it is possible to make sense of the fact that (as Husserl says) ‘[q]uadratic remainder’ is the same expression by whomsoever uttered—which is a condition of the possibility of our holding (what must be held by

anyone who would make use of the idea of *truth*) that ‘[t]he state of affairs is what it is whether we assert that it obtains or not.’⁴⁹

The difficulties with holding a contrary view are clear in the Buddhist account that can be elaborated as relevant to understanding Dharmottara’s brief references to the recollection, by someone who perceives a speaker uttering sounds, of ‘*samketa-kāla*’—of the ‘time of [one’s learning] a convention’. As we saw, Dharmottara needs to give such an account if he is to allow that we can appropriately describe the hearing of a *śabda-sva-lakṣaṇa* (an audible particular) as the non-conceptual *perception* of a unique acoustic event, while yet explaining how an event so described can also be understood in terms of the auditor’s *understanding what the speaker means*. On the view Dharmottara sketches, such an occasion is indeed describable as a true perception, and the semantic level of description is brought in only by the recollection that is stimulated thereby—the recollection, that is, of some bygone ‘*samketa-kāla*’.

But in order for such an account to succeed—in order, that is, for it to *explain* the emergence of a semantic level of description without at any point *presupposing* one—it must be possible to imagine both this recollection itself, and the ‘*samketa-kāla*’ so recalled, in constitutively non-semantic terms. And I have suggested that a characteristically Mīmāṃsaka argument for the eternity of linguistic relations can be understood as cogently calling into question precisely this possibility. Thus, Mīmāṃsakas have argued, at least since the time of the Vṛtti-kāra, that we can only imagine an act of meaning-assignment as *itself* a linguistic act. I have suggested that among the things the Mīmāṃsakas can be said thus to have recognised is (with Vincent Descombes) that we require ‘an explanation that provides the institution’s intellectual principle, but without seeking it in an individual consciousness.’ And among the things that make it impossible for Buddhists like Dharmakīrti to look anywhere other than to an individual consciousness is their deployment of the idea of *sva-samvitti*—which, we saw, lies at the root of characteristically Buddhist claims that we are entitled to infer from anyone’s utterance of words only that some subjectively occurrent representation (some object, Dharmakīrti says, that ‘appears in thought’, *buddhau prakāśate*)⁵⁰ has caused the noise we perceive.

It is, among other things, to the extent that these Buddhists in this way uphold something like FODOR’s ‘methodological solipsism’ that this Buddhist program is vulnerable particularly to those critiques of physicalism that argue for ‘semantic externalism’—that argue, in other words, that an intentional level of description cannot be reduced to an efficient-causal level of description just insofar as the for-

⁴⁹ Cf. n. Q.

⁵⁰ Cf. n. CC.

mer involves reference to something constitutively *social*. And the more compelling argument is then one to the effect that these Buddhist philosophers cannot forego such reference without also compromising their belief that their own account is intelligibly proposed as *true*.

Whether or not, then, arguments such as those developed by Lynne Baker and Vincent Descombes are finally convincing in showing the program of cognitive-scientific physicalism to be problematic, I hope to have suggested at least that they apply as well to the thought of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara as they do to the accounts of mental content developed under the contemporary program of cognitive science. I have not, then, here tried to argue that physicalism is false (though I find the arguments sympathetically developed here to be cogent); only that many of the important critiques that have been brought to bear upon physicalism can also be brought to bear against certain Buddhist arguments—and this despite the fact that these Buddhists are emphatically not physicalists.

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Studies in Dharmakīrti's Religious Philosophy: 4. The *Cintā-mayī Prajñā**

VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

1. From *cintā-mayī prajñā* to *hetu-vidyā*

— 1.1 —

In the sixth chapter of his AK(Bh), Vasubandhu presents us with the following statement about the sequence of the three traditional *prajñās* ('insights', 'wisdoms', 'discernments'):

'Whoever desires to see the Truths should first of all keep the Precepts. Then he reads the teaching upon which his Seeing of the Truths depends, or he hears their meaning. Having heard, he correctly reflects. Having reflected, he gives himself up to the cultivation of meditation. With the wisdom arisen from the teaching (*śruta-mayī*) for its support, there arises the wisdom arisen from reflection (*cintā-mayī*); with this for its support, there arises the wisdom arisen from meditation (*bhāvanā-mayī*).'¹

After criticising a Vaibhāṣika conception of the *prajñās*,² Vasubandhu gives his own explanation:

* I wish to express my most sincere gratitude to Helmut Krasser, Cristina Pecchia and Ernst Steinkellner, who looked at this paper and made useful comments on it, as well as to Cynthia Peck-Kubacek, who kindly corrected my English.

¹ AKBh 334.16–19 on AK 6.5ab: *satyāni h[i] draṣṭu-kāma ādita eva śīlaṃ pālayati. tataḥ satya-darśanasyānulomaṃ śrutam udgrhṇāty arthaṃ vā śṛṇoti. śrutvā cintayaty aviparītaṃ cintayitvā bhāvanāyāṃ prayujyate. samādhau tasya śruta-mayīm prajñāṃ nīśṛitya cintā-mayī jāyate. cintā-mayīm nīśṛitya bhāvanā-mayī jāyate.* English translation of POUSSIN (1980: VI,142–143) in PRUDEN (1991: III,911–912). On the three *prajñās*, see LAMOTTE (1976: 48) and SCHERRER-SCHAUB (1981: 195–197).

² AKBh 334.22–24 on AK 6.5cd: *nāmālanbanā kila śruta-mayī prajñā. nāmārthālanbanā cintā-mayī. kadācid vyañjanenārtham ākarṣati kadācid arthena vyañjanam. arthālanbanāiva*

‘[T]he wisdom arisen from the teaching is a certitude which arises from a means of correct knowledge termed “the word of a qualified person”; the wisdom arisen from reflection is a certitude born of rational examination; and the wisdom arisen from meditation is a certitude arisen from absorption.’³

According to Saṅghabhadra, Vasubandhu’s criticism falls in line with the so-called Sūtra-master, i.e. it matches the Sautrāntika doctrine.⁴ Although KRITZER (2005: 346–347) states that he is not aware of any parallel passages in the BoBh, I think there is enough evidence to hold Vasubandhu’s interpretation of the *cintā-mayī prajñā* as grounded in Yogācāra literature. First and foremost, the expression *yukti-nidhyāna* (‘rational examination’) itself occurs in an interesting MSABh account of the three aforementioned wisdoms.⁵ Second, most⁶ Yogācāra sources interpret *cintā-mayī prajñā*, or simply *cint(an)ā*, in terms of reasoning. The ŚrBh distinguishes between two forms of reflection (*cintanā*). Whereas the first has an enumerative aspect (*gaṇanākārā*), the second is accounted as having an evaluative aspect (*tulanākārā*), and is further described as an ‘examination of qualities and defects through reasoning’ (*yuktyā guṇa-dosḥōparīkṣaṇākārā*).⁷ The same holds true of the BoBh’s depiction of a Bodhisattva’s correct reflection (*samyak-cintanā*):

‘Engaged in reflection, the Bodhisattva analyses and penetrates [the *dharmas* as he has heard them before] by means of reasoning.’⁸

And a few lines later:

bhāvanā-mayī. sā hi vyañjana-nirapekṣā ’rthe pravartate.—‘According to the Vaibhāṣikas, wisdom arisen from the teaching has the name for its object; wisdom arisen from reflection has the name and the thing for its object: in fact, sometimes it grasps the thing by means of the name, and sometimes it grasps the name by means of the thing. Wisdom arisen from meditation has the thing for its object; it goes to the things as an abstraction made from its name.’ English translation of POUSSIN (1980: VI,143) in PRUDEN (1991: III,912).

³ AKBh 335.4–6 on AK 6.5cd: *āpta-vacana-prāmāṇya-jāta-niścayaḥ śruta-mayī. yukti-nidhyāna-jaś cintā-mayī. samādhi-jo bhāvanā-mayīti.* English translation of POUSSIN (1980: VI,143–144) in PRUDEN (1991: III,912–913).

⁴ Following POUSSIN (1980: VI,143, n. 4) and KRITZER (2005: 346).

⁵ See MSABh 82.1–4 on MSA 12.14–15. MSAVBh D *Mi* 240a7–b3 does not provide any explanation of *yukti-nidhyānāt*.

⁶ SNS 8.24 (105.7–31) being a notable exception.

⁷ See ŚrBh 117*.15 = 140.12–14 (ŚrBh_T D57a5–6 = Q67b3–4); °*ōparīkṣaṇā*° according to ŚrBh_T (*ñe bar brtag pa*) and ŚrBh 121*.2 = 143.19–20.

⁸ BoBh_D 76.11–12 = BoBh_W 108.8–9 (BoBh_T D58b4 = Q68a7–8, BoBh_{Vy} D128b7 = Q157a7–8, BoBh_{Vṛ} D175b7 = Q222b1): *bodhisattvaś cintā-prayukto yuktyā vicārayaty anupraviṣati.*

‘As he discerns, penetrates and analyses something through reasoning, [the Bodhisattva] does not rely on anyone else with regard to the *dharmas* he examines by means of reasoning.’⁹

Later Yogācāra sources such as the ASBh¹⁰ present us with equivalent interpretations of *cintā-mayī prajñā / cint(an)ā*.

— 1.2 —

Yogācāra texts provide us with a fourfold analysis of the reasoning (*yukti*) which bridges the gap between the servile learning of texts (*śruta-mayī prajñā*) and the sustained meditation on their rationally worked out contents (*bhāvanā-[mayī prajñā]*):

‘How is one to reflect on the teaching of the *skandhas* by means of the reflection consisting (°*ākāra*) of an examination through reasoning? One is to examine [it] by means of four [types of] reasoning.—Which four?—By means of *apekṣā-yukti*, *kārya-karaṇa-yukti*, *upapatti-sādhana-yukti*, and *dharmatā-yukti*.’¹¹

Three of these four *yuktis* share common features, namely the *apekṣā-yukti*, the *kārya-karaṇa-yukti*, and the *dharmatā-yukti*. In contrast to the *upapatti-sādhana-yukti*, all of them have the character of an investigation into causal processes, which they intend to reflect upon on a logical level.¹² Let me first summarise the ŚrBh’s

⁹ BoBh_D 76.18–19 = BoBh_W 108.18–20 (BoBh_T D58b7 = Q68b3, BoBh_{Vy} D129a5 = Q157b7, BoBh_{Vṛ} D176a3 = Q221b6): *yuktyā punaḥ kimcit praviṣṭinvaṇ praviṣayan vicārayan na para-pratyayo bhavati teṣu yukty-parikṣiteṣu dharmeṣu*. BoBh_{Vṛ} D176a3 = Q221b6 explains BoBh_T D58b7 = Q68b3 (*gṛān gyi driñ mi ’jog pa = na para-pratyayaḥ*) as: *gṛān la mi ltos pa zēs bya ba’i don to //*, to be compared with POUSSIN (1980: IX,246, n. 2).

¹⁰ See ASBh 150.10–12.

¹¹ ŚrBh 118*,10–13 = 141.7–10 (ŚrBh_T D57b2–3 = Q68a1–2): *katham yukty-upaparikṣākārayā cintayā skandha-deśanām cintayati. catasṛbhīr yuktibhir upaparikṣate. katamābhīś catasṛbhīḥ. yad utāpekṣā-yuktyā kārya-karaṇa* -yuktyōpapatti-sādhana-yuktyā dharmatā-yuktyā*.

* As SAKUMA (1990: II,8, n. 36) has rightly pointed out, one must read °*karaṇa*-° instead of °*kāraṇa*-°.

On the four *yuktis*, see respectively TfphSI (1991: 74b–76a), (1996: 77a–78b), (1996: 40b–42b), (1996: 124a–125b), and (2006: 93a–96b); see also MSABh 58.5–12 on MSA 19.43–46. On *yukti* in general, see SCHERRER-SCHAUB (1981), SAKUMA (1990: II,99–102, nn. 596–605), YOSHIMIZU (1996: 114–119, n. 85), DELEANU (2006: II,494–495, n. 74).

¹² Buddhist theoreticians have tried to supply these expressions with an ontological foundation: a given event *x* is the reason (*yukti*), device (*voga*) or means (*upāya*) for a given event *y* to occur (ŚrBh 119*,2–3 = 141.17–142.2 [ŚrBh_T D57b5–6 = Q67b6–7], ŚrBh 119*,11–12 = 142.9–11

account of these three *yuktis*. (1) In order to be produced (*utpatti*), a given *skandha* depends (*apekṣā*) on particular causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*); coining the verbal designation ‘*skandha*’ (*skandha-prajñapti*) depends on various linguistic factors such as names (*nāma-kāya*), phrases (*pada-kāya*) and syllables (*vyañjana-kāya*). The *apekṣā-yukti* investigates both of these dependences.¹³ (2) Arisen (*utpanna*) from the aforementioned causes and conditions, our *skandha* is bound (*vinīyoga*) by them to produce such and such an effect of its own (*tasmims tasmīn sva-kārya-karaṇe*). The *kārya-karaṇa-yukti* investigates this generation of effects.¹⁴ (3) That the said *skandha* is so and so (*tathā-bhūta*), say, impermanent (*anitya*), is due to its nature (*prakṛti*), to its own being (*svabhāva*), and to its fundamental nature (*dharmatā*). The *dharmatā-yukti* investigates this fundamental nature.¹⁵

Although the ŚrBh took the *skandha-deśanā* as its main example, i.e. a core Buddhist doctrine, it also brought some more ‘profane’ or ordinary examples into discussion. Sthiramati presents us with a more sharply delineated account of the *yuktis* in that he distinguishes between an ‘ordinary’ and, say, a ‘religious’ way of accounting for them.¹⁶ On an ordinary level, the *apekṣā-yukti* is concerned with the fact

[ŚrBh_T D58a1 = Q68a2–3], ŚrBh 120*,9–10 = 143.11–14 [ŚrBh_T D58a6–7 = Q69a2–3]). From an ontological point of view, then, these terms must be construed as *karma-dhāraya* compounds: the reason consisting in a [given event *x*’s] dependence [on the previous event *y*] (*apekṣā-yukti*), the reason consisting in [the fact that *x*] brings about an effect [*z*] (*kārya-karaṇa-yukti*), and the reason consisting in [the fact that it is due to their] fundamental nature [that events are what they are] (*dharmatā-yukti*). Since, as (psycho)logical events (*causae cognoscendi*), our *yuktis* question these ontological reasons or causes (*causae fiendi*), let me render them as follows: reasoning about dependence (*apekṣā-yukti*), reasoning about the production of an effect (*kārya-karaṇa-yukti*), and reasoning about the fundamental nature [of events/things] (*dharmatā-yukti*).

¹³ See ŚrBh 118*,15–119*,4 = 141.11–142.2 (ŚrBh_T D57b3–6 = Q67b2–7); see also SNS 10.7 (155.17–19), with *rjes su tha sñad gdags pa* instead of *prajñapti*.

¹⁴ See ŚrBh 119*,6–12 = 142.3–11 (ŚrBh_T D57b6–58a1 = Q67b7–68a3); see also SNS 10.7 (155.20–22).

¹⁵ See ŚrBh 120*,3–13 = 143.4–16 (ŚrBh_T D58a4–b1 = Q68b6–69a4), and WAYMAN (1961: 79–80); see also SNS 10.7 (158.28–30), with an interesting explanation of *dharmatā-yukti* through the famous formula: *utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā dharmāṇām sthitaye dharmatā-dhātu-sthititā*.

¹⁶ Respectively MSAVBh D Tsi 202a5 (*jig rten gyi tshul gyis*) and 202b2 (*chos kyi don dan sbyar ba*) on MSA 19.44cd. The scope of these three *yuktis* covers such transempirical (but by no means less ‘natural’) states of affairs as the structure and sequence of the Buddhist path to salvation. In his rather lengthy commentary on MSA 19.43–46, Sthiramati exemplifies it as follows: In the *adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi*, a Śrāvaka, a Pratyeka-buddha or a Bodhisattva thoroughly concentrates (*yoniso manas-kāraḥ*) on the *dharmas*’ being impermanent, unsatisfactory, empty and unsubstantial. Depending on that *yoniso manas-kāraḥ*, for the Śrāvaka or Pratyeka-buddha who has entered the stream (*srota-āpanna*), the right view (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*) that perceives *puḍgala-nairātmya* will arise at the time of the path of vision (*darśana-mārga*); depending on that same

that 'a visual cognition (*caḥsur-vijñāna*) arises in dependence on an eye (*caḥsus*) and a visible [object] (*rūpa*), and [that] a sprout (*aṅkura*) arises in dependence on a seed (*bīja*).'¹⁷ As for the *kārya-karaṇa-yukti*, it investigates the fact that 'entities bring about their own effects (*sva-kārya*) after they have arisen in dependence on causes and conditions.'¹⁸ Finally, the *dharmatā-yukti* devotes itself to the fact that 'in the world (*loka*), fire is hot (*uṣṇa*) by its own nature and water is liquid (*drava*) by its own nature.'¹⁹

Whereas the three *yuktis* discussed above are of an investigating character, the *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* has a mere probative or argumentative character, and aims at rationally establishing the essentials of Buddhist doctrine. The ŚrBh defines it as follows:

'By means of the three *pramāṇas*, viz. scriptures of a trustworthy [person], direct perception and inference, [a monk and/or a Bodhisattva] examines [the fact] that the *skandhas* are impermanent, [and/or] that they are produced in dependence [on causes and conditions], unsatisfactory, empty and unsubstantial. By means of those three *pramāṇas*, which are subordinate to [particular] arguments (*upapatti*) [and] convince wise [people], one carries out probative determinations, viz. of the *skandhas*' being impermanent, or produced in dependence [on

yoniso manas-kāraḥ, the supramundane (right) view (*lokōttarā* [*samyag-]**drṣṭiḥ*) that realises both *pudgala-* and *dharmā-nairātmya* will arise for a Bodhisattva at the time of *darśana-mārga*, in the first stage (*bhūmi*). In that case, the *apekṣā-yukti* examines this sequence by focusing upon the *drṣṭis*' dependence on *yoniso manas-kāraḥ* (see MSAVBh D *Tsi* 202b2–5 on MSA 19.47a; MSAVBh D *Tsi* 205a6–8 on MSABh 168.7–8). As for the *kārya-karaṇa-yukti*, it will examine the *drṣṭis*' being endowed with a fruit/effect (*phalānvita*), viz. the liberation (*vimokṣa/vimukti*) = *nirvāṇa* that is brought about by the *samyag-drṣṭi* born in the path of vision (see MSAVBh D *Tsi* 202b5–6 on MSA 19.47b). Finally, the *dharmatā-yukti* will investigate the very naturalness of the fact that, once the *samyag-drṣṭi* has arisen, one will reach those (presently) inconceivable (*acintya*) states of affairs that consist e.g. in the true reality (*dharmā-dhātu*) and the *nirvikalpa-kārya-jñāna* or non-conceptual insight (see MSAVBh D *Tsi* 203a3–5 on MSA 19.45c₂d₁; MSAVBh D *Tsi* 205a8–b3 on MSABh 168.10).

¹⁷ MSAVBh D *Tsi* 202a5 on MSA 19.44cd: *mig dañ gzugs la ltos nas mig gi rnam par śes pa skye ba dañ / sa bon la ltos nas myu gu skye ba [ni ltos pa 'i rigs pa źes bya 'o] //* .

¹⁸ MSAVBh D *Tsi* 202a5–6 on MSA 19.44cd: *de ltar dños po rnam rgyu dañ rkyen la ltos nas skyes pa 'i 'og tu rañ gi las byed pa [ni bya ba byed pa 'i rigs pa źes bya ste] /* .

¹⁹ MSAVBh D *Tsi* 202b1–2 on MSA 19.44cd: *'jig rten na me rañ bźin gyis tsha ba dañ / chu rañ bźin gyis gśer ba [ni chos űid kyī rigs pa źes bya 'o] //* . ŚrBh 120*,4–5 = 143.4–7 (ŚrBh_T D58a4–5 = Q68b6–7, WAYMAN (1961: 79)) contains numerous examples of the like.

causes and conditions], or unsatisfactory, or empty, or unsubstantial. This is termed a reasoning that proves by means of arguments^{20, 21}

Or, as the MSABh has it,²² ‘the *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* is an examination [that one carries out] by means of *pramāṇas* such as direct perception.’

— 1.3 —

According to Sthiramati, *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* is not only an (*upa*)*parīkṣā*, but also a kind of knowledge that ascertains (*dbab* = *nirṇaya*?) and causes one to attain (*yoṅs su sgrub pa* = *samprāpaṇa*?) the objects it deals with,²³ the latter property being reminiscent of Pakṣilasvāmin’s conception of a *pramāṇa*.²⁴ Sthiramati’s account presents us with other interesting features. First, *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* is concerned with two kinds of objects only, namely *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*; accordingly, this *yukti* makes use of only two *pramāṇas*, viz. *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, thus leaving no room for the third *pramāṇa* Buddhists traditionally agreed upon, viz. *āptāgama*.²⁵ Second, and more importantly, the vocabularies of *pramāṇas* and *yuktis* tend to intermingle, as is testified to by such ‘hybrid’ expressions as

²⁰ On the different translations of *upapatti-sādhana-yukti*, see STEINKELLNER (1988: II 18, n. 43). STEINKELLNER translates: ‘Argumentationsweise (*yukti*), die im Nachweis (*sādhana*) durch Argumente (*upapatti*) besteht.’

²¹ ŚrBh 119*,14–120*,1 = 142.12–143.3 (ŚrBh_T D58a1–4 = Q68b3–6): *upapatti-sādhana-yuktiḥ katamā. anityāḥ skandhā iti pratītya-samutpannā duḥkhāḥ śūnyā anātmāna iti tribhiḥ pramāṇair upaparīkṣate yad utāptāgamena pratyakṣeṇānumānena ca. ebhis tribhiḥ pramāṇair upapatti-yuktaiḥ satām hṛdaya-grāhakair vyavasthāpanā sādhanā kriyate yad uta skandhānityatāyā vā pratītya-samutpannatāyā vā duḥkhatāyā vā śūnyatāyā vā ’nātmatāyā vā. iyam ucyata upapatti-sādhana-yuktiḥ.*

²² MSABh 168.9–10 on MSA 19.43–46: *upapatti-sādhana-yuktiḥ pratyakṣādibhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣā*. See also SNS 10.7 (155.23–25): *so so’i śes pa dañ / bśad pa dañ / smras pa’i don sgrub pa dañ legs par khoñ du chud par bya ba’i rgyu gañ dag yin pa dañ / rkyaen gañ dag yin pa de ni ’thad pas sgrub pa’i rigs pa yin no //*, and SNS 10.7 (157.30–32): *de ltar ’thad pa’i sgrub pa’i rigs pa de ni mñon sum gyi tshad ma dañ / rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma dañ / yid ches pa’i luñ gi tshad pas mshan ñid lña po dag gis yoṅs su dag pa yin no //*. On the SNS’s understanding of *upapatti-sādhana-yukti*, see STEINKELLNER (1988: II,14–19).

²³ See MSAVBh D *Tsi* 202a7 on MSA 19.44cd, MSAVBh D *Tsi* 202b7 on MSA 19.47c₁. *dbab pa* = *nirṇaya* (but also *āveśa*) in TSD_{LCh} 1701b s.v. and TSD_{LCh-s} 1313a s.v.; *yoṅs su ’grub par bya ba* = *samprāpaṇa* in TSD_{LCh} 2174a s.v. On *samprāpaṇa*, see BHSD 579a s.v.

²⁴ See NBh 1.6–11.

²⁵ See MSAVBh D *Tsi* 202a7, MSAVBh D *Tsi* 202b6–7.

pratyakṣānumāna-yukti, *pratyakṣa-yukti* and *upapatti-sādhana-pramāṇa*,²⁶ which are used side by side with *pratyakṣānumāna-pramāṇa*, *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* and *upapatti-sādhana-yukti*.²⁷ Third, none of the examples Sthiramati adduces is concerned with the Buddhist path to salvation (this being in turn explicable by Sthiramati's ruling out of supersensuous objects): perception of a pot (*ghaṭa*) in a given place (*pradeśa*),²⁸ direct perceptual experience of pain (*duḥkha*) such as being bound (*bandhana*) or beaten (*tāḍana*) for having committed an evil act like murder (*prāṇātīpātādi-duṣkarman*) in a previous life;²⁹ inference of fire from smoke,³⁰ the visual faculty /organ (*cakṣur-indriya*) from the arising of a visual cognition (*cakṣur-vijñānōtpatti*),³¹ or impermanence (*anityatā*) from the property of being brought about by causes and conditions (*hetu-pratyaya-kṛtakatā*).³² The lexical confusion that prevails in Sthiramati's account of the *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* mirrors the fact that the latter's properties and range have been transferred from the *definiens* (the *pramāṇas*) to the *definiendum* (the *upapatti-sādhana-yukti*).

— 1.4 —

More interesting is the fact that Sthiramati's interpretation of *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* is indeed very close to his own understanding of *hetu-vidyā* ('logic', lit. 'science of reasons'), one of the five traditional 'sciences' or 'branches of knowledge' (*vidyā-sthāna*).³³ Like the *upapatti-sādhana-yukti*, the *hetu-vidyā* is mainly

²⁶ See MSAVBh D Tsi 202a6–7 (*mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa'i rigs pa*), MSAVBh D Tsi 202a7 (*mñon sum gyi rigs pa*), MSAVBh D Tsi 202b7 (*'thad pa sgrub pa'i tshad ma*).

²⁷ See MSAVBh D Tsi 202b6 (*mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma*), MSAVBh D Tsi 202b1 (*mñon sum gyi tshad ma*), MSAVBh D Tsi 202a6 (*'thad pa sgrub pa'i rigs pa*).

²⁸ See MSAVBh D Tsi 202a7–b1.

²⁹ See MSAVBh D Tsi 202b7–203a1.

³⁰ See MSAVBh D Tsi 202b1.

³¹ See MSAVBh D Tsi 203a1–2.

³² See MSAVBh D Tsi 203a2.

³³ The five branches of knowledge constituting a Bodhisattva's *sāstra-jñatā* (MSA 18.26a) are *adhyātma-vidyā* ('soteriology', 'scriptural science'), *hetu-vidyā* ('logic', 'epistemology', lit. 'science of reasons'), *śabda-vidyā* ('grammar', 'linguistics'), *cikitsā-vidyā* ('medicine') and *śilpa-karma-sthāna-vidyā* ('science of fine arts and crafts', see GRIFFITHS (1990: 99)). For a useful overview, see SEYFORTH RUEGG (1995: 101 ff.), and also GRIFFITHS (1990: 99–101). Note also that Sthiramati's commentary on MSA(Bh) provides valuable pieces of information in the three following passages: MSAVBh D Tsi 91b5–93b6 (on MSA 18.25–26 and MSABh 136.21 ff.), MSAVBh D Mi 202b3–203b6 (on MSA 11.60 and MSABh 70.14–18), MSAVBh D Tsi 201b6–206b1 (on MSA 19.43–46 and MSABh 167.28–168.16). *Adhyātma-vidyā* consists in the mastery over the Tathāgata's twelvefold word, and leads to the knowledge of the noble path (*ārya-mārga*)

concerned with investigation *and* demonstration by means of (mostly two) *pramāṇas*, as is testified to by the following definition:

‘We term “*hetu-vidyā*” as being the mastery (*mkhas pa = kauśal[y]a?*) over the treatises (*gźuñ = grantha?*) [bearing] upon [such] reasoning (*tarka*) [that are] supported by the *pramāṇas* direct perception and inference.’³⁴

There is at least one passage in the MSAVBh that testifies to the fact that in Sthiramati’s opinion *yuktis* and *hetu-vidyā* somehow correspond or even coincide:

‘In that [case], we [shall] term “*adhyātma-vidyā*” the Mahāyāna itself. Having included the *hetu-vidyā*, the *śabda-vidyā*, the *cikitsā-vidyā* and the *śilpa-karma-sthāna-vidyā* in the *Mahāyāna-sūtras*, the Blessed One taught [them] to the Bodhisattvas. For instance, in *Sūtras* like the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Samdhi-nirmocana*, he taught the *pramāṇas* direct perception and inference, which form/constitute (*lta bu = bhūta?*) the *hetu-vidyā*. In the *Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra*, he said: “*Yukti* should be known as fourfold, that is, *apekṣā-yukti*, *kārya-karaṇa-yukti*, *upapatti-sādhana-yukti*, and *dharmatā-yukti*”.’³⁵

as well as of the true reality (*tattvārtha*), which in turn bring about the destruction of passions (*kleśa*). *Śabda-vidyā* consists in the mastery of grammar (*byā ka ra ṇa*, MSAVBh D Tsi 92a4); skilfulness in Sanskrit (*saṃ skri ta’i skad*, MSAVBh D Mi 203a7–b2; see BoBh_D 74.13 = BoBh_W 105.17: *saṃskṛta-lapita*-^o) allows a Bodhisattva not to resort to *apabhraṃśa* (*tshig zur chags pa*) when teaching. As for *cikitsā-vidyā* and *śilpa-karma-sthāna-vidyā*, they consist in conversancy with such treatises as the *Caraka*-[*saṃhitā*] (*ca ra ka la sogs pa sman dpyad kyi gtsug lag*, MSAVBh D Tsi 92a4–5; see also Sthiramati’s statement to the effect that medicine was taught by the Tathāgata in the *Suvarṇa-prabhās[ōttam]a-sūtra*, MSAVBh D Tsi 203b7) and the *Bhārata-śāstra* (*bha ra ta’i gtsug lag*, MSAVBh D Tsi 92a5).

³⁴ MSAVBh D Mi 205b6 on MSA 11.60: *mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa tshad mas ni zin pa’i tar ka’i gźuñ la mkhas pa ni rgyu rig pa źes bya’o //*. See also MSAVBh D Tsi 92a4 on MSA 18.26bd: *tar ka’i phyogs la mkhas pa ni gtan tshigs źes pa źes bya’o //*. ‘We term “*hetu-vidyā*” the mastery over the field (*phyogs*) of reasoning.’

³⁵ MSAVBh D Tsi 203b3–6 on MSABh 168.2: *de la theg pa chen po ñid ni nañ rig pa źes bya’o // rgyu rig pa dañ / sgra rig pa dañ / gso ba rig pa dañ / bzo’i las kyi gnas rig pa dag kyañ chen po’i mdo sder bsdus nas / becom ldan ’das kyi byañ chub sems dpa’ rnam la bśad de / dper na rgyu rig pa lta bu yañ mñon sum dañ / rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma Lañ ka ra gśegs pa dañ dGoñs pa ñes par ’grel ba la sogs pa mdo sde’i nañ nas bśad de / dGoñs pa ñes par ’grel ba’i mdo las / rig pa ni rnam pa bźir źes par bya ste / ltos pa’i rigs pa dañ / bya ba byed pa’i rigs pa dañ / thad pa sgrub pa’i rigs pa dañ / chos ñid kyi rigs pa’o źes bya ba la sogs pa gsuñs pa’o //*. The passage quoted is SNS 10.7 (155.14–16).

In the BoBh as well as in the MSA(Bh),³⁶ a Bodhisattva cannot reach omniscience unless he gives himself up to the five *vidyā-sthānas*. Studied separately, however, each *vidyā-sthāna* has a purpose of its own. So whereas *cikitsā-vidyā* and *śilpa-karma-sthāna-vidyā* aim at benefiting (*anugrahaṇa*) others, *hetu-vidyā* and *śabda-vidyā* mainly aim at defeating (*nigraha*) others, i.e. non-Buddhist heretics (*tīrthika*, *tīrthya*). Let us consider first Sthiramati's (rather simple) commentary on MSA 11.60:

'The Bodhisattva devotes himself to *hetu-vidyā* and *śabda-vidyā*.—Why [so]?—He devotes himself [to these two sciences] in order to defeat the heretics who boast of knowing (*śes par rlom pa*) the *hetu-vidyā-śāstra* and *śabda-vidyā-śāstra*.³⁷

In another passage, Sthiramati makes a somewhat more explicit statement about the identity of the heretics and the polemic aim of *hetu-vidyā*:

'By means of the [*hetu-vidyā*, the Bodhisattva] recognises that the heretics make errors that infringe the *pramāṇas* [when they] invoke the *pramāṇas* direct perception and inference as [well-]established reasons to [prove] such [doctrines] as *ātman* or permanence (*rtaḥ par yod pa*) [; he identifies these errors] and, defeating, by means of *pramāṇas* like direct perception and inference, opponents (*para-vādin*) such as the heretics who discard the *Buddha-dharma*, he refutes the heretics' substantialist treatises.³⁸

From the time of the BoBh on, however, the purpose of *hetu-vidyā* had by no means been restricted to merely defeating non-Buddhist challengers. As the following passage testifies, it was correlatively connected with missionary aims:

³⁶ See BoBh_D 74.19–21 = BoBh_W 105.25–106.2 (BoBh_T D57a7–b1 = Q67a1–2). On the MSA(Bh)'s doctrine of omniscience in relation to the *vidyā-sthānas*, see GRIFFITHS (1990: 99–101); see also KRASSER (2005: 135–137).

³⁷ MSAVBh D Mi 203a3 on MSA 11.60: *rgyu rig pa dañ / sgra rig pa la byañ chub sems dpa' brtson par byed do // ci'i phyir ze na / mu stegs rgyu rig pa'i gtsug lag śes par rlom pa dañ / sgra rig pa'i gtsug lag śes par rlom pa de dag tshar gcad par bya ba'i phyir brtson par byed do //* . See also MSAVBh D Mi 203a6–7 on MSABh 70.16–17.

³⁸ MSAVBh D Tsi 92b2–3 on MSABh 136.23–24: *des ni mu stegs pa la sogs pa bdag dañ rtag par yod pa la sogs par grub pa'i gtan tshigs su mñon sum dañ / rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma dag smra ba la / tshad mar mi ruñ ba'i ñes pa yod par rtog pa dañ / mu stegs la sogs pa'i phas kyi rgol ba rnam sañs rgyas kyi chos la sun 'byin pa dag mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tshad mas tshar gcod ciñ mu stegs pa'i bdag tu smra ba'i gzuñ sun 'byin par byed de /*

‘[The Bodhisattva gives himself up to *hetu-vidyā*] in order that those who have no faith [develop] faith in the [Buddhist] Teaching, and that those who [already] have faith strengthen [it].’³⁹

According to Sāgaramegha’s commentary, *hetu-vidyā* helps those who have already developed faith in Buddhism (whom he also terms *zugs pa rnams*) to strengthen (**sthāpana*?) their own Buddhist position (*sva-pakṣa*).⁴⁰ In his MSAVBh, Sthiramati borrows from the BoBh with only one slight change:

‘[The Bodhisattva] gives himself up [to *hetu-vidyā*] in order that those who have no faith develop faith in the [Buddhist] Teaching, and that those who have [already] developed faith [in it] intensify [their] faith.’⁴¹

So according to Sthiramati, the *yukti/hetu-vidyā* enterprise was expected to shape arguments in order (1) to found and support key Buddhist doctrines, (2) to defeat the non-Buddhist intellectuals’ hostility towards Buddhism; (3) to convert them to the Buddhist *sad-dharma* or *śāsana*, (4) to strengthen the coreligionists’ adherence to Buddhism.

— 1.5 —

Sthiramati’s text testifies to the circumstance that, by the middle of the sixth century, two structures that had long been kept separate and were meant to meet very different theoretical and religious needs had merged with one another. On the one hand, the *yuktis* which the *cintā-mayī prajñā* mainly consisted of had been shaped as a hermeneutic tool aiming at demonstrating and investigating key Buddhist doctrines by means of reasoning. However, their purpose was strictly ‘internal’, and met the need of subjecting scriptural contents to critical analysis before these were passed on to cultivation/meditation.⁴² On the other hand, *hetu-vidyā* as an episte-

³⁹ BoBh_D 74.11–13 = BoBh_W 105.13–16 (BoBh_T D57a3–4 = Q66b3–5): *hetu-vidyām bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate ... aprasannānām asmimś chāsane prasādāya prasannānām ca bhūyo-bhāvāya*. See also MVy 255.5–6: 5. *anabhiprasannānām abhiprasādāya*. 6. *abhiprasannānām bhūyo-bhāvāya*.

⁴⁰ See BoBhVy D126a2–3 = Q153b5–6.

⁴¹ MSAVBh D Mi 203a7 on MSABh 70.16–17: *bstan pa 'di la ma dad pa rnams dad pa bskyed pa dan / dad pa bskyed pa rnams dad pa 'i phyir zin 'phel bar bya ba 'i phyir brtson par byed do //*. It is not easy to determine whether the second *dad pa bskyed pa* represents something like **utpanna-prasāda* (as a *bahu-vrīhi* compound), or if it just reflects the Tibetan translators’ understanding of *prasanna*. At any rate, Sthiramati’s Sanskrit is likely to have read **prasāda-bhūyo-bhāvāya*.

⁴² It is no wonder that of the many objects the *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* is reputed to deal with, impermanence (*anityatā*) is quoted by far the most often (see ŚrBh 119*,14 = 142.12–13 and 119*,18 = 143.1 [ŚrBh_T D58a1–2 and 3 = Q68a3 and 5]; SNS 10.7 [156.6]; MSAVBh D Tsi

mological and methodological device had long been connected with the primarily 'external' ambition to defend the Buddhist Dharma,⁴³ and to defeat (*nigraha*) and convert non-Buddhist opponents by means of *pramāṇa*-related reasoning (*tarka*). In the sixth century, theoretical as well as religious needs changed⁴⁴ to such an extent that what had long been kept separate, because of reflecting different concerns, was brought to coincide or coalesce. Dogmatics and dialectics, both of which had been using *pramāṇas*, came to merge and develop into a new apologetic and 'heresiological' enterprise. The gradual involvement of Buddhist dogmatics into the *hetu-vidyā* was made possible by Dignāga's achievements in the field of logic and by his reshaping of the traditional *hetu-vidyā* into a powerful epistemological enterprise. Dignāga's strong defence of Buddhist epistemological doctrine in the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* both served as an example and paved the way for his successors' endeavours in order to include key Buddhist doctrines like momentariness or Buddhology in the jurisdiction of *hetu-vidyā*. Buddhist *hetu-vidyā* specialists were now also in charge of the former concern and scope of *cint(an)ā*, in its *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* form especially, which they developed into a large-scale intellectual project committed to protection from outside hostility as well as the redefinition of Buddhist identity. Dharmakīrti stands out as the most prominent representative of this restructured Buddhist intellectual activity. But true to the traditional delineation between *hetu-vidyā* and *adhyātma-vidyā*, Buddhist epistemologists denied any soteriological relevance to epistemology as such, which, they contend, has no other *raison d'être* than to discard the heretics' misleading epistemological doctrines. We can easily understand why this task was deemed an important one: if the soteriologically valued *cint(an)ā* exhausts itself in rational enquiry by means of *pramāṇas*, wrong epistemological doctrines can only be detrimental to the Buddhist path. Epistemology has no soteriological relevance whatsoever, but makes the intellectual turning-point between *śruta-mayī prajñā* and *bhāvanāmāyī prajñā* possible.

203a2 on MSA 19.47c₁); next in importance come those properties Buddhist intellectuals regarded as closely connected with impermanence, namely, unsatisfactoriness (*duḥkhatā*), selflessness (*anātmatā*), dependent origination (< *pratītya-samutpannatā*), emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) (see ŚrBh 119*,14–15 = 142.13–14 and 119*,18–120*,1 = 143.1–2 [ŚrBh D58a2 and 3 = Q68a3 and 5]; SNS 10.7 [156.6–8]); mention can further be made of such *apratyakṣa* topics as the existence of the other world (*para-loka-sattā*), or the non-destruction of good and evil actions (*śubhāśubha-karmāvīpraṇāśa*) (see SNS 10.7 [156.10–12] and [156.16]; see also STEINKELLNER (1988: II,14–19)).

⁴³ See MSA 18.25–26 and MSABh 137.3 (*sad-dharma-[dh]āraṇāyā*), where a Bodhisattva's *śāstra-jñatā*, i.e. his conversancy with different sciences/scientific treatises, aims at preserving (*dhāraṇa*) the Buddhist *sad-dharma*. Sthiramati's commentary is located at MSAVBh D Tsi 93b5–6.

⁴⁴ See ELTSCHINGER (2007: 25–64).

2. The Buddhist Epistemologists' account of *cintā-mayī prajñā*

— 2.1 —

Dharmakīrti concludes the first chapter of his PVin with the following remark:

‘And it is this nature of the conventional means of valid cognition that has been explained. [Not only with regard to the ultimate means of valid cognition, but] also with regard to this [conventional cognition], others who are confused lead the world astray. Those, however, who cultivate the very wisdom born of reflection realise the ultimate *pramāṇa*, which is devoid of error, immaculate [and] without return.’⁴⁵

In this passage, conventional means of valid cognition (*sāṃvyaḥārikā-pramāṇa*, i.e. ordinary perception and inference) and ultimate means of valid cognition (*pāramārthika-pramāṇa*) are contrasted sharply. It is also suggested that Dharmakīrti only elaborates on epistemology because dull-witted opponents develop and propagate misconceptions regarding conventional *pramāṇas*. Since conventional *pramāṇas* are instrumental in the path to liberation insofar as the whole process of *cintā-mayī prajñā* resorts to them, Dharmakīrti considers it his duty to refute these misconceptions so that people are not laid astray. In other words, epistemology or *hetu-vidyā* as a theoretical concern has no direct bearing on the path to salvation, but misconceived *pramāṇas* ensure one's failure to achieve liberation, and hence epistemology is a necessary science.

A symmetrical contrast may be observed in the following statement by Kamalaśīla:

‘Because he is endowed with such a perfection of qualities, the Blessed One causes the world to obtain elevation and *summum bonum*, and hence is the Teacher. ... Now it is by teaching dependent origination that the Blessed One causes [people] to attain such [human goals] as elevation. Indeed, [both elevation and *summum bonum* originate] from the correct teaching of dependent origination. [First,] firm conviction (*sampratyaya*) concerning the correct relation between action and result etc., which is the cause of good destinies, arises from the determination of its meaning; and [second,] the [proper] understanding

⁴⁵ PVin 1.44.1–4: *sāṃvyaḥārikasya cātat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam, atrāpi pare mūḍhā viśaṃvādayanti lokam iti. cintā-mayīm eva tu prajñām anuśīlayanto vibhrama-viveka-nirmalam anapāyi pāramārthika-pramāṇam abhimukhī-kurvanti*. Translation in KRASSER (2005: 143). On this passage and Dharmottara's important comments on it, see KRASSER (2005: 142–144), and ELTSCHINGER (2005b: 154–162).

of *pudgala-* and *dharmā-nairātmya*, which is the cause of *summum bonum*, arises through the sequence of hearing, reflection and cultivation, for once it has arisen, ignorance, which is the cause of *samsāra*, ceases, and once it has ceased, all the obstacles [consisting] of passions and [the obstacles that are screens] to the knowable, which are rooted in this [ignorance], cease. One will therefore attain liberation due to the cessation of all obstacles. ... But opponents hold this dependent origination to be an unsuitable cause (*viṣama-hetu*, Tib. *mi mthun pa'i rgyu*) and to bear upon (*°-adhikaraṇa*, Tib. *brten pa*) entities that are contradicted by *pramāṇas*. Therefore, both in order to show, by refuting them, that [dependent origination] has been correctly explained by the Blessed One, and in order to hint at the identity of the topics that must be dealt with by the whole treatise that is to be composed, [Śāntarakṣita] enumerates the many attributes of dependent origination as it was explained [by the Blessed One].⁴⁶

The epistemological endeavour here serves both a polemical and apologetic purpose in refuting challengers to Buddhist soteriology and reaffirming the pristine truth of Buddhism. But for meeting (mainly outward) objections, Śāntarakṣita could have spared himself the trouble of composing a treatise as impressive as the TSa. Learning, reflecting and meditating upon dependent origination in order to realise the two types of unsubstantiality is indeed enough (if I may say so) to ensure liberation.

First, both Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla hold theoretical epistemology (i.e. the composition of treatises such as the PVin or TSa) to meet polemical needs, in the case of Dharmakīrti, those pertaining to misconceptions with regard to conventional *pramāṇas* and, in the case of Kamalaśīla, objections raised against *pratītya-samutpāda*. Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla agree in denying that epistemology itself has any soteriological value whatsoever provided one is not under the sway of mis-

⁴⁶ TSaP_K 10.12–23 = TSaP_{Sh} 13.1–12 (TSaP_T D Ze 141a4–b3 = P 'e 170a4–b5): [t]athābhūta-
guṇa-sampad-yogād abhyu^{*}daya-niḥśreyasa-prāpaṇato jagataḥ śāstā bhavati bhagavān ...
pratītya-samutpāda-deśanayā cābhuyāyādi-samprāpako bhagavān. tathā hy aviparīta-pratītya-
samutpāda-deśanātas^{**} tad-arthāvadhāraṇāt sugati-hetur aviparīta-karma-phala-sambandhādi-
sampratītyayōpajāyate. pudgala-dharma-nairātmyāvabodhas ca niḥśreyasa-hetuḥ śruta-cintā-
bhāvanā-kramenōtpadyate. tad-utpattau hy avidyā samsāra-hetur nivartate. tan-nivṛttau ca tan-
mūlaṁ sakalaṁ kleśa-jñeyāvaraṇaṁ nivartata iti sakalāvaraṇa-vigamād apavarga-samprāptir
bhavati ... sa cāyaṁ pratītya-samutpādaḥ parair viṣama-hetuḥ pramāṇa-vyāhata-padārthādhi-
karaṇas cēṣyate. atas tan-nirāsena yathā-vad eva bhagavatā ukta iti darśanārthaṁ vakṣyamāṇa-
sakala-śāstra-pratīpādyārtha-tattvōpakṣepārthaṁ ca bahūnāṁ yathōkta-pratītya-samutpāda-
viśeṣaṇānāṁ upādānam...

^{*} TSaP_K, TSaP_T: °yogād abhyu°, TSaP_{Sh}: °yogādy-abhyu°. ^{**} TSaP_{Sh}, TSaP_T: °deśanā°, TSaP_K
om. °deśanā°.

conceptions. Second, both of them consider the traditional sequence of *prajñās* as a self-sufficient means of securing enlightenment.

Let us now have a closer look at the various dimensions of *cintā-mayī prajñā* in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. Five topics are worth considering in this respect: the *cintā-mayī prajñā* as a definitional prerequisite for the cognition of *yogins* (§ 2.2), the removal of nescience as the aim of a *yogin*'s endeavour (§ 2.3), the initial philosophical reflections of the Buddha-to-be (§ 2.4), the appraisal of scriptural authority (§ 2.5) and the issue of practical rationality (§ 2.6).

— 2.2 —

As is well known, a given cognition must meet two conditions in order to be termed a ‘(direct) perception’ (*pratyakṣa*) and thus a means of valid cognition: first, it must be free of any intellectual/linguistic content whatsoever (*kalpanāpoḍha*); second, it must be non-erroneous (*abhrānta*).⁴⁷ This holds true of the so-called ‘perception of mystics’ (*yogi-pratyakṣa*).⁴⁸ According to ordinary understanding (*loka*, *loka-prasiddhi*), a *yogin* is one who devotes himself to psychic concentration (*samādhi*) or mental one-pointedness (*cittākāgratā*);⁴⁹ according to (Buddhist) treatises (*śāstra*, *śāstra-sthiti*), a *yogin* is one who is endowed with tranquillity (*śamatha*, i.e. *samādhi*) and discernment (*vipaśyanā*, i.e. *prajñā*), the latter being also described as the ‘discrimination’ of the (true) reality (**tattva-pravicaya*?).⁵⁰ Since mystics’ cognition has a nearly endless mental cultivation (*bhāvanā*) for its cause (*°-maya*),⁵¹ it is non-conceptual (*vidhūta-kalpanā-jāla*, *akalpa*, *avikalpaka*) and

⁴⁷ See PVin 1, p. 7.2, NB 1.5.

⁴⁸ See PV 3.281–286, PVin 1, p. 27.7sq, NB 1.11. On the cognition of mystics (*yogi-pratyakṣa*), see ELTSCHINGER (forthcoming 2).

⁴⁹ According to PVinṭ D117b2 /Q135b1 (*’jig rten na ni mñam par g’zag pa la rnal ’byor ba yin*), NBTṣ 12.8–9 = NBTṢ 70.2 (*yogaḥ samādhiḥ. sa yasyāsti sa yogī*) and DhPr 70.19–20 thereon (*yogi-sabdasya vyutpattim āha—yoga iti. samādhiś cittākāgratā. iha dharmottareṇa loka-prasiddhir āsritā*).

⁵⁰ According to PVinṭ D117b2–3 = Q135b1–2 (*bstan bcos las ni tiñ ne ’dzin dañ šes rab kyi bdag ñid ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ la yin te / rnal ’byor ba de dag la yod pa de dag ni rnal ’byor bas te / rtag tu mñam par g’zag pa dañ / de kho na rnam par ’byed pa la [D: P las] brton pa ’o //*) and DhPr 70.20–22 (*vinīścaya-ñikāyām tu śāstra-sthitis tenāvirodhaḥ. yad vā samādhi-grahaṇa-syōpalakṣanatvāt prajñā ca viveka-karaṇa-śaktir draṣṭavyā. s[ā?] yasyāsti sa nitya-samāhito viveka-karaṇa-tatparaś ca yogī*).

⁵¹ Commented upon as *°-hetu-ñiṣpattika* (PVA 326.23–24), *°-hetuka* (PVV 203.1–2), *°rdzogs pa las skyes pa* (PVP D210b4 /Q246b7–8). For a grammatical explanation of *°-maya*, see AKBh 335.6 (*hetau mayat-vidhānāt*) and POUSSIN (1980: VI,144, based on AKVy 525.8–16).

therefore presents a vivid or distinct image of its object.⁵² The first necessary condition is thus met. But contrary to other types of meditative experiences (*aśubhā*, *pr̥thivī-kṛtsnāyatana* etc.) or to dream-images, which present a vivid picture of an unreal (*abhūta*) object, the mystics' cognition Dharmakīrti describes is reliable/non-belying (*saṃvādin*, *avisāṃvādin*),⁵³ i.e. bears upon a real (*bhūta*) object.⁵⁴

Cintā-mayī prajñā is the factor Dharmakīrti holds to be responsible for a cognition's meeting the second defining condition and thus being a *pramāṇa*. In PVin 1, p. 27.9–11, Dharmakīrti presents us with the following sequence of cultivation (*bhāvanā-krama*⁵⁵):

‘The *yogins* cultivate objects after they have [first] grasped [them] through a cognition born of listening [to treatises that are favourable to cultivation], and [then] ascertained [them] through a [cognition] born of reflecting [upon them] by means of reasoning (*yukti*) [, i.e. by means of *pramāṇas*; of these *yogins*,] the [cognition] which, at the completion of this [cultivation], appears as vividly as in cases such as fear [or sorrow, and hence is] non-conceptual [but also] has a true object [because it bears upon an object that has been formerly ascertained by *pramāṇas*], this is also the *pramāṇa* [that consists in direct] perception.’⁵⁶

Here, *yukti-cintā-maya* (‘born from reflection by means of⁵⁷ reasoning’) already points to Dharmakīrti's indebtedness to the Yogācāra/Sautrāntika interpretation of *cintā-mayī prajñā* / *cint(an)ā*. Dharmottara's explanations, which clearly borrow from the AKBh, confirm this impression: whereas *śruta-maya* is commented upon as ‘having for its cause the hearing of treatises that are suitable for /conducive to mental cultivation’,⁵⁸ *yukti-cintā-maya* is explained as ‘reflection (*cintā*), i.e. exami-

⁵² See PV 3.281 (*spaṣṭam evāvabhāṣate*), PVin 1.28 (*spaṣṭam bhāṣate*), PVin 1, p. 27.10 (*spaṣṭāvabhāṣin*).

⁵³ See PV 3.286, PVin 1.28.

⁵⁴ *Bhūta* in PV 3.285 = PVin 1.31; *bhūtārtha* in NB 1.11.

⁵⁵ *Bhāvanā-krama* in PVinṬ D117b1–2 and 3 = Q135b1 and 3, DhPr 68.5.

⁵⁶ PVin 1, p. 27.7–8: *yoginām api śruta-mayena jñānenārthān gr̥hītvā yukti-cintā-mayena vyavasthāpya bhāvayatām tan-niṣpattau yat spaṣṭāvabhāsi bhayādāv iva tad avikalpakam avitatha- viṣayaṃ pramāṇaṃ pratyaḥsam*.

⁵⁷ Contrary to PVin 1_v, p. 72.30–31 (*rigs pa sems pa*), PVinṬ_{jin} D195a5 = Q238a1 and PVinṬ's *pratīka* (D117b4 = Q135b4) read: *rigs pas sems / bsams pa*.

⁵⁸ According to PVinṬ D117b3–4 / Q135b3–4: *thos pa las byuñ bas bsgoms pa dañ rjes su mthun pa'i bstan bcos mñan pa'i rgyu can gyis bzuñ ba'i ñes pa'i don...* Cf. AKBh 334.16–17 (*satya-darśanasyānulomaṃ śrutam udgr̥hñāti*). Dharmakīrti's *gr̥hītvā* is also reminiscent of Vasubandhu's formulation.

nation (*nidhyāna*) by means of reasoning (*yukti*), i.e. by means of *pramāṇas*.⁵⁹ According to Dharmakīrti, the objects of the *yogin*'s perception are *bhūta* or *bhūtārtha*, 'real', which Dharmottara comments upon as 'grasped by means of a *pramāṇa*.'⁶⁰ Similarly, the reason why this perception is reliable/ non-belying is, according to Jñānaśrībhadrā, that 'it cognises an object that has been [previously] determined ([*b*]ḥag) by means of reasoning.'⁶¹ It is thus clear that the reliability of the *yogin*'s perception rests on the fact that its objects have been submitted to a rational analysis carried out by means of *pramāṇas*. As an example of such objects, Dharmakīrti refers his reader back twice to (the vision of) the Noble Truths (*ārya-satya*) as he has ascertained (*nirṇīta*, *gtan la pheb pa*) them in his PV.⁶² Dharmottara adduces the same example,⁶³ whereas all of Dharmakīrti's commentators interpret the latter's use of *prāk* ('previously') as a reference to the *satya-vicāra*-section of PV 2.⁶⁴ Other examples are Prajñākaragupta's *para-loka* and Devendrabuddhi's impermanence (*anityādi*).⁶⁵

⁵⁹ According to PVinṬ D117b4 = Q135b4: *rigs pas te tshad mas sems śiñ nes par rtog pa ni rigs pa sems pa'o //*. Cf. AKBh 335.5 (*yukti-nidhyāna-jaś ca cintā-mayī*), n. 4 above. On the equivalence *nes par rtog pa* = *nidhyāna*, see HIRAKAWA (1973: 209) s.v. *nidhyāna*. AKVy 525.9 glosses *nidhyāna* with *nīraṇa*, which also can be found as *nes par rtog pa* in Tibetan translations (see TSD_{LCh} s.v. *nes par rtog pa*).

⁶⁰ According to NBT_§ 11.18 = NBT_M 67.3: *bhūtaḥ sad-bhūto 'rthaḥ. pramāṇena dṛṣṭaś ca sad-bhūtaḥ*.

⁶¹ According to PVinṬ_{Jñ} D195a5–6 /Q231b1: *rigs pas [b]ḥag pa'i don rtogs pa'i phyir bslu ba med pa...*

⁶² PVin 1, p. 27.11–12: *ārya-satya-darśanavad yathā nirṇītam asmābhiḥ pramāṇa-vārttike*; PV 3.286b₂: *prān-nirṇīta-vastuvat*.

⁶³ See NBT_§ 11.18 = NBT_M 67.4 (*yathā catvāry ārya-satyāni*) and DhPr 70.15–16 thereon; PVinṬ D118a4–6 = Q136a5–8.

⁶⁴ See PVP D210b4 = Q246b7 and D211b5 = Q248a5; PVA 327.32–33; PVV 204.12. In addition, mention should be made of the fact that all commentators interpret PV 3.281a (*prāg uktaṁ yoginām jñānam*) as: '[As to] the cognition of *yogins*, [it has already been] presented above [as bearing upon the four Noble Truths]' (PVP D210b4 = Q246b7: *'phags pa'i bden pa bzi'i yul can du bśad pa*; PVA 326.23: *catur-ārya-satya-viśayam ... uktam*; PVV 203.1: *satya-viśayam uktam*).

⁶⁵ See PVA 327.32–33; PVP D211b2 = Q247b8–248a1. In his first BhK, Kamalaśīla also addresses the issue of the *cintā-mayī prajñā*. By means of the *cintā-mayī prajñā*, a *yogin* is supposedly able to penetrate (*nirvedhayati*) the explicit as well as intentional meanings (*nīta-neyārtha*), and to ascertain (*niś/ci*) the real object (or: meaning) in order to dispel any possible doubts (*vicikitsā*) before proceeding to mental cultivation (see BhK 1 p. 508/198.11–16). Kamalaśīla says (BhK 1 p. 508–509/198.21–199.2): *cintā-mayyā prajñayā yukty-āgamābhyāṁ pratyavekṣya bhūtam eva vastu-rūpaṁ bhāvaniyam. vastūnām svarūpaṁ ca paramārthato 'nutpāda evāgamato yuktitāś ca niścitam*.—'The real nature of entities alone should be cultivated [by the *yogin*], after he has pondered [on it] by means of the *cintā-mayī prajñā*, i.e. through reasoning and scriptures. Now through reasoning and scriptures, the proper nature of entities has been ascertained (*niścita*) as consisting ultimately of mere non-origination.' A few pages later, Kamalaśīla concludes, BhK 1, p. 514/204.11–13: *tad evaṁ*

In order to grasp at the metaphysical as well as soteriological relevance of a *yogin*'s making use of *pramāṇas* at the *cintā-mayī prajñā*-level, some explanations may not be out of place.

— 2.3 —

According to Dharmakīrti and Vasubandhu,⁶⁶ *avidyā* ('nescience', 'ignorance') is neither something other than *vidyā* ('knowledge'), nor is it the mere absence of *vidyā*.⁶⁷ *Avidyā* can therefore only be some kind of 'anti-*vidyā*', i.e. a cognition that counteracts or opposes (*pratipakṣa*, *vipakṣa*) *vidyā*.⁶⁸ Moreover, *avidyā* must be 'cognitional' since it is a mental factor (*caitta*-[*dharmā*]).⁶⁹ Dharmakīrti sums up this rather technical discussion in the following way:

'Since [ignorance] is the opposite of *vidyā* [and] is a perception (*upalabdhi*) because it is a mental factor, ignorance consists in erroneous perception (*mithyōpalabdhi*).'⁷⁰

Here (1) *vidyā* is defined as the perception (*darśana*) or grasping (*grahaṇa*) of a real object (*bhūtārtha*);⁷¹ we may then expect *avidyā* to grasp an unreal object

cintā-mayyā prajñayā niścītya bhūtam artham tasya pratyakṣī-karaṇāya bhāvanā-mayīm prajñām utpādayet.—'Therefore [the *yogin*], having ascertained (*niścītya*), in the [above-mentioned] way (*evam*), the real object by means of the *cintā-mayī prajñā*, should generate the *bhāvanā-mayī prajñā* in order to realise [this object] directly.' Keywords are here the gerund and past passive participle of *niści*, 'to ascertain', a term we have already met in Durvekamiśra's interpretation of *pramāṇena dṛṣṭam* as *pramāṇena niścītam*. According to Kamalaśīla, the function of *cintā-mayī prajñā* is to ascertain a real object (and meaning), the real or true nature ([*sva*] *rūpa*) of entities (*vastu*).

⁶⁶ See AKBh 140.26–141.5, POUSSIN (1980: III,88–89), translated in PRUDEN (1991: II,419–420).

⁶⁷ If *avidyā* were something other than *vidyā*, then it would ensue that *rūpa* ('corporeity') would also be *avidyā*; since *nirvāṇa* puts an end to, or coincides with the elimination of (defiled) ignorance, mere *asamprakhyaṇa* ('lack of clarity') cannot define *avidyā*, because it may still characterise an Arhat. See PVP D91a7–b1 = Q105b3–5, PVA 145.16–21, PVV 85.5–7.

⁶⁸ See PVP D91b1–2 = Q105b5–6.

⁶⁹ Abhidharma defines mental factors as associated (*samprayukta*) with *citta* ('mind'), i.e. sharing the latter's support (*āśraya*), object (*ālambana*), aspect (*ākāra*), time (*kāla*) and (number of) *dravyas*. Since *asamprakhyaṇa* is mere absence (*abhāva*), it can have no support, object, aspect etc., and therefore can be neither a mental factor nor a cognition. See AK 2.34b₂d and AKBh, p. 62.5–10, POUSSIN (1980: II,177–178) translated in PRUDEN (1991: 205–206), PVP D91b7–92a2 = Q106a5–7, PVA 146.3–4, PVV 85.8–10.

⁷⁰ PV 2.213ac: *vidyāyāḥ pratipakṣatvāc caittatvenōpalabdhitāḥ / mithyōpalabdhir ajñānam*.

⁷¹ PVP D91a7 = Q105b3: *yañ dag pa'i don mthoñ ba ni rig pa yin la /*; PVṬ *Je* D113b7 = Q134b2 = PVSṬ 209.20–21: *bhūtārtha-grahaṇam vidyā /*.

(*abhūtārtha*) or, as Devendrabuddhi has it, to ‘grasp aspects that are contrary (*viparīta*) to the aspects grasped by *vidyā*.’⁷² (2) Unlike Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti defines *avidyā* as the false view of Self (*sat-kāya-darśana*, *ātma-dṛṣṭi*) or the belief in/adherence to a Self (*ātma-graha*, °-*abhiniveśa*).⁷³ Erroneous perception/ignorance then turns out to consist in the superimposition of ego-related aspects on a reality that is devoid of them. As Manorathanandin puts it, ‘*avidyā* is opposite to *vidyā*, the perception of unsubstantiality (*nairātmya-darśana*).’ To sum up: whereas *vidyā* grasps the *bhūtārtha*, i.e. real aspects like impermanence, unsubstantiality etc., *avidyā* as erroneous perception grasps superimposed aspects like Self (*ātman*).

Vidyā is nothing but the ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ operation of the mind. In this respect, the mind naturally has *tattva-darśana* (‘perception of the [true] reality’) or *vipaśyanā* (‘discernment’) as its own nature. This is the way Dharmakīrti interprets the canonical *topos* of the mind’s natural luminosity (*prakṛtyā prabhāsvaram*) in PV 2.208ab.⁷⁴ However, it is the very nature of human beings’ *saṃsāric* existence to be under the sway of *avidyā*, i.e. to superimpose erroneous aspects on the unsubstantial, unsatisfactory and impermanent reality. In other words, the erroneous cognition that defines *avidyā* represents a distortion of the mind’s ‘natural’ operation or *vipaśyanā*-nature. But there is a way out, as Dharmakīrti himself puts it:

‘Owing to another cause[, i.e. to a cause of error], the [mind] moves away from this [own nature, and with regard to its object engages in the superimposition of unreal aspects such as permanence; but as] unsettled [in this distortion] as the cognition of a serpent [instead of a rope, the mind stands] in need of a condition in order to get rid [of such deviations].’⁷⁵

The condition the mind depends upon in order to rid itself of that distortion consists in the *pramāṇas*, as is made clear by Devendrabuddhi.⁷⁶ Commenting on PV 2.209, the same author holds direct perception and inference to be causes that annul

⁷² According to PVP D91b1–2 = Q105b5–6: *de ltar na rnam pa gañ rig pas gzuñ ba de las phyin ci log pa'i rnam pa 'dzin pa can ni ma rig pa zes bya bar 'gyur ro //*. Note also PVP D91b5–6 = Q106a2–3: *rigs pas gzuñ bar bya ba rnams las phyin ci log tu rtogs pa'i ño bo ñid ni ma rig pa'o //*.

⁷³ Among numerous other passages, see PVSV 111.11–112.5 and PV 2.212d.

⁷⁴ See ELTSCHINGER (2005b: 180, 184–197 and n. 133) for *vipaśyanā* as the nature of the mind.

⁷⁵ PV 2.207a₂d:

... *asyās tan nimitāntarataḥ skhalat /
vyāvṛttau pratyayāpekṣam adṛḍham sarpa-buddhivat //*

On this stanza, see also ELTSCHINGER (2005b: 187–190).

⁷⁶ PVP D89a3 = Q102b6: *'khrul pa gnod pa can gyi tshad ma la ltos pa dañ bcas pa yin no //*.

(*bādhaka-nimitta*) the mind's distortion.⁷⁷ But whereas Devendrabuddhi remains silent about the way *pramāṇas* may neutralise or oppose error, Śākyabuddhi provides us with an interesting explanation:

'For example, at the time of the elimination [of error], one perceives another phase (*kṣaṇa*) that is entirely dissimilar (*ativilakṣaṇa*?) to the preceding one; therefore, by means of the [kind of] perception (*pratyakṣa*) called "non-perception" (*anupalabdhi*), one establishes (*vyavasthāp*-?) the impermanence (*anityatā*) of the cause, and on account of this, unsubstantiality (*nairātmya*). Then, once the sequence of cultivation has taken place, perception turns out to be the annulling cause (*bādhaka-nimitta*) which consists of (°*lakṣaṇa*) the perception of unsubstantiality (*nairātmya-darśana*). And when one successively undertakes such [stages] as reflection (*cintā*) and cultivation (*bhāvanā*) after having determined unsubstantiality on the [logical] ground (*liṅga*) of being a product (*kṛtakatva*), then inference (*anumāna*) also turns out to be an annulling cause.'⁷⁸

As this passage makes clear, *pramāṇas* are asked to establish or ascertain the real aspects that will help cognitions oppose erroneous superimpositions and will thus gradually correct the mind's distortion.

The cognitions that take these aspects for their objects are regularly described as 'agreeing with/corroborated by (a) means of valid cognition' (*pramāṇa-saṃvādin*). According to Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, a cognition (first and foremost *nairātmya-darśana*) that bears upon such aspects as impermanence or unsubstantiality is termed *pramāṇa-saṃvādin* (but also 'correct' [*aviparīta*], 'true' [*satya*]), and as such may successfully oppose and finally overcome the *ātmātmīya-dṛṣṭi*. Conversely, an erroneous cognition that functions (*pravṛtta*) on the basis of superimpositions (or bears upon superimposed aspects such as the Self) is described as 'disagreeing with /non-corroborated by (a) means of valid cognition' (*pramāṇasāṃvādin*), and is nothing but a condition that is entirely adventitious (*āgantuka-pratyaya*) to the

⁷⁷ PVP D89b5–6 = Q103b4: *mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa'i rkyen ji lta ba bžin du gnod pa can gyi rgyu mtshan khas blaṅs pa'i phyir ro //* .

⁷⁸ PVT Ñe D134a6–b1 = Q165b4–5: *rgyun rnam par 'chad pa'i dus na / śā ma las śin tu mtshan ñid mi 'dra ba'i skad cig ma gžan mñon sum du byed pa'i phyir / mi dmigs pa žes bya ba'i mñon sum gyis rgyu mi rtag pa ñid dañ / de'i stobs kyis bdag med pa ñid rnam par 'jog par byed do // de nas bsgom pa'i rim pa yin pa de'i tshe mñon sum ni bdag med pa ñid mthoñ ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi gnod pa can rgyu mtshan ñid yin no // gañ gi tshe byas pa ñid la sogs pa'i rtags kyis bdag med pa rnam par [b]žag nas / bsam pa dañ bsgom pa la sogs pa rim bžin rtsom pa de'i tshe / rjes su dpag pa yañ rgyu mtshan ñid yin no //* .

mind.⁷⁹ As for Dharmottara, he holds the objects of the *yogin*'s perception to have been 'purified' ([*pari*]śuddha) by, i.e. to be correct in virtue of (a) *pramāṇa*(s). According to him, the *yogins*' perception⁸⁰ 'is non-belying because it grasps an object that has been purified (*śuddha*) by the *pramāṇas*', or because⁸¹ 'it bears upon something that has been 'purified' (*pariśuddha*) by the *pramāṇas*.' To put it in other words, it is the very function of *yukti-cintā-mayī prajñā* to provide the *yogin*'s cultivation with *pramāṇa-(pari)śuddhārtha*, to make it **pramāṇa-pariśuddha-vastu-ṣṣāyā*.⁸²

⁷⁹ According to PVP D58b3 = Q66b7–8 (*bdag med pa mthoñ ba ni bdag dañ bdag gir lta ba 'i gñen po dañ / phyin ci ma log pa dañ tshad ma 'i grogs can yin no //*), PVP D58b4–5 = Q67a1–2 (*bdag med pa mthoñ ba ni bdag dañ bdag gir lta ba 'joms par byed pa yin no // gañ gi phyir bden pa dañ tshad ma 'i grogs can ñid yin pa...*), PVP D90a4 /Q104a4 (*mi rtag pa la sogs pa 'i rnam pa 'i yul can ñid yin pa 'i phyir ro // des ni tshad ma 'i grogs can ñid yin par bśad do //*), PVṬ Ñe D133a5 /Q164a4–5 (*rgyu mishan 'ga 'zig las bdag la sogs par sgro btags pas 'jug pa 'i 'khrul pa 'i śes pa ni glo bur gyi rkyen yin te / de ni tshad ma 'i grogs ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir ro //*), PVP D89a7 /Q103a3–4 ([concerning *dri ma*] *sgro btags pa 'i rnam pa 'i sgo nas dños po med pa 'i stobs kyiś zugs pa 'i phyir dañ tshad ma 'i grogs med pa ñid kyi phyir ro //*). See also PVV 86.24.

⁸⁰ NBṬ_§ 12.8 = NBṬ_M 70.1: *pramāṇa-śuddhārtha-grāhivāc ca sañvādakam*. Note also Durveka-miśra's explanation (DhPr 67.15–16): *pramāṇādhiḡato 'rthaḡ pramāṇa-śuddha ity ucyate*.

⁸¹ According to PVinṬ D117b1 = Q135a8: *tshad mas yoñs su dag pa 'i dños po 'i yul can yin pa 'i phyir ma 'khrul pa yin pas...* Note also PVinṬ D123a1–2 = Q142a2–3: *tshad mas yoñs su dag pa 'i don can ñid kyiś kyañ mi slu ba ñid yin te /*. For a similar use of *pariśuddha*, see the passage of the SNS quoted in n. 22 above, and compare PVSV 109.3–4.

⁸² The following two stanzas also make the sequence between *cintā* and *bhāvanā* quite clear, PV 2.252–253:

*sañskāra-duḡkhatāñ matvā kathitā duḡkha-bhāvanā /
sā ca naḡ pratyayōtpattiḡ sā nairātmya-dḡg-āśrayaḡ //
muktis tu śūnyatā-dḡṣṡes tad-arthāḡ śeśa-bhāvanāḡ /
anityāt prāha tenāva duḡkham duḡkhāñ nirātmatām //*

'The meditation on [such an aspect as] suffering has been stated thinking [not of suffering qua suffering, but] of [that] suffering [that is] essential to conditioned factors as such (*sañskāra-duḡkhatā*), and this [very suffering] is for us [Buddhists] the arising through conditions, this [being in turn] the basis of the [right] view of unsubstantiality. [As for] the liberation [from the bondage in *sañsāra*, it] is due to the [right] view of emptiness, [all] the remaining meditations aiming at this [view of emptiness]; this is the reason why [the Blessed One] taught suffering out of impermanence [and] selflessness out of suffering.'

That *sā nairātmya-dḡg-āśrayaḡ* pertains to *yukti* is made clear by Devendrabuddhi's commentary on this *pāda* (PVP D108b4–5 = Q126a1–3): *bdag med lta rten yin / bdag med pa ñid mthoñ ba skye ba 'i thabs yin te / skad cig mar zad pa can gyi dños po mi rtag pa rigs pas ñes par byas pas mi rtag pa gañ yin pa de ni rgyu 'i gźan dbañ skad cig ma re rer 'jig pa can byed pa med par 'jug par 'gyur ro // de bas na 'di ni bdag gam bdag gi ma yin no źes bsgoms pa na / gañ zag stoñ pa ñid du rtogs pa 'gyur ro //* — '[Suffering which is essential to conditioned factors as such] is the basis of the right view of unsubstantiality, viz., is the means (*upāya*) for the rise of the perception

Though unable to uproot ignorance by themselves, *pramāṇas* do more than just pave the way toward the Path to liberation. In being responsible for the arising of right views that (still on a theoretical level) counteract the most visible and gross manifestations of *avidyā*, they form the turning point that makes the Path toward salvation *possible*. This is I think exactly what Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin intend to say when they state that⁸³ ‘the *pramāṇas*, which grasp real aspects such as impermanence, induce (*āvahanti*) the counteracting path (*pratipakṣa-mārga*)’ a *yogin* will have to go through in order to reach liberation, i.e. to have his mind freed from the adventitious defilements that hinder its ‘natural’ operation.

— 2.4 —

Dharmakīrti's PV 2 presents us with a sketchy account of the main stages in the Bodhisattva's long career, from the prerequisite of compassion (*jagad-dhitāṣitva*, PV 2.34–131ab) to the various intellectual and meditative achievements that constitute the religious Path (*śāstrīva*, PV 2.131c–138), and from the Enlightenment (*sugatatva*, PV 2.139–144) to the (new) Buddha's teaching of the four Noble Truths (*tāyitva*, PV 2.145–279).⁸⁴ This chapter often provides an opportunity to fixate rather abstruse epistemological topics onto the general map of Dharmakīrti's Buddhism. In other words, PV 2 provides us with narrative equivalents of theoretical elaborations. The sequence between *cintā-mayī* and *bhāvanā-mayī prajñā* is no exception. Its ‘biographical’ account occurs in PV 2.131cd–136, where Dharmakīrti recounts the Bodhisattva's reflections and subsequent transition to cultivation:

‘[Wishing to calm other people's suffering,] the compassionate [Bodhisattva] engages in [the cultivation of] means to [calm suffering] in order to eradicate [his own] suffering: for whom the goal (*upeya*) and [its] cause remain imperceptible (*parokṣa*), it is indeed a difficult task to [correctly] teach [others about them]. Reflecting on [the means and the goal] through reasoning (*yukti*) and the Scriptures (*āgama*), [the compassionate Bodhisattva] inquires into the cause of the suffer-

of unsubstantiality. The ascertainment, by means of reasoning (*yukti*), that momentary entities are impermanent, [makes it clear that] what[ever] is impermanent exists as dependent on causes (*hetu-paratantra*), momentarily perishing ([*kṣaṇa-*] *kṣaṇa-kṣayin*) and bereft of an agent (*akartṛ?*). Therefore, the understanding of *pudgala-nairātmya* occurs when one has cultivated [the view] that the [impermanent] is neither I nor mine.’

⁸³ PVT Je D252a1–2 = Q299a8–b1 = PVSVT 401.12–13: *pramāṇāny anityādi-bhūtākāra-grāhīṇi pratipakṣa-mārgam āvahanti*.

⁸⁴ On this sequence of properties, see FRANCO (1997: 15–43), and ELTSCHINGER (forthcoming 1).

ing [that is to be eradicated] and, through the particularities of suffering itself, [he also inquires] into the impermanent nature etc., of the [cause in question]. Since in this way [he who wishes to eradicate suffering] sees that there is no end to the effect as long as the cause remains, he inquires into the antidote of the cause [of suffering] in order to eliminate it. [As for the *dharma* forming] the antidote to that [cause, it] is also ascertained by the [Bodhisattva's] knowledge of the nature of the cause [itself]. [That] cause [is] attachment to dispositions, [an attachment which] is due to the belief in Self and "one's own"; [as for] the antidote to that [cause, it is] the perception of unsubstantiality, [which is] incompatible with it. All the [respective] virtues and shortcomings of the [means and its antidote] become [very] clear to [the altruistic Bodhisattva] who practices the means [that he has ascertained, i.e. the perception of unsubstantiality] constantly, without interruption and for a [very] long time.⁸⁵

This passage presents us with no less than Dharmakīrti's account of the future Buddha's initial philosophical reflections, i.e. with an exemplary or paradigmatic case of *cintā-mayī prajñā*. Dharmakīrti's (and his commentators') terminology is typical for *cintā*: first, the Bodhisattva analyses (< *vimṛśan*, PV 2.132c) through *yukti* and *āgama*,⁸⁶ which we can safely interpret as the characteristic attitude gov-

⁸⁵ PV 2.131cd–136:

dayāvān duḥkha-hānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate //
parokṣōpeya-tad-dhetos tad-ākhyānam hi duṣkaram /
yukty-āgamābhyāṃ vimṛśan duḥkha-hetuḥ parikṣate //
tasyānityādi-rūpaṃ ca duḥkhasyāiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ /
yatas tathā sthite hetau nivṛttir neti paśyati //
phalasya hetor hānārtham tad-vipakṣaḥ parikṣate /
sādhyate tad-vipakṣo 'pi heto rūpāvabodhataḥ //
ātmātmīya-graha-kṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāra-gocaraḥ /
hetur virodhi nairātmya-darśanaṃ tasya bādhakam //
bahuśo bahudhōpāyam kālena bahunāśya ca /
gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra guṇa-doṣāḥ prakāśatām //

On that passage, see in general ELTSCHINGER (2005a: 397–408).

⁸⁶ In his review of VETTER (1984) = (1990²), FRANCO (1989: 86) has made a strong case of the former's 'belittling of the Buddha': VETTER's interpretation 'would leave no room for the Buddha to innovate anything, not even to improve a previously existing way to liberation' (1989: 85). According to FRANCO (1989: 88), Dharmakīrti's allusion to *āgama* in PV 2.132cd should be understood as referring to 'the time when the Buddha was not yet a Buddha, i.e. when he was still a Bodhisattva.' Moreover, it should be read against the background of the Buddhist 'traditional solution' (1989: 89) to the 'problem of the originality of the Buddha' (1989: 89), namely 'that there were many Buddhas, and they all have exactly the same teaching, but each of them discovers the way by himself' (1989: 90). In ELTSCHINGER (2005a: 399–400, n. 22), I partly interpreted

erning *cintā* in the light of the passages from Kamalaśīla's BhK quoted above; whereas Śākyabuddhi interprets *āgama* as actually consisting of a critical examination of the means taught in the scriptures (*des bstan pa = luñ gis bstan pa*),⁸⁷ he explains *yukti* as being inference (*anumāna*) as well as the analysis (*vicāra*) one carries out by means of inference;⁸⁸ second, *yukty-āgamābhyām vimarśaḥ* serves the end of a double examination (*parīkṣā*, PV 2.132d, 134b); third, both *parīkṣās* function by way of proof/establishment (< *sādhyate*, PV 2.134a), which Manoranandin as well as the Tibetan translators of PV understand as ascertainment (< *niścīyate; nes 'gyur*).⁸⁹ Now let us have a closer look at the structure and sequence of the double examination carried out by the Bodhisattva. First he inquires into the cause of suffering (*duḥkha-hetu*) as well as into the nature (*rūpa*) of this cause. By analysing causation (*hetu-mātra*), he makes certain that suffering cannot be without cause, and that it will be possible to put an end to it if its cause is not eternal;⁹⁰ as suffering itself is occasional (*kādācitka*), its cause must be occasional too, and hence impermanent and destructible (< *nivartana-yogyatā*).⁹¹ Second, he inquires into the antidote (*vipakṣa*) to the cause of suffering, i.e. into the *dharma* which proves to be contradictory to that cause, for he knows that the resultant suffering (*phala*) will last as long as its cause; the cultivation (*abhyāsa*) or practice (*anuṣṭhāna*) of this oppo-

PV 2.132cd along the line suggested by FRANCO. I would now suggest an altogether different interpretation of PV 2.132cd, one that reads with a decidedly Mahāyānist perspective. Although virtually infinite in number in all places and times, Buddhas are extremely rare in one and the same world-system. At the beginning of their careers, they all learn Buddhist teachings under the kind guidance of such *kalyāṇa-mitras* as fellow but more advanced Bodhisattvas or even Buddhas, and then proceed to reflect on these teachings in a rational and independent way. It is my contention that Dharmakīrti alludes here only to the *cintā-mayī* level: *yukty-āgamābhyām* does not refer in reversed order to *śruta-mayī* and *cintā-mayī*, but to the latter *only*, in much the same way as Buddhist, Yogācāra or Mādhyamika literature examines various topics *yukty-āgamābhyām*, i.e. first by demonstrating and then by quoting authoritative Buddhist scriptures. That *cintā-mayī prajñā* also consists of reasoning *yukty-āgamābhyām* is made clear by the passage of BhK 1 (see n. 65 above) quoted above, but also by some suggestive remarks by Kajiyama (see SCHERRER-SCHAUB (1981: 196–197)). If Dharmakīrti's half-verse is to be read against a Mahāyānist background, as I would suggest, the question of a Buddha's originality is no longer a problem: first, because all Buddhas have become Buddhas by first hearing *Buddhist* scriptures; second, because Buddhas are so rare that their uniform teaching is nevertheless always new to their audience, thus meeting the criterion of *ajñātārtha-prakāśatva*.

⁸⁷ See PVṬ Ñe D117a3–4 = Q143a4–7, and ELTSCHINGER (2005a: 398–400).

⁸⁸ PVṬ Ñe D117a2 = Q143a3–4: *rigs pa ni rjes su dpag pa yin la des rnam par dpyad pa ni rigs pa yin te /*.

⁸⁹ PVV 57.19.

⁹⁰ See PVP D55a4–5 = Q62b6–8.

⁹¹ See PVP D55b1–2 = Q63a3–5 and PVV 57.8–10.

site *dharma* will destroy the cause of suffering.⁹² Just as the Bodhisattva inferred the properties of the cause from the properties of its effect, he now identifies the antidote as that which presents an aspect (*ākāra*) of the object (*ālambana*) which is contrary to the aspect of the cause.⁹³ The cause of suffering can be identified as an attachment (*sneha*) (1) that bears upon (*gocara*, *viṣaya* = *ālambana*) the dispositions (*saṃskāra*), and (2) that itself arises from the belief in the Self and ‘one’s own’, i.e. has *ātman* and *ātmīya* for its aspects. In other words, the ultimate cause of suffering is nothing other than *avidyā* = *sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*, which in its turn gives rise to *trṣṇā*. The opposing or counteracting *dharma* can but consist in the perception of unsubstantiality (*nairātmya-darśana*).

This narrative account of *cintā-mayī prajñā* yields the same results as the materials we have been dealing with earlier. By means of reasoning (*yukti*, *vimarsā*, *parīkṣā*, *anumāna*, *vicāra*, *niścaya*, *sādhana*), the Bodhisattva first ascertains the cause of the suffering that must be eliminated, i.e. *sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi* or the superimposition of such erroneous aspects as *ātmātmya* on *saṃskāras*, which are devoid of them.⁹⁴ Second, he determines *nairātmya-darśana* to be the antidote, i.e. the opposing or counteracting factor that is to be cultivated. Our investigation into Dharmakīrti’s conception of *yogi-pratyakṣa* also showed that the four Noble Truths represent the most typical object of the *yogins*’ perception or mental cultivation. Now it is easy to show that the passage considered above describes the Bodhisattva’s rational ascertainment of the Noble Truths. PV 2.131cd–132ab present us with a Mahāyānist account of the Bodhisattva’s being struck by his own as well as the other living beings’ suffering (*duḥkha-satya*). This of course needs not be further investigated since *duḥkha* is but an empirical fact. PV 2.132c–133ab and 135ac₁ account for the Bodhisattva’s inquiry into the origin of suffering (*samudaya-satya*), whereas PV 2.134bd and 135c₂d describe his determination of the path leading to the destruction of suffering (*mārga-satya*). As to the destruction of suffering (*nirodha-satya*) itself, it cannot be made the object of an analysis, but merely be hinted at, which we can observe in PV 2.133cd–134a, with its characteristic allusion to *nivṛtti*.

— 2.5 —

Having thoroughly cultivated the means of salvation (*upāya*) he ascertained by way of reasoning, the Bodhisattva has rid himself of passions together with their traces (*vāsanā*) and has become a fully enlightened Buddha (or Sugata). He is now

⁹² See PVP D56a2 = Q63b6 ≈ PVV 57.15–16 and PVP D56a4 = Q63b8–64a1.

⁹³ See PVP D56a5–6 = Q64a2–3, PVV 57.19–20 and 58.5–6.

⁹⁴ PVP D56b1 = Q64a5–6: *sdug bñial du gyur pa’i ’dus byas bdag dan bdag gi dan bral ba la / .*

endowed with the perfection of teaching (*śāstrīva-sampad*) or miracle of instruction⁹⁵ (*anusāsani-prātihārya*) that enables him to teach what he had reflected upon myriads of rebirths earlier, i.e. the Path or the four Noble Truths:

‘[The Blessed Buddha’s] protecting [of living beings consists in his] teaching [them] the Path he himself experienced [in order to rid himself of suffering]; he does not speak untruth for this would be useless, [both] because he is compassionate and because [it is but] for the others’ sake [that] he has yoked himself to [that] whole [religious] enterprise; therefore, [the Blessed Buddha] is a *pramāṇa* [with regard to the means of salvation for those who seek salvation]. Or [his] protecting [them and hence being a *pramāṇa* consists in his] revealing the four Truths.’⁹⁶

The next 133 stanzas of PV 2 present us with Dharmakīrti’s own account of the four *ārya-satyas*.⁹⁷

But to expound on his ideas pertaining to the Truths is by no means the only purpose Dharmakīrti assigns to PV 2.145–279.⁹⁸ As he himself suggests in PVSV 109.15–16, the inferential analysis to be carried out in PV 2 illustrates the way a *pravṛtti-kāmapuruṣa* (‘a person who wishes to act /engage [religiously]’) should proceed in order to make sure that the scriptures on which he intends to base his religious endeavour are trustworthy. To be more precise, PV 2.145–279 exemplifies how one is to ascertain the reliability of a given scripture (here the Buddhist *āgamas*) on empirical matters in order to transfer the said reliability to completely imperceptible objects.⁹⁹ Dharmakīrti first shapes the general contour of this legitimisation strategy:

⁹⁵ See PVP D61a2–3 = Q69b5–6 and PVV-Vibh 61, n. 3.

⁹⁶ PV 2.145–146ab:

*tāyaḥ sva-dṛṣṭa-mārgōktir vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam /
dayālutvāt parārthaṃ ca sarvārambhābhīyogataḥ //
tataḥ pramāṇaṃ tāyo vā catuḥ-satya-prakāśanam /*

The explanation is based on PVP D61a1–62b3 = Q69b4–71b2.

⁹⁷ *Duḥkha-satya* in PV 2.146c–178; *samudaya-satya* in PV 2.179–189; *nirodha-satya* in PV 2.190–204; *mārga-satya* in PV 2.205–279. See VETTER (1990: 53–168).

⁹⁸ On the location of the *tāyitva/satya-vicāra* section in the framework of Dharmakīrti’s proof of the Buddha’s *pramāṇa-bhūtatva*, see FRANCO (1997: 15–43).

⁹⁹ The strategy adopted here by Dharmakīrti is indeed an alternative to the one he develops in PVSV 108.16–109.11 (in PVSV 108.24–25, Dharmakīrti also resorts to the four Noble Truths in order to exemplify an ‘objectively’ inferable state of affairs). As I have argued elsewhere (see ELTSCHINGER (2007: 112–114)), the first model is heresiological, whereas the second is of a more apologetic character. For a short overview of the two strategies and their Tibetan developments, see TILLEMANS (1993: 9–17).

‘Or, the principal point [viz. the four Noble Truths] is reliable, for the nature of what is to be rejected and what is to be realised as well as the means is established[, i.e. ascertained by means of a *pramāṇa*]. Therefore [the understanding arising from the Buddha’s words can properly] be an inference in the case of other things [too, i.e. completely imperceptible objects].’¹⁰⁰

Dharmakīrti next comments on his own stanza in the following way:

‘Reliability consists in the correctness[, when analysed by means of inference,] of that which the [alleged authority] has taught, i.e. what is to be rejected and what is to be realised as well as their [respective] means. As an example, [we may adduce the reliability] of the four Noble Truths [when analysed] by the method (*nīti*) we shall present [in the second chapter].’¹⁰¹

In the passage of PVin 1 quoted above,¹⁰² the four *ārya-satyas* as they have been dealt with in PV 2 also exemplify the kind of objects a *yogin* meditates on after having ascertained them by means of *yukti-cintā-mayī prajñā*. The consequence is easily drawn: the critique of authority that Dharmakīrti elaborates on in the PVSV clearly falls within the realm of *yukti-cintā-mayī prajñā*. This is not surprising in the least if we remember that to assess the reliability of scriptures on the empirical level was the defining feature of *cintanā* in the ŚrBh and especially in the BoBh: there, the Bodhisattva was advised to reflect upon (< *cintayitu-kāma*), evaluate (< *tulayitu-kāma*) and examine (< *upaparīkṣitu-kāma*) the *dharmas* as he had learnt them from the Buddhist *dvā-daśāṅga-pravacana*; to set inconceivable subjects (*acintya-sthāna*) aside from the very beginning;¹⁰³ to be intent on meaning alone; and to discriminate correctly between *kālāpadeśa* and *mahāpadeśa*.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ PV 1.217:

*heyōpādeya-tattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ /
pradhānārthāvisaṁvādād anumānaṁ paratra vā //*

Translation in TILLEMANS (1993: 15), slightly modified (i.a. on account of PVSVṬ 394.28: *pramāṇena prasiddhito niścayataḥ*).

¹⁰¹ PVSV 109.15–16: *heyōpādeya-tad-upāyānām tad-upadiṣṭānām avaiparītyam avisaṁvadaḥ. yathā catūrnām ārya-satyānām vakṣyamāṇa-nītyā*. Note PVSVṬ 395.15–16: *vakṣyamāṇayā nītyā vicāreṇa*.

¹⁰² See § 2.2 above.

¹⁰³ The oldest Yogācāra layers warn the Bodhisattva from tackling the so-called inconceivable subjects (*acintya-sthāna*), which contradict the scope and operation of *cint(an)ā* by remaining

unfathomable (note the interesting [and quite rare] definition of *acintya* in Asvabhāva's MŚaŅU D277a4–5 = Q335a7–b1 on MŚaŅ 10.3.5: *bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i mtshan ñid ni de bzin ñid rnam par dag pa de so so ran gis rig par bya ba zes bya ba la sogs pa la / bsam pa zes bya ba ni rigs pa ñes par sems pa las byuñ ba'i ses pa ste / rtog ger gtogs [P: D rtogs] pa dper ses par bya ste / de'i spyod yul ma yin pas rtog ge'i sa la yañ dag par 'das pa'i phyir bsam gyis mi khyab pa ñid do //*; see LAMOTTE'S (1973: II,274) translation of the Chinese equivalent of MŚaŅU; for an analysis of 'acintya', see also BoBhV_Ṛ D175b4–6 = Q221a5–8). Let us consider first the following statement from BoBh_D 76.8–10/BoBh_W 108.3–7 (BoBh_T D58b2–3/Q68a5–7, BoBhV_y D128b3–7/Q157a2–b1, BoBhV_Ṛ D175b4–7/Q221a5–b1): *iha bodhisattva ekākī raho-gato yathā-śrutān dharmāś cintayitu-kāmas tulayitu-kāma upapariṣitu-kāma ādīta evācintyāni sthānāni vivarjayitvā dharmāś cintayitum ārabhate /* —'Wishing to reflect upon, evaluate and examine the *dharmas* as [he has] heard [them before], the lonesome and secluded Bodhisattva sets about reflecting on *dharmas* by setting aside the inconceivable subjects right from the outset.'

In its definition of *cintanā*, the ŚrBh is a little more explicit regarding these *acintyāni sthānāni*: ŚrBh 117*,8–12/140.6–11 (ŚrBh_T D57a3–5/Q67a8–b3): *ekatyaś tān eva yathā-śrutān dharmān ekākī raho-gataḥ ṣaḍ acintyāni sthānāni tad yathā ātma-cintām sattva-cintām loka-cintām sattvānām karma-vipāka-cintām dhyāyinām dhyāyi-viśayaḥ buddhānām buddha-viśayaḥ varjayitvā sva-lakṣaṇataḥ sāmānya-lakṣaṇataś ca cintayati /* —'Setting aside the six inconceivable subjects, viz. reflection on a self, reflection on a living being, reflection on a person (*loka*), reflection on the maturation of living beings' *karman*, reflection on the meditative range of those who meditate, and reflection on the Buddha-range of the Buddhas, a lonesome and secluded one reflects on the *dharmas* as [he has] heard [them before] from [the point of view of] their individual and general characteristics.'

As hinted at by Sāgaramegha (BoBhV_y D128b5/Q157a5–6), these six *acintya-sthānāni* have their *locus classicus* in the *Śruta-mayi-bhūmi* of the VinSg. First, the VinSg (D190a6–b1/Q197b2–4) makes a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, *ātma-cintā*, *sattva-cintā* and *loka-cintā*, which all resort to the false view of Self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*, VinSg D190b5–6/Q197b8), and *sattvānām karma-vipāka-cintā*, *dhyāyinām dhyāyi-viśayaḥ* and *buddhānām buddha-viśayaḥ*, which are all, of course, devoid of *sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*. Next, the VinSg (D191a1–2/Q198a4–5) gives a threefold content to the *dhyāyinām dhyāyi-viśayaḥ*, and a fivefold one to the *buddhānām buddha-viśayaḥ*: whereas the meditative range of those who meditate consists of *tathatā-mātrārtha* (*de bzin ñid zad pa'i don*), *vaśitā* (?*dbañ* [*b*]sgyur *ba*) and *anāsrava-dhātu* (*zag pa zad pa'i dbyiñs*), the Buddha-range of Buddhas consists of these three plus two others, viz. *anāvāraṇa* (*sgrib pa med pa*) and *sattvārtha-kriyākāra* (?*sems can gyi don hya ba mdzas pa*.) Why should a Bodhisattva who is giving himself up to reflection set these subjects aside? Because, as the BoBh has it, 'a Bodhisattva who sets the inconceivable aside will not lapse into confusion and mental perplexity.' (BoBh_D 76.15–16/BoBh_W 108.13–14 (BoBh_T D58b5–6/Q68b1, BoBhV_y D129a3–4/Q157b4–5, BoBhV_Ṛ D176a2 / Q221b3–4): *acintyaḥ varjayan bodhisattvaḥ sammohaḥ citta-vikṣepaḥ nādhigacchati*). Put in other words: 'And when [merely] trusting something, he does not reject those profound *dharmas* that his intelligence does not fathom, [but simply says] so: "These *dharmas* are [within] the range of the Tathāgatas, [but] not [within] the range of our [ordinary] intelligence"; [in so doing,] he keeps himself uninjured and unimpaired, [and remains] beyond reproach.' (BoBh_D 76.19–22/BoBh_W 108.19–23 (BoBh_T D58b7–59a1/Q68b3–4, BoBhV_y D129b5–6/Q157b7–158a1, BoBhV_Ṛ D176a3–4/ Q221b6–7): *kiñcit punar adhimucyamāno yeṣv asya dharmeṣu*

— 2.6 —

We have seen how the Epistemologists' critique of authority as well as their account of the Bodhisattva's first philosophical steps relate to the issue of *cintā-mayī prajñā*. Now it should be noted that both themes are closely connected with the representation of the 'rational person' (*prekṣāvāt-puruṣa*), a key normative figure in the Buddhist Epistemologists' anthropology.¹⁰⁵ Suffice it to say here that as a property of goal-oriented actions, practical rationality (*prekṣāvattva*) consists in one's using the best possible means for the achievement of his aims (*prayojana*). And since practical aims of the religious type (e.g. *sugati*, *nirvāṇa*, *bodhi*) are the highest goals one can strive for, it is but natural that practical rationality should first and foremost characterise the so-called *pravṛtti-kāma-puruṣa*, he who is most in need both of trustworthy scriptures and sound soteriological strategies.

gambhīreṣu buddhir nāvagāhate tathāgata-gocarā ete dharmā nāsmad-buddhi-gocarā ity evam apratikṣipāns tān dharmān ātmānam akṣataṁ cānupahataṁ ca pariharaty anavadyam).

¹⁰⁴ At the stage of the *cintā-mayī prajñā*, the Bodhisattva continues to concentrate on the meaning (*artha-pratisaraṇa*) of what he has already heard, i.e. the twelvefold teaching of the Tathāgata, and not on the letter (*vyañjana-pratisaraṇa*) alone (see ŚrBh 113*,4–117*,6 = 135.6–140–5 [ŚrBh_T D55b3–57a3 = Q65b5–67a8], and LAMOTTE (1976: 159–161)); moreover, he proves able to discriminate between the so-called black teachings (*kālāpadeśa*), i.e. non-authoritative teachings, and great teachings (*mahāpadeśa*), i.e. authenticated Buddhist scriptures (see BoBh_D 76.13–14 = BoBh_W 108.9–11 [BoBh_T D58b4–5 = Q68a8]; note BoBhV_y D129a1–2 /Q157b1–2: *nag po bstan pa ni mdo sde la mi 'jug 'dul ba la mi snañ / chos ñid dañ 'gal bar gnas pa'o // de las bzlog pa dkar po'i phyogs ni chen po bstan pa'o //*; BoBhV_F D175b7–176a1 = Q221b2–3: *nag po bstan pa dañ chen po bstan pa rnam kyañ yañ dag pa ji lta ba bzin du rab tu ses so zes bya ba ni / gañ mdo sde la 'jug ciñ 'dul ba la snañ la / chos ñid dañ mi 'gal ba de ni chen po bstan pa yin la / de las bzlog pa ni nag po bstan pa'o //*; on *kālāpadeśa* and *mahāpadeśa*, see LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (1938: 158–160) [who did not know of Sāgaramegha's and Guṇaprabha's explanations]). As the BoBh puts it, 'being concentrated on the meaning and not on the letter, the Bodhisattva will penetrate all the Blessed Buddhas' intentional sayings, [so that] in no [possible] way can anybody cause the Bodhisattva, who masters the black and the great teachings, to turn away and shrink from the [true] reality (*tattvārtha*).' (BoBh_D 76.22–24 = BoBh_W 108.23–109.2 [BoBh_T D59a1–2 = Q68b4–6, BoBhV_F D176a5 = Q221b8–222a1]: *arthaṁ pratisaran bodhisattvo na vyañjanam buddhānām bhagavatām sarva-sandhāya-vacanāny anupraviśati. kālāpadeśa-mahāpadeśa-kuśalo bodhisattvas tattvārthān na vicalayitum na vikampayitum kenacit kathamcic chakyate*). That our text resorts to the traditional doctrines of the *apadeśas* and *pratisaraṇas* gives evidence to the fact that the exegetical function of *cintā(an)ā* is not limited to the assessment of a text's proper meaning, but also covers critique of scriptural authenticity and authority (see LAMOTTE (1947: 218–222) and (1949); DAVIDSON (1990); POUSSIN (1980: IX,246–248)).

¹⁰⁵ See MCCLINTOCK (2002: 38–42) and ELTSCHINGER (2007b).

The connection between *prekṣāvat-puruṣa* and the critique of authority can already be found in Dharmakīrti's writings, most conspicuously in the following summary of his own position with regard to the authority of scriptures:

'Every [person] who wishes to act [religiously] as a rational agent and not by [mere blind] devotion examines [whether a given treatise] is an [authoritative] scripture or not[, thinking in the following way]: "May I be successful [in my endeavour], if I act after having learnt from [this authoritative scripture] what I ought to practice[, i.e. realise¹⁰⁶]." This [person indeed] acts with regard to [objects of] another [type, i.e. imperceptible objects] on the ground of [a scripture's] reliability on [perceptually and inferentially] ascertainable¹⁰⁷ [objects], because ordinary practical activity usually [proceeds] that way.¹⁰⁸ But if one were to act by [first] inquiring into the [alleged trustworthy] person [himself], there would be no action at all, because such¹⁰⁹ [a person] is impossible to recognise, but not because [we would] not accept [that such a person exists], for such [persons assuredly] speak the truth.'¹¹⁰

However, the most striking expression of practical rationality is no doubt found in the entire career of the Bodhisattva itself. Driven by compassion, the Bodhisattva ultimately aims at alleviating other people's suffering; but in order to do so, he will have to teach them the goal (*upeya*) and its means (*upāya*); now since he will not be able to teach correctly unless he has experienced *upāya* and *upeya* himself, he sets about reflecting and meditating upon them in order to realise (*sākṣāt*/*kr*) them and hence remove his own suffering. To the best of my knowledge, we owe the first explicit mention of the *prekṣāvat-(puruṣa)* in this context to Devendrabuddhi:

'To set about [practising] the means of removing his own suffering is [for the Bodhisattva] the only [method] suited to [strive for] the well-being of others. Thus, by putting [its] means (*upāyārtha*), i.e. its cause into practice, those who must be [religiously] trained (*v[a]ineya*) will reach the goal (*tad-upeyārtha*). [But] for whom the goal and its cause

¹⁰⁶ According to PVSVT 396.19: *anuṣṭheyam sākṣāt-kartavyam artham*.

¹⁰⁷ According to PVSVT 396.20: *śakyaṃ darśanaṃ niścayaḥ*.

¹⁰⁸ PVSVT 396.23: *evam ity eka-deśāvisaṃvāda-darśanenānyatra pravartanam*.

¹⁰⁹ PVSVT 396.26: *tasya puṃsas tathā-bhūtasya yathārtha-darśanādi-guṇa-yuktasya*.

¹¹⁰ PVS 110.3–8: *sarva eva āgamam anāgamam vā pravṛtti-kāmo 'nveṣate prekṣā-pūrva-kāri na vyasanena. api nāmānuṣṭheyam ato jñātvā pravṛtto 'rthavān syām iti. sa śakya-darśanāvisaṃvāda-pratyayenānyatrāpi pravartate. evaṃ-prāyatvāl loka-vyavahārasya. puruṣa-parikṣayā tu pravṛttāv apravṛttir eva. tasya tathā-bhūtasya jñātum aśakyatvān nāniṣṭeḥ. tādyṣām avitathābhīdhānāt*.

remain imperceptible, it is [indeed] a difficult task to teach them, i.e. to correctly explain the goal and its cause to the living beings who ought to be instructed, because one who is ignorant of the way [to go] is not qualified to show the correct way [to others]. [Hence] one who wishes to teach living beings that very [goal] and its cause as they really are[, if he is] rational, first realises [them himself].¹¹¹

The full-fledged version of this doctrinal complex can be found in Kamalaśīla, who harmonises broader Mahāyānist concerns (here drawn mainly from the BoBh) and epistemological issues, thus often bringing Dharmakīrti's doctrinal background to light. In his commentary on Tsa no. 3337(8), Kamalaśīla argues strongly in favour of the purposefulness (*arthitva*) and hence rationality of *bhāvanā*. But, contrary to Devendrabuddhi, he does not restrict practical rationality to the commitment to Mahāyāna, but takes into consideration the (admittedly lower) motives (*nimitta*) that drive Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas in the direction of *nirvāṇa*:

‘And neither could [our opponent] say the following: “A [mental] cultivation that would result in a perceptual knowledge of the type [you assert] is not possible for anyone.” [Our opponent would not be able to say this,] for he would [then] have to state the reason for [such] an impossibility. ... Here, since the practice of a rational [person always] implies purposefulness, the reason for not engaging in [mental] cultivation could be that [the mental cultivation of unsubstantiality] is not at all useful to anyone. ... First, among the [various reasons supposed to justify the fact that a rational person does not engage in mental cultivation], purposelessness is not established. Indeed, fear of *saṃsāra* is the reason why those who are limited to the Awakening of the Hearers or [Buddhas-for-themselves] cultivate unsubstantiality: [their] thoughts being tormented by the suffering of birth etc., [and their] mind being terrified by *saṃsāra*, they seek to calm it for themselves. But since [a person] to whom the goal and its cause [remain] imperceptible cannot

¹¹¹ PVP D54b5–7 = Q62a4–8, rather freely in order to avoid the commentarial style: *ñid ñid kyi sdug bsñal rab tu zi ba'i thabs rtsom pa gañ yin pa 'di ñid gzan gyi don dañ rjes su mthun pa yin no // de lta yin na thabs kyi don gañ yin pa de'i rgyu gañ yin pa nan tan du byas pa las de'i thabs las byuñ ba'i don de gdul bya de dag gis 'thob par 'gyur ro // ... thabs byuñ de rgyu lkog gyur can* no // sems can bstan par bya ba la de 'chad pa ste / thabs las byuñ ba dañ de'i rgyu phyin ci ma log par bstan par mdzad pa dka' ba yin te / lam mi šes pas phyin ci ma log pa'i lam ston pa'i skabs med pa'i phyr** / re žig rtogs pa dañ ldan pa ñid sems can rnam la de ñid dañ de'i rgyu ji ltar gnas pa bžin du 'chad par bžed pas mñon sum du mdzad pa yin no // .*

* PV_T 2.132a. ** PVV-Vibh 57, n. 2: *na hy amārga-jñō 'viparīta-mārgōpadeše 'dhikriyate.*

teach them [to others properly], the reason why the [Bodhisattvas] proceed with the cultivation is compassion: having by nature, due to a specific *gotra*, the good of others as their sole delectation, they consider [this] world afflicted by the three sufferings of being conditioned etc.; suffering from its painfulness because they rely upon commiseration, they reject [all] self-interest; and considering all the [beings] who are caught in transmigration as themselves, they make the vow to come to their rescue.¹¹²

— 2.7 —

On the level of the Epistemologists' religious anthropology, the wisdom born of (rational) reflection mirrors the concerns of a human 'type' who ideally has two properties: first, his desire to commit himself to and engage in a religious path, second, his practical rationality. Although the Bodhisattva, driven by compassion and acting for the sake of living beings, typically incarnates this ideal (Devendrabuddhi), other religious types such as Śrāvakas or Pratyeka-buddhas-to-be, albeit on an inferior level, are not denied those properties (Kamalaśīla). Desire to engage as well as practical rationality command one to critically assess the truth of scriptures on the empirical level in order to maximise the probability of their trustworthiness in transempirical matters too. The four Noble Truths which form the core or principal point of the Buddhist teachings, stand critical analysis by means of valid cognition and especially by inference: 'instrumental in [such] human goals [as *nirvāṇa*]', these Noble Truths can then be declared 'worthy of exertion[, i.e. of repeated practice/cultivation].'¹¹³

The Bodhisattva's philosophical reflections at the eve of his long career form a second complex closely connected with *cintā-mayī prajñā*. In a philosophical narra-

¹¹² TSaP_K 871.12–15 and 872.1–7 = TSaP_{Sh} 1054.19–22 and 1055.14–20 (TSaP_T D 'e 296a6–7 and 296b6–297a2 = P *Ye* 361b1–2 and 362a3–7): *na cāpy evaṃ śakyam vaktum—sāva tādṛśī bhāvanā na kasyacit sambhavati, yā tathā-bhūta-pratyakṣa-jñāna-phalā bhaved iti, yato 'sambhave kāraṇam vacanīyam. tathā hi bhāvanāyām aprayoge sarveṣām evānarthitvaṃ ... kāraṇam bhavet, prekṣāvataḥ pravṛtter arthitayā vyāptatvāt. ... tatra na tāvad anarthitvaṃ siddham. tathā hi ye tāvaj jātyādi-duḥkhōtpīḍita-mānasāḥ saṃsārād uttrasta-manasas tad-upaśamam ātmanah prārthayante, teṣāṃ śrāvakādi-bodhaniyatānām saṃsārād bhayam eva nairātmya-bhāvanā-nimittam. ye tu gotra-viśeṣāt prakṛtyāiva para-hita-karaṇākābhīrāmāḥ saṃskārādi-duḥkhatā-tritaya-paripīḍitaṃ jagad avekṣya, kṛpā-paratantratayā tad-duḥkha-duḥkhiṇaḥ svātmani vyapekṣām apāśya, sakalān eva saṃsāriṇa ātmatvenābhyupagatās tat-paritrāṇāya praṇidadhate, teṣāṃ karuṇāiva bhāvanā-pravṛtti-nimittam, paroḥṣōpeya-tad-dhetos tad-ākhyānasya duṣkaratvāt.*

¹¹³ According to PVSV 109.17 (*puruṣārthōpayogino 'bhiyogārhasyāvisaṃvāditvāt*) and Karṇaka-gomin's comment thereon (PVSVT 395.17–18: *puruṣārthōpayogināḥ. puruṣārtho nirvāṇam tatropayogaḥ kāraṇatvaṃ sa yasyāsti tathā. ata evābhiyogārhasyābhyāsārhasya...*).

tive, Dharmakīrti relates how the compassionate Buddha-to-be rationally ascertains both the cause of suffering and the antidote to that cause, viz. the false view of Self and the perception/(realisation) of unsubstantiality respectively. But in so doing, the Bodhisattva rationally determines the four Noble Truths and hence the path of unsubstantiality that, once duly cultivated, will lead him to Buddhahood. Both doctrinal structures lay strong emphasis on inferential analysis and ascertainment, the first one in the perspective of a critical appraisal of the already existent Truths, the second as the very means of their determination. In both cases, these Truths or unsubstantiality alone are made the object(s) of repeated practice, mental cultivation and exertion, i.e. of the counteracting path that leads ultimately to the definitive suppression of (passions together with their) traces.

On a more theoretical level, these objects perfectly match the ones Dharmakīrti himself as well as his commentators associate repeatedly with the so-called perception of *yogins*. That the cognition of (Buddhist) mystics can be termed a perception and hence a valid cognition is not due only to the *bhāvanā*'s securing a vivid image, but also to the fact that its objects have been subjected to rational investigation (*parīkṣā*, *vicāra* etc.) and ascertainment (*niścaya*, *nirṇaya*, *vyavasthāpanā*, *nidhyāna* etc.) at the *yukti-cintā-mayī*-level. As the commentators have it, the truth or non-belying character of the *yogins*' cognition consists in its being *pramāṇa-saivādin* (Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Manorathanandin) or bearing upon *pramāṇa-(pari)śuddhārthas* (Dharmottara). In the stage of rational reflection, *pramāṇas* (i.e. inference) ascertain or determine the real aspects (impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, unsubstantiality, selflessness) of entities and hence provide the reflecting *yogin*'s cognition with aspects and objects that contradict, oppose or counteract the superimpositions (Self, 'one's own', permanent etc.) ignorance as a generalised erroneous perception is responsible for. What the *yogin* does here is tantamount to the Bodhisattva's rational identification of unsubstantiality as the antidote to *sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*. And what the *yogin* is intent upon is nothing other than a counteracting path that will enable him to remove the adventitious filth of passions and hence establish 'his' mind in its originally radiant and flawless condition.

3. Concluding remarks

Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika definition of *cintā-mayī prajñā* as *yukti-nidhyāna-jo niścayaḥ* testifies to his indebtedness to the Yogācāra tradition (ŚrBh, BoBh, MSA[Bh] etc.), which understands *cint(an)ā* as a rational appraisal-cum-examination (*tulanā*, *upaparīkṣā*, *vicāra* etc.) of scripture-based contents. Of the four *yuktis* resorted to by this tradition, the *upapatti-sādhana-yukti* is the only one endowed with a probative/demonstrative function: as a *vyavasthāpanā sādhanā* (ŚrBh), this *yukti*

serves the function of establishing key Buddhist doctrinal contents (*anityatā*, *śūnyatā*, *kṣaṇikatva*, *duḥkhatā*, *pratītya-samutpannatā*, *para-loka*, *anātmatā* etc.) by means of *pramāṇas* (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āptāgama*). In sharp contrast to the exegetical as well as soteriological purpose of *cint(an)ā*, *hetu-vidyā* possesses a strong polemical/dialectical character, aiming as it does at defeating (*nigraha*) non-Buddhist opponents with the help of *pramāṇas*; *hetu-vidyā* is also traditionally assigned the apologetic and missionary function of defending (*dhāraṇa*) the *Sad-dharma* against outward hostility, converting non-Buddhists and strengthening the coreligionists' faith (**prasāda-sthāpana*). Although *cint(an)ā* and *hetu-vidyā* both give strong emphasis to *pramāṇas*, they seem to have developed independently. This is in turn explainable in terms of their meeting religious needs that must have been felt quite distinct. Sthiramati's remarks may well testify to the fact that by the middle of the sixth century, the two structures and concerns started merging with one another, for the most part, I would suggest, not because of a growing awareness of their common resort to *pramāṇas*, but rather, with the collapse of the Gupta empire, because social, economical and political factors made it necessary. Epistemological debate and the religious quest for exegetical and doctrinal certainty could no longer be kept separated as the communities faced an easily documentable hostility and concomitant lack of political and economical security.¹¹⁴ This time coincides with the foundation of such centralised institutions as Valabhī and Nālandā, which probably mirrors on the institutional level what (the Valabhī-based) Sthiramati testifies to on the doctrinal level.

Dharmakīrti and his successors' ideas are in close consonance with older accounts of *cint(an)ā* and especially *upapatti-sādhana-yukti*, to which they assign the same function (cf. *vyavasthāpya* in PVin) and the same contents (the real aspects of entities, but also *para-loka* etc.). This consonance is best seen in two parallel but rhetorically distinct doctrinal complexes in Dharmakīrti, viz. the theoretical/epistemological depiction of *yogi-pratyakṣa*, and the narrative account of the future Buddha's first philosophical reflections. Moreover, the works of Dharmakīrti as well as those of Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla are remarkable representatives of the overlap between *para-nigraha*, *sad-dharma-dhāraṇa* and **prasāda-sthāpana* on the one hand, and *cint(an)ā*-like establishment of key Buddhist doctrinal contents on the other. Maybe some tentative explanations are necessary here. On the normative level of individual religious practice, no authority may substitute for a Bodhisattva's and/or *bhikṣu(ṇī)*'s beginning to reflect on scriptural contents (cf. BoBh: *na para-pratyayo bhavati teṣu yukti-parīkṣiteṣu dharmeṣu*) by means of reasoning. On a first institutional level, *hetu-vidyā*-specialists probably did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the various competing dogmatists or *adhyātma-vidyā*-specialists. On a

¹¹⁴ See ELTSCHINGER (2007: 25–64).

second institutional level, however, *hetu-vidyā*-specialists now seem to be concerned with dialectics and epistemology as well as with apologetics and doctrinal elaboration; by creating some kind of ‘interface’ between outward pressure and competing doctrinal interests within, they attempted to shape and propagate the non-ritual part of a renewed Buddhist identity. Note should be made, however, that authors like Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla maintained the traditional clear-cut distinction between the polemical precincts of *hetu-vidyā*, to which they denied any soteriological value whatsoever, and the salvational aims of *cint(an)ā*. One is of course free to consider whether these authors’ playing down of epistemology (!) bears sincere testimony to their beliefs or was rather a concession imposed on them by the dominating institutional concerns.

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The ‘Principle of True Nature’ (*dharmatā-yukti*) as a Justification for Positive Descriptions of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism¹

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When looking for a suitable topic for my contribution to the seminar on logic and belief in Indian philosophy, I quickly settled on the *Tattva-daśaka* of Maitrīpa (ca. 1007–ca. 1085)², in which reality is not only ascertained to be neither existent nor non-existent, on the basis of common Madhyamaka logic, but also equated with luminosity as directly experienced in the *samādhi* of realising reality as it is (*yathā-bhūta-samādhi*). Ultimately, there is of course only one reality for Maitrīpa, but descriptions of it differ depending on one’s approach: while reality escapes any category (ontological or otherwise) in analysis, it can be described in a more positive way on the basis of direct experience.³ Madhyamaka analysis can and should be questioned on logical grounds, but the positive descriptions of reality as luminosity and the like must be first believed in, and can be verified by becoming a successful *yogin* or Buddha oneself.⁴

¹ Improvements to my English by Philip H. Pierce (Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu) are gratefully acknowledged.

² TATZ (1994: 65).

³ See MATHES (2006: 210–220).

⁴ This is clear, for example, from the *Anūnatvāpūrṇatva-nirdeśa* (as quoted in the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga-vyākhyā* on stanza 1.1), RGVV, p. 2.8–11: *tathāgata-viśayo hi śāriputra ayam arthas tathāgata-gocaraḥ[.] sarva-śrāvaka-pratyeka-buddhair api tāvac chāriputra ayam artho na śakyah samyak sva-prajñayā [jñātum vā]^a draṣṭum vā pratyavekṣitum vā^b prāg eva bāla-pṛthag-janair anyatra tathāgata-śraddhā-gamanataḥ. śraddhā-gamanīyo hi śāriputra paramārthaḥ. paramārtha iti śāri[putra] sattva-dhātor etad adhivacanam.—^c Śāriputra, this [ultimate] meaning is the [cognitive] object of the Tathāgata; it comes under the range of the Tathāgata[’s awareness]. Śāriputra, it cannot, to start with, be known, seen or examined correctly even by Śrāvakas or Pratyeka-buddhas on the basis of their own insight, much less by fools and ordinary people, unless they (i.e. Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-buddhas, fools and ordinary persons) realise it by faith in the Tathāgata. Śāriputra, that which must be realised by faith is the ultimate. Śāriputra, “ultimate” is an expression for the [Buddha]-element in sentient beings.’ [^a Not readable in B (2a2) (several *akṣaras* are broken*

To grasp reality correctly is thus not only a philosophical discipline, but also a crucial soteriological pursuit. The long history of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India has witnessed a host of different views on what reality precisely is. For the Mādhyamikas it is the emptiness of all phenomena, while for the Yogācāras it is the mind empty of duality (to give only the generally accepted descriptions for the two main traditions in Mahāyāna). Whatever tenet was maintained, it is safe to say that nobody ever considered reality to be self-evident to ordinary sentient beings.

Thus reality must be either determined logically (usually to be something which is ‘free from mental fabrications’ (*niṣprapañca*)) or experienced directly in advanced *yoga* practices that mainly rely on non-conceptual types of insight. The latter approach enables, besides the definiens *niṣprapañca* or emptiness, such positive descriptions of reality as found in the *sūtras* of and commentaries on the third *dharmacakra* (i.e. the Yogācāra works, the *Ratna-gotra-vibhāga* and so forth). The division of the Buddhist doctrine into three sets or ‘wheels’ (*cakra*) of teachings was provided its chief doctrinal support in the *Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra*, and became necessary in order to accommodate the philosophical tenets of the Mahāyāna schools within mainstream Buddhism. The Yogācāras in particular felt compelled to resolve the tensions they observed between the Abhidharma ontology of momentary ‘factors of existence’ (*dharmas*) and the Prajñāpāramitā’s emptiness of all *dharmas* (these two forming the first two *dharmacakras*) by restricting emptiness to what has been wrongly projected onto the *dharmas*. A similar approach can be found among the proponents of a Buddha-nature (*tathāgata-garbha*) in all sentient beings.⁵

The reaction to such interpretative strategies was mainly twofold. While some Mādhyamikas, such as Candrakīrti (seventh century CE), refuted the Yogācāra and Tathāgata-garbha doctrines and dismissed their hermeneutics (which concluded that the third *dharmacakra* has definitive meaning), Kamalaśīla (ca. 700–750)⁶ tried to show that the last two *dharmacakras* do not contradict each other. Within such latter traditions, the differences between the second and third *dharmacakra* were explained by distinguishing an analytical from a direct approach to one and the same reality.⁷

Positive descriptions of reality must at first simply be believed in, but the believer eventually acquires the means of verifying them as he progresses along the path. In other words, one has to trust a *yogin* that reality has the nature of luminosity, in the

away); A is not available. The gap is filled in according to the Tibetan. See also TAKASAKI (1966: 143).^b B (2a2) reads *mvā*; A is not available. DE JONG (1979: 567) suggests reading *vā* without a following *daṇḍa*.]

⁵ For a detailed explanation of the three *dharmacakras* see MATHES (1996: 155–163).

⁶ NAKAMURA (1987: 281).

⁷ Such a strategy can be discerned, for example, in ‘Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s commentary on the *Ratna-gotra-vibhāga-vyākhyā*. See MATHES (2008: 375–377).

same way as one trusts a scientist that gamma rays reveal their nature of being both a wave and matter when hitting gold atoms in the Compton Experiment; with a laboratory of one's own one can then verify this. It is such a trust or belief in the true nature of the factors of existence (*dharmatā*) or reality that led to the coining of the 'principle of true nature' (*dharmatā-yukti*).

Dharmatā-yukti is the last in a group of four *yuktis*, which are as follows: (a) the principle of dependence (*apekṣā-yukti*), (b) the principle of cause and effect (*kārya-kāraṇa-yukti*), (c) the principle of proving on the basis of feasibility (*upapatti-sādhana-yukti*), and (d) the principle of true nature (*dharmatā-yukti*).⁸ In the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra*, stanza 19.45, the four *yuktis* respectively correlate to (a) correct mental engagement, (b) the right view accompanied by [its] fruit, (c) analysis based on valid cognition, and (d) the inconceivable.⁹ In his *bhāṣya* on MSA 19.45 Vasubandhu comments:

'A proper presentation of principle [explains its] fourfold [nature]: The principle of dependence, the principle of cause and effect, the principle of proving on the basis of feasibility, and the principle of true nature... The principle of dependence is correct mental engagement on the three *yānas*. Since the correct, supramundane view arises in virtue of that, that is, from that precondition, the principle of cause and effect is the right view accompanied by [its] fruit. The principle of proving on the basis of feasibility is an investigation on the basis of direct and the other types of valid cognition. The principle of true nature is an inconceivable subject. For the true nature is established and not something to be worried about—[worries] such as "From which correct mental engagement does the right view arise?" or "Is the abandonment of defilements because of that the fruit?"'¹⁰

While the first three principles are more or less based on logical analysis, *dharmatā-yukti* is considered to be a principle in the sense that reality is of a given nature

⁸ See MSABh, p. 168.5–12.

⁹ MSA 19.45, p. 167.24–25:

*yoniśaś ca manas-kārah samyag-dṛṣṭiḥ phalānvitā /
pramāṇair vicayo 'cintyaṃ jñeyam yukti-catuṣṭayam //*

¹⁰ MSABh, p. 168.5–12: *yukti-prajñapti-vyavasthānaṃ catur-vidhaṃ. apekṣā-yuktiḥ. kārya-kāraṇa-yuktiḥ. upapatti-sādhana-yuktiḥ. dharmatā-yuktiś ca. ... tatrāpekṣā-yuktis triṣv api yāneṣu yoniśo-manas-kārah. tam apekṣya tena pratyaena lokōttarāyāḥ samyag-dṛṣṭer utpādāt. kārya-kāraṇa-yuktiḥ samyag-dṛṣṭiḥ saphalā. upapatti-sādhana-yuktiḥ. pratyakṣādibhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣā. dharmatā-yuktir acintyaṃ sthānaṃ. siddhā hi dharmatā na punaś cintyā. kasmād^a yoniśo-manas-kārāt samyag-dṛṣṭir bhavati. tato vā kleśa-prahānaṃ phalam ity evam-ādī.*

^a According to Lévi's emendation, see BHATTACHARYA (2001: 14).

which can be as inconceivable as the fact that the building blocks of the universe do not only behave like billiard balls but also like waves, something which is difficult to grasp on purely logical grounds, but must be accepted as a result of experiments.

In the presentation of the four *yuktis* in the *Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra*, *dharmatā-yukti* is taken in the following way:

‘Whether Tathāgatas appear [in this world] or not, because the factors of existence (*dharmas*) must abide [in their true nature (*dharmatā*)] this very abiding in the sphere of *dharmatā* (i.e. the *dharmā-dhātu*) is the principle of true nature (*dharmatā-yukti*).’¹¹

In his *Ṭikā* on the *Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra* (Peking Tanjur No. 5517), Yüan-ts’ê (613–696)¹² explains that *dharmatā-yukti* implies the fact that things have a certain nature throughout beginningless time, just as fire burns, water moistens and wind moves.¹³

In the *Tathāgata-garbhā-sūtra* we find a passage similar to the *dharmatā-yukti* passage in the *Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra*. The true nature is here taken as the Buddha-nature in all sentient beings:

‘Son of a noble family, the true nature (*dharmatā*) of the factors of existence is this: whether Tathāgatas appear [in this world] or not, these sentient beings always possess the Buddha-nature.’¹⁴

Asaṅga¹⁵ comments:

‘This true nature is here principle, argument and method: by virtue of which (i.e. true nature) this (i.e. contents of perception) is this way (i.e. an accurate realisation of mind), and not otherwise. Everywhere it is precisely the true nature which is what is relied upon,¹⁶ the principle underlying an “accurate realisation” [and] a “correct knowledge” of

¹¹ SNS, p. 158.29–31: *de la de bzhin gshegs pa rnam byung yang rung / ma byung yang rung ste / chos gnas par bya ba’i phyir chos nyid dbyings gnas pa nyid gang yin pa de ni chos nyid kyi rigs pa yin no / .*

¹² A disciple of Hsüan-tsang, see STEINKELLNER (1989: 233).

¹³ POWERS (1994: 369).

¹⁴ As quoted in RGVV, p. 73.11–12: *eṣā kula-putra dharmāṅām dharmatā. utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā sadāvēte sattvās tathāgata-garbhā iti.*

¹⁵ For the sake of convenience, I simply follow the Tibetan tradition here in ascribing the *Ratna-gotra-vibhāga-vyākhyā* to Asaṅga.

¹⁶ DRSM *rtēn*, D *rtogs*, NP *rtog*. Given Skt. *pratisaraṇa*, the reading must be *rtōn* [*pa*], which is, moreover, the *lectio difficilior*.

mind. The true nature is inconceivable and unthinkable; it must rather be simply believed in.¹⁷

To sum up, the true nature is taken as either luminosity (Yogācāra) or the Buddha-nature (*Tathāgata-garbha-sūtra* and *Ratna-gotra-vibhāga*). In justification of this it is claimed that reality is simply of such a nature. This must be believed in, and can be verified when one eventually becomes a Buddha.

In his commentary on the above-quoted passage from the *Ratna-gotra-vibhāga*, 'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392–1481) makes it clear that the possibility to see the similarity between the mind of sentient beings and the *dharmakāya* of the Buddhas (i.e. the Buddha-nature of all sentient beings) is established by *dharmatā-yukti* and not by a direct cognition obtained on the basis of familiarity with the content of inferences:

‘Well then, one may ask, whether such a seeing is one that has become a direct [cognition] by virtue of first realising [what the Buddha-nature is] through an inferential valid cognition based on the principle of proving on the basis of feasibility (*upapatti-sādhana-yukti*), and [then] becoming continuously used to it (i.e. to the content of the inferential cognition); or whether it is a seeing that [occurs] without any special reason, [that is,] adventitiously? It is neither a seeing based on [the principle of] proving on the basis of feasibility nor a seeing without reason. It is a seeing based on the principle of true nature (*dharmatā-yukti*).’¹⁸

In other words, reality cannot be ascertained as luminosity or the Buddha-nature on logical grounds, for the simple reason that such a nature remains inconceivable even for somebody who relies on inferential valid cognitions. This leaves us with

¹⁷ RGVV, p. 73.12–16: *yāva cāsau dharmatā sāvātra yuktir yoga upāyaḥ^a. yayāvam^b evātat^c syāt. anyathā nāvātat^c syād iti. sarvatra dharmatāiva pratīsa(text:śa)raṇam. dharmatāiva yuktis citta-nidhyāpanāya citta-samjñāpanāya. sā na cintayitavyā na vikalpayitavyā[. a]^ddhimoktavyeti.* [^a Johnston inserts after *upāyaḥ*, against B (38a3), *pariyāyaḥ* (A is not available), but neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese has an equivalent for *pariyāyaḥ*. See TAKASAKI (1966: 295, n. 8).^b According to DE JONG (1979: 575). ^c According to B (38a3); Johnston reads in both cases *eva tat*. ^d TAKASAKI (1966: 296, n. 14) inserts *kevalam tv*, but the unemended phrase (that is, without TAKASAKI’s insertion, but an additional *danḍa*) is also found in ŚrBh, p. 377.6.]

¹⁸ DRSM, p. 431.13–6: *’o na de ltar mthong ba de dang por ’thad pas sgrub pa’i rigs pa la brten nas rjes su dpag pa’i tshad mas rtogs te de’i rgyun goms par byas pa las mngon sum du gyur pa zhig gam / rgyu mtshan chen med par glo bur du mthong ba zhig yin zhe na / ’thad pas sgrub pa la brten nas mthong ba yang ma yin / rgyu mtshan med par mthong ba yang ma yin te / chos nyid kyi rigs pa la brten nas mthong ba yin no / .*

the path of the *yogin*, which starts with direct valid cognitions right from the beginning (as described in Sahajavajra's commentary on TD 7cd).¹⁹

One might object that working with direct cognitions right from the beginning does not reveal the luminous nature of reality either, for everybody has direct cognitions—for example, in the first moment of perceiving visual forms—without experiencing their luminous nature. A similar objection is raised in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālamkāra*, stanzas 73:

‘Now, since the nature of it (i.e. a vase etc.) is directly manifest
By virtue of its having been realised,
Why is it that unwise persons
Do not similarly realise the nature (*dn̄gos po*)²⁰ of entities?’²¹

The point here is that a direct cognition is non-conceptual and thus free from reifications and denials. Ordinary people should thus realise the object of a direct perception exactly as it is (in the context of the *Madhyamakālamkāra*, as being empty of its own-being, which is emptiness that corresponds to luminosity in the *Tattva-daśaka*). Śāntarakṣita refutes this objection in stanza MA 74:

‘[In fact] they do not. Having a burdensome [mind]-stream without
beginning,
They are overpowered by [their habit of] of imagining entities as real;
Therefore no living beings
Directly realise it (i.e. the nature of entities).’²²

In other words, even though direct perceptions enable the seeing of objects as they are, these sense data are immediately processed under the distorting influence of mental imprints. In his commentary on these two stanzas (MA 73–74) gZhon nu dpal explains:

‘Moreover, [ordinary direct perception] is not very amazing. Even though
the shapes of a vase, an ox and so forth, which are devoid [of any universal
properties] of oxness and so forth, are clearly seen, those who have a

¹⁹ See MATHES (2006: 219–220).

²⁰ Mi pham explains in his *dBu ma rgyan rtsa 'grel*, 383: *dn̄gos rnam̄s kyi dn̄gos po as: dn̄gos po rnam̄s kyi dn̄gos po 'am ngo bo yin lugs*.

²¹ MA, p. 244.10–13: *'o na de ni rtogs gyur pas // de yi rang bzhin mngon sum phyr // mi mkhas rnam̄s kyang dn̄gos rnam̄s kyi // dn̄gos po 'di 'dra cis mi rtogs /*.

ICHIGŌ (1985: 244) introduces this and the following two stanzas (MA 73–75) in the following way: ‘By whom and how is the absence of intrinsic nature in all *dharmas* understood?’ MA 73–74 are given the subtitle: ‘Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and unwise people’.

²² MA, p. 246.9–12: *ma yin thog med rgyud lci bar // dn̄gos por sgro btags dbang byas pas // de phyr srog chags thams cad kyis // mngon sum rtogs par mi 'gyur ro /*.

mistaken understanding, [viewing as they do things] according to the traditions of Kapila, Kaṇāda and the like, do not perceive [them] in this way (i.e. as being empty of universal properties). Thus all sentient beings possess a knowledge of [direct] appearances [even] on the basis of not having ascertained natural emptiness. Nevertheless, owing to the confusion which has arisen throughout beginningless time, ascertainment is lacking. It is like the Sāṃkhyas and others, who possess a knowledge [of things] which clearly appear to be devoid of real universal properties, and still a [corresponding] ascertainment does not arise [in them].²³

In the epistemological tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, reality consists of specifically characterised phenomena or particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*), which are the object of direct valid cognition, but usually unreal universals are projected onto these particulars and this leads to a distorted knowledge of reality. This is most clear from *Pramāṇa-vārttika-kārikā* 1.68–70:²⁴

'The other form is concealed
By [thought's] own form—[imputed] by the intellect,
Which, [while] basing itself on different entities,
Reflects a single object.

Through [such] a concealing [thought]
The concealed manifold objects appear—even though discrete in
themselves—
As if they were not different entities,
In some form [suggestive of a universal property].²⁵

Under the constraint of [such] thinking on the part of it (i.e. the intellect),
[This] universal is [then] declared to be [something] existent.
It does not exist in any ultimate sense,
As imagined by that [intellect].²⁶

²³ DRSM, p. 57.8–13: *gzhan yang 'di ni ngo mtshar mi che ste / 'di ltar bum pa dang ba lang nyid la sogs pas dben pa'i ba lang la sogs pa'i dbyibs gsal bar mthong yang / ser skya dang / gzebs ma spyod pa la sogs pa'i lugs kyis blo gros phyin ci log tu gyur pa dag de ltar rtogs par mi byed do // zhes sems can thams cad la rang bzhin stong pa nyid ma nges pa las snang ba'i shes pa ni yod la / de yod kyang thog ma med pa nas byung ba'i 'khrul pas nges su mi lter ba ni grangs can la sogs pa la spyi dngos po bas dben pa'i gsal bar snang ba'i shes pa yod kyang nges pa mi skye ba bzhin no /*

²⁴ The numbering follows STEINKELLNER (1977).

²⁵ Even though concrete entities (i.e. particulars) are completely different from each other, certain entities can cause a perception whose image is the same. Such an image is usually mistaken for the concrete entity itself (see FRAUWALLNER (1932: 264–5) for a discussion of these stanzas).

gZhon nu dpal's commentary on these three stanzas is as follows:

'To a conceptual knowledge governed by direct cognition that takes in different entities, such as sandalwood and *nyagrodha* [trees], there appears the form of a single universal called "tree", into which all distinctive features of a tree are gathered. When it appears, one thinks that that form is external, and clings to the existence of a single object universal. Even though such objects do not relate to a single universal, the latter's non-existence becomes obscured by the thought's own form, and the [concrete] entities that are trees are looked upon as something not different from the single entity of the universal "tree". Since a great number of sentient beings possess such thoughts, the existence of universals is proclaimed in accordance with the ideas of the many. The intellect which harbours the form of a universal "tree" thus corresponds to the apparent [truth], concealing as it does the ultimate. Such a universal [form] of trees is a mere convention, but apart from that it does not exist in any ultimate sense. To sum up, it may be said that the universal [called] "tree" is imputed to the set of trees taken as the basis of imputation.'²⁷

In other words, the initial non-conceptual moments in the process of ordinary perception cannot lead to a soteriologically relevant realisation of reality as long as one's mind is engaged in the usual process of false imagining. It goes without saying that in the eyes of the Mādhyamikas it is not only the adherence to a notion of

²⁶ PV 1.68–70 (ed. GNOLI (1960: 38.11–6)):

*para-rūpaṃ sva-rūpeṇa yayā saṃvriyate dhiyā /
ekārtha-pratibhāsinyā bhāvān āśritya bhedinaḥ //
tayā saṃvṛta-nānārthāḥ^a saṃvṛtyā bhedinaḥ svayam /
abhedina ivābhānti bhāvā rūpeṇa kenacit //
tasyā abhiprāya-vaśāt sāmānyam sat prakīrtitam /
tad asat paramārthena yathā saṃkalpitam tayā //*

[^a Manorathanandin reads °-nānātvāḥ, which is supported by the Tibetan *tha dad pa nyid* (see the PV edition of Miyasaka (1972: 124–5)). My translation is based on Gnoli's edition.]

²⁷ DRSM, p. 57.20–26: *tsan dan dang nya gro dha sogs dngos po tha dad pa mthong ba'i mngon sum gyis drangs pa'i rtog pa'i shes pa la shing gi khyad par de dag gang du 'du ba'i shing zhes pa'i spyi gcig gi rnam pa shar zhing / de shar na rnam pa de phyi rol yin snyam nas don gyi spyi gcig pa zhig yod par 'dzin to / de 'dra ba'i don la spyi gcig pa med kyang med pa de rtog pa rang gi rnam pas bsgrigs nas shing gi dngos po rnam shing gi spyi'i dngos po gcig tu tha mi dad par mthong la / rtog pa de 'dra ba sems can shin tu mang ba la yod pas mang po'i bsam pa dang mthun par spyi yod pa skad du bsgrags so // de bas na shing spyi'i rnam pa can gyi blo ni kun rdzob ste dam pa'i don la sgrib byed yin pa'i phyir ro // de lta bu'i shing gi spyi de ni tha snyad tsam las dam pa'i don du med de / don bsdu na shing gi tshogs pa gdags gzhir byas nas shing gi spyi 'dogs so zhes bya ba yin no / .*

really existing universals which distorts one's perception of reality, but also the adherence to particulars, for both particulars and universals lack an own-being. gZhon nu dpal makes the following claim:

'Likewise, all imputations that a nature of entities exists are made on the basis of different parts. All perceptions of permanence, such as the thought that "The man of last year is this one [here]", are merely imputations relating to different earlier and later parts. Therefore, [whereas] Dharmakīrti [applies this critique] only to how universals are [wrongly] imputed to be real, it is applied in the Madhyamaka treatises to assertions concerning particulars as well, and [then] it is determined that all entities are without their own-being.'²⁸

Coming back to our principle of true nature: it has been shown why an ordinary conceptual mind does not experience reality as luminosity or the Buddha-nature (as taught in the teachings of the third *dharma-cakra*). Luminosity cannot be inferred by an inferential valid cognition, nor can it be ascertained on the basis of the first moments of a direct valid cognition. In this context it is of interest, how the Third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje (1284–1339) defends his definition of apparent truth as being mere appearances in the *Zab mo nang don gyi rang 'grel*. Rang byung rdo rje claims that even though the duality of a perceived object and a perceiving subject does not exist, something appears which is not deceptive. In response to the objection that these mere appearances would then be the ultimate truth, he clarifies his understanding of the ultimate truth:

'These [mere appearances] are presented as the expressible ultimate (*paryāya-paramārtha*), whereas the ultimate truth [here] is that which is related to the principle of the true nature (*dharmatā-yukti*), [namely] the natural emptiness previously mentioned while presenting the eighteen great [types of] emptiness.'²⁹

²⁸ DRSM, p. 58.23–26: *zhes gsungs pa ltar dngos po'i ngo bo yod snyam du btags pa thams cad cha tha dad pa la btags shing / na ning gi mi de 'di'o snyam pa la sogs pa'i rtag par 'dzin pa thams cad ni snga phyi'i cha tha dad pa la btags pa kho na yin pas chos kyi grags pas spyi dngos po bar btags pa'i tshul de kho na dbu ma'i bstan bcos rnams su rang gi mtshan nyid du 'dod pa rnams la yang sbyar nas dngos po thams cad rang bzhin med par gtan la phab bo / .*

²⁹ Rang byung rdo rje: *Zab mo nang don gyi rang 'grel*: 63a5–6: *'di yang rnam grangs kyi don dam par bzhag pa yod mod kyi / chos nyid kyi rigs pa'i rjes su 'brel pa dag ni stong pa nyid chen po bco brgyad kyi rnam par bshad pa'i rang bzhin stong pa nyid sngar smos pa de nyid don dam pa'i bden pa yin no / .*

In other words, the principle of true nature does not refer here to a correct perception of phenomenal reality (which yields apparent truth), but to the fact that the ultimate is of a given nature. Although its emptiness can be inferred on logical grounds, other aspects of it, such as luminosity, can only be verified after abandoning all wrong projections onto reality and the underlying process of false imagining. This is described in the *Nirvikalpa-praveśa-dhāraṇī*, for example, and referred to by Maitrīpa and Saha-javajra in the context of directly realising the luminous nature of reality.³⁰

Conclusion

The positive descriptions of the ultimate in the third *dharma-cakra* are mainly justified on the basis of the principle of true nature. This principle is not taken to stand in contradiction to the analytic approach of the second *dharma-cakra*, the latter being viewed indeed as a possible preparation for overcoming false imagining, which is a necessary condition for experiencing reality as it is. Since reality is thus beyond the reach of an ordinary intellect, one has to believe that it is of a certain nature, and that one will eventually experience it this way.

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Tsong kha pa on the Three Times: New Light on the Buddhist Theory of Time*

HIROSHI NEMOTO

1. Introduction

— 1.1 —

For Buddhist philosophers, time is not a substance existing apart from entities such as colour/form, sound and so on. In the *Abhidharma-kośa* time, not being enumerated in the list of seventy-five factors (*dharma*), is considered to be a nominal designation of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskāra*).¹ In the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* it is included in the list of non-associated compositional factors (*viprayukta-saṃskāra*) and is not posited as a substantial entity but rather as a nominal designation of a causal stream (*hetu-phala-prabandha-pravṛtti*).² Not surprisingly, Mādhyamikas deny that time is intrinsically existent, as is shown by such texts as the *Mūla-madhyamakakārikā* (Chapter 19) and *Catuḥ-śataka* (Chapter 11).

While denying the substantiality or intrinsic nature of time, however, Buddhist philosophers admit time divisions: the future, present and past, in terms of conventional experience. For otherwise one could not account for the recollection of past events, for the law of *karman* and transmigration, for the fact that previous karmic actions are responsible for our present experiences and so on. In fact, we can find

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¹ AKBh 212.13–14 (cf. POUSSIN (1937: 135)): *kālo nāma ka eṣa dharmah. saṃskāra-pari-dīpanādhivacanam etat.*—‘What is this *dharma* called “time”? It is a nominal designation indicating *saṃskāras*.’). AKBh 180.23: *kalpaṃ kiṃ-svabhāvaḥ. pañca-skandha-svabhāvaḥ.*—‘What is the essence of *kalpa*? [It has] the essence of being five aggregates.’

² AS₁ 19.8–9: *kālaḥ katamaḥ. hetu-phala-prabandha-pravṛtttau kāla iti prajñaptiḥ.*—‘What is time? It is a designation indicating the continuous succession of causes and effects.’

the definitions of the three times given in Buddhist texts such as the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, *Abhidharma-samuccaya* and *Catuh-śataka-ṭīkā*.³

Turning to Tibetan Buddhism, we notice that Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419), who flourished in Medieval Tibet and founded the dGe lugs pa sect, develops the Buddhist theory of time in an original way. He is unique, we have to say, in that he thinks that Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas assert that all the three times (*dus gsum ga*) are effective things (*dingos po*), that is, future, present and past things are equally capable of producing their effects. While it may be a challenging task to discuss whether and how Prāsaṅgikas actually express such an idea, this paper focuses upon Tsong kha pa's own view of time which he presents in his *rTsa she Tik chen* (Chapter 19), as well as in the *mNgon sum le'u'i Tikka*, a memorandum of his lecture on the *Pramāṇa-vārttika* 3, compiled by his prominent student mKhas grub rje dge legs dpal bzang po (1385–1438). His unique interpretation of the idea of time, we may say, has had a great influence on later dGe lugs pa scholars to this day.⁴

Tsong kha pa seems to have formed his own view of time by considering how the views of time accepted by the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools differed from that of the Vaibhāṣika school. Thus the purpose of this paper is first to consider his exposition of the Vaibhāṣika's view on time and then to examine his understanding of the view of time accepted by the other three schools.

2. Tsong kha pa on the Vaibhāṣika's view of time

— 2.1 —

As is generally known, Vaibhāṣikas, alias Sarvāsti-vādins, advocate the doctrine that factors exist as real entities (*dravya*) in the three time periods of future, present and past. Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, argue that there is no future nor past and that factors exist only in the present. Such a divergence of opinion had already been known in Tibet before the arrival of Tsong kha pa. mChims 'jam pa'i dbyangs (13c.) says the following:

‘Therefore, it is also stated by Ācārya Pūrṇavardhana as follows:
“Those who admit the existence of [an entity in each of] the three times are Sarvāsti-vādins; those who admit the existence of present

³ See MAVBh 47.8–11 (ad MAV 3.20cd), AS₁ 22.25–23.5 (=AS₂ 21.8–22), CṢṬ 171b6–7. Cf. *rTsa she Tik chen*, 197a3 ff.

⁴ For example, *Sras bsdus grwa*, an elementary textbook used at Drepung Gomang Monastery (*'bras spungs sgo mang grwa tshang*), devotes to the topic ‘Three Times’ (*dus gsum*) one chapter, in which Tsong kha pa's view is propounded.

things as well as that of past things which have not brought about effects are Vibhajya-vādins; and those who admit that [only] present things exist are Sautrāntikas”.⁵

mChims 'jam pa'i dbyangs already knew in this way that there is a divergence of opinion about the existence of a thing in the three time periods. According to him, in the Sarvāsti-vādins' view future, present and past things are equally existent; in the Vibhajya-vādins' view past things which have not yet brought about effects and present things are existent; in the Sautrāntikas' view only present things are existent. It is natural to assume that Tsonk kha pa must have been aware of such a difference of opinion among Buddhist schools concerning the existence of the three times.

— 2.2 —

Tsong kha pa summarises the Vaibhāṣika's theory of time as follows:

‘Vaibhāṣikas establish each [entity], e.g. a sprout, [as existent] in all of the three temporal periods. By doing so, they [intend to] say that a sprout exists even when the sprout has not yet come about and even when the sprout has passed away. They say the same thing about other entities also.’⁶

Tsong kha pa points out here that, in the Vaibhāṣika system, every entity is regarded as existing in each of the three temporal periods. This means that a single sprout, for example, continues to exist and remains constant throughout the three temporal periods. In Vaibhāṣikas' view, consequently, a single sprout can be established not only as a present sprout but also as a future sprout and a past sprout. Of course, this does not mean that a single entity can at the same time be a future thing, a present thing, as well as a past thing; for Vaibhāṣikas do accept time divisions. On the question of how the three times are distinguished from one another, there are four different views among Vaibhāṣikas: According to Dharmatrāta the three times are

⁵ mDzod 'grel mngon rgyan, 513.19–22 (cf. AKLA Chu. 112b4–5): *de'i phyir slob dpon gang spel gyis kyang / dus gsum ga yod par smra ba dang / da ltar ba dang 'das pa 'bras bu ma bskyed pa yod par smra ba dang / da ltar byung ba yod par smra ba rnams ni go rim bzhin du thams cad yod par smra ba dang / rnam par phye ste smra ba dang / mdo sde pa yin no zhes bshad do //*

⁶ rTsa she Tik chen, 198a3–4 (cf. SAMTEN—GARFIELD (2006: 400)): *bye brag tu smra ba rnams myu gu la sogs pa re re la dus gsum gsum du 'jog pas myu gu ma 'ongs pa dang 'das pa'i dus su yang myu gur yod par 'dod de dngos po gzhan la yang de ltar 'dod do //*

Comp. the parallel passages in *mNgon sum le'u'i Tikka*, 24b2 and *sTong thun chen mo*, 180a3–4; cf. CABEZÓN (1992: 307).

distinguished in terms of a change in nature (*bhāvānyathika*); according to Ghoṣaka, in terms of a change in characteristic (*lakṣaṇānyathika*); according to Vasumitra, in terms of a change in state (*avasthānyathika*); and according to Buddha-deva, through their mutual difference in state of affairs (*anyathānyathika*).⁷ According to Tsong kha pa, however, all Vaibhāṣikas should accept that an entity exists even when it has not yet come about and even when it has passed away. This is precisely what the three times theory advocated by Vaibhāṣikas claims.

3. Tsong kha pa on the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika's view of time

— 3.1 —

Tsong kha pa, basing himself on such Indian Buddhist treatises as the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, *Abhidharma-samuccaya* and *Catuḥ-śataka-ṭīkā*, attempts to grasp the point made by Sautrāntikas, Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas (including both Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas), saying:

‘Such being the case, the ceased sprout is the past sprout; the non-arisen sprout is the future sprout; the sprout which has arisen but which has not yet ceased is the present sprout. Therefore, with reference to three times, one has to take into consideration the following respective times of an entity like a sprout: the time of having ceased, that of having not yet arisen and that of having arisen but not yet ceased.’⁸

What Tsong kha pa means to say is as follows. First, when a sprout has ceased, it no longer exists; instead, there exists a ceased sprout (*myu gu zhig pa*). We should notice that the ceased sprout is not the sprout itself which has ceased (*zhig pa'i myu gu*). The sprout which has ceased is what existed before and what is hence not currently existent. The ceased sprout, on the other hand, refers to the state of the sprout's having ceased, which is considered to be existent. It is such a state of the sprout that is said to be ‘a past sprout’ (*myu gu 'das pa*). Secondly, when a sprout

⁷ See *rTsa she Tik chen*, 198a4–b8 (cf. SAMTEN—GARFIELD (2006: 400–401); AKBh 296.9–297.3 ad AK V 26ab) and *sTong thun chen mo*, 180a4–b3; cf. CABEZÓN (1992: 307–308).

⁸ *rTsa she Tik chen*, 197b6–198a1 (cf. SAMTEN—GARFIELD (2006: 400)): *de ltar na myu gu zhig pa ni myu gu 'das pa'i dus dang myu gu ma skyes pa ni myu gu ma 'ongs pa'i dus dang myu gu grub nas ma zhig pa ni myu gu da ltar ba'i dus yin pas / dus gsum char yang myu gu la sogs pa'i dngos po de'i zhig pa dang ma skyes pa dang skyes nas ma zhig pa'i dus gang yin pa de la rtsi ba yin gvi / ...* Comp. the parallel passages in *mNgon sum le'u'i Tikka*, 25b6–26a1 and *sTong thun chen mo*, 183a5–b1; cf. CABEZÓN (1992: 311).

has not yet arisen, it does not exist; instead there exists a non-arisen sprout (*myu gu ma skyes pa*). Here again, we should notice that the non-arisen sprout is not the sprout itself which has not yet arisen (*ma skyes pa'i myu gu*). The sprout which has not yet arisen is what will exist later and hence is not currently existent. The non-arisen sprout, on the other hand, is the sprout's state of having not arisen, which is considered to be existent. And such a state of the sprout is said to be 'a future sprout' (*myu gu ma 'ongs pa*). Thirdly, when a sprout has come into existence but has not yet ceased, the sprout itself is spoken of as 'a present sprout' (*myu gu da ltar ba*). In this case, there is no need to posit any factor other than the currently existent sprout as a present sprout.⁹

This is how Tsong kha pa explains the view of time held by the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools. The points he wishes to emphasise are (1) that in the three schools' view a sprout is regarded as existent only when it is in the present state; (2) and that in their view a future sprout is not the sprout which will come about, nor is a past sprout the sprout which existed before. Of these two points, the first point is in stark contrast to the Vaibhāṣika school's view that a single sprout continues to exist and remains constant throughout the three temporal periods.

—3.2 —

Of the second point, Tsong kha pa goes on to say:

'That which does not exist at the present moment when a speaker is in the process of using temporal language can nonetheless be said to be present (*lit.* 'is not said to be non-present'), because the [moment at which the speaker is making a statement] is the present [only] in relation to the speaker.'¹⁰

⁹ The same idea is expressed by dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po (1728–1791) who defines the three times as follows: 'The past is defined as the factor of another thing's having ceased in its second moment after its own time [i.e. the moment at which it is existent]. The future is defined as the factor of another thing's having not yet arisen due to the incompleteness of conditions within the context of a certain place and time even though causes producing it exist. The present is defined as that which has arisen but has not yet ceased.' (*Grub mtha' rin phreng*, 144.6–10: *dngos po gzhan zhig rang grub dus kyi skad cig gnyis par zhig pa'i cha de 'das pa'i mtshan nyid / dngos po gzhan zhig skye ba'i rgyu yod kyang rkyen ma tshang ba'i dbang gis yul dus 'ga' zhig tu ma skyes pa'i cha de ma 'ongs pa'i mtshan nyid / skyes la ma 'gag pa da ltar ba'i mtshan nyid /*).

¹⁰ *rTsa she Tik chen*, 198a1–2 (cf. SAMTEN—GARFIELD (2006: 400)): *dus kyi tha snyad byed pa pos brjod bzhin pa'i da ltar ba'i dus su med pa la da ltar ba ma yin par smra ba ma yin te de ni brjod pa po de la ltos pa'i da ltar ba yin pa'i phyir ro //* Comp. the parallel passage in *mNgon sum le'u'i Tikka*, 26a1–2 and *sTong thun chen mo*, 183b1–b2; cf. CABEZÓN (1992: 311).

This statement requires clarification. According to Tsong kha pa, the word ‘present’ has two different senses. First, the word is used in the sense of the moment at which a person makes a statement about a certain entity. For example, when a sprout has not yet arisen, one may say: ‘A sprout does not exist in the present.’ We may say that this is just the way we use the word ‘present’ from a commonsensical point of view.¹¹ Tsong kha pa, however, rejects such a way of using the word. He, instead, defines the present as the state of having arisen but not yet ceased, which is not distinct from the thing in that state. In his view, consequently, even the object which will arise tomorrow is regarded as present, for the object satisfies the condition of being present in the sense that it will be in the state of having arisen tomorrow. For example, when one speaks of the sprout which will be in the state of having arisen tomorrow, one may say: ‘It is a present sprout’, instead of saying: ‘It is a future sprout.’ What is, then, a future sprout? As we have seen, the future is defined as a thing’s state of having not arisen. Therefore, such a state of the sprout of tomorrow, today, yesterday, and so on, is spoken of as a future sprout. In the same manner, the object which existed yesterday is regarded as present. For example, when one speaks of the sprout which was in the state of having arisen yesterday, one may say: ‘It is a present sprout’, instead of saying: ‘It is a past sprout.’ What is, then, a past sprout? The past, under Tsong kha pa’s definition, is a thing’s state of having ceased. Therefore, such a state of the sprout of yesterday, today, tomorrow, and so on, is spoken of as a past sprout.

Tsong kha pa thus rejects the view that the present time is established in terms of a speaker’s perspective. From his standpoint, both the sprout of yesterday and that of tomorrow are ever present and never become past or future. We can recognise from these things that he takes the fact of the sprout being present as an unchanging truth.¹²

¹¹ We may recall that Bertrand RUSSELL (1940: Chap. VII) considers the words ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ to be ‘egocentric particulars’, the denotation of which is relative to the speaker.

¹² Interestingly enough, gSer mdog pañ chen Shākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), who argues against Tsong kha pa, seems to hold the view that the three times are established in terms of a speaker’s perspective. He defines the three times as follows: ‘The present is defined as that which has arisen but which has not elapsed at the present moment. This is illustrated by the harvest of this year. The past is defined as that which, in general, has arisen and then has gone away at the present moment. This is illustrated by the harvest of last year. The future is defined as that which, in general, has not yet arisen even though causes producing it exist. This is illustrated by the harvest of next year.’ (*dBu ma rnam nges*, Ba. 13b5–6: *da ltar gyi dus su skyes zhing thal ma zin pa de / da ltar ba’i mtshan nyid / mtshan gzhi ni da lo’i lo thog lta bu’o // spyir skye myong zhing da ltar gyi dus las gzhan du song ba de / ’das pa’i mtshan nyid / mtshan gzhi ni / na ning gi lo thog lta bu’o // spyir ’byung ba’i rgyu yod cing ma byung ba de / ma ’ongs pa’i mtshan nyid / mtshan gzhi ni / sang phod kyi lo thog lta bu’o //*).

— 3.3 —

Let me stress again that, as Tsong kha pa understands it, in the view of the three schools in question the sprout which will exist is not a future sprout; and the sprout which existed before is not a past sprout. Tsong kha pa distinguishes the sprout of tomorrow from a future sprout and the sprout of yesterday from a past sprout. In his view, the sprout of tomorrow, called ‘that which will come about’ (*'ong rgyu*), is considered to be the sprout’s present state which has not yet come about; and the sprout of yesterday, called ‘that which would cease’ (*zhig rgyu*), is considered to be the sprout’s present state which once existed. Let us consider the following remarks:

‘On account of this, we speak of the past king Mahā-saṁmata as a present person (*lit.* a present entity). This means that the king Mahā-saṁmata is a present person at his own time. And further, what will occur tomorrow is [said to be] a present entity since what will occur tomorrow is a present entity at its own time.’¹³

This might be explained as follows. A thing’s own time (*rang dus*) is the moment at which the thing is existent, before which it has not arisen and after which it will cease. That something is a present entity at its own time means that it exists at such a moment. Consequently, when one uses the expression ‘the sprout of tomorrow’, if one intends to imply that the sprout will exist tomorrow, one may speak of it as a present entity in the sense that the sprout is tomorrow’s ‘present’ sprout; and similarly, when one uses the expression ‘the sprout of yesterday’, if one intends to imply that the sprout existed yesterday, one may speak of it as a present entity in the sense that the sprout is yesterday’s ‘present’ sprout. What all this shows is that the sprout which exists at any particular moment should always be described as present irrespective of when the statement concerning the sprout is made.

In everyday linguistic usage also, we can describe the sprout of yesterday as the present by using a past tense, as we say: ‘The sprout was present’; and similarly, we can describe the sprout of tomorrow as the present by using a future tense, as we say: ‘The sprout *will be* present.’ But we should notice that Tsong kha pa, while analysing the expression of time, does not introduce the notion of verb tense at all. The fact of the sprout being present, as we have seen, is considered to be an unchanging truth. Accordingly, unlike in the case of ordinary language, the sprout is

¹³ *mNgon sum le'u'i Tikka*, 26a2–4: *rgyu mtshan 'di nyid kyis na 'das pa'i rgyal po mang pos bkur ba da ltar ba'i dngos po yin par smras pa ni rgyal po mang pos bkur ba'i rang dus na da ltar ba'i dngos po yin pa'i don dang / sang nyin dngos po da ltar ba yin pa'ang sang nyin rang dus na dngos po da ltar ba yin pa'i don yin no //*

always described as present by using an atemporal verb 'is' (*yin*), as it is said: 'The sprout is present' (*myu gu da ltar ba yin*). Mutatis mutandis for the future and past. The non-arisen sprout and the ceased sprout are always described as future and past, respectively, by using the atemporal verb, as it is said: 'The non-arisen sprout is future' (*myu gu ma skyes pa ma 'ongs pa yin*), and 'The ceased sprout is past' (*myu gu zhig pa 'das pa yin*). We may say that Tsong kha pa is thus trying to formulate all statements concerning the three times in an atemporal fashion.

4. Concluding Remarks

As shown above, Tsong kha pa, while explaining the view of time shared by the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools, makes a unique interpretation of the idea of the three times. According to him, the future is not that which will come about, but a thing's state of having not arisen; the past is not that which existed before, but its state of having ceased; and the present is the thing which is in the state of having arisen at the moment at which it exists. Consequently, from his viewpoint, the words 'future', 'present', and 'past' are used to refer to such objects without depending on the context in which their utterance is made. It is interesting that, identifying the three states of an entity with the three times, he ends up with the existence of the three times. This is along the line where he holds that Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas claim that the three times are effective things.

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The *Bodhi-caryāvatāra* and Its Monastic Aspects: On the Problem of Representation*

KAORU ONISHI

1. Introduction

— 1.1 —

Śāntideva, the author of the *Bodhi-caryāvatāra* (henceforth abbreviated BCA), is considered to have been active sometime between the mid-seventh century and the mid-eighth century.¹ If we are to believe the legendary accounts, he composed the BCA as a monk-scholar at the monastic university (*mahā-vihāra*) in Nālandā.² At the time of Śāntideva, Nālandā was one of the main *mahā-vihāras* that came to be the centres of Buddhist monastic life in India. Nālandā was so prosperous and prestigious that many monks from various regions of India, Tibet, and China wanted to come and study there.³ According to Xuanzang, who studied in Nālandā for six years (630–635 CE),⁴ there were several thousand monks at the ‘Nālandā

* I would like to thank Professor Robert Sharf (The University of California, Berkeley), Professor Donald Lopez and Professor Luis Gómez (both, The University of Michigan) for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper, although of course I am solely responsible for any surviving errors.

¹ According to BHATTACHARYA (1926: XXIII), the *terminus a quo* is suggested from the fact that Yijing, who left India in 695 CE, does not mention Śāntideva in his ‘Record’ (*Nanhai jigui naifazhuan*); the *terminus ad quem* is drawn from the fact that Śāntarakṣita, who visited Tibet in 743 CE, quotes two stanzas from the BCA (1.10 and 7.28) in his *Tattva-siddhi*. See PEZZALI (1968: 38; DE JONG (1975: 163, 179–80); SEYFORTH RUEGG (1981: 82). Also see BENDALL (1992: III–VI), who, earlier than Bhattacharya, suggests that the *terminus a quo* is the middle of the seventh century and the *terminus ad quem* is 800 CE, depending mostly on the accounts of Tāranātha. Cf. SCHIEFNER (1869: 161–164).

² OBERMILLER (1932: 162–63). Also see CHIMPA–CHATTOPADHYAYA (1970: 217), and SCHIEFNER (1869: 162–166).

³ DUTT (1962: 331–32).

⁴ LI (1959: 105, 120).

saṅghārāma'.⁵ Yijing, having stayed there for ten years (675–685 CE), also reports that there were more than three thousand monks and that there were eight halls and three hundred apartments in the monastery, for it was difficult for them all to assemble in one place.⁶ We can imagine a highly organised and institutionalised community from these accounts.

The Buddhist monastic community⁷ had, from early on, been regulated by the monastic codes: *vinaya*. It was the *vinaya* that prescribed the rules of discipline as well as rituals and behaviours of monks. The *vinaya* remained valid for the monastic communities regardless of whether they belong to 'Hīnayāna' or 'Mahāyāna'.⁸ Śāntideva, who is believed to have been a 'Mahāyāna monk', was very well aware of the *vinaya* regulations and seems to have respected them, which we know from his direct mention of *Prātimokṣa* rules in the BCA.⁹ And it is most probably in this local, cultural, and historical context that the BCA was produced by Śāntideva.

— 1.2 —

The BCA¹⁰ has been very popular in Western Buddhist scholarship. This is probably one of the texts most often rendered into Western languages throughout the his-

⁵ BEAL (1884: 170).

⁶ TAKAKUSU (1966: 154).

⁷ The word that refers to a Buddhist community in the broadest sense is *saṅgha*, which includes fully ordained monks and nuns (*bhikṣu/bhikṣuṇī*), male and female novices (*śrāmaṇera/śrāmaṇerī*), and laymen and laywomen (*upāsaka/upāsikā*). *Saṅgha* as a whole, which can be translated as 'Buddhist community', therefore, does not mean monastic community; however, the monks, nuns and novices constitute the community that is distinctive from lay people in terms of their social status. This community, which can be called '*saṅgha*' in the narrow sense of the word, can be conceived of as monastic; they left home and became wanderer (*parivrājaka*) or live in temporary retreats (*āvāsa*), or, later, they lived in monasteries (*vihāra*) or cave dwellings (*guhā*). See COLLCUTT (1987: 41–44) and GÓMEZ (1987: 57–60).

⁸ We do not know whether a monk could be called definitively Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna. Even if it was possible to somehow distinguish them, we do not know exactly how or to what extent this distinction was made.

⁹ ISHIDA (1993) details the correspondence between the stanzas and the *Prātimokṣa* rules. Together with other evidence, he suggests a hypothesis that the revision from Dunhuang version to the canonical version is a part of monachising process of the text.

¹⁰ The first Sanskrit edition of the text was published in 1889 by MINAYEFF, based on three manuscripts, two now in London and another in his possession. This edition was reproduced by H. P. Shastri in 1894 but it is said to be full of mistakes (KANAKURA (1958: 244)). Based on two more manuscripts, now in Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale, Devanāgarī 78 and Burnouf 98), la Vallée POUSSIN edited the text, along with Prajñākaramati's *Pañjikā*, from 1901 to 1914, which I

tory of Buddhist Studies.¹¹ The introductions to these translations, and other numerous remarks on the BCA, show that this work has been read in various manners: it was once called a ‘book of religious ardour (*enthusiasm*) and propaganda’ (la Vallée POUSSIN (1892)); KERN (1989: 11) defined it as a ‘poem breathing a truly pious spirit.’ In their subtitles to their translations, BARNETT (1959) and SCHMIDT (1923) characterised it as a ‘manual of Mahāyāna Buddhism’ and a ‘Buddhist didactic poem (*Lehrgedicht*) of the seventh century’, respectively. MURTI (1980: 101) said that the BCA and the *Śikṣā-samuccaya* are ‘our chief sources for the Mādhyamika path of spiritual realisation’; SEYFORTH RUEGG (1981: 82–83) claimed that it presented ‘the mystical aspects of Madhyamaka thought’, but should be read as ‘a philosophical treatise’ rather than a ‘religious and devotional poem’.

What is striking, however, is that most of these translators, as well as other scholars, have ignored its monastic aspects, which are especially evident in chapters five and six. It is only recently that its monastic character has been explicitly recognised and acknowledged. GÓMEZ (1995: 183) emphasised its monastic elements, such as ritual, demeanour, and monastic rules, by attributing importance to ‘precepts’¹². Further, in the ‘General Introduction’ to a recent English translation (CROSBY–SKILTON (1995)), WILLIAMS (1995: xi) imagines, based on the BCA, Śāntideva’s everyday life in a monastery, which serves as an indication of its monastic provenance. The translators are also well aware of the monastic context of the BCA.¹³ Despite this,

believe remains the best edition so far. V.S. Shastri (=Vidhushekhara BHATTACHARYA) also published an edition, together with the Tibetan translation, in 1960, probably based on the above-mentioned H.P. Shastri’s edition and perhaps revised depending on la Vallée Poussin’s edition. Also in 1960, VAIDYA published another edition based on a manuscript in Nepalese script (all stanzas in ten chapters and *Pañjikā* on the first nine chapters) and another in Maithili script (VAIDYA used this for the stanzas and *Pañjikā* of the ninth chapter); cf. KANAKURA (1958: 243–245); VAIDYA (1960: VII–VIII); PEZZALI (1968: 47–56); WALLACE (1997: 145–151).

¹¹ There have been two translations in French (from Sanskrit), two in German (from Sanskrit), eight in English (from either Sanskrit or Tibetan or both), one in Italian (partial), one in Spanish, one in Estonian. The BCA has been rendered into non-Western languages as well: two in Japanese (one from Sanskrit, one from Tibetan); one in each of four modern Indian languages—Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi, and Bengali; one in Mongol and Oirat (Kalmuk). Cf. VAIDYA (1960: x); PEZZALI (1968: 63–5); BATCHELOR (1994: 58); WALLACE (1997: 145–151).

¹² It is noteworthy that he presents selected passages from the BCA under the title of ‘Mahāyāna Liturgy’. Here, he also mentions the problem of circulation or usage of texts, which has rarely been asked, noting that the BCA was very popular ‘at least in monastic circles, during the later Mahāyāna period in India’ (1995: 184).

¹³ The translators repeatedly mention the importance of its monastic context. For example, CROSBY–SKILTON (1996: xxviii) say: ‘Particularly pertinent to Śāntideva’s work was the development of the monastic university at Nālandā, where it is said that he lived as a monk during the period at which he composed the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.’ Also see pp. xxvii, xxix, and xxxv.

perhaps because this translation is published as one of ‘World Classics’, the translators still try to present the BCA as a book not only for monks but also for lay people.¹⁴

In this paper, I consider how and why the BCA’s monastic aspects had been largely neglected until recently and why its monastic characteristics tend to be underrepresented still today. In other words, I address the problem of cultural representation, which has been recently raised in Buddhist Studies—e.g. in ALMOND (1988), TUCK (1990), SCHOPEN (1991), LOPEZ (1996)—reflecting the recent development of other fields, notably history and literary studies. Although there have been numerous translations of the BCA, there is no critical research on the interpretations of the BCA as cultural representation. This essay would be the first contribution that links the BCA to a broader discussion about the question of the production of knowledge in Buddhist Studies.

— 1.3 —

Before starting to discuss how the BCA has been represented and why its monastic aspects have been ignored, however, I should make it clear what I mean by ‘monastic’. The word ‘monastic’, when referring to people, generally means people living in a religious community who lead disciplined lives. Monasticism can be defined by its unique combination of social status, specific discipline, ritual and behaviour. The monastic leaves his lay household and dwells in a ‘new’ sacred home. His special status and self-identification are usually presented by his clothing, daily schedule, diet, all of which are distinctive from those of ordinary lay people. The monastic observes specific discipline, or monastic codes, in order to attain his religious goals. The monastic discipline also serves as the monastic identification by prescribing certain rituals and normative behaviours.¹⁵ Bearing in mind this general

¹⁴ In their comment on the monastic rules in the fifth chapter, CROSBY-SKILTON (1996: 33) note: ‘Yet although Śāntideva uses the terms of the monastic discipline, he is not merely quoting rules which must be obeyed mechanically. By emphasising that this code of discipline is a means of developing mindfulness, in a sense he is bringing these rules to life, both for the monks, for whom they may have become banal from familiarity, and *for the layman who has no obligation to observe them*. ... and in this way implies the primacy of practice and attainment over and above mere clerical hierarchy and formalism’ [my emphasis]. The prototype of this kind of view can be found in la Vallée Poussin’s introduction to his translation of chapter five; see la Vallée POUSSIN (1896: 308). WILLIAMS (1995: xxvi), too, says: ‘Though it was composed in India over a thousand years ago by a Buddhist monk for himself and a few like-minded friends, even allowing for the verses concerned with a Buddhist monastic environment, *the Bodhicaryāvatāra nevertheless presents us with a series of brilliant meditations directly relevant to our own present lives*’ [my emphasis].

¹⁵ Cf. WECKMAN (1987: 35–41).

usage of the word ‘monastic’, I will here use the word ‘monastic aspects’ to refer to these elements that are found in a text written by a monk, not by a lay person, composed for monks, not for lay people, and produced in a monastic community rather than in a lay community. In other words, monastic aspects are the features of a text as a product of monastic life. And, although the BCA is precisely this kind of work with many of these ‘monastic’ elements, it is these aspects that have received little attention in the study of, and in the production of knowledge about, the BCA.

2. Representations of the Text

The BCA has been represented in various manners but it would be useful, just for our discussion’s sake, to classify these portrayals into four models according to their presupposed orientations: (1) a doctrinal history model, (2) a spirituality model, (3) a philosophy model and (4) a way of life model. I should note, however, that these models have been historically influenced by, and ideologically connected with, each other. I will discuss the representatives of these models basically in chronological order, but we should keep in mind that most ‘portraits’ of the BCA represented by a translator have elements of two or more models.

2.0. Four Models

— 2.1 —

The first model sees the BCA from the perspective of the history of doctrines as an exemplar of thought as opposed to religious practice. La Vallée POUSSIN’s (1892) introduction to his first translation of the BCA (only chapters I–IV, and X) is an example of this strain; since his arguments presented there have influenced many other introductions, I will examine his introduction in greater detail.

La Vallée Poussin’s introduction consists of three parts: (1) general Introduction; (2) Śāntideva and the composition of the BCA according to Tāranātha’s history; and (3) Religious doctrine of the BCA. In the first part, he says that ‘from the point of view of ideas and religious impression the BCA is similar to *Bhagavad-gītā* as a religious and philosophical song’, and states that ‘several chapters are devoted to metaphysical discussions of the school.’¹⁶ After having explained the meaning of its title, he defines the BCA as a ‘book of religious ardour (*enthusiasm*) and propa-

¹⁶ POUSSIN (1892: 68–69). It is not very clear what he means by ‘the school’, but it probably means ‘Mahāyāna Buddhism’ because he does not mention Mādhyamika before this sentence but says that the BCA is the most interesting and suggestive ‘parmi les textes Bouddhiques du Nord’ (68).

ganda', for, according to him, 'all the flames of pious thought are expressed in it nobly and sincerely.' La Vallée POUSSIN (1892: 69) further maintains:

'We know the name of its author and the time of its composition, therefore, it is possible to construct the history of religion in India through the study of the dated document and through the history of the sects.'

Here we can see his excitement about a document of which he thought he could know the date somewhat precisely; at the same time, however, we must note that he is particularly interested in placing the BCA in 'the history of sects' (*l'histoire des sectes*), showing his personal inclination to the analysis of the different sects.¹⁷ But it is not of course just a matter of personal preference. La Vallée Poussin's assumption that we can reconstruct the history of religion in India by tracing the history of sects is of great significance in thinking about the representation of the BCA in the West. This presupposition most probably comes from the nineteenth-century *Zeitgeist*: historicism, which is concerned primarily, if not solely, with the reconstruction of historical, objective, and therefore universal 'facts'. This historicist orientation led to the idea that the analysis of the doctrines of different sects can constitute the major part of the study of religion. We should not overlook that it is this idea, represented by la Vallée Poussin, that has played a key role in creating the privileged status of the ninth chapter in the research history of the BCA. After all, la Vallée POUSSIN (1898) published the Sanskrit edition of chapter nine of the BCA, with the corresponding section of the *Pañjikā*, before he published the complete edition of all nine chapters of the *Pañjikā*.

In the second part, la Vallée Poussin tries to place Śāntideva in the lineage of scholars at Nālandā by utilising secondary sources—mostly Chinese texts.¹⁸ But he does not even mention Nālandā's local situation as a monastic university, despite the fact that we can see it, albeit indirectly, in Tāranātha's accounts la Vallée POUSSIN (1892: 72–5) introduces in the following part. This omission of the local context shows that he is only interested in 'universal' thoughts that are supposedly constructed from a philological reading of written texts. La Vallée Poussin only summarises the 'legend' told by Tāranātha and does not reflect upon the implication the legend carries. In other words, he deals with the legend only as a quasi-historical account, which he uses as external evidence to support his 'reconstructed' ideas, and does not fully consider the meaning of the legend in Indo-Tibetan tradition itself. Many other trans-

¹⁷ DE JONG (1987: 45) says: 'He preferred to analyse the views of the different schools. No scholar has contributed more to our knowledge of Buddhist Abhidharma than La Vallée Poussin.'

¹⁸ La Vallée POUSSIN (1892: 70) acknowledges three books as his sources: (1) *Bouddhisme* by Ryōon Fujishima, (2) *Bouddhisme II* by H. Kern (Jacobi's translation), and (3) Minayeff's article (?): 'La doctrine du salut dans le Bouddhisme postérieur' (source unidentified).

lators follow la Vallée Poussin and, in almost the same manner, give a summary of the Tibetan historian's account in their introductions (e.g. Finot, Schmidt).

In the third part, la Vallée Poussin first declares that the BCA 'expounds the doctrine of Salvation' and is 'not a philosophical treatise but a vivid and sincere exhortation.' What is surprising is that, for him, 'philosophical treatise' means 'certain Buddhist works, the *Dhamma-pada* for example and the works of Southern (Buddhism) in general.' La Vallée POUSSIN (1892: 75) then goes on to the comparison of them with the BCA and claims:

'These Pāli treatises are completely unaware of the confidence of the faithful in its master, love and faith. In a word, it is Bhakti that characterises the Northern Buddhism and the Hindu religions (*les religions hindoues*).'

The subtext here is of course the dichotomy between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhisms. It is originally an emic categorisation with highly polemical intentions, but, in the West, it was generalised to become a framework for conceiving Buddhism as an object of study. In this framework, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna came to be considered sharply distinctive from each other with little overlaps, which we know is no longer true. This is obviously a result of too much emphasis on the doctrinal history in which the contention between the two is most evident.¹⁹ Thus, while 'Pāli Buddhism' is restricted by 'philosophical' doctrines, la Vallée POUSSIN (1892: 77) maintains, we find in the BCA a 'living and warm religion.' And he concludes his discussion by noting as follows:

'Now we know that the doctrine of salvation, *which is the core (le tout) of Buddhism*, appears to us very differently in the books of Pali and in the books of Northern Buddhism. ... Buddhism sometimes assumes the character of philosophy and morality without God. This is the doctrine of

¹⁹ In his article, 'Mahāyāna', la Vallée POUSSIN (1908–1926: 330–31) begins his 'Definition and Description' by noting that '[i]n order to define Mahāyāna, we must first notice certain characteristics of the Hīnayāna.' He then lists five points that he thinks define Hīnayāna: (1) the doctrine of salvation, which he calls a 'perfectly coherent mysticism' with 'philosophical' and 'ethical' dogmas; (2) the method of salvation, which, he notes, cannot be practised 'except by a person who observes ... 'morality' and, what is very important, 'a person who practises continence ... as a Buddhist monk'; (3) the view on Buddha, who is 'very different from other saints'; (4) the place of 'devotion (*bhakti*)' in the cult of the Buddha, which is 'useful and recommended ... , as penance (*tapas*) is, but is not essential'; (5) teachings on 'how to be re-born in heaven, in the world of *Brahmā*.' In contrast with these characteristics of Hīnayāna, la Vallée Poussin argues that Mahāyāna consists of three elements: (1) the practice of the virtues (*pāramitās*) of a *bodhisattva* or future Buddha; (2) the wisdom or knowledge of vacuity; (3) devotion.

Southern Buddhism, which became popular in the West (*en occident*). It sometimes assumes the character of ardent religion (*religion enthousiaste*). This is Northern Buddhism with countless deities, tutelary Buddhas, and benevolent Bodhisattvas.’ (1892: 82) [My emphasis].

Nevertheless, as the title of the third part, ‘religious doctrine’, shows, most of his argument there consists of ‘doctrinal’ and ‘soteriological’ issues such as views on Buddha and *nirvāṇa* and the philosophies of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika found mostly in the ninth chapter. On account of these almost exclusively doctrinal discussions, it should be noted, la Vallée Poussin came to the above conclusion. Even though he says that the BCA is not a ‘philosophical treatise’, he still perceives it only from the perspective of Buddhist doctrines, excluding the elements of religious practice that would have indicated the monastic context of the BCA. He published a complete translation of the BCA in 1906 and 1907 but again never explicitly mentioned its monastic aspects in his introduction.

La Vallée Poussin, however, was by no means indifferent to, nor of course ignorant of, Buddhist monastic rules. On the contrary, he was well aware of the fact that Śāntideva refers to the *Prātimokṣa* rules in the BCA, which we know from the footnotes in his translation (1906–1907) and his introduction to the translation of chapter five (1896) that was published between the two above-mentioned translations.²⁰ la Vallée POUSSIN (1896: 308) notes:

‘*Bodhicaryāvatāra* is a sort of *Vinaya* or *Dharmaśāstra* for the use of Buddhists: we read in the fifth chapter the series of precepts of a practical nature, (on the manner of eating, of sitting, of gesturing) (91, 92, 94, 95), general advice on purity, the rule which orders that one avoid what is disapproved of in society (93). The ascetic must have a smiling face, he must speak gently and clearly; he looks at creatures in the face, his step is silent, he encourages good people.—All these practices are dominated by a constant concern about “the purification of thought (*pensée*)”: ... To realise this essential “*vrata*” (see 16, 18) one must read the books of *Dharma* (98).’²¹

But, at the same time, la Vallée POUSSIN (1896: 308) maintains that:

²⁰ It is not all clear to me why he published this chapter separately.

²¹ He has a footnote to this passage: ‘We must not forget that the practice is an inferior means of salvation: if intelligence is not illuminated by the supreme truth, nothing serves for taking vow of Bodhi and for observing the rules of conduct (rien ne sert de former vœu de Bodhi et d’observer les règles de vie) ...’

‘Śāntideva does not address the *Bhikṣus*, members of a religious order with regular *Prātimokṣas*, but the lay Bodhisattvas, the faithful of a broader Church (see śl.93).’

The verse in question (5.93) does not talk about rules to address ‘the lay Bodhisattvas’ but about monastic codes laid down for ascetic monks, however.²² As la Vallée Poussin himself explains, the second half of the verse is simply ‘the rule which orders that one avoid what is disapproved of in society.’ And the context of the verse makes it clear that ‘one’ here means an ‘ascetic’ (*yati*).²³ Still, as is evident in his discussions on ‘religious doctrines of Bodhicaryāvatāra’, la Vallée Poussin assumes that Mahāyāna is entirely different from Hīnayāna. And this assumption comes from his conception that ‘the core of Buddhism’ is ‘the doctrine of salvation’. It thus seems that his limited interests in the doctrinal history prevented him from recognising the fact that these verses in chapter five are the rules for ascetic monks. He must have thought that he should present the BCA as an exclusively Mahāyāna text that is distinctive from Hīnayāna texts.²⁴

— 2.2 —

The second model emphasises the ‘spirituality’ of the Bodhisattva practice. The examples are Louis FINOT’s (1920) introduction and Auguste BARTH’s (1893) remark that compares the BCA to the *Imitation of Christ* by Thomas à Kempis. FINOT

²² BCA 5.93 reads:

*nāikānya-striyā kuryād yānaṃ śyanam āsanam /
lokāprasādakaṃ sarvaṃ drṣṭvā pṛṣṭvā ca varjayet //*

‘One should neither walk nor lay down nor sit down with any one women. By knowing and asking all the things that are considered disturbing by common people, one should avoid them.’

I have not identified the rule in *Prātimokṣa* corresponding to 93cd, but ISHIDA (1993: 8–9) points out that we can find the elements in 93ab in more than one *Prātimokṣas*. Cf. la Vallée POUSSIN (1901–1914: 149). Also see CROSBY–SKILTON (1995: 163, a note to 5.93b).

²³ We find explicit references to *yati* twice (5.21 and 5.73). If you look at only the verse 5.93, it is not entirely impossible to take it as an exhortation to ‘ascetise’ lay people. But chapter five as a whole makes this interpretation very unlikely. Cf. ROBINSON (1965–66).

²⁴ In the introduction to his edition of the ninth chapter of the BCA and *Ādikarma-pradīpa*, la Vallée POUSSIN (1898: 1–161) opposes the views of the so-called Pāli school, represented by Oldenberg and Rhys Davids, that only the Pāli canon can be the source for the ‘historical’ study of Buddhism. He maintains that ‘Pāli Buddhism’ is a narrow doctrinal system and Mahāyāna Buddhism, which the BCA represents as a new text of the time, can provide much richer religious ideas. Cf. its review by Paul CARUS (1899).

(1920: 9) gives a literal translation of the title: ‘Introduction to the Practice leading to Bodhi’, and explains that ‘the practice (*caryā*, the “course”, or “career”, in the etymological sense) is the set of spiritual exercises which lead the future Buddha toward his goal.’ It seems that he uses the word ‘spiritual exercises’, which is of course a Catholic term,²⁵ to emphasise two elements of Buddhist practice that he thinks share their value with Christianity: piety and charity.²⁶ Interpreting the key words such as ‘Buddha’, Finot maintains that Śāntideva belongs to the ‘Mahāyānist church’, in which, according to him, ‘the travellers’ are led to the ideal state of ‘Buddha, Saviour of the world’ through the practice of charity. Although he does not attempt to detail the doctrinal history, he takes for granted the dichotomy between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. He certainly gives the impression that only Mahāyāna Buddhism can be ‘spiritual’. FINOT 1920: (13–14) states:

‘Although hagiography tells us very little about this person (*personnage*), his work is more instructive: it reveals an original and engaging physiognomy, where the characteristics of the Mahāyānist spirit dominate: piety and charity.’

In order to support this point, FINOT (1920: 14) quotes the following remark by Auguste BARTH (1893: 259–260):

‘It is a very beautiful work, ... a kind of Buddhist equivalent to the *Imitation of Christ*, with which it shares its *humble renunciation and passionate charity*. An aspect in the Indian Buddhism of the seventh century, about which we had not known, is revealed to us: *the true spirit of the apostolic mission had not been extinguished* and, among its ranks, *it included not only bonze (il ne comptait pas que des bonzes)*.’ [My emphasis]

The BCA’s similarity to *The Imitation of Christ* is one of the recurring themes in its representation, especially in the early stage of Western studies on the BCA (from 1890’s to 1920’s).²⁷

²⁵ For Ignatius Loyola’s well-known work, which has the very term, ‘Spiritual Exercises’, as its title, see, for example, an English translation by Anthony MOTTOLA (1989). Thomas à Kempis also wrote a book titled ‘Spiritual Exercises’; see SHERLEY-PRICE (1952: 22).

²⁶ FINOT (1920: 19–20) is aware of Poussin’s doctrinal inclination and seems to have tried to contrast his translation against it by emphasising spiritual aspects and the poetical beauty of the BCA. On its poetical beauty, also see WINTERNITZ (1987: 308, 313).

²⁷ On BARTH’s remark, also see FOUCHER (1908: 241–42) and WINTERNITZ (1987: 313). MURTI (1980: 101) also regards the BCA in a similar way: ‘A very high order of spiritual serenity and detachment pervades his works. One is invariably reminded of the *Imitation of Christ* in reading the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, which is the stronger in appeal, as it is born of deep philosophical insight.

The Imitation of Christ (*Imitatio Christi*) is a fifteenth-century work that is usually, at least since the nineteenth century, included in the genre of ‘devotional’ literature (CREASY (1989: xiii)), or what is now called books of ‘spirituality’. It has been traditionally attributed to Thomas à Kempis (c. 1379–1471), an Augustinian monk of Mount St. Agnes monastery (near Zwolle, Holland) that was associated with a religious movement called *Devotio Moderna*. The movement led to the formation of the Brethren of the Common Life, a group that stressed ‘simplicity, humility and great faith’, ‘an intimate relationship with God’, and ‘personal piety grounded in devotion to Jesus and to prayer and meditation’ (CREASY (1989: xliiv)). As a monk of such a community, Thomas spent 72 years in the monastery in his 92 year-long life; he wrote as Novice Master his collection of sermons to the novices and other didactic works, one of which is the *Imitation*. It is therefore a well-known fact that this text was composed in a monastic context (SHERLEY-PRICE (1958: 11)): a monk composed it for novices in a monastic community. We should also note that it is primarily an ascetic work because, as a work of *Devotio Moderna* movement, its main themes are *contemptus mundi* and self-denial. Given that the *Imitation* thus has monastic and ascetic aspects, it seems curious that scholars who noticed its similarity to the BCA did not acknowledge the monastic and ascetic aspects of the BCA. In other words, why, despite *The Imitation*’s monastic provenance, was the BCA’s monastic context ignored? Why did they think that the BCA and the *Imitation* had in common only such elements as ‘piety and charity’ or ‘humble renunciation and passionate charity’?

We can probably find a clue to these questions if we consider how the *Imitation* has been recommended to and read by lay people in Christian countries. It is perhaps the case that lay readers have been attracted not so much by its monastic and ascetic roots and ideals as by its devotional and ‘spiritual’ aspects, that is, by those aspects of its message that can be taken out of their monastic contexts to become ‘internalised’, ‘individualised’ and ‘universalised’ private ideals. It also appears that the translators of the *Imitation* have tried to present it as a book from which not only monks but also laymen can learn something about their spiritual life.²⁸ It thus seems highly probable that in the time of secularisation, especially from the Victorian era onward, both groups of lay intellectuals, those who read the medieval Christian text from modern lay perspectives and those who introduced the Buddhist text from the ‘Orient’ to the West, have interpreted their texts on a similar set of presuppositions, seeing them as documents of private piety, or ‘spirituality’. Such presuppositions reflect major changes that came with modernity but culminated in the late nine-

Devotion (*bhakti*) to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and confession of one’s transgressions (*pāpadeśanā*) before them are enjoined as part of spiritual purification. This is by no means an innovation; Nāgārjuna’s *Catuḥstava* is in the same strain.’

²⁸ See in particular CREASY’S (1989) introduction to his translation.

teenth century, and led to the secularising of religion in general and the laicising of monastic works in particular.²⁹

The last sentence of BARTH's comment as well furnishes a clue to these questions. The word 'bonze' in particular seems to be suggestive in this context because this word had been used, since the late eighteenth century, in the 'rhetoric of indolent and decadent Chinese monasticism.'³⁰ As Almond explains, the nineteenth-century views on *contemporary* Buddhist monasticism were primarily negative ones. He suggests that severe criticism against Buddhist monasticism was motivated by 'an anti-Catholic bias in Victorian society' in general and 'Victorian gospel of work' in particular. Thus, Buddhist monasticism of the time came to be seen as 'pre-eminently selfish and anti-social.' Its similarity to the practice of Catholicism, says Almond, also played an important role in forming the negative evaluations of Buddhist monasticism.

In considering the origin of the spirituality model in the BCA's representation, it is even more significant that not only Protestant Victorians but also Catholic missionaries from earlier periods criticised Buddhist monasticism, particularly that of Chinese Buddhism, which came to produce the dominant 'image of a decadent Mahāyāna monasticism' (ALMOND (1988: 121)) in the Victorian era. This image therefore is not just a product of Protestant bias against other religions but a typical manifestation of Orientalism, which postulates the absolute difference between the West and the Orient, claiming the ultimate supremacy of the West over the Other. ALMOND (1988: 140) suggests that this 'fundamental mode of organising the East' provided Europeans with a 'conceptual filter through which acceptable aspects of Buddhism could be endorsed, unacceptable ones rejected.' It is of course difficult, from BARTH's brief remark quoted above, to determine whether or not he actually had this filter, or how strongly he held it even if he did. In other words, we cannot tell, depending only on the remark, whether or not he acknowledged the BCA's similarity to the *Imitation* in order to give his endorsement to the 'spirituality' of the BCA in the Orientalist discourse.

The context in which he made this remark, however, makes it clear that Barth was working within a massive textualisation of 'religions of India'. He commented on the BCA as one of the numerous Indian texts that were newly edited and translated in the West. In fact, his article entirely consists of the enumeration of such texts and his brief comments on them. And this article as a whole, we should note, is called

²⁹ For a useful account of 'laicisation', 'monachisation', 'secularisation', and 'asceticisation', see ROBINSON (1965–66).

³⁰ ALMOND (1988: 120). There have been much criticism of Almond's book and I agree that it poses certain problems we should be careful of. See, in particular, Charles HALLISEY's (1995: 31–32) critique on 'latent Orientalism'. Even so, I believe, Almond accounts on the nineteenth-century construction of Buddhism give much useful information for my present discussion.

‘Bulletin des religions de l’inde’. This kind of textualisation of the Other, which has as its basis what SAID calls ‘textual attitude’, is one of the main features of Orientalism.³¹ Seen from this perspective, it is perhaps not farfetched to interpret Barth’s words as a part of Orientalist discourse. ‘True spirit of the apostolic mission had not been extinguished’; in other words, it had survived in this eighth-century Indian *text*, which only we, Westerners, can read and understand to reconstruct the ideal of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is we in the West, he would maintain, that speak for the true form of Mahāyāna that has been long lost, not they, the contemporary ‘corrupt’ Buddhists in the Orient.

On the surface level, the spirituality model can be seen as a reaction to the Victorian denigration of Mahāyāna monasticism. But on the deeper level, we should note, this type of admiration of the BCA is still in the same framework of Orientalist discourse. They share with the Victorians the Orientalist and textualist assumption that that true Buddhism can be found only in the text, not in the actual practices of ‘fallen’ Buddhists in Asia. Despite the fact that FINOT (1913), before his translation of the BCA, edited the *Prātimokṣa* of the Sarvāsti-vādins, which explains his often accurate understanding of stanzas referring to these rules in chapter five of the BCA, he never mentioned the monastic context of the BCA.³² He dismissed it deliberately and emphasised its spirituality expressed in the text, since the image of Buddhist monasticism was too negative to be acknowledged as an aspect of a text that was supposed to represent ‘true’ Mahāyāna Buddhism. What we should remember here is that this negative image had largely been formed on account of the actual practice in contemporary Asian countries.

— 2.3 —

In the third place, partly as a reaction against the spirituality model and partly as a continuation of the doctrinal history model, the BCA is often seen as primarily, if not exclusively, a philosophical treatise. This tendency has been demonstrated by many Japanese scholars as well,³³ but the best examples are still Western. Consider, for instance, the following statement of D. SEYFORTH RUEGG (1981: 83):

³¹ On the textualisation of Buddhism, see ALMOND (1988: 3). On ‘textual attitude’, see SAID (1979: 92–95). Cf. HALLISEY (1995: 37 and n. 37).

³² He does not mention the existence of these stanzas in his introduction and never gives reference to the rules in his translation of these stanzas.

³³ To discuss how Japanese scholars have seen the BCA is beyond the scope of this paper, but I should note here that most research in Japan have dealt only with chapter nine.

Privileging philosophical aspects of Buddhist texts as the object of study appears to have a lot to do with Japanese scholars’ fear of being called ‘sectarian’. By avoiding being explicitly

‘Because it is concerned also with the religious side of Madhyamaka thought the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* has sometimes been described as a primarily religious and devotional poem rather than a philosophical treatise. Such a description however curiously neglects the ninth chapter—the longest in the whole work—dealing with the *prajñāpāramitā*, which clearly places the treatise in the main stream of Madhyamaka thought; and if due consideration is given to this chapter it becomes abundantly clear that the work is hardly more religious in any sense exclusive of philosophy than certain earlier works of the school attributed to Nāgārjuna, e.g. the *Ratnāvalī*, as well as important portions of Āryadeva’s, Bhāvaviveka’s and Candrakīrti’s treatises.’

Notice first that he considers the BCA only in the context of Madhyamaka philosophical treatises. Chapter nine is the most important of all the chapters, he appears to think, just because it ‘places the treatise in the main stream of Madhyamaka thought.’³⁴ Notice also his presupposition that ‘philosophy’ is different from the ‘religious’ side of thought; he even considers the ‘religious’ side as a side of ‘Madhyamaka thought’, not as an aspect of Buddhism as religion. In other words, he

‘sectarian’, they try not to ‘taint’ their supposedly scientific objectivity with their faith or religious commitment. Since the creation of ‘Buddhist Studies’ in the Meiji period, Japanese scholars, most of whom are Buddhist priests, have struggled to establish the discipline as a scientific field of study worthy of pursuing even in an increasingly modernised and secularised society. For instance, in the introduction to Nanjō Bunyū’s autobiography, Hajime SAKURABE (1979: 327–8), a contemporary scholar of Abhidharma (now retired from Otani University), argues that ‘modern Buddhist Studies’ differ from sectarian studies in three aspects: (1) sources and materials, (2) method and (3) purpose or goal of study:

‘They are different in terms of sources in that, while previous studies deal with Chinese and Japanese materials ..., modern Buddhist Studies, in addition to them, use Sanskrit and Pāli materials ... They are different in terms of method in that, while previous studies placed their main emphasis on the exposition of sectarian doctrines ..., modern Buddhist Studies, by introducing Western academic method, explore new research fields such as historical, philological, and doctrinal studies, *with liberal and critical attitude that is free from sectarian restrictions*. They are different in terms of purpose in that, if one can, or should, distinguish academic study of Buddhism which stems from *universal desire for knowledge* from following Buddhist path guided by *one’s inner religious desire*, modern Buddhist Studies definitely fall into the first category.’ [My translation and my emphasis].

³⁴ He assumes that the longer a chapter is the more important it is, but there is no ground for that assumption. Moreover, as for the number and length of *kārikā* themselves, chapter nine (168 *ślokas*) is merely the second longest after the eighth one (with 180 *ślokas* and 6 *triṣṭubhs*). Apparently SEYFORTH RUEGG is wrong because it is Prajñākarmati’s commentary that dedicates more space to the ninth chapter than to any other.

seems to be forgetting that Buddhist philosophy is a part of the religion and Buddhism is more than just a thought.

For SEYFORTH RUEGG (1981: 82), Śāntideva is simply a ‘great representative of the (Prāsaṅgika?) Madhyamaka school.’ It is in a manner of speaking only natural, however, that he takes this point of view because his book is, after all, about the *Literature of the Madhyamaka Philosophy in India* published in a series called *A History of Indian Literature*. But the real problem is that, as LOPEZ (1995a: v) pointed out, this kind of book, or series, which focuses almost exclusively on philosophy or ‘the religious expressions of elite groups’, have until recently dominated Indology in general and Buddhist Studies in particular. Seyforth Ruegg claims that, ‘if due consideration is given to this chapter’, it becomes evident that the BCA is as philosophical as other earlier works of Madhyamaka school. But the question I am asking here is how, by what standard, one decides what is ‘due’ in the study of Buddhism. Who decides what is ‘due’ is also a critical question, of course, which appears to elude Seyforth Ruegg’s ‘philosophical’ mind.

There seem to be a number of factors that have brought the special emphasis on philosophy into Buddhist Studies. One element among others would be the rationalism of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, which made Buddhism an object of ‘reasoned analysis and study’ and ultimately aimed at ‘rational construction of Buddhism’ (BATCHELOR (1994: 231, 246)). Romanticism of the nineteenth century appears to be another reason; as TUCK (1990: 10) suggests, Europeans have enthusiastically studied Buddhism to find ‘answers to Western philosophical problems.’ But the nature of modern scholarly tasks can be counted among the most important reasons for the privileged status of philosophy. Scholars in Buddhist Studies, and perhaps scholars in humanities in general as well, who undertake intellectual tasks as their profession, tend to pay more attention to intellectual activities, or ‘high tradition’, of Buddhists, thus granting a privileged status to ‘philosophy’, a culmination of intellectual practice. But they all too easily forget the fact that philosophy is for most Buddhists only a part of their religious life; the majority of people in Buddhist traditions, both the monastic and the lay who do not produce philosophical texts, are more concerned with ‘mundane’ things such as merit, right behaviour, rituals, and ceremonies in a community.³⁵

What should be noted here, however, is that, among traditional Buddhists themselves, philosophy and ‘philosophers’ often claim authority over a whole religious tradition, trying to create the identity, consistency, and integrity of the tradition. This

³⁵ These aspects of Buddhism are clearly demonstrated in LOPEZ (1995a). SCHOPEN (1997) has also shown that monks and nuns in India were as well concerned with these ‘mundane’ matters as lay people.

point about the place of philosophy in Buddhist traditions is supported by the fact that the emphasis on philosophical aspects can also be found in Indian scholarship. As is well-known, Prajñākaramati (late tenth century to early eleventh century) comments more on the ninth chapter than on any other. Furthermore, the fact that there is a commentary on only chapter nine (P No. 5278) suggests that this chapter assumed a special meaning among Indian scholars already around the eleventh century.³⁶ This does not mean that the BCA as a whole was thought of as a philosophical work,³⁷ but it does mean that what might be called ‘philosophical bias’, which must have been pervasive in Indian Buddhist scholars’ circles, began to be applied to the BCA rather soon after its production by Śāntideva. And it is this attitude that has been inherited in modern Buddhist Studies in the West.³⁸ As SEYFORTH RUEGG’s confusion about the length of the chapters (eight and nine) of the BCA implies,³⁹ he looks at the text only through the eyes of Prajñākaramati, who most certainly represents the ‘religious expressions of elite groups’ and, therefore, cannot be counted as one of the majority in Buddhist traditions at large.

It is thus not surprising at all that Western scholars who have been interested only in philosophy or in the thought of individual authors as the representatives of philosophical schools, have not taken into account the BCA’s monastic aspects in their representation of the text. The purpose of studying a text, those scholars would maintain, is to reconstruct its author’s thinking process as meticulously as possible in the historical development of ‘Buddhist thought.’ Their assumption is that philosophy is a purely intellectual entity that can be treated separately from other sides of religion. Monastic elements, such as the liturgical structure and allusions to the

³⁶ The Tibetan *Tri-piṭaka* also lists a commentary only on the ninth and tenth chapters (P No. 5279) as an independent work. But this commentary is actually an extract of the two chapters from another commentary on all chapters (P No. 5274). This confusion may suggest that chapter nine, together with chapter ten, in this case, had been circulated independently probably as a text for philosophical debates; cf. EJIMA (1966).

³⁷ On the contrary, clear evidence shows that the BCA had been used as liturgical manual as well as pedagogical device in Indo-Tibetan tradition. For its liturgical structure, see GÓMEZ (1995). As to a pedagogical usage of the text, see EIMER (1981), which contains the list of stanzas in a summary called *Piṇḍārtha*. The *Piṇḍārtha* is an abridgement of the text, but the inclusion of the first stanzas of some chapters gives an impression that these stanzas were chosen somewhat mechanically just to draw an outline of the BCA. Nevertheless, its selection of verses clearly shows that this work was meant to be a kind of introductory guide for novices.

³⁸ Considering the nature of any scholarly tasks and the place of philosophy in both Western and traditional Buddhist scholarships, it should be clear why the philosophical bias remains strong even today. For example, SEYFORTH RUEGG (1995: 145), again, recently confirmed his conviction that ‘philosophical thinking constitutes a major component in Buddhism.’

³⁹ See n. 34.

states of mind of monks in a community found in the BCA, is irrelevant to this reconstruction of the author's philosophy. For, an author's philosophy consists of his 'private' thoughts and, therefore, can be placed in the historical, and 'universal', development of philosophy. Accordingly, scholars who privilege philosophy tend to ignore social and cultural conditions in local and traditional communities, in which various thoughts were produced, accepted (or rejected), and transmitted over time.

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At the almost exactly opposite pole of the philosophy model and, therefore, at least on one level, on somewhat closer side of the spirituality model, we find the fourth approach to the BCA: the 'way of life' model.⁴⁰ It is represented by modern Western scholars who sympathise with certain aspects of Tibetan Buddhism as their 'spiritual' ideal. It also serves as a model when the BCA is presented to Western audience by modern Tibetan scholars who appeal to Westerners to make them supporters of their endangered culture and religion in the current historical situation since 1959.⁴¹ In this model the BCA is portrayed as a book that tells the way of life to modern everyday man in the West. Asking why the BCA has been popular in the Western intellectual world, BATCHELOR (1994: 58) maintains:

'What is it about A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life that makes it so appealing even today? ... It is the compelling *humanism* of the text, the author's intensely *personal tone*, that speaks across time and culture to the concerns and aspirations of our age.' [My emphasis]

In the chapter of his book that contains this passage, Batchelor describes the historical and cultural context in which the BCA was produced. He is probably right when he assumes that Śāntideva 'lived at a time of internal political conflict and disarray in the Indian subcontinent', noting that the time of the production of the

⁴⁰ Tenzin GYATSO (1994: 1), the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, notes: 'Shāntideva composed this text in the form of an inner dialogue. He turned his own weapons upon himself, doing battle with his negative emotions. Therefore, when we teach or listen to this text, it is important that we do so in order to progress spirituality, rather than making it simply a subject of academic study.' He seems to warn Western scholars and practitioners to avoid both the doctrinal history and philosophy models.

⁴¹ For a brief account of Tibet's cultural and political relation to the West and China in the twentieth century, see SNELGROVE-RICHARDSON (1995: Chap. 9, esp. 233–36, 242–45, 264–67; 268–71 ['Epilogue'] and 272–83 ['Aftermath']). As for Tibetans' as well as Westerners' struggle to keep Tibetan culture in exile and in the West after 1959, see in particular (1995: 274–77). For an account that places this cultural endeavour in the broader context of Orientalism, see LOPEZ (1995c: 251–52, 263–68).

BCA was ‘renowned for its advances in scholarship and philosophical analysis’ in ‘vast monastic universities’ that had replaced the ‘freely wandering *bhikshus*’ and it was therefore ‘the time when Buddhism became top-heavy with institutions’ (1984: 55). What makes me wonder, however, is his logic and rhetoric when BATCHELOR (1984: 57), interpreting the meaning of Śāntideva’s legendary life in Tibetan historiographies, states:

‘Whatever the historical legitimacy of these accounts, they confirm the underlying principles of Shantideva’s legend. The example of Shantideva stands as a model Buddhist life of his times. He is a true individual, one who follows his own insights and intuition ..., first by rejecting the expectations of the world and then those of the monastic establishment. His life is a critique of the institutionalization of the Buddhist order, which he purifies, as it were, through his poem, by forcefully restating the principles of the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life.’

It is now clear that he emphasises the ‘institutionalization’ of Buddhist orders in his description of the historical context of the BCA because he wants to claim that Śāntideva is, curiously enough, not only an exception but also a critic of that movement. BATCHELOR (1984: 57) goes on to say:

‘... the institutions were beyond salvation. The authentic Buddhist life was to be found outside the monastic walls, in a return to the world, to a practice based on a personal insight and expressed through protean forms of life, some of which might outwardly appear shocking.’

Here we see Batchelor’s rather obvious agenda: he tries to create the autonomy of the individual author free of the institution of a monastic community, thus, in effect, explicitly laicising the BCA to include the Western lay people, the target audience of his book, into the BCA’s audience as well. We, modern everyday people in the West, can learn the way of life from the BCA, he seems to say, because it is only based on Śāntideva’s ‘personal insight’ and ‘intuition’. However, it should be noted, Batchelor laicises the BCA by interpreting Śāntideva’s legend in the historiographies in a Tibetan tradition, not by presenting an analysis of the discourse found in the BCA.

In societies with pre-modern culture, legends about authors are created and confirmed through the interpretation of texts attributed to them. An author’s legend generally shows how his works have been interpreted in a given tradition during a certain period in history. But Batchelor here ignores that these interpretations often reflect not so much what is actually said in texts as *Zeitgeist* of later period in which they are interpreted. In Śāntideva’s case, you could surely find some elements in his legend that could be interpreted as the ‘critique of the institutionalization’, reflecting

the growth of Tantrism in the late stage of Buddhism in India. But we cannot find in the BCA's text itself any evidence indicating that Śāntideva actually criticised the so-called institutionalisation of Buddhist order. In other words, Batchelor deals with the legend in the same way as other scholars in that they all use it as external evidence to support their own readings of the BCA and their 'reconstructed' ideas about Buddhism. He does so only in a very different direction.

But why does he have to laicise the BCA to appeal to Western audience today? It is perhaps helpful to quote from SNELLGROVE–RICHARDSON (1995: 276) to answer the question from a broader perspective:

'... the United States has now become the most sought after haven for Tibetan lamas intent on establishing a following amongst westerners. Following in the wake of Indian yoga schools and the very successful Zen Buddhist movement, they have learned rapidly how to best adapt their teachings to an American audience.'

Their observation that Tibetan Buddhists came to the West after 'Indian *yoga* schools' and 'Zen Buddhist movement' is important. This perspective would allow us to see the fact that Tibetan Buddhism in the West is another instance of the transmutation of a religion that tends to happen when it moves from one cultural realm to another, both geographically and historically (e.g. from pre-modern to modern). In other words, it would allow us to place the laicising process of Tibetan Buddhism in the historical context of the modern Western world.

The historically contingent combination of current political and cultural situation of Tibetan Buddhism and a modern Western myth about religion has undoubtedly played a major role in creating this laicising process. In the modern West, notably in the United States, people deeply and firmly believe that religion is, and should be, simply a matter of individual choice based on private experience and individual conscience.⁴² Their antipathy toward overtly institutionalised religions is common and pervasive. Those who present a text to Westerners, especially to an 'American audience', necessarily try to underrepresent the monastic aspects of their religion in general and of their religious texts in particular. Acknowledging the BCA's monastic character, let alone emphasising it, is the last thing they would do if they want the BCA to be accepted by such an audience.

In considering more specifically how Tibetan scholars 'adapted' their teachings, it is suggestive that Batchelor chooses 'compelling humanism' and 'intensely personal tone' as the factors that have supposedly made the BCA 'appealing even today' in

⁴² For the individualism in the United States based on the concept of Civil Religion, see BELLAH–TIPTON (1985: 220–27, 232–35, 243–46).

the West. These two factors represent the universalisation and internalisation of religion—the two sides of the coin—which are usually employed to construct an individual Self that is free from local communities, traditional discourse, and historicity, both sociologically and psychologically.⁴³ Indeed we find ‘the author’s intensely personal tone’ in the BCA—many verses are presented in the first person voice. But it is questionable if we can call it ‘compelling humanism’ that ‘speaks across time and culture’⁴⁴ that can be juxtaposed against institutionalised religions. Writing a text in a ‘personal’ tone at a monastic university in medieval India is most likely very different from doing so in a modern Western society in the twenty-first century. If we want to understand something the author wrote in his ‘personal tone’, we first have to ask what it meant to present a text in a ‘personal’ tone, or more generally, what it was to be ‘personal’ at a monastic university in the eighth-century India,⁴⁵ rather than universalising it as ‘humanism’. The reality of the monastic community must have conditioned writing and being ‘personal’ in its own historicity. In other words, instead of trying to retrieve our modern values and ideals from the text, we should raise the various questions about the cultural representations of the Self to re-think our modern presuppositions and values.

I am not saying that we, lay people in contemporary secular industrial society, can learn nothing ‘spiritual’ from the BCA. What I am saying is that we do not have to ignore nor dismiss its monastic aspects to maintain that we can learn something spiritual, ‘the way of life’. Emphasising only the way of life, while ignoring these monastic elements, would be a gross distortion of the text, which is produced by not

⁴³ Two following remarks offer good examples of the universalisation and individualisation of religion. First, Tulku Pema WANGYAL (1994: vii), while referring to the Dalai Lama, says: ‘For him, Buddhism is not a dogma or religion but *a way of life*, a source of happiness, *inner* peace, and *wisdom*. It awakens in us kindness and love, teaching us to protect every living thing on this earth. This is why he emphasises *universal* responsibility, the awareness that each one of us, as a member of *the human family*, can be a worker for peace and a protector of the environment’ [my emphasis]. Second, Jonathan LANDAW (1989: xi) notes: ‘In presenting his commentary Geshe Kelsang continually reminded his audience that despite the antiquity of the root text and the rigorously logical language in which certain of its sections (notably the ninth chapter) are couched, everything contained within Shantideva’s work is meant to be taken as *personal advice* by the modern day practitioner interested in travelling the path leading to full spiritual awakening’ [my emphasis].

⁴⁴ The word and the concept ‘humanism’ is only an ‘invention’ of nineteenth-century scholarship on the history of Renaissance, although Batchelor here seems to use the word in an extended meaning closer to ‘humanitarianism’ (also the nineteenth-century origin), which is more ‘altruistic’ in orientation; see NAUERT (1995: 8).

⁴⁵ GÓMEZ (1994) has raised this sort of question and discussed it from the perspective of autobiography. I believe that further exploration of this line is necessary and would be fruitful in the future study of the BCA.

taking critical steps in the representation of other cultures. ‘The way of life’ presented in the BCA is embedded in the monastic life in medieval India in its cultural and historical context.

I should also note here that my intention in this discussion is not to undermine the entire value of the effort of Tibetan people, including scholars, to desperately preserve their jeopardised religion and culture. It is easy to criticise the obvious connection between the political situation of Tibet and their apologetic production of knowledge under this circumstance. But the question about the role of scholars in this kind of condition remains to be answered. My point here is at least to suggest another, less obvious, but perhaps equally grave danger: namely, that modern Tibetan scholars, either consciously or unconsciously, adjust their own culture to the value of the modern West. Tibetans hope that politically strong power of the West would help them to restore the nation of Tibetan Buddhism. But the culture of the restored nation would inevitably be coloured by the ideology of the West.

3. Provisional Conclusion: Summary and Implications

The purpose of this paper has been to discuss how and why the monastic aspects of the BCA have largely been neglected, in the hope that this examination gives us ideas about what kinds of questions we could and should ask in the study of the BCA. Now, as a provisional conclusion, I summarise the discussion and consider some of its implications to link them to the question of the production of knowledge in Buddhist Studies.

In the first model, although la Vallée Poussin was very aware of the reference to monastic codes found in the BCA, he did not see its significance in presenting the text as a whole. He is concerned only with ‘universal’ thought and shows little interest in the local context for the production of meanings.⁴⁶ Seen in the broader intellectual context in the West, which I discussed in the second and third models, we can also see the doctrinal history model as another example of Orientalist textualisation. The process of this textualisation was intertwined with a traditional Buddhist discourse: the dichotomy between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. For him, the BCA must be a book of the doctrine of salvation representing Mahāyāna Buddhism. For, he thought, it offered richer and broader religious doctrines than the narrow philosophical system of Hīnayāna Buddhism. What has been overlooked, as the result of this doctrine-oriented textualisation, is the continuity between ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hīnayāna’. As the BCA clearly demonstrates, this continuity manifests par-

⁴⁶ Cf. HALLISEY (1995: 49–53).

ticularly in the lives of monks in monastic communities situated in the local, institutional, and cultural contexts.

Finot ignored the BCA's monastic aspects and emphasised the spirituality of Bodhisattva practice because he represented it as a text that speaks for Mahāyāna Buddhism. What makes his and Barth's representation problematic is that they did not find 'true' Mahāyāna Buddhism in religious practice found in contemporary Asia. From the nineteenth century on, Westerners had been constructing 'Buddhism' based on the philological elaboration, with Orientalist discourse working under this 'scientific' enterprise. Although Finot was critical of the philological and doctrinal orientation in its extreme, he was still working in the Orientalist discourse. He might have sincerely admired the spirituality of Bodhisattva practice expressed in the BCA. But he had to choose only that side of the text as the 'true' Mahāyāna Buddhism and suppress the monastic aspects also found in the text. For, thanks to the Orientalist and textualist construction of 'Buddhism' in the West, the actual practice found in monastic communities in the 'Orient' assumed too negative an image to be represented as 'true' Buddhism to a Western audience.

The third model offers yet another example of this textualisation of Buddhism, privileging philosophy as a purely intellectual entity that can be separated from other aspects of religion. Accordingly, chapter nine, which surely deals with philosophical issues, came to be considered the most significant of all. Several scholars have attempted to study some particular points in the BCA, rather than simply translating the entire text. But most of them have investigated, with few exceptions, only the ninth chapter from the perspective of the history of Buddhist philosophy, often with the help of philologically meticulous reading of commentaries. This kind of research has been legitimised by the dominant discourse of modern Buddhist scholarship. As long as one studies a philosophical text in a 'scientific' way, following the principles of philology, his research is valid and useful. It is therefore only natural that monastic aspects of the BCA have been ignored in this model. Scholars representing this model are only interested in the history of Buddhist philosophy that is reconstructed by philology-oriented 'scientific' method. They assume that philosophy is not a product of communal activities of monks but a product of individual authors' 'private' thinking process. It is entirely legitimate to investigate it without taking account of the local circumstances of the production of knowledge. Thus, monastic aspects that would help us to shed a light on the different sides of philosophical issues do not fall into the scope of their research.

The origin of the fourth model is found in a more general intellectual realm in the West. 'The way of life', is not a matter of a small number of scholars interested in Buddhism. To single out the way of life first and foremost results from Batchelor's historically contingent agenda that he has to effectively appeal to Western audience

in general and American public in particular. His need to make the BCA more attractive for Western audience comes from the current political and cultural situation of Tibetan Buddhism since 1959. But the way he does so reflects more about modern Western values and ideals than about those of Tibetan Buddhism.

Batchelor not only neglects the BCA's monastic aspects but also explicitly laicises the BCA by creating an individual and autonomous author. His rhetoric of individualisation is evidently brought by the BCA's encounter with modern Western myth that religion is a matter of private experience and individual conscience. As a result, Tibetan Buddhism, represented by the BCA, has been transformed into an internalised and universalised religion free of local communities, traditional discourse, and its own historicity. When we conceive a religion as such, we necessarily make very little room for an institutional side of a traditional religion to be acknowledged in the representation of a text.

This universalisation and internalisation of religion raises the question of modernity in cultural representation. As the problem of the representation of the Self indicates, this question of modernity is most evident in the way of life model (§ 2.4.). But all other models are also the products of modernity, which in general underplays communal activities of believers (e.g. cosmology, ritual and ceremonies) in their local and institutional milieu, in favour of individual, rational, and therefore universal elements of religion.⁴⁷ Both the doctrinal history and philosophy models are the epitome of the rationalisation of religion. The spirituality and way of life models exemplify the internalisation and universalisation. In short, Orientalism, which has certainly played a significant role in shaping these models, is only one of the variations of the discourse of modernity.

This essay is meant to be a point of departure for more critical discussions on the research history of the BCA. As such, it only reconfirms a now well-known fact that Buddhist Studies has been dominated by Orientalist and modernist discourse. But one contribution of this paper on the problem of the production of knowledge would be to offer a specific example of a situation in which not only the selection of texts⁴⁸ but also the selection of aspects of a single text to be represented has been deeply affected in various ways by these modern, often ideological, presuppositions in the West. The BCA has been chosen as a text worthy of study in the West. Even so, it should be clear from what I have been discussing in this paper, only a part of the text has been represented and properly understood due to the assumptions of Western scholarship that have been ingrained in modernity.

⁴⁷ Cf. HALLISEY (1995: 49).

⁴⁸ Cf. LOPEZ (1995b: 7).

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
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**Belief, Hope
and
Gambling**



Sociological and Juridical Aspects of Dice-Play in Ancient India

IRMA PIOVANO

Society in ancient India was organised according to an ideal division of the individual's existence into four stages or subsequent phases (*āśrama-dharma*, i.e. *dharma* applied to the way of living): the stage devoted to study, characterised by the initiation ceremony (*upanayana*), known as *brahma-carya*; the stage devoted to practical life when the individual establishes a career for himself and forms a family (*grha-stha*); the stage characterised by retirement from active life and withdrawal to the forest (*vānaprastha*); the final stage when the individual devotes himself entirely to an ascetic life (*saṁnyāsa*). This structure highlights the all-pervading nature of the religious element and the constant aspiration to escape the cycle of rebirth (*saṁsāra*). At the age of seven or eight, children of the higher castes began the long stage devoted to study and lived with a teacher (*guru*) who was deeply knowledgeable of the Vedic texts—the inescapable foundation of all knowledge—consequently little time was left for playing. Indeed, classic literature contains but little reference to children's games and toys¹. One of the children's most common and most cherished toys was a cart made either of metal—sometimes precious—or terracotta, and in fact 'The terracotta cart' was the title of a famous play which dates back to the fourth century CE and is attributed to Śūdraka. This play offers an insight into the social life in an Indian town at a time, when dice players contributed towards enlivening the realistic portrayal.²

Outdoor and indoor pastimes and games were numerous, the most popular being archery, playing ball, horse and chariot racing and several others.³

Bearing witness to often neglected playful spirit of the Indian people are the numerous festivals which offered an occasion to dice-playing. The latter was very popular

¹ ALTEKAR (1951: 273–275).

² See BOTTO (1969: 228–29); BASAK (1929: 299–325). It must be noted that OLEKSIW (1980–81: 415–435) expresses his regret about the fact that the part devoted to dicing in MṛK, while certainly remarkable, was not paid adequate attention by LÜDERS (1907), presenting an analysis and classification of the various types of dice-play.

³ See RAY (1939: 240–26); BIARDEAU (1981: 875–881); GOKHALE (1959).

and was practised both as a ritual, in order to interpret the will of the gods, and even more so as a gambling activity. According to anthropologists, the latter is the category to which it belongs, because it offers the opportunity to place bets and it generates in the player a deep sense of excitement which prompts him to increase his wagers.

Dicing has recently become an object of many studies, offering an analysis of its ritualistic and philosophical-religious aspects, as well as its technical components, the way in which the game is played and the various types of dice used. A vast diachronic analysis of the primary and secondary sources in Sanskrit literature that contain references to dice-play is to be found in the volume by C. PANDURANGA BHATTA (1985). Such analysis, however, is not within the scope of this article, which intends to examine a few sociological and juridical aspects of dice-play, as can be inferred from ancient Indian literature, particularly juridical-political writings.

Vedic texts contain many references to dice-play, that appears to have been popular among all the social classes. The famous ‘Lament of the dicer’ contained in the *R̥g-veda*⁴ not only bears witness to the popularity of the game in the Āryan society, but it reflects emblematically the influence dice-play exercised on social life, especially in terms of its negative consequences such as the loss of one’s wealth—often also of one’s wife—and the resultant social decline of the dice player: ‘Now my mother-in-law hates me, my wife turns me out. The dicer is like a beggar for whom nobody feels any sympathy, claiming that «I cannot find any usefulness in a player, like an old horse put up for sale»’. And again ‘The winning die yearned for his possessions and now others embrace his spouse. His father, his mother, and his brothers say of him, «We do not know him: take him away in chains!»’.

In some hymns the anguish emerges in all its dramatic clarity, the desire to escape the addiction to the game, that assumes almost ‘erotic’ contours: dice ‘by their appeal on the player seem to be smeared with honey.’⁵ The attraction of dicing is impellent: ‘If I resolve not to play anymore with these dice and step aside when my friends go to play dice, none the less, those brown nuts⁶, thrown on the table, call out for me, then I go to meet them, as a woman in love.’⁷ As narrated in the *Mṛccha-kaṭīka*, the same powerful pull of the dice makes the losing player Saṁvāhaka come out of the temple, where he was hiding, the same temple where the game supervisor and another player, who had been chasing him, had stopped to play, probably counting on his very weakness to flush him out. It is this weakness

⁴ RV 10.34.3–4; see SANI (2000: 203).

⁵ RV 10.34.7; see SANI (2000: 203). SANI (1989–1990: 239–260).

⁶ The ‘brown nuts’ refer to the fruit of the *vibhīdaka* tree (*Terminalia bellerica*) that were used as dice and this term will also come to indicate the type of game played in the Vedic age.

⁷ RV 10.34.5; see SANI (2000: 203) and BASHAM (1969: 207).

that makes him exclaim, ‘The tinkling of the dice inflames the heart of a penniless person just like the beat of drums fills the heart of a king who has lost his kingdom!’⁸

The torment is such that the player abandons himself to exhort others to avoid this addiction: ‘Do not play dice: plough your field, enjoy what you have and regard it as enough.’⁹

The player was not immune to hopes of increasing his wealth, the desire to tempt, to dominate fate, the attraction to risk, a sort of exaltation that took hold of the gamblers then as it does today and that transforms the game into a sort of total addiction and enslavement.

Prayers and rituals to bring luck to the game can be found in the *Atharva-veda*. In particular, hymn AV 4.38, contains a prayer to Apsaras, the deity who brings luck to gambling. It describes dancing with the dice and invoking the deity’s propitious intervention to make the opponent lose: ‘The winning Apsaras who arrives unexpectedly, who plays deftly, who wins at the gambling table, this Apsaras I hereby invoke’, while in hymn AV 7.52, the invocation is addressed to Agni, the Maruts, Indra and lastly, directly to the dice urging them to concede a game as ‘fruitful as a milk cow.’¹⁰

The way the winning player casts the dice is likened to the action of the god Varuṇa who sets down his laws: ‘King Varuṇa can probe into what is between sky and earth and what is beyond. He also counts the battings of men’s eyes: he does this in the same way as the player [does] with the dice.’¹¹ Centuries later, in the *Bhagavad-gītā*—where dice-playing is listed among human passions—the god Kṛṣṇa, addressing Arjuna and listing his prerogatives, declares himself to be the personification of dicing: ‘I am the dicing of the deceivers, of the glorious I am the glory, I am the victory and the firm purpose, I am the courage of the braves.’¹²

The fact that the Vedic gods were even likened to the throwing of the dice and therefore were able to award or take away wealth, depending on whether the game was won or lost, was a belief that was based on social foundations. References to the distribution of wealth—a distribution that took place in the assembly hall (*sabhā*, *samiti*)—can be found in several passages of the *R̥g-veda*, among which is the following, addressed to Agni: ‘O Lord, for an equal fruition you have bestowed your wealth dividing it in parts in the assembly.’¹³ Once determined that the function of the *sabhā* or *samiti*—two synonymous terms that indicate the assembly (the

⁸ MṛK 2.5.

⁹ RV 10.34.13; see SANI (2000: 204).

¹⁰ For both extracts see ORLANDI-SANI (1992: 548–549).

¹¹ AV 4.16.5 (The literal translation of this extract is provided by Prof. Saverio Sani).

¹² BhG 10.36.

¹³ RV 2.1.4; see OLDENBERG (1964: 186).

terms also refer to the assembly hall) of the clan or military chiefs in the *R̥g-veda*—was to distribute wealth through a draw by casting the dice, N.N. BHATTACHARYA (1974: 297) wonders if dice-play, representing one of the most important characteristics of the coronation ceremonies known as *rāja-sūya* and *agny-ādheya*, is perhaps reminiscent of the drawing of the riches in pre-Vedic times, that is, the illusory representation of an ancient custom of equal distribution. The dice game played symbolically by the sovereign in the course of the *rāja-sūya*, is described as follows in the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*: ‘He then throws the five dice in his hand, reciting «You are the dominant one: may these five regions of yours prosper! Since there are indeed five regions, he thus determines their prosperity»¹⁴ (the dice used in the ceremony of the *rāja-sūya* were made of gold and in numbers of over a hundred or over a thousand).

Moving away from the principle that every ritual is the symbolic representation of ancient social realities, N.N. BHATTACHARYA (1974) maintains that the dice game, mimed by the sovereign, contributes towards understanding the long phase of change from a tribe-based society to a society organised in classes and to the stabilisation of the figure of the elected sovereign—and therefore not yet hereditary—among the clan or military chiefs who had distinguished themselves particularly in the wars of conquest. The action of the sovereign symbolised therefore the application of an ancient norm of social justice of which the sovereign represented the highest ideal. He thus provided evidence of the adherence to ancient tribal customs linked to the collective ownership of wealth and the principle that required one not to keep it personally as this was contrary to the *ṛta* (justice)¹⁵. Drawing by casting dice was in fact the best method to distribute wealth because, without knowing the cost of the products amassed as collective wealth, it was impossible to determine its exact value. Dice play—the original tribal nature of which is demonstrated—takes, in this context, on significance that is deeply different from the one it will acquire later on, that is to say a high-betting game of chance.

The dice most commonly referred to in the texts are *kṛta*, *tretā*, *dvāpara* and *kali*, with decreasing values of four to one. The same terminology is used in the Hindu mythology to define the four times (*yuga*) or eras of the existence of the world.

The most feared dice is the one worth one point, known as *kali*, indicated in the *Atharva-veda*¹⁶ as ‘the lord of the dice’, and later on in the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*¹⁷ referred to as ‘the die dominating on the other (dice)’, the die that sanctions the loss.

¹⁴ ŚaT 5.4.4. See RAYCHAUDURY (1953: 165 f.).

¹⁵ WINTERNITZ (1981–85, I: 154) regards it as the order of the universe, MACDONELL (1972: 75) as the physical and moral order, KEITH (1989: 248) as the cosmic, RADHAKRISHNAN (1996, I: 78–79) as, literally, the ‘course of events’, i.e. a law in general and the immanence of justice, the order of the world.

¹⁶ AV 7.114.1; see ORLANDI-SANI (1992: 551).

¹⁷ ŚaT 5.4, AŚ.4.6.

The game was played in rather a complex manner and several dice were used; one verse refers to no less than 150! This number probably refers to the most ancient period when *vibhīdaka* nuts were used.

Dice-play is absolutely forbidden to students (*brahma-carin*) and to the youth who have completed their student stage (*snātaka*)¹⁸. This concern to protect youth from the vice of gambling is clearly expressed in a few passages of the *Gṛhya-sūtras* and the *Śrauta-sūtras* (auxiliary and doctrinal handbooks pertaining to different Vedic schools of thought, containing norms and provisions of various nature) in which there are indications for the construction of buildings which state that assembly or meeting halls must be oriented southwards. Other authors believe instead that such an attitude leads the youth to indulge in gambling and, among them, Āśvalāyana in particular maintains that the people who frequent such halls will turn into gamblers, troublemakers and will have a short life.¹⁹ Kātyāyana, for his part, suggests that the building where a gambling hall is located must have a special entrance in the shape of an arc (*dvārāvasthita-toraṇa*) so as to be recognisable by decent people, thus implying a negative judgement.²⁰ Instead an assembly hall is considered favourable and, more to the point, free from gambling when it is built on land²¹ where the waters flow easily in all directions. According to Apastamba²², it is up to the sovereign to see to the construction of an assembly hall where a gambling table (*adhidevana*) is to be positioned and dice in even numbers are made available to the devoted and trusted subjects so as to allow them to gamble. The assembly hall described in the *Mahā-bhārata*²³ is monumental and lavishly decorated with precious metals and stones, but this was the assembly hall of the palace of the sovereign. Also in the *Hari-vaṁśa* the hall where the dice game between Rukmin and Bālārāma takes place is adorned with golden columns and embellished with flowers and fountains from which sprinkle sandal-scented water²⁴, but in general the references contained in theatre works, in prose and also in the *Artha-śāstra* by Kauṭilya, refer to public and private gambling houses of a popular nature that existed in the larger towns²⁵.

The popularity enjoyed by dice-play in different historical times is witnessed by archaeological excavations that have brought to light several dice, some of which

¹⁸ See GDhS 2.17, VSm 71.45 and MDhŚ 4.74.

¹⁹ See PANDURANGA BHATTA (1985: 107).

²⁰ KMS 785.

²¹ APTE (1954: 139).

²² ĀDhS 2.10.25.12–13, no.11.

²³ MBh, *Sabhā-parvan* 56.18. See MANI (1984).

²⁴ See PANDURANGA BHATTA (1985: 108).

²⁵ AŚ 3.20; DKC, *dvitīyōcchvāsa*, pp. 76–77 (tr.: pp. 53–54).

with six faces, as well as gambling tables. In Mohenjo-daro dice were found that date back to the Civilisation of the Valley of the Indus (fig. 1)²⁶. In Taxila instead were found dice dating back to the Greek and Schythian-Parthian period; in Kumrahar archaeological finds confirm the existence of dice-play, while in the famous Buddhist site of Andhra Pradesh, Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, several ivory dice were found with engraved pips, similar to those of the Vedic period²⁷. Yet another testimony is represented by a bas-relief of Bharhut *stūpa* (2nd–1st century BCE) depicting two people engaging in a game that is presumably dice-play (fig. 2)²⁸.

According to the law texts (*dharmasāstra*), the two authors Gautama and Baudhāyana strongly disapprove of dicing and gambling. Indeed, Gautama²⁹ regards the dice player as belonging to that group of people who must be avoided during the performance of the rites to honour ancestors (*śrāddha*); Manu goes as far as to forbid the company of players during such ceremonies and extends the same injunction also towards the managers of gambling houses,³⁰ while Baudhāyana³¹ confines himself to judging gambling as a cause of impurity.

Manu³² cites dice-play as the eighteenth and last category that can lead to a law suit. He considers dice-play as the act of earning money from the use of inanimate objects and wagers (*samāhvaya*) in the same way as if they were animated beings used for the same purpose³³.

Manu, whose vision of society is governed by balance and strict moral principles, is rather harsh in his appraisal of gambling and wagering. According to this author these are practices—or rather vices—that lead to the destruction of kingdoms and their sovereigns; they are blatant thefts and the sovereign should spare no efforts to suppress both and condemn to corporal punishment not only those who engage in gambling and wagering, but also those who make them possible. Since players are regarded as thieves, they should be banned from the town in order to prevent them from corrupting honest subjects. However the punishment to be inflicted, envisaged also for those who gamble in private, is left to the discretion of the sovereign and may simply consist of a fine.³⁴

²⁶ See CITÉS (1988: 171).

²⁷ See KRISHNA MURTHY (1982: 69–70) and KRISHNA MURTHY (1961: 1–4).

²⁸ See COOMARASWAMI (1956: 93–94).

²⁹ GDhS 15.18.

³⁰ MDhŚ 3.151 and 159.

³¹ BDhS 14.2.1.2–16.

³² MDhŚ 8.7.

³³ MDhŚ 9.223.

³⁴ MDhŚ 9.221–228.

As if to justify his completely hostile position towards gambling, Manu recalls that in earlier times (*kalpa*) dice-play was the cause of great enmities and therefore the wise man would be well advised to refrain from it even if practised only for the purpose of entertainment³⁵. These statements clearly refer, according to Georg BÜHLER (1984: lxxx), to two episodes contained in the *Mahā-bhārata*, and specifically to the one regarding the loss of King Nala's kingdom at dicing, and the tragic dice game between Yudhiṣṭhira and Śakuni, representing respectively the two warrior groups of the Pāṇḍava and the Kaurava. But if the loss of the kingdom caused by Nala's gambling led to the touching tale of the love and fidelity of his spouse Damayantī, Yudhiṣṭhira's fateful dice game triggered the bloody war among the cousins. From a juridical point of view, Yudhiṣṭhira's obstinacy in continuing his dice-playing which led to the loss of his kingdom, his brothers, himself and his spouse Draupadī, contains an important juridical issue to which M.A. MEHENDALE (1986: 179–194) devotes a vast and detailed analysis. The question is posed by Draupadī when, humiliated and at that point regarded as a slave by the winning cousins, addressing the two groups of contenders in the assembly hall where she has been led, leaves all those present speechless. The anguished question asked by Draupadī is: Was she lost at gambling by Yudhiṣṭhira before or after he wagered and lost himself? From this answer depends nothing less than her honour or her future as a slave. And the answer will be given by Arjuna, who affirms that Yudhiṣṭhira, having lost himself first at gambling, is no longer in a position to lose his spouse and thus Draupadī preserves her honour.

According to P.V. KANE (1930–62, III: 542), the intentions of the author of the *Mahā-bhārata* were to emphasise a condemnation of gambling regarded as a deplorable practice and so detrimental and degrading as to lead even the best and the greatest to lose all sense of duty, morals and even the ties of love and family life.

Both Nārada³⁶ and Bṛhaspati³⁷ declare that, in the same way as the worst criminals and even murderers, dice players cannot be called to testify, and the possessions, that is to say the winnings, obtained through gambling represent possessions of the lowest type³⁸.

The definition of dice players as blatant cheats put forth by Manu³⁹ is shared by Nārada, who puts them on the same level as alcoholics and those belonging to the lowest strata of society according to their work activity, and, in particular, those who use crooked dice are considered manifest thieves⁴⁰.

³⁵ MDhŚ 9.227.

³⁶ NāSm 12.1.159 and 14.178.

³⁷ BṛSm 7.30.

³⁸ BṛSm 1.47.

³⁹ MDhŚ 9.258.

⁴⁰ NāSm, Appendix 1.2, 12.45 and 22.3,9.

In his very strict view, Manu considers any art form and also gambling among the ten vices that derive from a love for entertainment that a sovereign should avoid⁴¹.

Several contradictions appear evident in the *Manu-smṛti* due to the fact that the text dates back to a time characterised by the reaffirmation of the ideals of purity, which were set in the Vedic time and which represent the foundations of the theory of the *varṇa* and of the corresponding social hierarchy⁴², a hierarchy which under the influence of the theories made popular by Buddhism, were rejected earlier on.

The theory of equality among the castes and the importance attached to work and to frugality preached by Buddhism had indeed determined the development of activities pertaining to industry and commerce, with a consequent affirmation of a prosperous social class which, concerned with the preservation of integrity and wealth, had promoted conservative values and punitive norms towards gambling. The latter was regarded as dangerous for society and one of the six ways in which to squander one's wealth. The *Dīgha-nikāya*, the Buddhist canonical text, maintains that there are six negative consequences of gambling: the winner is hated, the loser is saddened by the money lost, there is an evident loss of wealth, the player is not admitted to testify in a court of law, he is despised by his friends and is not taken in consideration by the parents of girls at a marriageable age because a scoundrel addicted to gambling is unfit to have a wife⁴³.

Consequently, if society in Buddhist times condemned gambling by virtue of the conservative values mentioned above, so did the society that developed in Manu's time a few centuries later, in the name of a return to the fundamental values of the Vedic world.

Nevertheless the commentators Mitrāmīśra and Nīlakaṇṭha, respectively the authors of the *Viramitrōdaya* and the *Vyavahāra-māyuka*, assert that the prohibition of gambling on the part of Manu extends only to cases in which crooked dice are used or the authorisation of the sovereign has not been obtained. Clearly the commentators tend to stress that no particular differences exist among the texts of the *smṛti*, precisely because these are texts belonging to a consolidated tradition and therefore are regarded as sacred⁴⁴.

On the other hand, the statement by Nārada is decidedly supportive in that it considers gambling as a form of entertainment that is completely legal as long as it is carried out in public gambling houses and is organised and managed by an official whose authority must be recognised by the players and to whom they must spontaneously pay a set sum amounting to 10% of the winnings. If gambling takes places

⁴¹ MDhŚ 7.47.

⁴² MDhŚ 12.95–96. See INDRA DEVA (1986: 115–119).

⁴³ See INDRA DEVA (1986: 46–47).

⁴⁴ See PANDURANGA BHATTA (1985: 126).

without the authorisation of the sovereign, the player has no right to receive his winnings and must instead pay a fine⁴⁵.

Already in the *Yajur-veda* a passing reference is made to a supervisor (*akṣa-vāpa*) who oversaw the gambling on behalf on his sovereign: a figure that will be found, centuries later, recognised and affirmed in the *Artha-śāstra* and the law texts. Thus a professional figure is consolidated, that of the *sabhika*, indicated clearly by Yājñavalkya⁴⁶ as the official in charge of overseeing games with specific duties and who, in the *Mitākṣarā*⁴⁷, is identified with the manager and owner of the gambling house. The *sabhika* is assisted by an employee (*sabhā-pati*) whose task consists in making available to the players all that is necessary for the game, a task from which he earns his living. In this text there is a curious definition of the players who, while having lost everything and therefore are unable to continue gambling, are nevertheless incapable of leaving the gambling hall and remain watching the others play, as motionless as pillars (*sabhā-stānū*)⁴⁸.

According to Yājñavalkya the *sabhika* has the right to receive 10% of the wagers of the losers, and also 5% of the winnings if the bet was increased—fraudulently—by 100 times. He must pay the sovereign a set percentage and, after collecting what is owed by the defeated player, sees to the winner's payment. According to this author, in order to expose thieves, it is useful that the gambling houses be supervised by an appointed supervisor whose job it is to gather information on thieves also to visit gambling houses regularly. If the *sabhika* fails to make the losing player pay what he owes and if the game was played publicly in the presence of himself and other players, the sovereign may require the *sabhika* himself to pay off the sum owed by the loser, as well as what is owed to the state in taxes.⁴⁹

The *sabhika* is also charged with collecting pledges, seeing to it that various articles are sold inside the gambling house, and he himself is subject to fines if he fails to prohibit cheating due to dexterity of hands during the game.⁵⁰

If the losing player does not have the money to pay off his debt to the winner, Kātyāyana maintains that the *sabhika* must take it upon himself to pay the sum, granting the loser a 45-day respite, but he must demand to be paid back immediately when the possibility exists that he could lose the money. In a subsequent passage he

⁴⁵ NāSm 17.2.5.7.

⁴⁶ YDhŚ 2.202–203.

⁴⁷ PANDURANGA BHATTA (1985: 111) and BANERJI (1997: 361).

⁴⁸ MACDONELL (1912: 426): *sabhā-sthānu* is instead the game supervisor, called 'the pillar of the assembly' for his constant presence in the room. See also BHATTACHARYA (1974: 304–305).

⁴⁹ YDhŚ 2.202–206.

⁵⁰ AŚ 3.20.10–12.

is however more drastic and states that the wagers must be paid off immediately in the gambling house and that the *sabhika*, being the one who established the exact procedure to be followed for the game, is the person who has to compel the loser to pay, even by resorting to force⁵¹. The *Mṛccha-kaṭika* contains an emblematic scene when Saṁvāhaka, unable to settle his gambling debt amounting to 10 gold coins, runs away and is chased by the supervisor Māthura and another player. Saṁvāhaka complains and asks for a reduction of his debt, Māthura declares that he is under arrest in the name of the Association of Dicers and invites him to sell his own parents or himself. A third person intervenes to defend Saṁvāhaka and the quarrel degenerates into a fight with insults and blows⁵².

In this text too the figure of the *sabhika* appears again as particularly significant⁵³. Furthermore the game supervisor Māthura seems to have used a book where he recorded the winnings and the losses and the names of the players who had yet to settle their debts before being allowed to visit other gambling houses⁵⁴. The *sabhika*, who was familiar with the habits of many of the subjects, could also become a precious informant for the sovereign⁵⁵.

The players who were unable to settle gambling debts were allowed to leave the house after submitting adequate guarantees. Gambling debts however were not transferable and therefore could not fall on heirs⁵⁶.

The powerful role of the *sabhika* in the society of the time is attested by the fact that he could also inflict punishments and for this reason, not infrequently, many a defaulting player ran away at the mere sight of him⁵⁷. The *Kathā-sarit-sāgara* narrates of a *sabhika* so enraged that, after beating up with a stick a player who had not paid off his debt, he got other players to throw him into a well and personally committed himself to settling the debt to the winner⁵⁸.

Kauṭilya, who has a supervisor appointed even for the courtesans, has not appointed one for gambling (*dyūtādhyakṣa*). He deems it necessary however to appoint a director whose responsibility it is to make available a clean dice, cup and the dice against a payment of 5% of the winnings, a percentage to which has to be added the rent for the cups, the dice, a supplement for water, the use of the premises

⁵¹ KMS 783–792 (*dyūta-samāhvaya*).

⁵² MṛK 2, p. 84–85.

⁵³ See BANERJEE (1994: 116).

⁵⁴ MṛK 2.2, p. 84–85.

⁵⁵ See PANDURANGA BHATTA (1985: 112).

⁵⁶ MDhŚ 8.159, BṛSm 11.51.

⁵⁷ MṛK 2.2, p. 84–85.

⁵⁸ KSS 92.19–22.

and the permit to play. The description of the fines is detailed and meticulous: 20 *paṇa* to replace the cup or the dice, while the fine for fraudulent gambling is as high as the lowest one implemented for an act of violence; confiscation of winnings and, in case of cheating, a fine for theft. In general terms, Kauṭilya, while regarding the players as cheats, seems to be more concerned about the economic aspects—that is, the increase in the state revenue—than about the moral issues related to the game⁵⁹.

The chance to make easy gains from gambling determined the adoption of fraudulent practices such as dice manipulation and many other expedients, not the least of which the possibility to swallow the unfavourable die. Cheating at dice play was a rather common practice, so much so that the terms *kitava* and *dhuta* that originally indicated dicers finally came to mean cheat and scoundrel respectively.⁶⁰

In order to prevent frauds, it was decided that dice play should take place in especially selected sites, approved by the state. If however the game took place in secret locations and without authorisation, the players and the game supervisor could not collect their due and were also punished⁶¹. For cheats particularly harsh punishments were adopted, such as exile⁶², those who used crooked dice could have their hands cut off and those who adopted other fraudulent practices to win risked losing their index finger and thumb⁶³. And then there were also interesting punishments, intended to expose dishonest players to public contempt, like branding their foreheads with the shape of dog's pawn and sending them into exile⁶⁴ or the less ignominious one of wearing a dice collar around the neck⁶⁵. Those who appeared reluctant to settle what they owed risked being beaten mercilessly by the managers of gambling houses and forced to 'sell' their parents or be tortured or hung upside down by their feet for one full day or be dragged on their backs on an uneven road⁶⁶.

The case list is vast and very detailed and suggests that players resorted to very sophisticated stratagems and shrewd ruses in order to win. This case history however also bears witness to the moral decay in which the dicers eventually fell, inveterate gamblers who regularly visited gambling houses where chaos and racket reigned undisturbed and talk was vulgar and indecent⁶⁷.

⁵⁹ AŚ 3.20.7–10.

⁶⁰ See PANDURANGA BHATTA (1985: 115).

⁶¹ YDhŚ 2.204, NāSm 16.7.

⁶² YDhŚ 2.205, BṛSm 28.8.

⁶³ VSm 5.135.

⁶⁴ YDhŚ 2.205.

⁶⁵ NāSm 16.6.

⁶⁶ See C. PANDURANGA BHATTA (1985: 115–116).

⁶⁷ DKC, *dvitiyôcchvāsa*, pp. 76–77 (tr.: pp. 53–54).

To resolve the disputes that arose among the players both Nārada and Yājñavalkya believe other players who would act as judges and witnesses, as the case required, should be called in⁶⁸. The players were to be appointed by the sovereign. Br̥haspati maintains very fairly that a judging panel made up of the *sabhika* and three players could also act as witnesses to settle a dispute related to the game and if the players were manifestly hostile to the disputants, it was up to the king to settle the issue. The losing players, if not aware of the rules of the game, had to be released, just like the players who were indeed familiar with the rules, but were defeated through cheating or using crooked dice. And if a player lost all his belongings in gambling, he was not required to relinquish them all⁶⁹. As regards disputes between two players, based on the widespread belief that both are dishonest and therefore there is no distinction between winner and loser, Kauṭilya maintains that, if the contenders have gambled without authorisation, both must be punished, while if the winner of the game is nominated by the court, no fines are inflicted. Kauṭilya believes that the habit of accepting that, if the player who won the game by cheating also wins the dispute and therefore his fine is small, while the loser of the game and of the dispute is given a higher fine, only encourages more fraudulent behaviour at gambling⁷⁰.

The juridical writings of the different authors of the *smṛti* appear to contain a number of incongruities, justified by the fact that this type of norms was of a customary nature and was for a long time rooted in definitions that were totally informal and often contradictory; only later were they elaborated and systematised over the course of the centuries.

The variations and the contradictions in form and substance are nevertheless evidence of an effort to adjust to the historical context and of a constant commitment towards adapting the rules to a truth that proved very ephemeral in itself, before attaining the definition and the actual implementation of laws that adhered more closely to reality. The dissimilarities contained in the writings themselves speak eloquently of the commitment on the part of the legislator towards his quest for absolutes that, by their formulation, represent the cornerstones and the main lines of civil law⁷¹.

These derogations originate from an analysis of the human behaviour, that is often animated by deep passions and ardent attraction of the imponderable. The gambler sets off for his own destruction, leaving it to the dice to decide about his future.

⁶⁸ NāSm 17.4; YDhŚ 2.205. This is an exception to the general rule that forbids players to testify in a court of law and be part of a jury.

⁶⁹ BrSm 26.7–8.

⁷⁰ AŚ 3.20.3–7.

⁷¹ See PIOVANO (1999: 158).

The examination of the gambler's behaviour reveals not only the purpose of improving his habits and restraining his wild passions but also an unusual aptitude to deep psychological investigation.

The dice game becomes the symbol of a fortuitousness that affects both the cosmic and the human world; both *ṛta* and *dharma*, albeit regulated by rigid laws and by a supratemporal and changeless order, can be impaired by events escaping the rule, or rather escaping human rationality.

Recourse to an irresponsible act and thus to irrationality consequently implies an unforeseen and deadly event but, as ancient Indian texts state, this is the fate of our age. These considerations lead legislators to recognise the difficulty, almost impossibility, of complying with all the norms of *dharma* and to accept, around the eleventh century, the theory of 'the actions forbidden in the Kali Age' (*kali-varjya*).

ILLUSTRATIONS




Fig.1

Cubic dice found during archaeological excavations in Mohenjo-daro. The position of the spots on the six faces follows the arithmetic progression and varies from one item to the next. The dice on the left is made of white limestone and on opposing faces presents the following pairs: one-three, two-five, four-(nought); the middle one is made of terracotta and has the following pairs: one-two, three-four, five-six; the one on the right is one of the finest and has the following pairs: one-two, three-five, four-six.

Source: CITÉS (1988: 171).



Fig. 2

Dice players depicted on the relief of the trabeation in the Bharhut *stūpa*.

Source: A.K. COOMARASWAMI (1956: 93–94, pl. XLVIII, fig 223).




Fig. 3

Pacīsī players depicted in the Zanana (Janana) Mahal of the Udaipur Royal Palace (by courtesy of Prof. Rosa Maria Cimino).

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